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ABSTRACT 
The lack of alternatives and choices make sparse networks and peripheral regions 
distinct. Travel choices are limited, as are employment and supplier choices. This 
thesis is therefore concerned with whether cost benefit analysis techniques need to be 
adapted so as to adequately deal with the appraisal of transport projects in these 
areas. Specifically, improved treatment of scheduling costs, uncertainty and wider 
economic impacts is proposed. A theoretical case is made for the inclusion of 
scheduling costs and the cost of risk bearing by drawing on the literature on time use, 
departure time choice, activity scheduling, risk premia and option values. Similarly a 
theoretical case is made for the inclusion of efficiency gains from an expansion in 
output in imperfectly competitive markets, an expansion of employment in the presence 
of a labour market failure, and an increase in productivity in industry clusters. 
A survey of ferry users and island residents in the Outer Hebrides finds evidence of 
statistically significant costs associated with transport related constraints on activity 
scheduling. These costs decrease non-linearly in the transport constraints - headway 
and operating hours. A difficulty faced when estimating discrete choice models with 
taste variation is a lack of knowledge of the distribution of willingness to pay. This 
difficulty can be overcome through a mix of contingent valuation questions and stated 
preference questions with fixed boundary values. Significant differences are found in 
willingness to pay depending on whether the stated choice question is framed as per 
trip or per year. In contrast to what might be expected from the options value literature, 
no difference in the cost of risk bearing is found between a fixed link and a high quality 
ferry service. Further empirical work identifies less than complete wage compensation 
for commuting costs of workers in peripheral areas of Scotland. This indicates the 
presence of a labour market failure arising through high job search costs in a thin 
labour market. 
The main conclusion of the thesis is that the scope of a cost benefit analysis should be 
widened to include the studied effects. The case studies undertaken show that for 
public transport projects the effects, in totality, can be a similar order of magnitude to 
user benefits. Importantly, the large potential benefits from fixed links and the low 
incomes evident in peripheral regions combine to make income effects important, when 
calculating total economic welfare in these areas. Further research opportunities on 
scheduling costs, risk premia and thin labour markets are identified. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Sparse transport networks and peripheral regions go hand in hand. Peripheral regions 
typically have small populations, low economic power and a sparse transport network 
characterised by limited alternatives or choices. These attributes in isolation and in 
combination lead to particular set of issues. Long distances of travel, the reliance of 
communities on what is often a single 'lifeline' link, and the vulnerability of these links to 
inclement weather and subsidence, places a burden on businesses and residents in 
remote communities. This together with the limited choices that residents and 
businesses face in finding employment, filling vacancies and purchasing goods and 
services set sparse networks and peripheral regions apart. Government economic and 
transport policies explicitly reflect the nature of these regions recognising both the role 
of lifeline transport links in sustaining remote and fragile communities (Scottish 
Executive, 2006 p.19) and the need to achieve a better regional balance in wealth 
(Scottish Government, 2007 pp.36-39). 
Networks can be sparse in any of several dimensions: geographically, modally or 
temporally. Sparse networks therefore lack either route choice options, mode choice 
options or departure time choices. Furthermore in sparse networks, alternatives -
where they exist - typically have a high cost compared to the preferred route, mode or 
travel time. The sparsest network is, of course, that in which no alternative exists, such 
as an island's only link to the outside world -the lifeline link. Peripheral regions are, in 
a geographic sense, those located along the boundary of a nation. In an economic 
sense a peripheral region has minor economic importance relative to other regions (the 
core). They are typically characterised by low population densities and low incomes. 
Invariably these regions are also distant from the core (in that transport costs are high) 
and therefore experience a degree of isolation. 
These characteristics are clearly distinct from those of cities and busy inter-urban 
networks. This raises the question as to whether existing cost benefit analysis 
methods are applicable in their current form to sparse networks and peripheral regions. 
Such methods are exemplified by COBA (OfT, 2006a) and NESA (Scottish Executive, 
2005) and embedded into the respective appraisal frameworks New Approach To 
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Appraisal (NATA) (DETR, 1998) in England and Wales, and the Scottish Transport 
Appraisal Guidance (STAG) (Scottish Executive, 2003) in Scotland. The applicability of 
these methods is questioned as they were pioneered on busy inter-urban routes and 
further developed to encapsulate the economic impact of transport projects in cities, 
including that of generated traffic and productivity growth (e.g. SACTRA, 1986; 1994; 
1999). Whether cost benefit analysis methods need to be adapted to adequately deal 
with the special case of sparse networks and peripheral regions is the central research 
question this thesis therefore sets out to address. The research uses a mixture of 
existing evidence and new evidence from the Highlands and Islands of Scotland to 
model the economic impact of transport projects in this geography. 
1.2 Measuring economic impact in the transport market 
The economic identity set out in Figure 1.1 encapsulates the method by which the 
economic benefits of a transport project in a sparse network and peripheral region are 
modelled using existing transport cost benefit analysis methods. This identity focuses 
on the transport market not because transport projects are only expected to impact on 
the transport market, but because, in the first instance measuring the economic impact 
of a transport project as the sum of all impacts across all markets affected would result 
in serious double counting (Mohring, 1961; Dodgson, 1973; Nash and Mackie, 1990). 
Secondly it can be shown that if the economy operates under conditions of perfect 
competition and zero externalities (or all externalities are appropriately charged for) -
that is price equals marginal social cost everywhere in the economy outside of the 
transport market - then an exact measure of the economic impact of a transport project 
can be obtained by analysing the transport market alone (Dodgson, 1973; Jara-Diaz, 
1986). Additionally the transport market is the preferred place to measure the 
economic impact of a transport project as basing the analysis in any other market (e.g. 
the labour market or land market) would result in an underestimate of the economic 
benefit with an elastic supply of any factor input (e.g. labour, capital, land, etc.) (Nash 
and Mackie, 1990). 
Figure 1.1: Economic benefit of a transport project 
Change in Changes in Change in Transport Transport Government external Economic Users' Benefit Operators' costs (e.g. 
= + + grants and + Benefit (Consumers' Profits indirect tax accidents, Surplus) (Producers' 
revenue 
pollution, 
Surplus) etc.) 
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The identity in Figure 1.1 therefore acts as the starting point for this research. The lack 
of choices and alternatives in sparse networks and/or peripheral regions leads to a 
focus on three economic issues in understanding whether the scope of this identity 
needs to be expanded. These are: 
1. Scheduling costs. Sparse networks differ from the denser urban networks 
and inter-urban networks in the availability and frequency of public transport 
services (bus, rail, ferry and plane). Communities in sparse networks served by 
only two or three services a day face tremendous scheduling restrictions in 
accessing employment, services and leisure activities. Within the current cost 
benefit analysis framework such costs do not feature 1. Whether there is a 
theoretical justification for including them and what their scale is relative to 
traditional components of economic impact is an important question, and forms 
the first research issue addressed in this thesis. 
2. Uncertainty. There is a large literature that indicates risk imposes a cost on 
economic decision makers. All activities are affected by uncertainty, but the 
vulnerability caused by reliance on a single option with limited, if any, 
alternatives it is argued imposes a higher burden than if alternatives exist. A 
rockfall or landslip on a road, or the cancellation of a ferry due to high winds 
may have severe consequences in a sparse network where there are no 
alternatives of route or mode (e.g. for access to healthcare). Uncertainty is not 
just restricted to the supply of transport services, as uncertainty regarding 
locations of future workplaces (if made redundant) and how to access those 
workplaces are important factors in economic decision making. How and to 
what extent uncertainty affects economic welfare in a sparse network and 
peripheral region forms the second research issue. 
3. Wider economic impacts. If market failures occur in markets outside of 
transport the economic identity in Figure 1.1 does not hold. Extensions to 
appraisal practice to incorporate the changes in economic efficiency with such 
failures have focused on agglomeration externalities arising through 
urbanisation and imperfect competition (e.g. DfT, 2005). Economic benefits 
1 It is noted that in the rail demand forecasting literature scheduling costs arising 
through transport constraints feature. In contrast appraisal guidance, including UK rail 
appraisal guidance, still places the full economic emphasis on user benefits when 
calculating the total economic impact (e.g. DfT, 2007a Table 3). 
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attributed to wider economic impacts are therefore mainly associated with large 
projects in big cities (e.g. Eddington, 2006). There is good reason to expect 
wider economic impacts to also occur in peripheral areas as the nature of the 
economy in these areas leads to the presence of industrial clusters, isolated 
markets and thin labour markets. However, whether significant gains in 
economic efficiency can be made in the wider economy in peripheral areas has 
received limited attention in the literature, and the potential importance of wider 
economic impacts is therefore unknown. This is the third issue examined in the 
thesis. 
For each of these issues the research looks at: 
• Whether there is a theoretical argument to expand the scope of a cost benefit 
analysis to encompass the issue; 
• Whether there is empirical evidence demonstrating that a statistically significant 
economic effect can be identified; and 
• Whether the inclusion of the additional economic impact makes a material or 
practical difference to the estimate of total economic impact. That is whether 
the additional economic impact is small or large relative to the impacts already 
included in a cost benefit analysis. 
1.3 Highlands and Islands as a case study area 
The Highlands and Islands region in Scotland is sparsely populated, being home to 
approximately 1 % of the UK's population but accounting for one sixth of the UK's land 
mass. Within the region there are also more than ninety inhabited islands. Journey 
times to the economic centres of Scotland and the UK are longer than from any other 
location in the UK and the transport network contains many sections of poor quality -
single carriageway trunk roads and infrequent train and ferry services (SDG, 2007). As 
can also be seen from Figure 1.2 the majority of the region is classified as very remote 
- that is drive time to a settlement with a population of 10,000 or more is in excess of 
60 minutes. Average income levels in the region are about 12% below the Scotland 
average (HIE, 2007a), which are in themselves below the UK average. With such 
geographic, economic and transport characteristics the area lends itself as an ideal 
case study for this research. 
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Figure 1.2: Urban-rural classification of Scotland and location of case studies 
Scottish Executive· 
a .. Fold Urban Rural Classification 
• l;!'ge Uft) n lWe3 S (wIth II populatiOn of O\IC' 12S.ooo) 
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• 
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The size of the Highlands and Islands leads to many diversities within it. Inverness is 
the main economic force and has experienced significant economic growth. By 
contrast, in the remoter parts of the region populations are in decline and the economy 
struggles. The Outer Hebrides, for example, experienced a marked population decline 
of 10.5% between the 1991 and 2001 censuses, and Gross Value Added per head is 
low compared to the Scotland average (HIE, 2003a; 2007b). The transport network is 
also weak as single track roads with passing places dominate the internal road 
network, ferries are still required to connect some of the islands in the group and 
connections to mainland Scotland are infrequent (there are two ferry services a day 
from Stornoway, the main population centre, to the mainland). The transport network, 
particularly the lifeline ferry links, is also vulnerable to inclement weather. The story is 
similar in other parts of the Highlands and Islands. Furthermore the cost associated 
with long distance of travel between population centres is exacerbated by the cost of 
ferry fares (for island communities), high fuel prices and low frequencies of public 
transport services. 
These high costs of travel impact on the wider economy, notably the labour market. 
Those without access to a car find it difficult to access employment opportunities - for 
example 20% of survey respondents reported turning down employment opportunities 
because of travel costs (SDG 2004, cited in HIE 2006 p.6). Employers also feel the 
effect as they experience difficulties recruiting (Nelson et al., 2008). With significant 
transport related barriers to employment transport projects can have a strong positive 
effect on labour supply. This is indeed the case within the region with examples 
ranging from the provision of commuter rail services (Carl Bro, 2003) to the 
replacement of short sea crossings with fixed links (SaW, 2004). 
This is the context in which the three research issues: scheduling costs, uncertainty 
and wider economic benefits are examined. Scheduling costs and uncertainty are the 
focus of a stated preference survey in the Outer Hebrides. The role that wider 
economic benefits play in an economic appraisal of a sparse network and a peripheral 
region is examined using data drawn from the whole of Scotland including the 
Highlands and Islands. The two case studies presented within this thesis are also 
located within the region. The first relates to train services linking isolated communities 
with Inverness, and the second relates to the replacement of a short sea ferry crossing 
with a fixed link (causeway) in the Outer Hebrides. 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the thesis' structure. As can be seen from this figure Chapters 2 
and 7 consider the theoretical case for extending the scope of cost benefit analysis, 
whilst the empirical case is considered in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8. Whether the 
inclusion of additional economic impacts makes a practical difference to an appraisal is 
considered in Chapters 3 and 9. As can also be seen from the figure the main body of 
the thesis comprises of two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 to 6) considers the 
theoretical justification for and evidence of including, in an economic appraisal, 
scheduling costs and uncertainty. Like user costs, these costs are associated with the 
economic behaviour of individuals. The second part (Chapters 7 and 8) considers 
whether the economic conditions prevalent in peripheral regions lead to the occurrence 
of wider economic impacts additional to transport user benefits. The concluding 
chapter, and the case study that precedes it, bring all the different facets of the thesis 
together. A fuller description of each chapter is given below. 
The first chapter, this chapter, is the introductory chapter, whilst Chapter 2 introduces 
the first part of the main body of the thesis. Chapter· 2 therefore considers the 
theoretical justification for including the welfare impacts associated with infrequent 
transport services and uncertainty in an appraisal. The chapter focuses on the 
behavioural effects of scheduling constraints and the concept of the risk premium. The 
discussion on the risk premium partially draws from the literature on option values - a 
form of risk premium. 
Building on the theoretical case for the inclusion of the risk premium, Chapter 3 takes 
as its starting point the limited and disparate evidence on option values and non-use 
values, reconciles the different studies and considers the issue of double counting with 
other elements of benefit within a transport appraisal. The relevance of option and 
non-use values for rail projects in peripheral areas is highlighted through the use of 
several case studies. 
Chapter 4 is the first of three chapters reporting fieldwork undertaken in the Outer 
Hebrides aimed at eliciting willingness to pay for improvements in ferry quality including 
the replacement of a ferry with a fixed link. Two different surveys were administered. 
The first focused on users of a 'long-distance' inter-island ferry, whilst the second 
focused on households recently affected by the replacement of a 'short' ferry service 
with a fixed link. The design of the survey is discussed and presented in this chapter. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 describe the results of the two surveys respectively, the econometric 
models developed and the economic implications of the results . These chapters 
conclude the first part of the thesis. 
Figure 1.3: Thesis structure 
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Chapter 7 introduces the second theme of the thesis, that of the wider economy. The 
chapter reviews the justification for and evidence of economic efficiency impacts 
additional to transport user benefits, with a particular emphasis on peripheral areas. 
Chapter 8 presents econometric work analysing the relationship between commuting 
costs and wages in peripheral labour markets. This is of interest as job search models 
suggest that in thin labour markets workers will not be compensated for their 
commuting costs and the marginal product of labour will differ from the wage - that is a 
labour market failure occurs. In such conditions a change in levels of employment will 
result in a wider economic impact additional to transport user benefits occurring in the 
labour market of a peripheral region. This work is undertaken using the Scottish 
Household Survey. 
Chapter 9 brings the different strands of the theoretical and empirical research 
presented in Chapters 2 to 8 together through the use of a case study of the Berneray 
causeway and the Sound of Harris ferry. 
Chapter 10 presents the conclusions of the research and makes suggestions for further 
research. 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
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2 SCHEDULING COSTS AND 
UNCERTAINTY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the first part of the thesis which considers the issues of 
scheduling costs and uncertainty. The chapter itself considers the theoretical basis for 
extending the economic impact identity (as set out in Figure 1.1) to include costs and 
benefits associated with these issues. Such benefits are felt by users and potential 
users of the transport system, but as the benefits are not directly associated with 
transport use, they do not feature in the existing appraisal framework. The hypothesis 
pursued in this chapter and developed further with empirical research in chapters 3, 4, 
5 and 6 and the case study in chapter 9 is that these benefits are important contributors 
to overall economic impact in sparse networks. Such benefits should therefore appear 
in the appraisal of a transport scheme. 
This assertion is based on the fact that the need for effective activity scheduling is 
never more pertinent than in sparse networks, where transport constrains activity 
schedules both geographically and temporally, and a lack of alternatives within such 
networks creates economic uncertainty. Uncertainty arises through network availability 
(supply side uncertainty) and uncertainty in future preferences including future travel 
demands (e.g. access to future employment if a person is made redundant). This is 
demand side uncertainty. There is a large literature on the role of transport costs on 
residential location and travel demand (see for example Lerman, 1976 for an early 
model), whilst uncertainty plays a role in household and business location decisions in 
regional economic models - for example the new economic geography literature 
(Krugman, 1991 pp.38-49). As such, scheduling costs and uncertainty form part of 
both trip-making and household location decisions in a sparse network. Consequently 
to understand the welfare benefits from a change in the transport network an economic 
model that incorporates activity scheduling and uncertainty is needed. Such a model is 
proposed in this chapter. 
There is consensus on the theoretical identification of the economic value of time spent 
in work and non-work activities (Becker, 1965; Dort, 1969; De Serpa, 1971: and Evans, 
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1972). The work of De Serpa is most applicable to travel research and, following the 
work of Truong and Hensher (1985) and MVA, ITS and TSU (1987), forms the basis for 
describing the economic value of travel time savings in the literature. Similar 
agreement is evident regarding the means of analysing trip scheduling - deferring to 
Small's (1982) analysis for a 'car-available' household. Utility derived from undertaking 
an activity also varies with time of day and activity duration (Winston, 1982; Wilson, 
1989; Wang, 1996). The distinguishing aspect of a sparse network - an infrequent ferry 
to an island, for example - is that a number of scheduling constraints exist that are not 
applicable in the environments for which the literature has been developed. These 
constraints include: 
(i) The maximum duration of an activity, as for example it will be necessary to return 
home on the last ferry of the day at the very latest; 
(ii) The minimum amount of time required for an activity. Whilst, for example, a four 
hour gap between arriving by ferry and first available ferry departure ferry will 
impose a minimum time at the destination on a business trip of four hours despite 
only two hours being needed; and 
(iii) The start time of an activity. For example an activity on the mainland can only 
commence once ferry or air services have begun to operate and have arrived at the 
destimation. 
The main thrust of travel research into the impact of uncertainty on behaviour utilises 
the concept of maximisation of expected utility. Both Noland and Small (1995) and 
Bates et al. (2001) utilise this approach in the treatment of trip scheduling under 
uncertainty. This approach is most suited to that of travel time variability. In sparse 
networks the consequences of uncertainty can be severe and potentially irreversible -
missing the last ferry, needing emergency medical treatment after ferry operations 
have ceased for the day, losing one's job and not being able to access another one 
due to geographic or temporal constraints. In such situations it is hypothesised that the 
full costs of uncertainty are not captured within the expected utility function. 
The contribution of this chapter is to formalise two extensions to the existing literature 
and to identify empirical gaps in the economic valuation of scheduling and uncertainty. 
First, the concept of schedule constrained activities is developed by combining Small's 
analysis with De Serpa's. The existence of schedule constrained activities gives 
economic justification for including benefits of alleviating travel constraints in the 
welfare function when modelling the economic impacts of transport services. Second, 
a measure of the value (or cost) of uncertainty is developed by reconciling the literature 
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of travel behaviour under uncertainty with the concepts of the 'risk premium' and 'option 
value'. This demonstrates that the full economic value of a transport good is given by 
the sum of expected use value and the risk premium (equivalent to the option value for 
the situations where option values exist). In the third section, a review of the eXisting 
empirical evidence in this field identifies several gaps. There is limited evidence on the 
costs associated with infrequent services, little information on the costs of moving from 
discrete departure time choices to continuous (infinite) choice of departure time - as 
occurs with the construction of a fixed link in replacement of a ferry service - and what 
evidence there is on risk premia is confined to the handful studies on transport option 
values. The final section draws the different elements of the chapter together, 
proposes a revision to the economic identity set out in Chapter 1 and sets the scene for 
the empirical work contained in the following chapters. 
2.2 Scheduling under certainty 
Classical economic theory assumes that consumers derive utility from the consumption 
of commodities. Such theory does not have space for time spent in different non-work 
activities, and yet consumers are constrained by a time budget (the number of hours in 
the day, week, month, etc.) and have to split their time between different activities 
including work, leisure, household tasks and sleeping. Time therefore impacts on 
consumer decisions in that it affects the consumption choice set that is available to any 
consumer. The pioneering work of Becker (1965), Oort (1969), De Serpa (1971) and 
Evans (1972) considered these issues and has since led to a degree of consensus 
being developed. In essence individuals derive utility from what they do (activities) and 
what they consume (goods). They are restricted by a money budget of earned income, 
related to time spent at work, and unearned income. They are also subject to a time 
budget constraint that has to account for social and biological activities (e.g. sleeping). 
Finally, the consumption of activities and goods requires that a minimum amount of 
time is spent on the production of these goods (e.g. the preparation of a meal). 
Following De Serpa a simple, but rich, framework regarding the social value of a saving 
in travel time can be developed (Truong and Hensher, 1985; MVA, ITS and TSU, 
1987). Utility (U) is a function of goods consumed, represented by a single numeraire 
good X, time spent undertaking non-work activities tj , for j=1 ... J, and time spent 
undertaking work related activities (tw). 
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Individuals maximise utility subject to: 
m 
Money budget constraint wtw + Y ~ LPX 
;=1 
n 
Time resource constraint: T ~ tw + L t J 
j=1 
Time consumption constraint: t J ~ t J. 
where w = wage rate, 
y = unearned income; 
X = a single numeraire good 
p = price of good X 
T = total time 
tj = time spent in activity j 
tw = time spent at work 
tt = minimum amount of time for activity j (can be zero) 
(2.1) 
De Serpa terms all activities where the time consumption constraint is ineffective (Le. t/ 
> t/) as pure-leisure goods whilst those for which the constraint is binding as 
intermediate goods. 
This is a constrained maximisation problem that can be solved by forming the 
Lagrangian and obtaining the first order conditions for a maximum. The relationship in 
equation (2.2) can therefore be derived. Here J.J is the marginal utility of having an 
extra unit of time available, A. is the marginal utility of an additional unit of income and 
11 is the marginal utility of decreasing the minimum time requirements of an 
intermediate activity. 
Marginal social value of 
saving time in activity j 
(e.g. travel) and 
transferring it to leisure 
= 
Resource value of 
time 
(The value to have 
the total time budget 
increased) 
The marginal 
valuation of time 
spent in activity j 
(e.g. travel) 
(2.2) 
Equation (2.2), which describes the social value of transferring time in one activity to a 
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leisure activity, demonstrates that the marginal value of transferring time from one 
leisure activity to another is zero. This is because the terms on the right hand side of 
Equation (2.2) cancel out. It does not mean that the value of leisure is zero (as the 
value of leisure equals the resource value of time i.), rather it means that a saving in 
leisure time has no value as that time saving is transferred to another leisure activity. A 
time saving can only bring about a change in utility if the time is transferred from an 
activity with a minimum time constraint (an intermediate activity) to a leisure activity (a 
final activity). As travel is an intermediate activity this model clearly demonstrates that 
a saving in travel time has value. The value is given by the marginal valuation of time 
spent travelling and it is this concept that is conventionally referred to as the value of 
travel time savings, rather than the i. term (the resource value of time). 
Small's seminal work on consumers' work trip scheduling (Small, 1982) sets out a 
framework that has since formed a starting point for the economic analysis of departure 
time choice and uncertainty of travel times. Small exploits Becker (1965) and Vickrey 
(1969) to present a scheduling model in which individuals try to optimise their time of 
arrival at work to balance both their dislike for travelling and for arriving late or early. 
Small's model is relatively simple in that it includes only two activities (work, tw, and 
leisure, t,) with a single scheduling decision, s - the time of arrival at work - and a 
single numeraire good x. The utility function in Small's model is set out in (2.3) 
(2.3) 
Small adjusted the Becker budget constraint and the time resource constraint to reflect 
that the cost of consumption of the good, c(s), and the consumption time associated 
with an activity, t(s) , varies with the time that the good is consumed. A further 
technical constraint, a work hours constraint, F(s,tw,w), was also added. The latter 
constraint reflects the fact the wage rate effectively depends through promotions or 
merit pay increases on arrival time as well as work hours. Small did not include De 
Serpa's time consumption constraint within his model. Small's model allows a 
description of the dependency that utility has on the start time, s, (see equation 2.4) to 
be made and it is from this that Small developed the now classic formulation of 
schedule delay (equation 2.5). 
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Utrip = aT + PSOE + '}SOL + t5L 
where: T is travel time 
SOE is schedule delay early 
SOL is schedule delay late 
L is a penalty for late arrival 
a,p, r,o are constants 
(2.4) 
(2.5) 
The above formulation is conditioned by the preferred arrival time (PAT) of the traveller 
as follows: 
SOE = max[(PAT -alO] 
SOL = max[(a -PATlo] 
L=1 if (a-PAT»O, 
L = 0 otherwise 
where: PA T is preferred arrival time 
a is actual arrival time 
(2.6) 
In Small's original analysis on work trips the PAT is taken as given. This is not an 
unrealistic assumption in that for the majority of workers this situation will apply. This 
scheduling framework has formed a popular starting point for models of departure time 
choice (see De Jong et a/., 2003 for a review). The model has also been used to 
model departure time choice for trips other than the journey-to-work - De Jong et a/., 
for example, applied the model to commute trips, business trips, education trips and 
'other' trips. Bates et al. (2001) and Batley (2007) extend this framework to model 
departures at fixed service intervals. 
The previous interests have been concerned with choice of travel departure time, both 
under certain and uncertain conditions of supply, so as to commence an activity at a 
given time. The choice of activity schedule is therefore external to the framework 
considered. Winston (1982) emphasises that the utility derived from undertaking an 
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activity varies according to when that activity takes place (Le. the timing of it) and its 
duration. In Winston's household consumption model the household optimally 
chooses, at each moment, to do the activity in which time has the greatest value. It is 
therefore expected that if transport constraints prevent a household optimising its 
activity schedule, the alleviation of those constraints will generate a welfare impact 
additional to transport use impacts. In a slight variation on this theme Wilson (1989) 
shows that for the majority of people utility is maximised if leisure time can be taken at 
the same time as others within the friendship and family group and at a time in which 
leisure and social facilities are also available/open. The corollary is that utility can be 
improved through better co-ordination of work start times. Similarly it can also be 
beneficial for businesses to co-ordinate the work activities of their employees and to 
have opening hours similar to suppliers and clients. Scheduling costs are therefore 
more associated with the inconvenience of having to undertake activities at particular 
times, rather than the problem of alternative uses of time as in Small's model. The 
constraints on schedules that give rise to these scheduling costs can be institutional 
(e.g. limits on shop and leisure facility opening hours), cultural (e.g. work begins at 9am 
and ends at 5pm) or transport related (e.g. a public transport timetable). 
By interpreting the Small concept of schedule delay as conditional on institutional and 
cultural constraints (IC) it is easily reconciled against the Wilson concept of scheduling 
costs. The PAT is also conditional on transport related constraints (TC), particularly for 
trips other than the commute. This is because, for example, appointments and 
meetings are arranged to fit in with the given transport network and/or public transport 
schedule. The PAT, in this case the apPointment/meeting time, is determined in 
advance and travellers then experience schedule delay early or late as part of the 
decision process in determining, for example, their departure time. Equation 2.7 
therefore generalises the Small definition of schedule delay to be consistent with the 
Wilson and Wang concept of scheduling costs. 
SOE = max [(PAT I (IC,TC)-a}O] 
SOL = max[(a-PAT I (lC,TC)}O] 
L = 1 if (a - PA T I (lc, TC)) > 0 
L = 0 otherwise 
(2.7) 
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where: PAT I (Ie. TC) is preferred arrival time conditional on 
institutional/cultural and transport constraints 
a is actual arrival time 
To develop the concept of schedule constrained leisure activities a model is now 
proposed that can be viewed as a synthesis of. and extension to. the models of De 
Serpa (1971) and Small (1982). Utility. U. is a function of a numeraire good X. time 
spent at work two time spent in non-work activities tj • for j=1 .... J. and the associated 
start times of those activities Sj. Individuals maximise utility subject to a number of 
constraints: the money budget constraint. the time resource constraint. the time 
consumption constraint and a scheduling constraint. The money budget and time 
resource constraints are those of Sma"'s generalised to J non-work activities. De 
Serpa's time consumption constraint has been adjusted by making tj and t/ a function 
of the start time Sj. This accommodates the possibility that. in sparse networks. the 
minimum and maximum duration of an activity is dictated by the start time of that 
activity. The final constraint is a scheduling constraint and is an extension of Small's 
work hours constraint. The scheduling constraint reflects the fact that activity start 
time. hours at work and hours spent in different non-work activities are dependent on 
the wage rate as well as institutional/cultural scheduling constraints (IC) and transport 
scheduling constraints (TC). The model is as set out below: 
Individuals maximise utility subject to: 
Money budget constraint: 
Time resource constraint: 
Time consumption constraint: 
Scheduling constraint: 
where: w= wage rate. 
wtw + y ~ LC(Sj)+PX 
j 
T ~ tw + Ltj(Sj) 
j 
tj(Sj)~t/(Sj) 
F(sj.tw.tj(Sj );w'/C. TC) = 0 
y= unearned income; and 
X= a single numeraire good 
p= price of numeraire good X 
T= total time 
tj = time spent in activity j 
(2.8) 
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tw = time spent at work 
t/ = minimum amount of time for activity j, where ~. ~ 0 
Sj = start time of activity j 
TC = transport scheduling constraints (e.g. operating hours) 
IC = institutional/cultural constraints (e.g. work hours, shop opening 
hours) 
It is possible from this model to derive a relationship for the marginal value of time 
spent in activity j with all constraints binding, as given by (2.9). The full working for this 
derivation is contained in Appendix A. The term ~ of represents the marginal value 
A. at] 
of the scheduling difficulties incurred if the time spent in activity j is altered. 
(2.9) 
It should be noted that the Lagrangian multipliers A.,p,TJ and v have economic 
meaning. Specifically, they are the marginal utilities of income, a change in the time 
resource constraint, a change in the time consumption constraints, and a change in the 
scheduling constraints, respectively. 
If the scheduling constraints do not bind then the marginal value of time spent in 
activity j is given by (2.10). The term i represents the value of a reduction in the 
time consumption constraint. This gives a result equivalent to the De Serpa model for 
the marginal value of time spent in an 'intermediate' activity if the time spent in an 
activity is independent of the activity start time. 
(2.10) 
If the scheduling constraints bind but the time consumption constraints do not then the 
marginal value of time spent in activity j is given by (2.11). This is equivalent to the 
original Small model for the particular circumstance that there is only one non-work 
activity (aside from the commute) and arrival time at work is inflexible. 
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(2.11 ) 
If neither the time consumption nor the scheduling constraints bind then the marginal 
value of time spent in activity j is equivalent to the resource value of time, i; i.e. the 
Becker model of time allocation (2.12). 
(2.12) 
Three types of activity therefore exist: those for which no constraints bind, which De 
Serpa termed 'pure leisure' activities; those for which the time consumption constraint 
binds, which De Serpa termed 'intermediate' activities; and a new group of activities for 
which the scheduling constraint binds. This group of activities are 'schedule-
constrained' activities, and can be either intermediate activities (Le. the time 
consumption constraint is also binding) or leisure activities. The existence of schedule-
constrained activities means that transport scheduling constraints impose costs on 
activities other than travel. Any analysis of economic welfare in the presence of 
transport scheduling constraints should, therefore, have a broader focus than the 'use' 
costs associated with travel. 
The utility function (2.8) and associated constraints suggest a relationship between 
utility and time spent in an activity and the start time of an activity. These are given by 
equations (2.13) and (2.14) respectively. Transport constraints can therefore be seen 
to impact on utility in three ways: through the marginal utility of a change in the time 
consumption constraint (TJ) as the presence of transport constraints can determine 
whether this constraint binds; the marginal utility of a change in the scheduling 
constraint (v); and the scheduling function (F) itself. 
(2.13) 
(2.14) 
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Two methods present themselves for the estimation of the marginal value of alleviating 
transport constraints on activity scheduling: activity based travel analysis and a direct 
elicitation of willingness to pay. The emphasis of activity-based travel analysis is the 
role of temporal-spatial constraints (Hagerstrand, 1970) in determining behaviour, 
including travel behaviour (for a review see Kitamura, 1998; Axhausen and Garling, 
1992). Whilst there have been many practical applications of activity-based travel 
analysis models the approach is very data and resource intensive. Typically data on a 
population's activity schedules are required, the location of activities and the transport 
costs between different locations at different times of the day. The advantage of such 
a method however is that it can give a direct estimate of the marginal utility derived 
from changing the start time of an activity (au/as) ) and changing an activity's duration 
(au/at l ). The change in utility from a change in transport constraints then has to be 
calculated through a comparison in activity schedules before and after the transport 
intervention in combination with the marginal utilities of money, activity duration and 
activity start time. 
An alternative approach to eliciting the marginal value of a change in transport 
constraints is a direct survey of willingness-to-pay. In the context of public transport 
services, transport constraints include frequency and hours of operation. One would 
therefore survey the willingness to pay for changes in headway and operating hours to 
obtain an estimate of the cost that transport constraints place on activity schedules. A 
drawback with a direct elicitation of willingness-to-pay is that it does not uniquely 
identify either the marginal value of undertaking activities at a more appropriate time or 
the marginal value of activity duration. The value derived is also confounded with use 
values (such as changes in waiting or interchange time and possibly travel time in the 
context of journey time as a transport scheduling constraint). Brathen and Hervik 
(1997) term the confounded value of use values and activity re-scheduling values 
'inconvenience costs'. The principal advantage of a direct survey of willingness to pay 
is that it does not require a large amount of data nor the development of complex 
activity based models. For this reason it is the basis of the method used to derive 
estimates of scheduling costs in this thesis. 
2.3 Uncertainty in sparse networks 
Over the last 150 years, twenty two Outer Hebridean islands have lost their populations 
(Comhairle nan Eilean Siar, 2008). The most recent two are Scarp (abandoned in 
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1971) and Taransay (abandoned in 1994). The reasons for abandonment vary, but 
isolation, inability to cope after disasters at sea and the unexpected effects of illness 
are common themes. Clearly resilience of population to random shocks is important in 
maintaining island populations. 
Sparse transport networks differ from dense networks in the relevance of uncertainty 
and the severity of the consequences of uncertainty. The lack of alternatives in a 
sparse network means that a loss of supply can mean a community is severed from 
access to a large part of the country. For example cancellation of ferry or air services, 
bridge collapse or land slip all can result in a complete loss of transport supply to a 
remote community or region. In more extreme environments than the UK, uncertainty 
in transport supply is also created by earthquakes, volcanic activity and floods. Supply 
side uncertainty can also be created by terrorist activity (e.g. targeting of mainline train 
stations and hub airports). Demand side uncertainty exists in sparse networks, 
particularly when combined with the low population and employment densities of 
peripheral regions, as future demand needs are unknown For example a lack of 
alternative employment opportunities or a lack of specialist healthcare facilities within a 
locality may necessitate travel at some point in the future. But the need for such trips is 
unknown, as for example it is not known if a person will be made redundant or if 
specialist healthcare will be needed. 
Whilst the probabilities of events such as bridge collapse, need for specialist medical 
care, need for a new job, terrorism, etc. are naturally low, this does not detract from the 
impact of the event - which can be severe and long lasting. Nor does it detract from 
the desire by economic agents to behave so as to avoid experiencing such events. For 
example, as the severity of job loss in a small economy is high, it forms one of the 
reasons that labour has historically been observed to migrate to large labour markets. 
Businesses also locate in clusters for similar reasons. Migration of workers and 
clustering of businesses occurs as when the economy is subject to random shocks 
expected wages and expected business profits are higher in large labour markets than 
in small labour markets all else being equal (e.g. productivity) (Krugman, 1991 pp.38-
49); Duranton and Puga, 2003 p.18). 
The issue of uncertainty in transport networks is closely related to the concept of 
reliability in networks, of which there is a well-established engineering based literature. 
Reliability engineering focuses on the probabilities of events and the identification and 
ranking of unreliable parts of a network. An extension to this field is the emerging 
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literature on transport network vulnerability (Berdica, 2002; Husdal, 2005; Jenelius, 
Petersen and Mattsson, 2006). This literature specifically addresses the issue that 
whilst events are random the consequences of an event can vary. This distinction is 
important as events with a low probability but very severe consequences can be more 
important from a policy perspective than events with a high probability but hardly any 
consequence. Again the emphasis within the field is on the identification of the most 
vulnerable points in the network (e.g. Jenelius, Petersen and Mattsson, 2006). This 
literature whilst illuminating the inter-relationship between probability and 
consequences does not inform us as to the economic costs of uncertainty. Husdal 
(2005) therefore develops the vulnerability literature by proposing a multi-criteria 
framework as mechanism for incorporating vulnerability into a cost-benefit analysis. 
Other research efforts have estimated use costs during a network degrading event 
(e.g. Nicholson and Du, 1997) and calculated expected use costs from an analysis of 
historic event data (e.g. Dalziell and Nicholson, 2001). Whilst going part way to 
enhancing a cost benefit analysis to include the economic costs of uncertainty in 
sparse networks neither of these extensions addresses the issue fully. 
The literature on transport economic decision-making under uncertainty has a different 
perspective on the economic costs of uncertainty compared to the reliability 
engineering and vulnerability literature. To date this literature has been developed 
within the context of the costs of travel time variability (Noland and Small, 1995; Bates 
et al., 2001; Batley, 2007). It has therefore focused exclusively on supply side 
uncertaint; and is caged within the context of a single trip. Both Noland and Small, for 
car-based continuous departures, and Bates et al. for public transport based discrete 
departures exploit the concept of maximum expected utility (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1947) as a means of including travel time variability into the utility 
function. Travel time variability is modelled by adding a random parameter with an 
exponential distribution to Small's scheduling model (Equation 2.5). This approach has 
achieved a degree of consensus within the relevant literature (Noland and Polak, 2002; 
De Jong et al., 2004). Batley (2007) extends Bates et al.'s approach by marrying the 
concept of travel time unreliability with the microeconomist's notion of risk through the 
introduction of a reliability premium. Batley's reliability premium is the "delay to arrival 
time the individual would be willing-to-pay in exchange for eliminating unreliability in 
arrival timen • This is analogous to the microeconomist's risk premium (Pratt, 1964) but 
the pay-off is arrival time rather than income. Whilst these approaches are applicable 
2 In this strand of the literature the decision maker's preferences are known. There is 
therefore no demand side uncertainty within these authors' work. 
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to the concept of travel time variability within a sparse network, they do not account for 
all of the burden that uncertainty places on individuals' and firms within a sparse 
network. This is because the problem is set within the context of a single trip and is 
therefore purely associated with supply side uncertainty. Furthermore the approach 
cannot accommodate a complete loss of supply, such as when a lifeline link is blocked 
or a network is severed in two. To capture the costs that uncertainty in sparse 
networks places on economic decision-makers it is necessary to extend the existing 
literature. The extension proposed below does this by marrying the literature on the 
economic costs of uncertainty in transport networks with that of option values. 
One of the principal consequences of the existence of a risk premium for risk averse 
individuals or firms is that under conditions of uncertainty the expected utility from an 
income is less than if that income was available with certainty (Pratt, 1964). As already 
mentioned this principle is exploited by Batley (2007) in his definition of the reliability 
premium - within the context of travel time variability. It is also appropriate to the 
problem of the full economic cost of uncertainty in sparse networks. Following Pearce 
and Nash (1981), let U(Y) be the utility function of money which is upward sloping at a 
decreasing rate - thereby reflecting a diminishing marginal utility of income. 
Furthermore let two potential income levels, Y, and Y2, exist. If each of the two income 
levels have an associated probability P1 and P2 then expected utility E(U) is: 
(2.15) 
The line AB, in Figure 2.1, represents the locus of expected utility given different 
probabilities of the two outcomes. The expected utility E(U) in (2.14) is associated with 
an expected 'risky' income of Y 3. The same utility level, however, could have been 
obtained from a certain income of Y4• Here Y4 is the certainty equivalent of Y3. The risk 
premium is given by the difference between Y3 and Y4• It is also clear that a certain 
income of Y3 gives rise to more utility than a 'risky' income of Y3• Using superscripts C 
and R to represent certainty and risky this can be expressed: 
As the risk premium, Y 3 - Y 4, represents what the decision-taker will accept by a way of 
reduction in income to obtain a secure income, this value should be deducted from the 
net expected benefits (in monetary terms) to determine the net welfare value to the 
decision-taker of facing an uncertain income level (which could be either Y
" 
or Y2) 
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(Pearce and Nash, 1981 p.69). 
This concept and result can be applied to uncertainty in sparse networks. If the 
scenario depicted in Figure 2.1, for example, reflects a small labour market constrained 
in size by say a ferry link that is inappropriate for commuting on; then outcome B could 
be associated with a worker being in employment and outcome A with the worker being 
out of work and in receipt of unemployment benefit. With random shocks to the small 
island economy the worker is uncertain whether he will be in work and in receipt of 
income Y 1 or out of work and in receipt of income Y 2 at some point in the future. Given 
a set of probabilities for each outcome his expected income is therefore Y3• However, 
he would be willing to accept a lower income of Y 4if that lower income was 
guaranteed, as in utility terms he would be no worse off. Now by replacing the ferry 
with a fixed link the worker becomes exposed to an infinitely large labour market and 
economy and is therefore able to obtain a certain income of Yi at all times. The worker 
would therefore be willing-to-pay up to the difference between Yi and Y4 to obtain the 
fixed link. This is greater than the difference between his expected incomes (Y 1 - Y 3) 
under the two transport quality scenarios (ferry and fixed link). This is because it 
reflects the added value the worker attributes to the reduction in uncertainty associated 
with his income. 
Two observations can now be made. Firstly, a survey of expected use values of island 
residents (e.g. travel time saving values) would obtain values leading to an estimate of 
transport user benefits equivalent to Yi - Y3 (for the fixed link compared to the ferry). A 
conventional transport appraisal (Figure 1.1) therefore, by excluding the risk premium, 
underestimates the economic impact on the worker. Secondly, the difference between 
the pay-offs under each outcome (employed and unemployed in this instance) can be 
interpreted as the consequence of an event happening (becoming unemployed in this 
instance). As can be seen in Figure 2.1 the size of the risk premium is a function of 
this difference. This is consistent with the a priori view that vulnerability increases with 
the severity of event. As the risk premium is also a function of the diminishing marginal 
income utility function, U(Y), the risk premium is at its smallest when the likelihood of 
an event is large, though it is non-symmetrical in the probability of an event. That is the 
risk premium associated with a high probability of event B (e.g. Ps=O.999) and low 
probability of event A (e.g. PA=O.001) is greater than the risk premium associated low 
probability of B (e.g. Ps=O.OO1) and high probability of A (pA=O.999). This is again 
consistent with the concept of network vulnerability. 
Figure 2.1: The risk premium 
Utility 
(U) 
U(Y1) 
Risk 
~ premium 
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It must be stated that the existence of the risk premium in a measurable form is 
dependent upon a number of stringent conditions. Firstly an income-utility function has 
to be specified and estimable. Secondly the income-utility function needs to exhibit 
diminishing marginal returns - i.e. individuals need to be risk averse. Whilst these 
conditions appear in general sensible, they are necessary conditions and under certain 
circumstances may not hold. Without being drawn into the debate on these issues and 
given the analogy between the risk premium and the option value (Pearce and Nash, 
1981 p.78; Wilman, 1987) it is useful to defer to the option value literature on this issue. 
The option value of a good was first identified by Weisbrod (1964) and is the "price 
people are willing to pay for an assurance (an option) that the good in question will be 
available (at a predetermined price) if they want it" (Pearce and Nash, 1981 p.79). The 
term option value in transport is typically used to relate an alternative transport good to 
the one that is being used - e.g. a rail service for car users. The reason why the 
transport good holds an option value is that an individual's existing mode of transport 
may become unavailable or their personal circumstances may alter (e.g. changing job). 
The alternative transport mode is therefore needed to continue to access existing 
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activities and potentially new activities at some point in the future. There are therefore 
many analogies within a transport context between the risk premium associated with a 
single piece of infrastructure with no alternatives (e.g. ferry or fixed link to an island) 
and a piece of infrastructure to which there are alternatives (e.g. car, bus and rail links 
between a city and a distant settlement). 
Option values can be both positive and negative and will only exist if there is 
uncertainty, individuals are risk averse and consumer surplus exists in at least one of 
the uncertain future states (Schmalensee, 1972; Bishop, 1982). Uncertainty in the 
supply of the good will typically lead to positive option values (Bishop, 1982; Wilman, 
1987), however, once the uncertainty is extended to the demand side there is 
ambiguity over the sign of the option value (Schmalensee, 1972). Option values may 
also exist in situations of risk neutrality particularly where decisions are irreversible or 
are possibly very costly to reverse (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). There is a well 
established empirical evidence base on option values - Carson et al. (1995, cited in 
Humphreys and Fowkes, 2006) noted some 2,000 papers or studies where empirical 
estimates of option values have been made. This empirical evidence lends credence 
to the existence of the conditions necessary for risk premia to exist. Option values are 
also expected to exist in transport, in fact Weisbrod in his seminal paper identified 
public transport services as a likely good for which individuals would hold option 
values. 
There are good grounds to expect risk premia and option values to be significant in 
sparse transport networks in contrast to dense networks. This is because in sparse 
networks the risk of a service or infrastructure no longer being available is real (due to 
closure due to weather for example) and substitutes are poor. This is set against a 
background, equally applicable to those residing in either a sparse or a dense network, 
in which individuals' own circumstances are vulnerable to change (e.g. loss of 
employment or good health) and the consequences of the lack of availability of 
transport are irreversible or severe. 
2.4 The empirical evidence 
The previous sections have argued that there is a theoretical justification for including 
scheduling costs, the costs that travel constraints have on activity schedules, and the 
risk premium (the burden of uncertainty) in a cost benefit analysis. This section now 
examines what evidence there is for each of these benefit categories. In the first 
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instance the literature on scheduling costs is discussed and then that on the risk 
premium is presented. 
Scheduling costs 
As discussed earlier, scheduling costs influence willingness to pay for changes in 
departure time, headway and operating hours. On this basis Table 2.1 summarises 
some of the key studies from the literature on these attributes. For presentational and 
comparability purposes the valuations in these studies have all been converted to 
equivalent in-vehicle time minutes (IVT-mins), except for the two air studies where 
values of time are not available (Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick, 2004; McGregor and Laird, 
2005). The valuations presented relate specifically to scheduling costs or the costs of 
not having complete travel flexibility. 
There have been a sUbstantial number of studies on the value of headway (for a review 
see Wardman, 2004). At low frequencies (large headways) the valuation of a change 
in headway is driven principally by a change in scheduling costs, though because 
elements of use costs (e.g. wait time) will always be present in headway valuations, 
headway values do not offer a precise measure of scheduling costs. On the other 
hand headway valuations at high frequencies are driven by use costs. Empirical 
studies on the values of long headways are therefore useful to the interest of this 
thesis. There are also a substantial number of studies associated with departure time 
choice (for a review see De Jong et al., 2003). Where these models use the Small 
formulation of schedule delay they are also useful to the interests of this thesis. This is 
because schedule delay estimates are equivalent to scheduling costs when the time 
consumption constraint does not bind and the PAT is fixed by institutional and or 
cultural constraints (e.g. the start of the working day). Studies on the value of replacing 
ferries with fixed links are also of interest as a fixed link removes all transport related 
constraints on activities. 
As can be seen from Table 2.1 there is substantial variation in the values. Values vary 
by whether the trip is work related or non-work related and importantly also with 
distance. The longer the distance travelled the lower the value that a traveller places 
on improvements in frequency (or reductions in headway). Wardman (2001) and 
ASEK (2000) explicitly separate values by distance, but the results from Bates et al. 
(2000 cited in ATOC 2002 Table C4.1) can also be considered to exhibit some 
variation by distance. This is because train operators such as Virgin cater for the long 
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Table 2.1: Literature survey: value of headway reductions 
Study/Guidance .-- Units .. ~ Equivalent In-Vehicle Time (mins) .- - --~ i 
" >0. r .. 
-
~ -,-
-- -
Work Trips 
-
Non-work Trips 
Periodic departures to continuous departures (ferry to fIXed link) -
Brathen and Lych Proposed guidance for Norwegian ferry Car veh-mins Ferry to city centre: 2.2 Ferry to city centre: 4.4 
(2004) (derived from and fixed link appraisal Other ferry: 6.9 Other ferry: 13.8 
Brathen and Hervik, 
1997) 
Equivalent in-vehicle time for a change in frequency per day (low frequency) - L - •• - ---
.. -
Scott Wilson SPASM - UK air demand forecasting and £ (1998 From 1 to 2 departures/day: £10.80 
Kirkpatrick (2004 evaluation model behavioural From 1 to 3 departures/day: £19.80 
p55) values) From 1 to 4 departures/day: £27.30 
From 1 to 5 departures/day: £33.60 
McGregor and Laird Air services in the Highlands and Islands, £ (2004 1 to 2 flights per day £69 1 to 2 flights per day £38 
(2005) Scotland behavioural Day return trips (8 hrs at Day return trips (8 hrs at 
values) destination) £83 destination) £29 
Equivalent in-vehicle time for a 1 hour reduction in headway - - . --
.. - .. 
Daly et at. (1998) Great Belt Bridge, Denmark Person-mins 16 No data - Frequency model 
COWl et al. (1999) Oresund Bridge, Denmark Person-mins Short distance trips (p16) 34 
Long distance trips (p67 Table 11 .3) 2 
FTC (1998) Fehrman Belt Bridge, Denmark Person-mins 19 15 
Wardman (2004 Meta-analysis of public transport values of Car person-mins Trips 2km length: 53 Trips 2km length: 43 
Table 12) time from 171 British studies Trips 200km length: 15 Trips 200km length: 12 
ATOC (August 2002 UK rail guidance (PDFH): Person-mins 90 mins to 30 mins Full fare: 25 Reduced fare: 12 
Table B3.4) Penalty costs with headways 120 mins to 60 mins Full fare: 24 Reduced fare: 12 
180 mins to 120 mins Full fare: 24 Reduced fare: 12 
ASEK (2000) Swedish appraisal guidance Person-mins Regional: 37 Regional: 17 
Inter-regional: 29 Inter-regional: 13 
-Equivalent in-vehicle time for a 30 minute reduction in schedule delay (equivalent to a 1 hour reduction in headway) 
. 
- - -
De Jong et at. (2003) Departure time choice study Person-mins 30 - 45 
(Netherlands) 
Bates et al. (2000, Punctuality and reliability study for UK rail Person-mins 7 (Central) to 29 (Connex) 2 (Virgin) to 19 (Central) 
cited in ATOC 2002 services 
_Table C4.1) 
- -- -
__ L ___ 
_. 
--
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distance market, whilst train operators such as Connex cater for the short distance 
market. 
Looking at the Danish fixed link studies (Daly et al., 1998; COWl et al., 1999; FTC, 
1998) variation by trip distance also exists, with values associated with a 1 hour 
reduction in ferry headway ranging from 2 equivalent in-vehicle time minutes to 34 
minutes. The Norwegian fixed link studies (Brathen and Hervik, 1997, Brathen and 
Lych, 2004) differ from the other fixed link studies as the values relate to vehicle trips 
not passenger trips. This makes comparisons difficult. However, given that most 
crossings analysed had 15 minute or 30 minute ferry headways it can be seen that 
similar valuations to those obtained in Denmark are observed. No evidence on the 
cost of limited operational hours has been found. The Norwegian and Danish fixed link 
studies, for example, all relate to crossings with either a long operating day (6am to 
11 pm) or to a 24 hour service. There have been no published fixed link valuations or 
ferry headway studies in Britain to date. Indirect evidence however exists in that traffic 
growth across recently constructed fixed links has been substantial (Laird, Nellthorp 
and Mackie, 2004; DHC, 2007). Such growth has occurred due to the significant 
change in the generalised cost of travel following the construction of the fixed link. 
The studies discussed above, whilst valuing scheduling costs indirectly, do not 
specifically focus on the costs or benefits of activity re-scheduling, that is the specific 
costs or benefits of altering the time when an activity is undertaken, the duration of that 
activity or even the replacement of that activity with another activity. Wilson (1989) 
analysed the costs to workers who started work in the off-peak and found that allowing 
them to adjust the time they start work towards the peak had a similar value to that of 
travel time savings. Thus a shift of say 30 minutes earlier in their work activity 
schedule was comparable to a 30 minute travel time saving. Thus transport projects 
that allow an adjustment of activity schedules can give rise to significant benefits, other 
than pure use costs. 
Another feature regarding the empirical data available is that there is very little data on 
low frequency services. This can be illustrated by Wardman's review. He reviewed 
171 value of time studies from the UK and identified 49 studies that considered 
headway - giving rise to 159 valuations of headway. However only 5 of these 
valuations were associated with headways of 1 hour and none were associated with 
headways over 2 hours. The ATOC (2002) guidance also provides no advice on 
headways over 3 hours duration, whilst the Danish and Norwegian fixed link work 
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Table 2.2: Literature survey: option and non-use values (average values, converted to yearly WTP values) 
, UK case studies Non-UK case studies 
, Bristow et a/. (1991) Crockett (1992) Humphreys & Fowkes Painter et al. (2002) Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee 
-
---
(2006) (2006) 
Mode Bus Rail Rail Bus Rail 
Study area Hawksworth, Leeds; Settle Edinburgh to North Chelan County; Clallam Arnhem to Winterswijk and 
Rainow, Cheshire Berwick, Scotland County, both Washington State, Leiden to Gouda, the 
USA Netherlands 
Base year 1990 1992 2002 1999 2004 
Currency UK pound UK pound UK pound US dollar Euro 
Unit of Possibly household WTP, Possibly household WTP, Household Not specified in the survey. A individual (4) 
analysis but not specified in CV but not specified in CV follow-up survey identified it to 
questions, so could be questions, so could be be a mixture of individual and 
individual WTP individual WTP household values 
Consumer user: £102 (year) not estimated user: £46 (year) not estimated user: €86 (year) 
surplus 
Option value not estimated not estimated user: £150 (year) not estimated user: €112 (year) 
(OV) non-user: £ 172 (year) non-user: €96 - €132 (year) 
average(2): £154 (year) average (3): €94 
Non-use value not estimated not estimated total indirect use value: not estimated user: €196 (year) (4) 
(NUV) user: £28 (year) non-user: €97 (year) (4) 
non-user: £22 (year) average: €148 (4) 
average(2): £27 (year) 
altruistic value: 
user: £17 (year) 
non-user: -£27 (year) 
average(2): £9 (year) 
OV+NUV user: £22 to £30 (year) user: £43 (year) user: £195 (year) user: not estimated user: €308 (year) (4) 
non-user: £78 to £84 (year) non-user: £24 (year) non-user: £ 167 (year) non-user: $56 (year) non-user: €193 - €229 (year (4) 
average(1): £58 (year) average: £36 (year) average(2): £190 (year) average: €242 (4) 
Basis ofOV+ No alternative PT service Existing bus service and Existing bus service No alternative PT service No alternative PT service 
NUV valuation alternative railline/train 
station 
Notes: (1) Average values calculated using user/non-user proportions in Bristow et al. (1991 Tables 3.13), (2) Average values calculated using proportions: 81% users and 
19% non-users (Humphreys and Fowkes, 2006), (3) Average option value calculated assuming that those who indicated that they would never catch the train have an option 
value of zero, (4) Geurs (2006): non-use values may reflect household WTP. Furtherrnore user non-use values may also be biased upwards by use motives. The OV+NUV 
total is therefore likely to be biased upwards compared to the true total for an individual. 
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relates to crossings which previously had high frequency ferries (a minimum of 2 ferries 
an hour). There is therefore a clear evidence gap for public transport services, and 
ferries in particular, with low frequencies and limited hours of operation. 
Risk premium 
Turning now to evidence on the existence of a risk premium in transport. It appears 
that there are no specific studies on transport related risk premia aside from the limited 
number of studies on option values for public transport services. In a recent review of 
the literature Laird, Geurs and Nash (2007) identify six studies on option and non-use 
values of which only the results from five are published (see Table 2.2). Two of these 
studies have focused on values associated with bus services and three on rail services. 
All have focused exclusively on passenger transport by households. However, as can 
be seen from the penultimate row in the table a wide range of values regarding the 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for transport services, above and beyond pure use costs, 
appear to exist. These range from £36 per year (Crockett, 1992) to £190 per year 
(Humphreys and Fowkes, 2006)3. With only five reported studies and with all the 
studies aside from Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee (2006) having small to modest sample 
sizes it is apparent that the field of measuring transport option values is in its infancy. 
Whilst Chapter 3 considers the source of the variation between the studies and the 
implications for transport appraisal, it is clear from Table 2.2 that there is a need for the 
option value evidence base to be expanded to include ferry, air and road links, and for 
a parallel evidence base on risk premia for transport links with no alternatives to be 
developed. 
2.5 A revised economic Identity 
Drawing the different strands of this chapter together, it is clear there is a strong 
theoretical basis for extending the economic identity presented in Chapter 1 (Figure 
1.1) to include costs associated with: 
• activity scheduling arising from a change in travel constraints - that is 
scheduling costs; and 
• the risk premium arising from the cost of uncertainty. 
3 These values are the sum of option and non-use values. Non-use values represent 
the willingness to pay for continued existence of transport service regardless of future 
use. Non-use values are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, both in relation to 
option values, the motives that give rise to them and transport appraisal. 
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These costs are not directly associated with transport use and, importantly, have 
welfare impacts additional to transport user benefits, transport provider and 
government impacts and external costs as set out in the identity in Figure 1.1. 
Whether economic appraisals of transport projects in sparse networks and peripheral 
regions should include these additional benefit categories now becomes an empirical 
question. This is because the inclusion of additional benefit categories requires 
additional effort by the analyst, and is only justified if these benefit categories form a 
significant element of the total economic impact of a transport project. The current 
evidence base is too limited to permit this question to be answered. Chapters 3, 4, 5 
and 6 therefore attempt to fill some of the evidence gaps and go someway to 
addressing this question. 
The limited evidence on option values (a form of risk premium) is therefore reviewed in 
Chapter 3 and adapted for use in a transport cost-benefit analysis. Five case studies 
are used to illustrate the importance of option values to rail scheme appraisal by type 
and location of scheme. 
As discussed in the previous section there is a paucity of evidence on the scheduling 
costs associated with ferries and the relative values of the risk premia attached to 
ferries and fixed links. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 therefore present the results of a stated 
preference survey aimed at eliciting such values. The approach adopted is a direct 
survey of willingness to pay for changes in hours of operation and frequency. Hours of 
operation and frequency are the aspects of a ferry service that impose scheduling 
constraints. As discussed earlier this gives a confounded value of use and scheduling 
costs. The final element in determining whether scheduling costs and risk premia are 
important benefit categories in a cost benefit analysis is to consider the size of the 
benefits they produce relative to user benefits. This is considered through the medium 
of a fixed link case study presented in Chapter 9. 
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3 OPTION AND NON-USE VALUES 
AND RAIL PROJECT APPRAISAL 
3 .. 1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 a theoretical case was made for extending the economic identity 
underpinning cost benefit analysis to include the risk premium. Option values are a 
type of risk premium. This chapter therefore looks at evidence on option values and 
their relevance to appraisal in more detail - particularly to rail schemes in sparse 
networks. Despite the possibility that option values exist for transport related goods as 
well as for environmental goods (Weisbrod, 1964; OfT, 2003), as far as it can be 
ascertained there have been no incidences of option and non-use values being 
included in transport efficiency calculations (Le. the cost-benefit analysis). Given the 
potential importance of option values to developing the economic case for transport 
projects in sparse networks this seems unusual. Why is it the case? In part because 
the evidence base is not only small and fragmented but has, at first glance, a very large 
range. In part it is also because of the problem of double counting. Double counting 
arises as estimates of option values often include elements of non-use values. The 
contribution of this chapter therefore is in setting out the role of option and non-use 
values within the context of a transport cost benefit analysis and, through a review of 
recent international empirical studies, demonstrating that there is consistency, at least 
at a qualitative level in the evidence base. Drawing from five rail case studies the 
importance of option and non-use values to the total economic impact of projects in 
sparse low trafficked networks is demonstrated. The case studies also highlight some 
of the difficulties in applying option and non-use values in a transport cost-benefit 
analysis, particularly with the existing evidence base. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section the principles behind the 
identification of option and non use values and their use in transport appraisals is 
described. The empirical evidence is then reviewed and synthesised. In the fourth 
section the results of introducing option and non use values into five case studies is 
presented, before the final section presents some conclusions. 
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3.2 Option and non-use values in a transport cost-benefit analysis 
In a transport cost benefit analysis the focus is on measuring the total economic 
change caused by a transport intervention. As discussed earlier under partial 
equilibrium conditions, with perfect competition everywhere except the transport sector, 
this is equivalent to measuring the change in the value of consumption plus any 
impacts felt by transport operators, the government and society - the latter as a 
consequence of a change in external costs. The implication of this summation (see 
Figure 1.1) is that the value of consumption (user benefits) is the value of the transport 
good or service. However, and as set out in chapter 2, under conditions of uncertainty 
the welfare cost borne by the decision-taker also includes a component unrelated to 
use - the risk premium. To reflect both this and other non-use values that decision-
takers may attribute to a good the environmental economics literature uses a concept 
known as total economic value (TEV). TEV therefore includes both use and non-use 
attributes. In a transport cost-benefit analysis the change in user benefits cannot 
simply be replaced with the change in TEV without double counting some of the 
economic impacts, such as those associated with noise, pollution and de-congestion 
benefits to non-public transport users (for a public transport scheme). Some 
adjustments to the change in TEV are therefore needed before it can be included in a 
transport cost-benefit analysis. To understand these adjustments it is necessary to be 
clear as to the components of TEV within a transport context. 
Whilst the concept of TEV is accepted its precise definition is still subject to some 
debate. Aside from option values concepts such as passive non-use values, existence 
values, bequest values, altruistic values, stewardship and intrinsic values have been 
defined by various authors (see Pearce and Turner, 1990, for a discussion), as have 
the concepts of vicarious-indirect-use and functional-indirect-use (see Humphreys and 
Fowkes, 2006, for a discussion). Ultimately the boundaries between the different 
components of TEV are unclear and tend to overlap. Without being drawn into the 
debate regarding the nomenclature of the components of TEV, there is a consensus 
that such a concept exists and that it will differ from the value of consumption if 
individuals are willing-to-pay for: 
(1) The option of consuming the good at some point in the future, even if they may 
never actually take up that option - Le. the option value (OV); or 
(2) The continued existence of a good which they themselves do not directly 
consume or ever intend to consume. Following Bateman et al. (2002 p.29) this 
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is referred to as the non-use value (NUV)4. 
An option value, in the transport context, is the willingness-to-pay over and above the 
expected value of future use to preserve the option of using a transport service for 
future trips not yet anticipated, anticipated but with some uncertainty, or currently 
undertaken by other modes5• As discussed in chapter 2 it exists only if there is 
uncertainty, individuals are risk averse and individuals value consuming the good. It is 
analogous to the risk premium, can be either positive or negative depending on 
circumstance, is additional to the change in the value of consumption (Le. change in 
consumer surplus) and can always be included in a cost-benefit analysis without 
double counting other economic impacts. 
Non-use values on the other hand differ from use values and option values in that a 
value may be placed on the continued existence of a good regardless of any possibility 
of future use by the individual in question. The motivation for the desire for the good to 
continue to exist may, however, vary from one circumstance to another. For example, 
individuals may value a good for altruistic reasons, reasons of indirect use or because 
the good has some existence, bequest or intrinsic value. Examples of situations where 
non-use values may exist in a transport environment include: 
• A resident in a village deriving benefit from the knowledge that the elderly can 
use public transport to access the facilities they need; 
• A householder living on a busy road experiencing less noise, and a car 
commuter experiencing less congestion as a consequence of other commuters 
using a rail service; 
• Where the vitality of a community may depend on the transport link - for 
example where a substantial proportion of the economic activity in the 
4 Whilst such a categorisation of option values and non-use values is consistent with 
that adopted by one of the strands of the literature (e.g. Bateman et al., 2002; Geurs, 
Haaijer and van Wee, 2006), Humphreys and Fowkes (2006) define option values as a 
non-use benefit. The primary motivation for using the Bateman et al. nomenclature is 
twofold. Firstly the interst of this thesis is in the risk premium and the option value, and 
secondly this categorisation more easily dovetails into transport appraisal practice. 
The latter is because the option value is always additional to user benefits, whilst some 
or all of the non-use value will double count user benefits. 
5 The literature also identifies a concept referred to as a quasi-option value, which 
represents the value of maintaining a facility until better knowledge is available as to its 
future demand (Arrow and Fisher, 1974). Its estimation involves estimating the 
probability distribution of future demand and how this may change in future with better 
information; it is not considered further, although to the extent that such a benefit exists 
at the individual level, it may be indistinguishable from option values as defined here. 
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community stems from either passing trade or from business associated with 
the provision of transport services. 
• Where the cultural heritage value of transport infrastructure is large. 
Clearly there may be other context specific circumstances in which non-use values 
may exist - see Table 3.1. Importantly from the perspective of a transport cost benefit 
analysis some double counting may occur with the inclusion of non-use values, 
particularly when the motives are associated with personal gain/loss - such as de-
congestion benefits for road users, noise and pollution benefits for householders and 
loss or gain in income or house values. Where the motives that give rise to non-use 
values are purely altruistic, non-use values can be included in a cost-benefit analysis 
without double counting (McConnell, 1997)6. Given the potential for double counting 
benefits when including non-use values it is important that any surveyed non-use 
values are adjusted for double counting prior to inclusion. This is a non-trivial task as it 
requires the survey methodology to be able to distinguish between the different motives 
underlying non-use values. Ideally the survey method should also account for the bias 
introduced by those households who are willing to pay to maintain a transport service, 
not because they hold use, option and non-use values for it, but because they believe 
its presence influences the value of their property. 
Situations in which people might become highly dependent on rail in the future would 
be expected to generate high option values. The most likely of these cases would be 
the need to change employment in circumstances in which rail offers a substantially 
better service than the alternatives. Thus the combination of lack of car availability and 
a poor bus service, or of severe road congestion and parking difficulties might raise 
such an issue. Other regular journey purposes such as shopping, visiting or medical 
related trips might also create significant option values, although given that these trips 
are generally less frequent than commuting trips, these are unlikely to be as large as 
for commuting trips. For similar reasons significant option values would be expected to 
be associated with stations upon which people become dependent. Origin stations and 
major destination stations - where they are major attractors e.g. in cities - would form 
6 McConnell (1997) shows that the motive for the altruism is also important in 
determining whether the non-use value is additional to consumer surplus. Where the 
motive is paternalistic altruism, which will prevail in a transport context, the non-use 
value is always additional to consumer surplus in the cost benefit analysis. 
Paternalistic altruism, in a transport context, is when the altruist cares about the 
consumer surplus of or the quantity of services available to a particular group in society 
(the poor, children, the elderly). 
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the primary candidates, as would stations that primarily serve the commuter market. 
Table 3.1 Motives for willingness-to-pay for the provision of transport services 
Use value (as Option value Non-use value 
generally l 
measured) 
User Expected Value of preserving the option Use by other members of the 
value of future of using it in the future for trips household ; 
actual use. not yet antiCipated or currently Use by friends, family; 
undertaken by other modes Concern for other people in over and above expected value 
society in general; of future use. 
Concern for particular groups, 
poor, elderly, children; 
Concern for future generations; 
Reduced congestion; 
Reduced environmental 
problems; 
Cohesion effects, link to larger 
communities 
Non- N/A As user. The same as above 
user 
Source: Laird, Geurs and Nash (2007) 
Contrastingly the motives that give rise to non-use values are quite varied and as a 
consequence the situations in which high non-use values exist are also varied. Given 
that non-use values arise through either altruism (e.g. concern for the poor or children) 
or personal loss/gain (e.g. reduced congestion, vitality of community) the largest non-
use values would be expected to be found where personal losses/gains are large7. 
Such a situation occurs where businesses rely on transport infrastructure to bring in 
customers (e.g. retailers or tourist attractions which are fixed in location). The minimum 
bound on the non-use value held by a firm is the fall in profit from a loss of the transport 
infrastructure availability. For individuals on the other hand the minimum bound is the 
drop in income. Such an income drop could occur if individuals had to change job or 
reduce work hours as a consequence of the loss of availability of transport 
infrastructure. 
7 As set out earlier non-use values arising through personal loss/gain either double 
count benefits already included in a transport appraisal (e.g. environmental benefits for 
householders) or do not represent a net welfare loss/gain to society (e.g. a change in 
business profitability). It is only when the non-use value arises through altruism that it is 
additional to benefits already included in a transport appraisal. 
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3.3 Rationalising the evidence 
To facilitate a comparison between the five studies for which option and non-use 
values are available (see Table 2.2) it is necessary that each of the values found in the 
literature are converted to the same base. This is done by: 
(i) combining the user and non-user values into an average value, as each of the 
studies uses a different user/non-user definition (see Table 3.2); 
(ii) summing the option and non-use value, as three of the studies have not 
separately identified these components of TEV.; and 
(iii) converting the study values to a common price, value and currency base. 
Table 3.2: Definition of users and non-users by study 
Study Definition of users Definition of 
non-users 
Bristow et al. (1991) Use the bus service in a normal week Rest of 
sample 
Crockett (1992) Use the train service Rest of 
sample 
Painter et al. (2002) Households where at least one household Rest of 
member uses the transit system regardless of sample 
frequency. 
Humphreys and Fowkes Households in which the survey respondent Rest of 
(2006) indicated that they were 'likely' or 'very likely' sample 
to use the North Berwick to Edinburgh train 
service in the following 6 months [from date of 
survey). 
Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee Individuals who (a) used the selected train Rest of 
(2006) service in the previous year, or (b) are car- sample 
owners and might have used the train service 
had the car suddenly become unavailable in 
the previous year. 
As can be seen from Table 3.3 despite converting the evidence on option and non-use 
values to a common base a large range remains - from £41 to £190 (2002 prices and 
values). The next step in explaining this range is to understand to whom the valuations 
relate to - households or individuals. In fact it appears that some of the studies are 
unclear as to whether the values surveyed apply to individuals or households, 
particularly with respect to the earliest three studies. Painter et al. for example with 
follow-up questionnaire discovered that some of the respondents had answered for the 
household and others had responded as individuals. In Table 3.3 it can be seen that 
studies reflecting individual valuations give rise to values that are significantly lower 
than studies reflecting household values. Consequently, an adjustment for individual or 
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the sum of option values and non-use values at a common price and value base 
Sum of option and non-use Painter et al. Bristow et al. Crockett (1992) Geurs, Haaijer and van Humphreys and 
values (average over users (2002) , (1991) l Wee (2006) Fowkes (2006) 
and non-users) 
.Ij 
"""~ 
Survey year (study base 1999 1990 1992 2004 2002 
year) 
Population unit Mixture of household Probably household Probably household Individual values Household values 
and individual values values values 
Mode Bus Bus Rail Rail Rail 
Alternative public transport No No Existing bus service No Half hourly bus 
service available and alternative rail service 
line/train station 
1. Study values USD56 £58 £36 EUR 242 £190 
2. (1) converted to GBP £36 £58 £36 £139 £190 
with PPP currency 
exchange rates for study 
year 
3. (2) converted to 2002 £41 £104 £59 £125 £190 
price base with elasticity to 
(3[)~!capit~growt~_~~ __ 
L-. 
Notes: (1) USD to GBP currency conversion with PPP (1999) is 0.644; EUR to GBP currency conversion with PPP (2004) is 0.575 (OEeD, 2006). (2) RPI 
Multipliers to 2002: from 1990 1.40, from 19921.27, from 19991.07, from 2004 0.94 (ONS, 2006a). (3) GOP/capita multipliers to 2002: from 1990 1.28, from 
19921 .31, from 19991.07, from 20040.95 (ONS, 2006b) 
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household valuations would be expected to significantly narrow the gap between, for 
example, the values observed by Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee and those obtained by 
Humphreys and Fowkes - for what are otherwise similar train services. 
Some of the differences between the study values are expected to arise as a 
consequence of the availability or lack of availability of alternative transport services. 
The existence of a rail alternative in Crockett's study therefore goes some way to 
explaining the difference in values between his study and those in both the Geurs, 
Haaijer and van Wee study and the Humphreys and Fowkes study. Importantly from 
the perspective of a transport cost-benefit analysis Humphreys and Fowkes also find 
that the contribution of a bus service to a public transport package including both a bus 
and train service is small (a weighted average between users and non-users of £11). 
Thus the value of a package of train and bus services is similar in magnitude to the 
value of just a train service. 
Given that it is expected that option and non-use values will be greater for services on 
which one is or could become dependent, variation by quality of the service and 
whether the service serves a commuting or other function is expected to occur. Table 
3.3 demonstrates such a variation in that bus services have lower valuations than train 
services and the services that offer good commuting opportunities (Bristow et al., and 
Humphreys and Fowkes) have higher valuations than those which do not (Crockett, 
1992; Painter et al., 1999)8. This is in line with expectations and along with the issue of 
the availability of public transport alternatives and individual or household valuations 
indicates that the studies can be qualitatively reconciled against one another. Albeit 
this is not a formal validation, but it does suggest that the large range in surveyed 
values is due to differences between the studies, both in terms of definitions used and 
the characteristics of the service surveyed and its alternatives, rather than a lack of 
precision in the estimates. 
Thus the large range of values observed in the literature can be largely explained by 
differences in services valued in each study and the characteristics of the study areas. 
The upper end of the range reflects a high quality train service linking a community to a 
large employment and service centre and for which there already exists a strong 
commuter demand. In the middle of the range we find values associated with high 
8 Crockett (1992) found that the only function of the line surveyed was for shopping 
purposes, whilst Painter et al. (1999) surveyed a rural bus network but included people 
in the sample for whom the bus network provided no opportunities for travel. 
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quality bus services (3 or 4 buses an hour with good evening and weekend services). 
Such services have a strong existing demand base reflecting their existing and 
potentially future usefulness to the community. At the lower end of the range we find 
lower quality bus services and potentially lower quality rail services, neither of which 
may necessarily serve the community's needs particularly well. The evidence also 
suggests that it is perfectly possible that a poor rail service (with an alternative) can 
have a lower option and non-use values than a high quality bus service (with no 
alternative ). 
3.4 Option and non-use values In practice 
To apply this evidence base in a transport cost benefit analysis a number of 
considerations need to be borne in mind. Firstly, the evidence is restricted to 
household values for personal travel and does not include the values businesses may 
hold for employees travelling on company business or for the transportation of freight. 
It is also restricted to local services and not national or long distance services9, and 
values are only available for bus and rail services. Furthermore, the values relate to 
origin stations and to households within the catchment area of that station. It is 
possible that option and non-user values may be held by households outwith a station's 
catchment area - for example Deberezion et a/. (2006) find that stations influence 
house prices up to 10km from a station. The evidence also relates to the complete loss 
of a service. Thus it cannot be applied to communities which experience an 
incremental loss (or improvement) in terms of access to employment and service 
opportunities. Furthermore the evidence suggests that the option and non-use value is 
very much dependent on the transport alternatives available. Thus it seems that the 
option and non-use value of a bus service to a locality already served by a train is small 
compared to both the option and non-use value of the train service and the value of 
such a bus service to a locality with no other public transport. 
Finally, and as discussed earlier, the non-use value may double count benefits already 
included in a transport cost-benefit analysis. To avoid double counting one ideally just 
excludes the element of the non-use value that is not altruistic. Drawing from 
Humphreys and Fowkes this would appear to be approximately 14% of the sum of the 
9 The surveyed values in the evidence base are associated with the loss of a local rail 
service and not the loss of mainline services. Some of the willingness to pay values 
associated with the local services are however associated with long distance trips that 
would utilise both the local rail service and mainline rail services. 
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option and non-use value. A much more conservative approach to avoid double 
counting would be to exclude all the non-use value from the appraisal. Unfortunately, 
the two studies that separately examined option and non-use values (Humphreys and 
Fowkes and Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee) suggest very different levels of importance 
for the non-use element of TEV compared to the option value element. Humphreys 
and Fowkes found that the non-use element comprised 25% of the sum of the option 
and non-use value whilst Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee found that it comprised between 
40 and 60% (depending on the category of user). Both studies were exploratory and 
the results may in fact be artefacts of the survey design. Humphreys and Fowkes 
treated option values as a 'residual' category and used proxies for the different non-use 
motives to estimate the non-use value. As their proxies may have been insufficient to 
capture all the non-use benefits it is likely that they underestimate non-use values and 
overestimate option values. Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee on the other hand estimated 
option values for individuals but the phrasing of the questionnaire means that the non-
use values estimated may reflect household values and should therefore be interpreted 
as an upper bound for individual non-use values. Some sensitivity testing of the results 
to the inclusion of non-use values is therefore prudent when undertaking a cost-benefit 
analysis. 
From the case studies undertaken the importance of option and non-use values varies 
with the characteristics of the rail service and the type of proposal (see Table 3.4). 
Three of the case studies are in the Inverness area of the Highlands and Islands in 
Scotland (Highland Rail Developments, 2000; Highland Rail Partnership, 2003; 
Halcrow, 2006). Historically, the rail network in the Invemess area served a long 
distance function and therefore did not serve the immediate needs of the local 
communities particularly well - frequencies were low and service timings did not 
facilitate access to employment and social opportunities. This combined with the fact 
that the area is sparsely populated, aside from Inverness, means that the rail network 
is lightly trafficked. In contrast the fourth and fifth case studies are situated near much 
larger conurbations. The fourth scheme is in central Scotland (Jacobs, 2006) and the 
fifth in the south of England (OfT, 2006c). Importantly from the perspective of these 
case studies both have a reasonably frequent rail service and consequently are much 
more heavily trafficked than the north of Scotland lines. The location of the four 
Scottish case studies is detailed in Figure 1.2 and, in more detail for the three 
Inverness area case studies, in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Location of rail stations considered in Inverness area case studies 
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• Beauly Station re-opening 
• Conon Bridge station re-opening 
• Invernet: provision of morning rail commuter services to 
stations north of Inverness (Lairg, Culrainllnvershin and 
Ardgay) and to the south of Inverness (Kingussie, Aviemore 
and Carrbridge) 
Source: Ordnance Survey website (http://www.ordnancesurvey.co.uk/oswebsite/) 
[accessed 1st November 2008] 
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Table 3.4: Size of option and non-use values relative to user benefits and the present value of benefits 
" 
-
Scheme Area type ' , - No. of Annual patronage on Option and non-use 
-
, ~ I" ,j households line (single trips In values as percentage of: I ' . 
. "" ~: 
, 
,t' 
I ,: 
" ~ l . " 0,,< affected opening year) I ~, .. 
'" 
,. 
' - . , ,-
-
~ .f: 
',-" ~ ~'" .,", /' (opening year) l.j , " -~ ..: I - ., 
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Do Do Transport Present 
]I .-~ I ~: 
'-: .;;.' ::<0,'/'. ~ "::; ··'l Minimum Something Value of , " " ,'I;; 1~ , I ~ ~ oil .. user "I .. ' " , - " J . ' " ; ~ . -I" ~_ .~ ., - benefits Benefits r ", ""i :1 , , " , . 
- oS:'''' I ~1~ .•.. . , . .. 
.. ~' " , ';:.' . - j. ~ ., ,j' l '1' ... (PVB) 
-. -.- .. : ... ; C6<O - . 
Beauly station re-opening Remote community in North 550 125,000 148,000 87% 84% 
(opened 2002) Scotland 
Conon Bridge station re-opening Remote community in North 1,000 250,000 270,000 561% 117% 
(proposal) Scotland 
Invernet - provision of services within the Remote communities in North 2,600 485,000 557,000 64% 57% 
Inverness travel to work area Scotland 
(opened 2005) 
(a) Increase in service frequency by 700 145,000 210,000 23% 20% 
approximately 50% immediately north 
of Inverness plus provision of 
commuting opportunities for 3 
communities (Ardgay, 
Culrain/lnvershin, Lairg) 
(b) Provision of a commuter service 1,900 340,000 347,000 197% 178% 
from the south to Inverness (from 
Kingussie to Inverness) 
Airdrie-Bathgate proposal - line re- Small to medium sized 7,400 0 4,000,000 Not 4% 
opening between Airdrie and Bathgate communities within commuting known 
providing travel opportunities for distance of large conurbations 
communities in the corridor to access both 
Glasgow and Edinburgh 
Anonymised example Rural communities in a part of 3,700 3,798,000 0 9% 9% 
(rail closure) southern England near to some 
moderately sized conurbations 
- - ---
Note: Transport appraisals have been undertaken in accordance with UK standard practice (www.webtag.org.uk). The option and non-use values used are 
£170 for rail and £90 for bus (2002 prices and values). These have been derived from Humphreys and Fowkes (2006) for rail and Bristow et at. (1991) for 
bus converted to a 2002 price base (as per Table 3.3) and deflated by 14% (and rounded to nearest £10) to account for double counting in the non-use value. 
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The large variation in the relationship between user benefits and option and non-use 
value benefits reflects the different characteristics of the schemes. At one extreme is 
the Conon Bridge station re-opening where option and non-use values are almost six 
times the level of user benefits. Primarily this occurs because user benefits are low, 
rather than option and non-use values being high. User benefits are low because dis-
benefits to existing users (caused by the extra stop) almost cancel out benefits to new 
users. Whilst dis-benefits to existing users are similarly large for the reopening of 
Beauly station there is a much larger demand at this station - despite the lower 
population - and as a consequence user benefits are stronger. This results in option 
and non-use values therefore forming just over 80% of the user benefits of re-opening 
Beauly station. 
The Invernet project contains two distinct elements: a significant strengthening of 
services to the north of Inverness plus the provision of commuting opportunities to 
three communities (north of Inverness); and the provision of commuting opportunities 
to three communities south of Inverness. The latter 'southern' element of the project 
occurs without any strengthening of services, beyond the provision of the morning 
commuter service. It therefore generates only small amounts of user benefit, whilst 
providing quite large option and non-use values due to the size of the population 
served. Contrastingly, the strengthening of services to the north of Inverness 
generates large user benefits. Option and non-use value benefits therefore forms a 
much lower proportion of the total PVB of the northern element of the scheme than for 
the southern element. 
The fourth case study concerns the re-opening of a line between Airdrie and Bathgate. 
The primary function of the line is to provide access for the communities within the 
corridor to employment and service opportunities in both Glasgow and Edinburgh. As 
the majority of the communities within the corridor already have access to the 
opportunities in one of the conurbations the benefits of the service are driven by the 
use of the rail service, rather than the increased opportunities it creates 10. Option and 
non-use value benefits only form 4% of the PVB. The final case study, a line closure 
appraisal, combines both station closures and the loss of a well used fairly good rail 
service. Here even though several communities lose their rail service the scale of the 
user costs dominates the option and non-use values - which form 9% of the total PVB. 
10 The evidence base on option and non-use values is too limited to identify the 
difference between a community being connected to two large employment and service 
centres rather than just one. 
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A pattern therefore emerges: the importance of option and non-use values is high for 
lines where user benefits are low - typically lines with relatively infrequent levels of 
service and low levels of demand - and for projects that involve the provision (or loss) 
of commuting opportunities (including station openings/closures). Such projects occur 
in areas where rail performs a strong social function, such as providing accessibility for 
isolated communities to employment opportunities and other social needs necessary to 
sustain the community's vitality. Clearly therefore option and non-use values are an 
important element of the total economic impact of a rail project in a sparse network, 
and their inclusion in the cost-benefit analysis would be expected to significantly 
improve the case for investment. 
It is interesting to note that the impact of option and non-use values on the PVB 
(increasing the PVB by between 4% and 178%) differs significantly from the 
contribution to TEV as reported in the empirical studies. Humphreys and Fowkes for 
example find that option and non-use values for rail users form 51 % of the TEV of rail, 
Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee find that they form 40-45% on average and Bristow et a/. 
find they form around 20% of the TEV of bus for bus users. The difference between 
the TEV and PVB proportions occurs because a transport appraisal considers an 
incremental adjustment to the existing transport system and is therefore concerned 
about the change in option and non-use values rather than their absolute level. 
Furthermore a transport appraisal considers all users and non-users and therefore 
considers the benefits/costs to through traffic in addition to local traffic as well as the 
full cost of any safety or environmental externality - all of which, but particularly the 
benefits/costs to through traffic, can be substantial relative to the change in the option 
and non-use value for the households affected. 
A consequence of the lack of development in the field of transport related option and 
non-use values means a number of difficulties arose in applying them in the case 
studies. Uncertainties in the catchment area of stations and whether option and non-
use values are held by households outside those catchment areas; the real growth in 
values over time; the potential for double counting in the non-use value; and the option 
and non-use value of a mixed mode (bus and train) package all can significantly affect 
the present value of option and non-use values in an appraisal. Furthermore the 
limited data on option and non-use values means that variations in frequency of service 
and connectivity to different sized employment centres are not reflected in the 
appraisal. For example, one might expect the option and non-use values associated 
---------------------~---------
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with the new stations and train services in the north of Scotland case studies to be less 
than those derived by Humphreys and Fowkes. This is because the frequency of train 
services is lower in the north of Scotland compared to the North Berwick to Edinburgh 
service and Inverness does not offer as many employment and social opportunities as 
does Edinburgh. 
3.5 Conclusions 
The field of measuring transport option and non-use values is far from developed. To 
date only values from five studies, which in the main have small sample sizes, are 
available giving a potentially large range of between £41 and £190 (2002 prices). 
Despite this it is possible to reconcile, in a mainly qualitative manner, the results from 
these studies against each other. The upper end of the range reflects a high quality 
train service linking a community to a large employment and service centre and for 
which there already exists a strong commuter demand. Values associated with high 
quality bus services (3 or 4 buses an hour with good evening and weekend services) lie 
in the middle of the range. The lower end of the range reflects lower quality bus 
services and lower quality rail services, neither of which may necessarily serve the 
community's needs particularly well. The evidence base is too small to indicate how 
values vary with: quality of service; the mix of public transport services that may be 
available in the study area; socio-economic factors such as car ownership; or to 
communities adjacent to mainline stations or 'hub' stations. It reasonable to think that 
services offering little or no value for commuting will have much lower values than 
services that do. Additionally there is no evidence on the values that business may 
attribute to the rail network either for the carriage of freight or for employees travelling 
on company business. 
The main purpose of this chapter was to examine the inclusion of option and non-use 
values in transport appraisal. This has never been done before. The case studies 
presented clearly demonstrate the importance of option and non-use values to a 
scheme appraisal is very varied. Their importance increases for lines where user 
benefits are low - typically lines with relatively infrequent levels of service and low 
levels of demand - and for projects that involve the provision (or loss) of commuting 
opportunities (including station openings/closures). Such areas are associated with 
station openings/closures in sparse networks. 
The lack of evidence on option and non-use values poses some problems regarding 
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their implementation within an appraisal. This particularly relates to the treatment of 
which households hold the option and non-use value, the potential of double counting 
of the non-use value with other elements in the appraisal and how the values vary with 
transport quality and quality or size of the employment/service centre. This combined 
with the need to build up the existing evidence base forms the future research agenda 
for this field. As discussed above, option values are just one form of risk premium. 
Risk premia are also expected to exist for other types of infrastructure. Chapters 4, 5 
and 6 present a stated preference study conducted in the Outer Hebrides with one of 
its aims to elucidate the difference in risk premia between a fixed link and a ferry. 
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4 ISLAND SURVEY DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter and Chapters 5 and 6 is in researching whether risk premia 
exist for ferries and fixed links and whether evidence for significant scheduling costs for 
ferries can be found. These were two of the evidence gaps identified in Chapter 2, 
which also presented a theoretical justification for the inclusion of scheduling costs and 
risk premia in a cost benefit analysis. It has already been seen in Chapter 3, that 
option values, one of the forms of risk premia, are important to the economic benefit of 
rail projects in sparse networks in peripheral regions. This chapter and chapters 5 and 
6 are therefore interested in whether risk premia are important for the appraisal of other 
types of infrastructure and whether scheduling costs are also important. The role of 
this chapter in that analysis is to describe the design of a stated preference survey that 
goes part way to filling this evidence gap. The results and analysis of the survey are 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6. A stated preference survey of willingness to pay is 
used as it allows both values for risk premia and scheduling costs to be derived. The 
two alternative methods - activity based travel analysis, as discussed in Chapter 2, and 
an ex-post analysis of traffic flows (e.g. Brathen and Hervik, 1997) - would only allow 
an estimate of scheduling costs to be derived and not that of risk premia. Furthermore 
the data requirements for both alternative methods, particularly the need for good 
quality origin-destination data, are beyond the scope of this research to collect. 
Two stated preference surveys were administered: one to makers of long distance trips 
and one to makers of short distance trips. This is because there is an a priori 
expectation that long and short distance trips will have different attitudes to scheduling 
costs. For example, the requirement for evening and night time services on a strategic 
route is probably limited. This contrasts with a route that serves as a link between a 
small island community with limited services and employment opportunities where 
evening and night time services could well be highly valued. One survey therefore 
focused on longer distance trips between the larger islands in the Outer Hebrides and 
examines scheduling costs only. This involved a self completion questionnaire which 
travellers on the Sound of Harris and Sound of Barra ferry services completed. The 
second survey focused on local trips to/from islands in the Outer Hebrides recently 
connected with a fixed link to a neighbouring island and examines both scheduling 
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costs and the difference in risk premium between a fixed link and a ferry. This was a 
face-to-face household survey administered to residents of the islands of Berneray, 
Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay. The questionnaires were piloted as pa rt of the design 
process. Figure 1.2 and Figure 4.1 illustrate the location of the islands and ferry 
services surveyed. 
Figure 4.1: Location of fixed link and ferry case studies 
Source: Google maps (http://maps.google .co.uk/maps?hl=en&tab=wl) [accessed 5th June 2008] 
The surveys were financially supported by the Scottish Executive. Caledonian 
MacBrayne, the ferry operator, also supported the surveys by permitting free travel for 
survey enumerators. This support enabled a far larger survey than could otherwise 
have been undertaken. Despite this support the survey budget was still relatively 
small. Consequently the face-to-face interview element of the survey focussed 
exclusively on households and did not include business interviews, whilst the survey 
length was deliberately kept short to maximise the number of interviews that could be 
undertaken in a day. 
The design of the inter-island ferry survey is discussed next, followed by the household 
survey. The final section of the chapter sets out some of the administrative details of 
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the survey. Example questionnaires are contained in Appendices Band C. 
4.2 Inter-island ferry survey methodology and design 
The inter-island ferry survey focused exclusively on scheduling costs as reflected by 
operating hours and frequency of service. It was also set within the context of the 
journey in which the respondents are intercepted - either the Sound of Harris crossing 
(duration 1 hour) or the Sound of Barra crossing (duration 40 minutes). Both ferries 
provided a comfortable environment in which travellers could be intercepted and issued 
a self-completion questionnaire. 
The survey consisted of four parts. The first part obtained background information on 
the journey: origin, destination, journey purpose, group size, ticket type, ticket price, 
who paid for the ticket, nights away from home and vehicle type. The second part 
obtained information about the planning of the journey including decision-making and 
departure times, whilst the third part contained eight stated preference questions. The 
final part of the questionnaire requested data on the respondent including gender, age 
and income. The survey could be completed in approximately 10 minutes. 
Methodology and model 
The approach adopted to surveying the value of a marginal change in transport related 
scheduling constraints was a direct survey of willingness to pay. As discussed in 
chapter 2 such a survey does not uniquely identify the marginal value to the individual 
of undertaking activities at a more appropriate time or of transferring time between 
activities. This is because neither the scheduling of activities, the duration of activities 
or the activities themselves is modelled. Instead the approach values the costs of the 
transport imposed constraints on activities. In the context of the Sound of Harris and 
Sound of Barra ferry services such constraints are frequency and operating hours 
(Grangeston Economics, 2003 p.46). It is therefore hypothesised that utility associated 
with a ferry trip can be expressed as in equation 4.1. 
(4.1) 
where U:rry is the utility that individual q (belonging to population segment k) 
receives from the ferry service j. f(H) is a function in headway, g(OH) is a function 
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in operating hours and h{P} is a function in price (fares). a k is the population segment 
specific intercept for the ferry service, arising from its unobserved attributes. In this 
model specification this includes journey time and comfort. Pk' X/( and ;/( are 
population segment specific utility parameters associated with headway, operating 
hours and price respectively. Eqj is a random term that is independently and identically 
distributed (110) over individuals (q) and alternatives (j) and can be thought of as 
representing taste variation between individuals. 
As mentioned in section 2.4 there is limited evidence on the value of headway and 
increased operating hours· for ferry services. What data that is available is 
international, typically relates to long (international) distance trips and does not reflect 
restrictive operating hours (e.g. Daly et al., 1998; COWl et al., 1999; FTC, 1998; 
Brathen and Hervik, 1997). This dearth of evidence poses a challenge for the 
development of the stated preference games, as the games typically are only able to 
recover values within a particular range. Having an a priori understanding of what the 
likely values will be is therefore an important input to the survey design. Consequently, 
the approach adopted is to use what evidence that is available, including evidence from 
the bus, rail and air sectors (see Table 2.1), to develop a broad range of target values 
to be used in developing the stated preference games in the pilot survey11. This range 
is presented in Table 4.1. This range is particular large as it covers all trip purposes 
both work and non-work. The pilot survey is then used to adjust this range, though in 
practice it only resulted in reducing the minimum value of operating hours (from 4.2 to 
11 Headway range: Minimum value of headway is 2 in-vehicle-time (IVT) mins per 60 
mins of headway; maximum value of headway 43 IVT mins per 60 mins of headway 
(see Table 2.1). 
Hours of operation range: From Brathen and Lych (2004) an extension from an 18 hr to 
24 hr operational day and a reduction in headway from 30 minutes to 0 minutes is 
valued at 13.8 IVT mins (non-work non-city centre trips) (see Table 2.1). As the value 
of a reduction in headway of 30 minutes ranges from 1.0 to 21.S IVT mins, extending 
the hours of operation from 18 to 24hrs is worth anything between 0 IVT mins and 12.8 
IVT mins. This implies a range per hour closed from 0.0 to 2.1 IVT mins. A mid-point 
in this range is 1.0 which is taken to be representative of the minimum end of the hours 
of operation range, as it reflects of the value of an hour closed in the middle of the 
night. In the absence of other data the value of an hour closed during the day is 
assumed to have a maximum value five times this (Le. SIVT mins). 
Value of time: To convert the derived ranges to valuations they are multiplied by the 
value of time. From OfT (2007b) values of time for 200S are derived. A lower bound is 
taken to be 55% of the lowest average value (non-work other trips) derived from OfT 
(2007b) (Le. 4.73p/min), whilst the maximum value is taken to be 130% of the 
maximum value derived (Le. 54.83p/min - from car driver work trip). 
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1.4 pence per hour closed). 
Table 4.1: Target range of marginal values for the headway and operating hours 
(inter-island ferry survey) 
- Valuation (equivalent Valuation (pence) 
in-vehicle time ~ minutes) Ii 
Min Max Min Max 
Headway (1 min) 0.03 0.73 0.16 18.28 
Operating hours (1 hr closed) 1.0 5.0 4.2 274.14 
Inter-island stated preference game design and simulation 
The stated preference game for the inter-island ferry is set within a choice between two 
alternative ferries for the current journey. The starting point for the stated preference 
design is a main effects orthogonal design in four variables, each with four levels. The 
main effects design template was obtained from Kocur et al. (1982 cited in Wardman 
and Toner, 2004) and involves 16 experiments (questions). The starting design is 
orthogonal in differences in headway between the two ferry services on offer, 
differences in fare and the number of hours closed of each ferry service. This mixture 
of differences and absolute values of the attributes was chosen as it was felt that the 
value per hour closed may vary with the number of hours closed - with for example 
night time hours being valued less than late afternoon hours. As can be seen from 
Table 4.2 the levels chosen permit an examination of large changes in headway (up to 
3 hours) and large changes in operational hours (from a 24 hour service to a service 
that only operates between gam and 5pm). In developing the design from this starting 
point the values of each attribute were adjusted on a question by question basis to 
avoid dominant choices and to improve both the range of boundary values (Fowkes 
and Wardman, 1988) and the recovery of target values. The latter was tested through 
simulation 12.13. 
12 The utility of each ferry option is simulated using target values for the respective 
attributes, headway and hours closed, plus an error term - giving a utility specification 
akin to a random utility model. The error term is generated through the use of random 
numbers drawn from a probability distribution, the standard deviation of which is 
adjusted to ensure that the adjusted rho-squared statistic from the logit model 
estimation was less than 0.2. The simulated mode choice is the mode which offers the 
highest utility (Le. lowest disutility). This gives a set of simulated choices to each 
stated preference scenario, from which a logit model is estimated. The output from the 
model estimation is compared to the target values to see how well the stated 
preference design recovers attribute values within a certain range. The simulated 
sample was 40 completed sets of 16 stated preference scenarios (Le. 640 scenarios). 
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Table 4.2: Definitions of levels - inter-island ferry design 
Variables 
Difference In Ferry Ferry Difference In 
1- headway Service A Service B fare 
~ (mlns) Hours Hours (£ single) 
closed closed 
Levels 0 -120 0 0 +15.00 
1 -60 7 7 +7.00 
2 0 12 12 0 
3 -180 16 16 +22.00 
The final design is presented in Table 4.3. For the variables that are orthogonal in 
differences, headway and fare, the base variables are a four hour (240 minute) 
headway and a fare of £25. 
Boundary ray diagrams (Fowkes, 2000) and results from the simulation of 40 
respondents (each facing all 16 questions) are presented in Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. As can be seen from these tables and figures there is a good 
spread of boundary rays throughout our range of interest in both variables. The design 
also appears to recover well values of headway and hours closed at all levels of the 
anticipated range except at the absolute lower end of the expected range (in both 
headway and hours closed). The design has been based on fares for cars and vans. 
The final design for commercial vehicles and foot passengers (including cyclists and 
bus users) is just an inflation/deflation of the car and van fares. 
13 During the simulation phase of the survey design it was found that designs that 
included journey time as an additional variable could not recover values of time with an 
appropriate level of accuracy. This was attributed to the limited range of journey times 
that could be regarded as plausible by survey respondents and the high valuations 
attributed to other variables. The final design therefore did not include journey time as 
a variable. 
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Table 4.3: Inter-island ferry final design 
Scenario Inter-island Ferry A 
.. 
.J' - ~~- . 
" Inter-island Ferry B -
- -
- . 
-
. .• 
Headway r Hours Ferry Fare Headway Hours Ferry Fare 
I - , closed closed 
- Cars and Foot Lorries and Cars and Foot Lorries and . , , . , 
.. 
small vans passengers large vans small vans passengers large vans 
1 240 0 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 60 0 £21 .00 £4.20 £105.00 
2 240 0 £40.00 £8.00 £190.00 240 7 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 
3 240 0 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 60 12 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 
4 240 7 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 180 0 £35.00 £7.00 £170.00 
5 240 7 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 180 0 £31.00 £6.20 £150.00 
6 240 7 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 60 7 £40.00 £8.00 £190.00 
7 60 7 £30.00 £6.00 £145.00 240 7 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 
8 240 7 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 105 16 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 
9 120 12 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 120 0 £30.00 £6.00 £140.00 
10 220 12 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 120 7 £35.00 £7.00 £170.00 I i 
11 220 12 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 165 12 £26.00 £5.20 £125.00 
12 220 12 £31.00 £6.20 £150.00 60 16 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 
13 120 16 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 120 0 £47.00 £9.40 £230.00 
14 210 16 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 192 7 £25.00 £5.00 £125.00 
15 210 16 £20.00 £4.00 £100.00 110 12 £26.00 £5.20 £130.00 
16 120 12 £25.00 £5.00 £120.00 120 0 £26.00 £5.20 £125.00 
Note: 0 hours closed is a 24 hour ferry, 7 hours closed is 6am to 11pm, 12 hours closed is 7am to 7pm and 16 hours closed is 9am to 5pm. 
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Figure 4.2: Boundary value ray diagram for headway - inter-island ferry survey 
(cars and vans) 
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Figure 4.3: Boundary value ray diagram for numbers of hours closed - inter-
island ferry survey (cars and vans) 
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Table 4.4: Recovered value of headway values - inter-island ferry survey (cars and vans) 
- , Headway Recovered value in: 
-
Percentage : 
, .. target Simul- Simul- Simul- Simul- Simul- Average difference "':~ , value ation 1 ation 2 ation 3 ation 4 ation 5 from target , 
- (p/min) 
Low values (hours closed = 4.73p/hour closed) 0.16 0.41 0.43 0.40 0.28 0.21 0.35 121.1% i 
Low to mid values (hours closed = 93.64p/hour closed) 6.14 6.21 6.05 6.26 6.91 6.99 6.48 5.6% I 
Mid values (hours closed = 139.44p/hour closed) 9.22 8.44 9.97 9.35 8.48 9.68 9.18 -0.4% I 
Mid to high values (hours closed = 185.24p/hour closed) 12.30 11.36 13.64 11 .91 13.95 14.01 12.97 5.5% 
High values (hours closed = 274.14 p/hour closed) 18.28 15.70 18.01 15.37 22.60 15.36 17.41 -4.8% 
Note: Values in red italics are not Significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
Table 4.5: Recovered value of hours closed values - inter-island ferry survey (cars and vans) 
.. - Hours Recovered value in: Percentage 
, - closed difference - ,. Simul- Simul- Simul- Simul- Simul- Average 
. 
-
target ation 1 ation 2 ation 3 ation 4 ation 5 from target , 
value -
-
~.~ 
Low values (headway = O.16p/min) 4.73 9.99 8.76 9.34 4.17 3.16 7.08 49.7% 
Low to mid values (headway = 6.14p/min) 93.64 105.26 91 .15 83.68 103.63 89.38 94.62 1.0% 
Mid values (headway = 9.22p/min) 139.44 134.68 149.32 150.89 121 .00 144.57 140.09 0.5% 
Mid to high values (headway = 12.30p/min) 185.24 186.93 175.33 162.22 196.55 184.64 181 .14 -2.2% 
High values (headway = 18.28p/min) 274.14 234.50 289.41 238.94 315.47 254.85 ____ ~E)J3~~ _ -2.7% 
- -
Note: Values in red italics are not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
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Inter-island stated preference game - question framing and presentation 
The stated preference questions were included in the self-completion questionnaire in 
the format shown in Figure 4.4. The question was worded as follows : 
We would now like to know how you would react if the travel conditions 
were as described in the tables below. In each of the 8 situations 
presented, we would like you to indicate which type of ferry service you 
would prefer for THIS JOURNEY. If travelling on employer's business 
please bear in mind your company's travel policy. 
Figure 4.4: Sound of Harris Survey Card for Inter-Island Ferry Stated Preference 
Game 
Single Fare Frequency and hours of operation Choice (for your 
group) (Mon - Sat) Please tick one 
Ferry £31 .00 Every 3 hrs 40 mins 7am to 7pm 0 Service 1 E.g . Sailings at: 0700, 1040, 1420, 1800 
Ferry £25.00 Every hour 9am to 5pm 0 Service 2 E.g. Sailings at: 0900,1000, 1100, .... etc .... , 1500, 1600 
The pilot survey also helped inform the design of the question in that example sailing 
times are included to aid the respondent in distinguishing the implications of different 
combinations of frequency and operating hours, as this had been a problem in the pilot. 
The 'baseline' operating hours - a 12 hour operating day (7am to 7pm) - also differ from 
those in the pilot as it was felt that the 8 hr operating day (9am to 5pm) used in the pilot 
tended to encourage some respondents into non-trading behaviour. The pilot survey 
also raised a number of issues associated with the wording of some of the non-stated 
preference elements of the questionnaire. These were relatively simple to address and 
ensured that the final questionnaire was straight forward for respondents to complete. 
Wardman and Toner (2004) suggest that good practice in the industry is to limit the 
maximum number of stated preference questions faced by a respondent to between 9 
and 16. Their analysis also indicates that the average number of questions faced by 
respondents in stated preference stUdies has been falling over time from 12.48 
between 1980 and 1988 to 10.13 between 1993 and mid-1996. To avoid respondent 
fatigue the stated preference design was therefore split into two random groups of 8 
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questions. In administering the survey, respondents were randomly allocated one of 
the two sets of 8 questions. 
4.3 Household survey methodology and design 
The purpose of the household survey was twofold . Firstly to elicit scheduling costs 
associated with local trips, as opposed to longer distance trips, and secondly to elicit 
the relative difference in risk premium values between a fixed link and a ferry. As in the 
inter-island survey, scheduling costs were elicited by directly surveying the willingness 
to pay for changes in transport scheduling constraints (ferry frequency and operating 
hours) at the trip level. As the risk premium, in the context of island communities, is 
primarily associated with the burden that uncertainty of access to employment, health 
and service opportunities places on households, it is not related to a household's 
existing use of the infrastructure or service. A different approach to that used to elicit 
scheduling costs is therefore needed, as the payment vehicle and question framing 
cannot be set within the context of a trip. As option values are a specific type of risk 
premium, the limited empirical work that has been undertaken in this field (see Chapter 
2 and Chapter 3) provides a starting point for the development of an appropriate survey 
methodology. The household survey therefore contained two stated preference 
designs. The first design (the local ferry stated preference game) focused exclusively 
on ferry scheduling costs, whilst the second design (fixed link stated preference game) 
supported by three contingent valuation questions examined whether a difference in 
risk premium exists between a fixed link and a ferry. The design of each of these 
questionnaire components is described separately below. 
Households were surveyed, for this particular aspect of the study rather than transport 
users, as one of the variables of interest, the risk premium, is unrelated with use. The 
sample unit is also the household, rather than individuals, because travel and 
expenses within a household are often shared - both in terms of budget and in terms of 
vehicle. Additionally, the council tax, one of the chosen payment vehicles, is a 
household expense. 
The household survey was administered through face-to-face interviews on the islands 
of Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay which have all recently been connected to 
one of the bigger islands in the Outer Hebrides by a fixed link. This is unusual in that 
for most stated preference experiments the respondents typically have most familiarity 
with the scenario depicted as the base or existing case - which in this survey is the 
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ferry infrastructure. This lack of realism in the base scenario in each stated preference 
game was felt to be outweighed by the benefits of surveying households who have had 
experience of both ferries and fixed link infrastructure. Such households are better able 
to appreciate the difference between the two types of infrastructure compared to those 
who have only experience of one type of infrastructure. With such an emotive subject 
as island transport links, people who have not got a fixed link may not appreciate how 
much they will depend on it, or conversely may think that it will give them more 
advantages than it does in reality. The questionnaire was designed such that no 
interview would last longer than 15 minutes. This was to ensure that householders 
would be willing to participate in the survey and to maximise the number of households 
the survey enumerators could visit during the survey period. 
Whilst risk premiums (and option values) are held by both households and businesses 
the present study, for the budgetary reasons outlined earlier, focused on those held by 
households only. In this regard the household questionnaire is set within the context of 
household travel for household purposes only (Le. non-work travel). 
Local ferry stated preference game - survey method and model 
Ideally scheduling costs associated with local trips should be obtained by intercepting 
and interviewing travellers on a ferry that serves such a market. However, there is no 
such ferry in the Outer Hebrides. Given the limited survey budget it was therefore felt 
that the best possible way to obtain such data would be to include it in the household 
survey, as the majority of households on Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay 
would have experienced the constraints of living with a lifeline ferry service until the 
recent completion of the fixed link to their island. 
Given the equivalence in the object of both the inter-island ferry stated preference 
game and this stated preference game (hereafter referred to as the local ferry stated 
preference game) a similar approach in design was adopted. The only differences that 
arise between the designs stem from the context in which the experiment is conducted 
and the definition of the sample. Thus whilst the inter-island ferry survey intercepted 
travellers on the ferry and administered a self-completion questionnaire, the local ferry 
survey was conducted by interview and the stated preference games were presented 
to interviewees on cards (one per stated preference question). The context of the trip 
in which the stated preference game is set differs, as higher frequencies, lower fares 
and shorter trip durations are associated with local ferries compared to inter-island 
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ferries. In all other aspects the stated preference games between the two surveys are 
identical (variable definitions, number of variables and number of levels and choice is 
between two ferry services)14. The model that is being estimated therefore has the 
same specification as that presented in equation 4.1 - that is utility is a function of 
unobserved attributes of the ferry, a function of headway, a function of operating hours 
and an error term that represents taste variation within a population segment. 
Local ferry stated preference game - design and simulation 
The starting point for the local ferry stated preference design is therefore the same 
main effects design from Kocur et al. (1982 cited in Wardman and Toner, 2004) that 
requires 16 experiments (stated preference scenarios) as used in the inter-island 
survey design. The values for each level differ from the inter-island design reflecting 
the potential for higher frequencies and lower cost of the local ferries since replaced by 
the fixed links. As can be seen from Table 4.6 the levels chosen once again permit an 
examination of large changes in headway (up to 3.5 hours) and large changes in 
operational hours (from a 24 hour service to a service that only operates between 9am 
and 5pm). 
Table 4.6: Definitions of levels - local ferry stated preference game 
Variables 
I· Difference In Ferry Ferry Difference In 
headway Service A Service B fare II (mlns) Hours Hours (£ single) 
11 closed closed 
Levels 0 -180 0 0 +8.00 
1 -120 7 7 +4.00 
2 0 12 12 0 
3 -210 16 16 +12.00 
The design was tested through simulation, with variable levels in individual stated 
preference scenarios being adjusted to avoid dominant choices and to improve the 
range of boundary values and the recovery of the target valuations. The range of 
target values derived from the literature is set out in Table 4.7. These have the same 
source as those in Table 4.1 except that the maximum value is determined by an upper 
14 In the pilot survey journey time was also included as a variable. However, it was 
found that respondents firstly queried the realism of the ferry times presented and 
secondly typically ignored them in their decision making. Journey time therefore was 
not included as a variable in the main survey. 
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limit to the value of non-work time (as opposed to work time). As mentioned earlier the 
pilot survey identified that the minimum value for operating hours maybe lower than 
indicated in this table at 1.4 pence per hour closed. 
Table 4.7: Target range of marginal values for the headway and operating hours 
(local ferry stated preference game) 
Valuation (equivalent Valuation (pence) 
in-vehicle time 
minutes) 
,. Min Max Min Max 
Headway (1 min) 0.03 0.73 0.16 9.3 
Operating hours (1 hr closed) 1.0 5.0 4.2 57.8 
The final design is set out in Table 4.8 for each of the 16 stated preference scenarios. 
Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6 demonstrate that the boundary rays are well spread out, 
though they do not cover the values at the higher end of the target ranges particularly 
well. This occurs as the emphasis in the design was placed on obtaining good 
coverage of the lower to mid ranges in the target range as this is where it is expected 
(and the pilot survey indicated) there is a higher probability that the values would lie. 
The design is tested through the simulation of responses from 40 respondents (each 
facing all 16 questions). For each pair of target values the simulation was undertaken 
five times. The results of these tests, in terms of the ability of the design to recover the 
target values are detailed in Table 4.9 and Table 4.10. In the main the design appears 
to recover the target values to a reasonable degree of accuracy, however, the design 
can be seen to be weaker at high values of headway and at very low and high values 
for each hour closed. 
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Table 4.8: Local ferry final design 
-Scenario Local ferry A Local ferry B 
Headway Hours Ferry fare Headway Hours Ferry fare 
(mlns) closed (return) (mins) closed (return) 
(hrs) (hrs) 
1 205 0 £7.00 60 0 £7.50 
2 180 0 £8.00 180 12 £7.00 
3 205 0 £5.00 60 7 £5.00 
4 205 7 £7.00 120 0 £13.00 
5 205 7 £5.00 120 0 £7.00 
6 205 7 £7 .00 30 7 £15.00 
7 60 7 £6.50 205 7 £5.00 
8 205 7 £7.00 60 16 £7.00 
9 180 12 £7.00 180 0 £9.00 
10 180 12 £7.00 60 7 £11 .00 
11 180 12 £7.00 120 12 £13.00 
12 180 12 £8.50 30 16 £7.00 
13 240 16 £7.00 240 0 £8.00 
14 240 16 £7.00 130 7 £9.00 
15 240 16 £5.00 60 12 £6.50 
16 180 12 £7.00 180 0 £7.50 
Note: 0 hours closed equates to a 24 hour ferry, 7 hours closed equates to one from 6am to 
11pm, 12 hours closed from 7am to 7pm and 16 hours closed from 9am to 5pm. 
Figure 4.5: Boundary value ray diagram for headway - local ferry stated 
preference game 
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Figure 4.6: Boundary value ray diagram for numbers of hours closed - local ferry 
stated preference game 
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Local ferry stated preference game - question framing and presentation 
9 10 
As mentioned earlier the stated preference scenarios were presented to interviewees in 
the form of one card per question (scenario) as illustrated in Figure 4.7. The question 
that supports this card is: 
I am now going to show you some more HYPOTHETICAL situations. 
This time I would like you to imagine that this island was still only 
connected to Harris15 by ferry. I will show you two types of ferry seNice, 
which differ in fares, frequency and hours of operation. 
In each situation I would be grateful if you could choose the ferry seNice 
that YOUR HOUSEHOLD would most prefer. 
15 Wording varied with island surveyed to reflect whether a bridge or causeway linked it 
to the neighbouring island and what that neighbouring island was. 
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Figure 4.7: Scalpay Survey Card -local ferry stated preference game 
OPTION A OPTION B 
II Vehicle Ferry Vehicle Ferry 
Vehicle size No restrictions No restrictions 
Fares £5.00 £6.50 
(vehicle and (return) (return) passengers) 
Frequency Every 4 hours Every hour (average) 
Opening Hours 
First ferry: 9am to First ferry: 7am to 
Last ferry: 5pm Last ferry: 7pm 
Example Sailing 0900, 1300, 1700 0700,0830, 0900,1000, ... etc .... , times 1700, 1800, 1900 
Choose one only A B 
The questions are set within the context of the household's preferred level of service 
provision to the island. This is because the pilot survey identified that householders 
responded in this way even when the question specifically focussed on a journey that 
had occurred in the preceding week. For example, in the pilot the context for one 
household was a shopping trip that was completed by 4 o'clock, however, rather than 
choosing the ferry service that best suited this trip the householder choose more 
expensive ferry options that included opening hours that far exceeded the 4 o'clock 
return time, as that would suite the household better in general. As with the inter-island 
example sailing times were included on the question card in the final questionnaire to 
help respondents understand the implications of the mixture of opening hours and 
service frequency, as this had also been a problem during the pilot. 
To ensure the total number of stated preference and contingent valuations questions in 
the household questionnaire is at the lower end of the recommended range of nine to 
sixteen questions; only four questions from the final design of sixteen are placed on 
each questionnaire. That is the final design of sixteen stated preference questions is 
split into four random groups of four questions, with each group of questions being 
randomly allocated to one quarter of the sample. 
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Table 4.9: Recovered value of headway values - local ferry stated preference game 
-Target Recovered value in simulation 
- , , ~ , Percentage 
< ~ . value difference r 
.' 
, 1 2 3 4 5 Average I';;: 
'" 
" 
~ , 
from target Q: ~ . " 
uo ~ _~. 
Low end of target range 0.70 0.60 0.90 0.83 0.44 0.59 0.67 -4.0% 
Low to mid part of target range 3.16 3.38 2.91 2.98 3.00 3.29 3.11 -1 .7% 
Mid part of target range 4.71 4.31 4.62 4.35 4.87 4.89 4.61 -2.3% 
Mid to high part of target range 6.26 5.30 5.97 6.27 5.69 6.47 5.94 -5.1% 
High end of target range 9.27 8.42 15.73 10.14 10.26 11 .07 11 .13 20.0% 
Note: All coefficients significant at 5% level 
Table 4.10: Recovered value of hours closed values - local ferry stated preference game 
Target Recovered value in simulation Percentage 
. ~~ value 1 2 3 4 5 Average difference jj .. ' ~ from target 
•. -,::-,> 
Low end of target range 5.00 6.19 6.79 5.21 9.03 7.08 6.86 37.2% 
Low to mid part of target range 20.88 21.33 23.84 20.49 18.33 25.13 21 .82 4.5% 
Mid part of target range 30.24 30.37 31 .33 28.28 32.22 33.21 31.08 2.8% 
Mid to high part of target range 39.61 34.71 39.85 33.89 32.67 43.08 36.84 -7 .0% 
High end of target range 57.79 56.03 99.77 62.65 55.07 83.52 71.41 23.6% 
Note: All coefficients significant at 5% level 
69 
Fixed link stated preference game - methodology and model 
The object of the second stated preference game in the household questionnaire 
(which is the third stated preference game developed as part of this study) - hereafter 
referred to as the fixed link stated preference game - was to elicit the difference in the 
risk premium value between a fixed link and a ferry. The risk premium in this context is 
not related to a household's existing use of a fixed link or ferry service. The study 
design cannot therefore be couched in terms of a specific trip. The design of this game 
has therefore taken as its starting paint the limited empirical work that has been 
undertaken on transport related option values. 
Following Bristow et al. (1991), Crockett (1992), Humphreys and Fowkes (2006) and 
Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee (2006) the Total Economic Value (TEV) of the transport 
good is separated into its component terms: actual use, option value (i.e. risk premium) 
and non-use value (Equation 4.2). By estimating the TEV and subtracting from it the 
actual use value an estimate of the sum of the option value (risk premium) and the non-
use value is obtained. Humphreys and Fowkes further disaggregate the non-use 
component of TEV into a number of components (e.g. indirect use, altruistic, etc.). 
Total 
Economic 
Value 
= 
Actual use 
value + 
Value of risk 
premium 
(option value) 
+ Non-use value (4 .2) 
Extending Equation 4.1 to include a function in journey time, I(T), the utility a 
household, h, in population segment k derives from a fixed link or ferry can be 
expressed as in equation 4.3. 
(4.3) 
Here the marginal utility of income for the household, ¢k ' is taken to be independent of 
the transport infrastructure, whilst the marginal utility of time, rk' is allowed to vary by 
infrastructure type reflecting, for example, the differing levels of comfort associated with 
travelling by the two modes. If all the use costs and activity scheduling costs 
associated with the ferry and fixed link are captured through the functions in headway, 
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hours closed, price and journey time then the marginal value of the alternative specific 
a ferry aFixedUnk 
constants (ASCs), _k_ and k , can be thought of as representing the sum of 
¢k ¢k 
the risk premium value and the non-use value. The risk premium is illustrated in Figure 
2.1 in Chapter 2. 
The two equations in (4.3) are not identified due to the presence of intercept terms in 
both equations. To estimate the utility functions it is necessary to re-arrange them as 
in Equation 4.4. In equation 4.4 the functions have been re-arranged to allow the 
difference in utility between the two alternatives (ferry and fixed link) to be calculated. 
The term a:iXedUnk-Ferry is the difference between the ferry and the fixed link intercepts. 
(4.4) 
a:ixedunk-Ferry can be estimated directly from a stated preference experiment in which 
respondents are asked to choose between the preferred form of connectivity to an 
island - a fixed link or a ferry. In practice care needs to be made in placing such an 
economic interpretation on estimated ASCs as to do so means it is necessary to 
ensure that all use costs are explicitly included in the utility function and that there is no 
mis-specification of the function. Clearly unobserved attributes of the ferry or fixed link 
will bias the ASC away from the sum of the risk premium value and the non-use value, 
whilst a mis-specification of the utility function (including an inappropriate treatment of 
the error term in the estimation) can bias all estimated coefficients (Bates and Terzis, 
1997; Hensher and Greene, 2003). Such requirements are very arduous and as a 
consequence, industry practice typically avoids, where possible, placing an 
interpretation on the ASC. 
Unfortunately the two alternative approaches to estimating option values adopted in the 
literature, and used respectively by Humphreys and Fowkes (2006) and Geurs, Haaijer 
and van Wee (2006), cannot be adopted in this study. The approach adopted by 
Geurs, Haaijer and van Wee is consistent with strategies adopted in the environmental 
economics literature (e.g. Mitchell and Carson, 1989 pp.288-292) in that the sample is 
split into non-users, option users and users, with the particular valuations from the 
different population segments being attributed to the different motives for valuing the 
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good (non-use, option use and actual use). This was particularly effective for Geurs, 
Haaijer and van Wee as they considered a rail line which some people had never used 
and never intended to use (the non-users), others did not use but might use at some 
point (the option users) and others who did use the service (the users). For the present 
study this approach is unworkable as the transport link being valued is a lifeline link for 
which all people are users. The approach used by Humphreys and Fowkes in contrast 
is workable but would have required a much larger survey programme than was 
available. This is because Humphreys' and Fowkes' method estimates option and non-
use values for a specific infrastructure. As the present interest is the difference in the 
risk premium value between a ferry and a fixed link, the application of Humphreys' and 
Fowkes' approach would necessitate surveys in two locations - one with an existing 
ferry and one with a fixed link. Survey resource constraints meant that this was not 
possible. 
Instead the approach of the present study is to base an estimate of the sum of the risk 
premium value and the non-use value on the difference between the value of the ASCs 
of a fixed link and a ferry. This is estimated through stated preference questions in 
which respondents are asked to choose between a ferry and a fixed link. Given the 
noted weaknesses in this approach two contingent valuation (CV) questions are also 
asked. The CV questions act as a validation of the stated preference results as well as 
allowing respondents to express their true willingness to pay. 
The present study does not separate the risk premium value from the non-use value. 
Primarily this is because the disaggregation process increases the complexity of the 
questionnaire and therefore lengthens it. Humphreys and Fowkes disaggregate 
between the option value (risk premium) and the different components of the non-use 
value by using three variables as proxies for the different non-use components. This is 
because Bristow et al. (1991) had found respondents experienced difficulty valuing the 
non-use component separately from the use component for a transport good (in 
contrast to the literature on environmental goods). Using proxy variables significantly 
increases the burden on the respondent and the length of the questionnaire. To 
ensure the difference in the ASCs estimated reflect differences in risk premium and not 
use values the ferry proposed as an alternative to the bridge was free, there were no 
vehicle restrictions and it provided a high quality half hourly service16• 
16 saw (2003) identified that substantial financial savings were made as a 
consequence of the construction of the untolled fixed links (an average of £830 per 
household on Scalpay). In the main these savings come from no longer having to pay 
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An important component of a stated preference valuation study is the choice of 
payment vehicle. For the fixed link stated preference survey the payment vehicle 
cannot be associated with use (such as a toll) as the risk premium (in this context) and 
non-use values are not associated with use. Council tax was chosen as the payment 
vehicle because of its lump sum nature and its relationship between local services and 
local taxation. The council do subsidise local transport services - for example the old 
ferries to Eriskay and Vatersay were operated by the council - so this linkage is familiar 
to respondents. The difficulty with using an existing form of local taxation, such as the 
council tax, as a payment vehicle is that the payment vehicle is associated with 
opinions the respondent may hold towards the local council and, as such, this can 
introduce a bias into the data. Alternative options to council tax would have been a 
form of infrastructure fund. The infrastructure fund would represent an unknown 
funding process to households and would therefore add to the complexity of the 
questionnaire. These disadvantages were felt to outweigh its advantage of not being 
associated with local authority's decision making and therefore it was rejected as a 
payment vehicle. 
A further consideration was whether to associate a council tax premium with the fixed 
link (willingness to pay) or a council tax reduction with the ferry (willingness to accept). 
It could be argued that the later would present a more realistic scenario to the 
respondent, in that no council tax premium has been associated with the construction 
of the fixed links. However, the interest of the study is in willingness to pay for an 
improvement in transport quality as would be used in a cost benefit analysis of a fixed 
link, rather than the compensation necessary for a loss in quality, such as the loss of a 
bridge. This would suggest that the willingness to pay measure is the correct measure. 
Furthermore there are strong theoretical and practical reasons why willingness to pay 
and willingness to accept measures may differ (for a discussion see Mitchell and 
Carson, 1989 pp.30-38; Bateman et al., 2002 pp.24-28 & pp.385-391). For example, 
questions have been raised regarding the plausibility of the willingness to accept 
ferry fares, but also derive from access to cheaper goods and services and 
employment. Clearly such financial benefits reflect the minimum a household would be 
willing to pay for a fixed link if presented with a ferry service similar to that which used 
to serve the islands. By presenting respondents with a high quality ferry (no vehicle 
restrictions and a half hourly frequency) that was free at the point of use such financial 
savings would be minimised or zero. This would ensure any premium associated with 
the fixed link over the ferry, aside from user costs associated with a 30 minute 
headway and a 15 minute journey time increase, relates to the risk premium and non-
use value {e.g. altruistic, bequest, etc.}. 
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question to respondents, whilst prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
emphasises that gains and losses maybe valued differently. A council tax premium is 
therefore associated with the fixed link in the stated preference scenarios. This 
premium is couched both in terms of a weekly payment and an annual payment to help 
the respondent understand the financial implications of the premium. This is because 
the pilot survey identified that when respondents were faced with only a weekly 
payment they did not appreciate the full financial implications of their choice. The 
council tax premium was also accepted by respondents without difficulty in the pilot 
survey. 
Stated preference game design and simulation - fixed link stated preference study 
As simple a model as possible is proposed so as to minimise model mis-specification 
errors. Such errors make it difficult to place an economic interpretation on the ASC. 
Between the stated preference questions the properties of the ferry are therefore kept 
fixed aside from opening hours 17, whilst the properties of the fixed link are kept fixed 
aside from the Council Tax premium. The model to be estimated therefore has the 
form set out in Equation 4.5. 
(4.5) 
UFixedLink _ aFixedLink-Ferry + AI h(P) + eFixedUnk 
h - k 'f'k h 
Some use costs associated with travel time differences and the half-hourly headway of 
the ferry are included in the intercept term (a:ixedLlnk-Ferry). The intercept term 
represents the difference in the fixed link and ferry's ASCs. To estimate the sum of the 
risk premium and non-use value these use costs need to be deducted from the value of 
the intercept term. Estimates for headway costs are obtained from the local ferry 
stated preference deSign, whilst estimates for the journey time costs are obtained from 
the contingent valuation question on journey time. 
17 The shortness of each of the crossings meant that it is not possible to offer a 'fast' 
ferry option that would reduce the journey time advantage of the fixed link over the 
ferry. In each scenario presented the fixed link therefore has a 15 minute advantage 
over the ferry, which broadly comprises of several minutes wait time, several minutes 
boarding time (including fare collection) and 7 to 8 minutes crossing time. A fast ferry 
may only have reduced this total journey time by ferry by a few minutes. This is 
consistent with the ex-ante appraisal of the Berneray Causeway (Halcrow Fox, 1996) 
used as a case study in Chapter 9. 
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The target range for the marginal values are the same as those used for the local ferry 
stated preference design (see Table 4.7), with the addition that the target range for the 
risk premium is £41 to £190. Given that the payment vehicle in the fixed link stated 
preference survey is annual council tax premiums these target values need adjusting to 
an annual basis (to reflect annual use costs). Such an adjustment is presented in 
Table 4.11 . 
Table 4.11: Target range of marginal values - fixed link stated preference game 
Valuation 
Minimum Maximum 
Main survey (annual for 2 return trips per week, 50 week year) 
Alternative specific constant (ASC) of fixed £152 £937 
link relative to ferry 
Operating hours (1 hr closed) £4 £116 
Main survey (annual for 10 return trips per week, 50 week year) 
Alternative specific constant (ASC) of fixed £758 £4 ,686 
link relative to ferry 
Operating hours (1 hr closed) £21 £578 
Main survey (annual for 15 return trips per week, 50 week year) 
Alternative specific constant (ASC) of fixed £1,136 £7 ,029 
link relative to ferry 
Operating hours (1 hr closed) £32 £867 
Note: Minimum value of time used is 4.73 p/min/trip; headway 0.16 p/min/trip; operating hours 
2.1 p/hr/trip and option value plus non-use value £41 per year. Maximum value of time used is 
12.64 p/min/trip; headway 9.3 p/min/trip; operating hours 57.8 p/hr/trip and option value plus 
non-use value £190 per year. 
An important point emphasised by the lower rows of Table 4.11 is that households with 
the same unit values per trip, but exhibiting very different trip making characteristics, 
have very different annual valuations. These annual valuations can, for high trip-
making households, be very large. Analysis indicated that to set boundary values to 
recover such values would require very high levels of council tax. To ensure a degree 
of realism to the survey the council tax premium was limited to a maximum of £1,000. 
For all households on Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay, except two, this would 
represent at least a doubling of council tax (e.g. from £750 to £1,750) and for some it 
would represent a tripling (e.g. from £455 to £1,455). 
The final design is set out in Table 4.12 for each of the 16 stated preference scenarios. 
The starting point was a main effects design for two variables with four levels each 
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from Kocur et al. (1982 cited in Wardman and Toner, 2004). Such a design requires 
16 experiments (stated preference scenarios). As can be seen from Figure 4.8 and 
Figure 4.9 the boundary rays are well spread but only really cover the mid and lower 
annual values detailed in Table 4.11. It can also be seen that, aside from one 
incidence, the hours closed boundary rays do not cross (see Figure 4.9). The lack of 
intersecting boundary rays weakens the design in its ability to recover the target values 
for hours closed. These two weaknesses are borne out by the simulation results (see 
Table 4.13 and Table 4.14) which indicate that the design performs well at recovering 
values for the ASC and each hour closed that lie within the middle and lower part of the 
target range. However, the design does not appear to be able to recover very low 
values for each hour closed (£5 per hour), nor can it recover high values for either the 
ASC (greater than £1,200) or each hour closed (greater than £100 per hour). In the 
main this is felt to be a consequence of restricting the maximum council tax premium to 
£1,000 to maintain realism. It was considered unlikely that many households would 
hold such high values for the ASC and each hour closed when considered against net 
household incomes and average household expenditure on transport 18. The design 
was therefore considered appropriate, but given the potential that a household's 
willingness to pay may lie outside the range the design can recover one of the 
contingent valuation questions was designed to corroborate the stated preference 
results. 
18 In 2005-6 transport comprised 14% of average household expenditure in Britain 
(ONS, 2007). For a household with a net income after deductions of £ 15,000 
household expenditure on transport is therefore in the region of £2,100. 45% of 
households in Scotland have a net income of £15,000 or less (Scottish Executive, 2007 
Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.12: Fixed link stated preference game - final design 
Fixed link Local ferry 
Scenario 
Council Tax Opening hours(no.of hours closed) 
1 £300 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
2 £180 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
3 £120 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
4 £20 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
5 £1,000 6am to 11pm (7 hrs) 
6 £800 6am to 11pm (7 hrs) 
7 £350 7am to 7pm (12 hrs) 
8 £60 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
9 £1,000 7am to 7pm (12 hrs) 
10 £800 7amt07pm (12hrs) 
11 £220 24 hrs (0 hrs) 
12 £150 7am to 7pm (12 hrs) 
13 £600 9am to 5pm (16 hrs) 
14 £800 9am to 5pm (16 hrs) 
15 £300 9am to 5pm (16 hrs) 
16 £100 9am to 5pm (16 hrs) 
Note: The fixed link is untolled and 15 minutes quicker than the ferry. There are no vehicle 
restrictions on the ferry, no ferry fare and the ferry operates at half hourly intervals. 
Figure 4.8: Boundary value ray diagram for the alternative specific constant -
fixed link stated preference game 
£1,200 -,---------------------------
u ; 
'u 
~ £1 .000 
f/)_ 
Q) E .~ ::l 
- c::: ns c::: E ns 
Q) ... 
:: Q) 
< Co 
"'41 0-
.... -Q) c::: 
:::2 ns jij1ii 
> c::: ~8 
ns 
"'C 
c::: 
:::2 
o 
m 
£800 
£600 
£400 
£0 £20 £40 £60 £80 £100 £120 £140 
Value for each hour closed (£ per annum) 
77 
Figure 4.9: Boundary value ray diagram for numbers of hours closed - fixed link 
stated preference game 
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Table 4.13: Recovered value of ASe of fixed link relative to ferry • fixed link 
stated preference game 
Target value for modal constant of fixed link relative to 
ferry (£ per annum per household) 
100 400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 
Target value per 5 157 387 824 686 1,140 2,148 
hour closed (£ per 20 164 391 890 1,062 1,235 2,854 
annum per 
household) 50 134 351 762 991 1,645 2,800 
100 75 366 896 1,461 1,023 895 
200 124 504 Model failed to converge 
Note: Recovered values in italics are not significantly different from zero at 5% level 
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Table 4.14: Recovered value for each hour closed - fixed link stated preference 
game 
-~ Target value for modal constant of fixed link relative to 
ferry (£ per annum per household) I! 100 400 800 1,200 1,600 2,000 
Target value per 5 3.0 7.4 1.1 58.8 19.3 -38.3 
hour closed (£ per 20 16.4 18.3 12.6 17.0 33.6 -16.3 
annum per 
household) 50 41 .6 66.5 61.9 48.5 71.5 14.3 
100 131.8 102.3 84.3 85.9 66.3 78.5 
200 158.9 174.9 Model failed to converge 
Note: Recovered values in italics are not significantly different from zero at 5% level 
Question framing strategy - Fixed link stated preference game 
The stated preference questions were presented to respondents in the form of a card 
(see Figure 4.10) from which they choose their preferred option . The question was 
worded as follows: 
I am now going to show you a number of HYPOTHETICAL situations. 
I would like you to imagine the situation before the bridge was constructed 
but YOUR HOUSEHOLD could choose whether this island was to be 
connected to Harris with a FREE ferry or with a bridge 19. However, as the 
bridge has to be constructed by the local council, council tax must go up to 
pay for it. 
In each situation I would be grateful if you could choose the transport and 
council tax option that YOUR HOUSEHOLD would most prefer. 
As with the local ferry stated preference design the final design of 16 questions was 
split into four groups of four questions at random. Each set of four questions was 
administered to quarter of the sample. A fifth question was added (which was common 
across the complete sample). This question attached a low council tax premium to the 
fixed link (£0.50 per week) and acted as a dominant choice logic check. Importantly it 
also gave householders a means to express their strong approval for the replacement 
of the ferry with a fixed link. 
19 Wording varied with island surveyed to reflect whether a bridge or causeway linked it 
to the neighbouring island and what that neighbouring island was. 
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Figure 4.10: Scalpay Survey Card for Fixed Link versus Ferry Stated Preference 
Game 
OPTION A OPTION B 
(Vehicle Ferry) (Brldge19) 
-
Funding Fully subsidised through council Constructed by the council tax 
Vehicle size No restrictions No restrictions 
Journey time --- 15 minutes quicker than ferry 
Fares/tolls No fares No tolls 
Frequency Half Hourly ---
Opening Hours 
First ferry: 
7am 7pm 24 hrs 
Last ferry: 
Existing 
Council Tax As existing + £15.38 per week 
(£800 per year) 
Choose one only A B 
Contingent valuation question design 
Three contingent valuation questions were included in the questionnaire. The first two 
were set within the context of the stated preference games and therefore the answers 
could be used to corroborate the stated preference results. The third question related 
to the value of a journey time saving. It was necessary to understand the value of time 
as this formed one of the elements of user cost comprising the difference in TEV 
between the fixed link and the ferry. 
A number of different approaches are available for eliciting monetary values with 
contingent valuation (for a discussion see Mitchell and Carson, 1989 pp.97-104; 
Bateman et al., 2002 pp.135-145). Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. 
The format chosen is an 'open-ended direct' question followed up by a question to 
determine the reason for any zero response. If respondents have difficulty replying to 
the open ended question, as some did in the pilot survey, an iterative bidding approach 
starting at bids of £0.50 per week (£26 per year) is adopted. That is the householder is 
asked if they would be willing to pay £26 per year, and if they said yes they would be 
asked if they would be willing to pay £52 per year, and so on. 
The main advantage of using an open-ended direct approach to elicit willingness to pay 
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is that it is straight forward and does not provide respondents with cues about what the 
value of the change might be. There is no starting point or anchoring bias. Its main 
weakness is that it can be difficult for respondents to come up with their true 
willingness to pay 'out of the blue' for something they are not familiar with valuing. This 
can lead to high non-response rates, protest answers, zero answers and outliers. As 
the contingent valuation question followed a set of stated preference questions 
respondents already have some familiarity with the task at hand. It is therefore felt that 
within this context the strengths of the open-ended question outweighed its 
weaknesses. Despite the familiarity from the stated preference questions some 
respondents experienced difficulty answering the open-ended question, in which case 
an iterative bidding game is adopted. This is easy for respondents to answer as it is 
similar to the process of an auction. Its main weakness is in the possibility of starting 
point bias occurring. That is the outcome of an iterative bidding game can be heavily 
influenced by the starting bid. For this reason the starting bid was very low (£0.50 per 
week) to ensure that any value elicited would be a conservative estimate of willingness 
to pay. Alternatives to the iterative bidding approach would include the use of a 
payment card or ladder or dichotomous choice questions. The iterative bidding 
approach was preferred as whilst the payment ladder approach is not subject to 
starting point bias it is subject to other biases. These relate to the values presented to 
the respondent. This, combined with the fact that the iterative bidding approach was 
more efficient for the survey enumerators to implement, meant the iterative bidding 
approach was preferred. Dichotomous choice questions are often viewed as being 
less open to bias than other types of contingent valuation elicitation approaches. They 
do not however provide the same level of information to the analyst as the alternatives, 
and it is for this reason that they are not used. Dichotomous choice questions only 
indicate whether willingness to pay is higher or lower than the amount presented in the 
question, much the same as the stated preference questions. Dichotomous choice 
does not therefore indicate maximum willingness to pay (as the other contingent 
valuation approaches do). 
A general concern with contingent valuation methods, and stated preference methods 
for that matter, is the hypothetical nature of the questions. Unlike real choices there is 
no obligation on the respondent to purchase the good. This can lead to study 
estimates of willingness to pay that exceed real willingness to pay. This is known as 
hypothetical bias. Meta-analysis by List and Gallet (2001) and a review by Harrison 
(2006) suggest that this overestimation occurs quite frequently. Two basic approaches 
have evolved to address the bias: these are known as 'cheap talk' and 'certainty'. In 
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the cheap talk approach respondents are read a script advising them of the potential 
biases that may occur. In the certainty approach a simple follow-up question is asked 
regarding how certain a respondent is that they would purchase the good at the price 
quoted - once they have expressed either their choice (in a stated preference 
question) or expressed their willingness to pay. Blumenshein et al. (2008) suggest that 
the certainty approach removes hypothetical bias, but that the cheap talk approach 
does not. Both methods are still quite experimental and represent ongoing research 
areas. Given that the main focus of the work is on the use of stated choice methods in 
a little researched area, rather than the enhancement of the stated choice methods per 
se, neither approach was adopted on grounds of complexity. Hypothetical bias may 
therefore be present in the results. To ensure that hypothetical bias is minimised 
survey enumerators are briefed to impress on respondents that extra council tax is a 
household expense, additional to existing household expenditure and would not be 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in income (e.g. pensions). The effect of 
hypothetical bias on estimates derived in this study represents an area for future 
research'. 
Contingent valuation question framing 
For the fixed link and local ferry contingent valuation questions the scenarios were 
presented to respondents in the form of a card, that had exactly the same design as 
the stated preference questions (see Figure 4.10). The value of time question was only 
asked orally. No card was given to support the value of time question, due to the 
relatively simple nature of the scenario considered compared to the local ferry and 
fixed link scenarios. The precise wording of the three contingent valuation questions is 
set out below. 
LOCAL FERRY CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTION 
I would now like to find out what the maximum amount YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD would be willing-to-pay in ADDITIONAL council tax if this 
island had a ferry linking it to Harris and that ferry service was improved. 
If the island had a free ferry operating for 12 hrs (from tam to 7pm) at a half 
hourly frequency, but through additional council tax contributions the 
service could be extended to 24 hrs. However to extend the hours of the 
ferry would require an increase in the subsidy from the council, therefore 
Council Tax would have to go up. 
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How much more Council Tax would you be willing-to-pay for such an 
improvement to the ferry service? 
FIXED LINK CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTION 
I would now like to find out what the maximum amount YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD would be willing-to-pay in ADDITIONAL council tax if this 
island had a free 24 hour ferry with a half hourly frequency, but through 
additional council tax contributions a bridge could be constructed. The 
increase in council tax would fund construction of the bridge. 
How much more Council Tax would you be willing-lo-pay to have a bridge 
constructed if it was to replace a free 24 hour ferry service with a half hourly 
frequency? 
VALUE OF TIME CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTION 
The value of time contingent valuation question was set within the context of the road 
either side of the fixed link being upgraded to deliver between a 10 and 20 minute time 
saving over a return trip between the householder's island and the nearest service 
centre on the neighbouring island2o• 
I would now like you to imagine a situation in which the road either side of 
the bridge had been improved at the same time that the bridge had been 
built. A return trip to Tarbet would have been 15 minutes quicker than it is 
today (i.e. 7.5 minutes quicker each way). 
If such a road improvement was funded through Council Tax what would be 
the maximum amount YOUR HOUSEHOLD would be willing-to-pay in 
ADDITIONAL council tax. 
Household survey background questions 
The background information collected in the household survey includes household car 
ownership, income, composition, the number and purpose of trips made by each 
member of the household over the fixed link in the previous week, and whether the 
household had experience of living on the island without a bridge. This data was 
20 10 minute return time saving for Eriskay and Vatersay, 15 minutes for Scalpay and 
20 minutes Berneray. 
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collected as it was thought these characteristics would affect the valuation a household 
may place on the fixed link. Ideally, a travel diary as utilised by Bristow et al. and 
Crockett would have been included, however, interview time constraints precluded this. 
Instead only the number of trips over the fixed link in the last week by each household 
member and trip purpose were collected. Data on pre-fixed link behaviour was not 
collected as SQW, in their 2004 survey of Scalpay and Berneray residents, found that 
the elapsed time between construction of the link meant that many households had 
difficulty re-collecting pre-fixed link behaviour. The downside of not collecting travel 
diary information or pre-fixed link crossing trip data is that no information is available on 
origins, destinations and trip durations of current trips and pre-fixed link trips - a point 
that will be returned to when interpreting the model estimations. A question on the time 
saving between the ferry and the fixed link was dropped from the final questionnaire 
after being tested in the pilot survey. The reason for this is that it produced a wide 
variation in responses, and the data was not needed in the model estimation process. 
Aside from that the pilot survey did not identify any other issues with the formulation of 
the background questions. 
4.4 Survey administration 
Passengers were intercepted on board the Sound of Harris and Sound of Barra ferries 
and householders were interviewed over a three week period between April 12th 2005 
and May 4th 2005. Four survey enumerators were used, two were locally based on the 
islands and two travelled out from the mainland. Three were briefed by myself and the 
fourth was briefed by one of the interviewers. Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 present a 
summary of the number of interviews completed, the target number of interviews and, 
for the inter-island ferry survey, the days of the week on which the interviews took 
place. 
Table 4.15: Inter-Island Ferry survey schedule and returns 
Route Days surveyed Interviews Target 
completed 
Sound of Barra VVednesday, Sunday, Monday 71 
-(bank holiday) (3 days) 
Sound of Harris Tuesday * 2, Saturday *2, 172 
-
VVednesday (5 days) 
Total 4 weekdays, 4 weekend days 243 80 
(incl. 1 Bank Holiday Monday) 
Note: All interviews undertaken between April 12th 2005 and May 4th 2005 
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Table 4.16: Household survey schedule and returns 
Island Interviews Target 
completed 
Scalpay 70 70 
Berneray 33 34 
Eriskay 28 33 
Vatersay 18 18 
Total 149 155 
Note: All interviews undertaken between April 12th 2005 and May 4th 2005 
The inter-island ferry received a much better completion rate than had been 
anticipated. Furthermore no problems were experienced during the survey. The 
following chapter, Chapter 5, describes the analysis of the inter-island ferry survey data 
and presents the surveys findings. 
A target of 155 households was set for the household surveys - which is approximately 
half the total number of households on the islands of Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and 
Vatersay. On the basis that it would not be possible to obtain a response from all 
households approached, all households on the island were included in the sampling 
strategy. The survey enumerators were therefore issued with a local map and address 
list (derived from the council tax register) and proceeded door-to-door on each island. 
The household surveys achieved a slightly lower completion rate than was initially 
targeted. This was due to problems experienced on Eriskay. On Eriskay a lot of the 
ferry alternatives were considered unrealistic by respondents due to the presence of 
skerries and reefs. These sea hazards restrict the operating hours and type of vessel 
used for any ferry service. This has a detrimental effect on the data from Eriskay as 
discussed in Chapter 6 - which presents the findings of the household survey. 
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5 INTER-ISLAND FERRY ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is scheduling costs for long duration trips which include a 
journey on a low frequency ferry. Scheduling costs, the costs that travel constraints 
place on activity schedules, are of great interest as they are additional to user benefits 
in a transport cost benefit analysis (see Chapter 2). If scheduling costs are found to be 
significant, this research has important implications for not only appraisals of 
enhancements to the services surveyed but also to other ferry services in Scotland. 
The surveyed Sound of Harris and Sound of Barra ferry services (see Figure 1.2 and 
Figure 4.1 for the locations) are themselves not particularly long (1 hour and 40 
minutes respectively), but the types of journeys that utilise them have long durations. 
The long durations arise as a consequence of the main population and service centres 
being distant from the ferry end points, dispersed populations in general, and high fare 
costs (typically £50 return for a car). A priori there is an expectation that scheduling 
costs for long duration trips will differ from local trips. This is because for long duration 
trips the day's activities focus around travel. Compared to local trips this leads to a 
larger degree of flexibility in departure time choice (i.e. lower valuations of 
headway/frequency) and less need for late night or early morning sailings - as the trip 
is timetabled for the middle of the day. For day return trips (e.g. a business trip) overly 
restrictive operating hours may prevent the possibility of completing the trip in a day 
therefore some sensitivity to opening hours is expected. 
The uniqueness of the analysis presented here arises from the focus on low 
frequencies (long headways) and restrictive hours of operation as perceived by 
travellers making trips of a long duration. The Sound of Harris service in the summer 
has either 3 or 4 sailings a day (dependent on the day of the week) over an 11 hour 
day, whilst in the winter it has 2 sailings a day over a 6 hour day. That is headways of 
around 3 hours. The Sound of Barra service on the other hand has 5 sailings a day in 
the summer and 4 in the winter and operates over an 11 hour day in the summer and 
slightly less in the winter. That is headways are around 2.5 hours. The ferries are 
small. The ferry that serves the Sound of Harris (see Figure 5.1) has a capacity of 36 
cars, whilst that which serves the Sound of Barra (see Figure 5.2) has a capacity of 18 
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cars. Total patronage on the routes in 2004 (the year before the survey) was 51 ,800 
passengers on the Sound of Harris route and 38,700 on the Sound of Barra route. The 
majority of this demand occurs in the summer months. Travellers were interviewed in 
April and May (i.e. when the ferries were operating on the summer timetable and when 
patronage was picking up after the winter). 
Figure 5.1: Sound of Harris ferry (the Loch Portain) 
Figure 5.2: Sound of Barra ferry (the Loch Bhrusda) 
87 
A self-completion questionnaire was issued to travellers on each of the ferry services. 
The stated preference scenarios presented travellers with ferry services that had 
headways ranging from 1 hour to 4 hours and operating hours from gam to 5pm to 24 
hours. The design of the stated preference questions (SP) has been presented and 
discussed in the preceding chapter, Chapter 4. The survey also complements the 
household survey which looks at scheduling costs for local trips, the analysis of which 
is presented in the following chapter, Chapter 6. 
This chapter is structured in the following manner. After this introductory section, the 
second section describes the dataset collected. The third section presents the 
econometric models estimated and discusses the evidence on the distribution of 
willingness to pay. The estimation strategy and results are presented in the fourth and 
fifth sections respectively, whilst the final section discusses these results in the context 
of cost-benefit analysis in sparse networks. 
5.2 The dataset 
252 inter-island ferry questionnaires were returned by respondents, of which 70% were 
collected from users of the Sound of Harris ferry and 30% from the Sound of Barra 
ferry. This places a slightly greater weight in the sample on Sound of Harris users as 
2004 annual patronage data indicates a 60:40 split between the two ferry services 
(Reference, 2006 Table 3.25). 77% of the returned questionnaires were from the 
car/LGV passenger questionnaire, 16% from foot/cycling/bus ferry passenger 
questionnaire and 7% from HGV ferry passenger questionnaire. These ratios are 
consistent with annual patronage data for the Sound of Harris ferry where commercial 
vehicle volumes are 11 % of car/LGV volumes (Grangeston Economics, 2003 Table 
2.7). 
The sample also reflects national evidence that men travel more than women, working 
age adults travel more than children and retired people and those with high incomes 
travel more than those with lower incomes. This is because in the sample two thirds of 
respondents are male, whereas women form 51 % of the population in the Outer 
Hebrides (GROS, 2008 Table UV03). Two thirds of respondents are also between the 
ages of 36 and 65 years old, whilst this group only comprises 52% of adults in the 
88 
Outer Hebrides (GROS, 2008 Table UV04). The median income group21 in the sample 
is £21,000 to £35,000 (gross annual household income). This is higher than the 
median household incomes reported in the household survey (see Chapter 6) and also 
implies a net (after tax) household income greater than the median for the Outer 
Hebrides (£13, 026i2• 
39% of those interviewed are travelling for work (employers' business), whilst 24% of 
respondents are on holiday. The remaining 37% are travelling for other non-work 
purposes. The high proportion of business traffic and the low proportion of commuting 
traffic (4%) are indicative of the strategic function of the ferry routes23. Annual 
patronage figures for the Sound of Harris suggest that visitor traffic (Le. holiday traffic) 
forms 50% of all vehicle trips (Grangeston Economics, 2003 Table 2.13). The sample 
therefore under represents this segment of demand. Primarily this is a consequence of 
the surveys being undertaken in late April and early May when the majority of the 
holiday traffic occurs in the summer months. Even so, at 24% of responses holiday 
traffic forms a sizeable proportion of the sample and is sufficient to allow tests 
examining whether such traffic holds different marginal valuations from other types of 
traffic. The relative proportions between business and other non-work traffic (51 :49) in 
the sample are similar to those found for the Sound of Harris (64:36) by Grangeston 
Economics in 2003 though the business proportion is lower. This is re-assuring as it 
suggests that there is no bias in the sample between business and other non-work 
journey purposes. 
Facts that once again emphasise the strategic and long distance nature of the ferry is 
that almost two thirds of respondents (63%) are spending 1 or more nights away from 
home, and frequency of use by users is low. For example for all the holiday makers 
this ferry trip was the first time they had travelled on either the Sound of Barra or Sound 
of Harris ferry, whilst for the business travellers and the other non-work travellers just 
under half use the ferries less than once a month. 
The majority of respondents (84%) planned their own journey, rather than having 
21 Just over 20% of respondents withheld their income. 
22 Source: 2003/4 Scottish Household Survey variable annetinc (MORI Scotland et a/. 
2005) 
23 Across the UK an average 13% of car traffic is business traffic and 25% is 
commuting traffic(DfT, 2007b Table 7). On the Skye Bridge 18% of total vehiclular 
traffic (including goods vehicles) is on employers business whilst just over 80% of 
vehicles are making non-work trips (DHC, 2007 Appendix C). 
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someone else plan it for them (e.g. work or a relative). This would suggest that 
respondents are capable of treating the stated preference elements of the 
questionnaire seriously. Almost all business travellers had their ticket paid for by their 
employer, whilst 25% of non-work travellers had their ticket paid for by someone else. 
This was usually the employer (for commute trips), family and friends, or the council 
(for concessionary travel). In the econometric analysis it is therefore important to 
examine whether those who do not have to pay the ferry fare themselves have a 
different attitude to cost. 
Despite the ferries on the respective crossings having a relatively low frequency (every 
3 hours) 80% of respondents were able to plan their trip around this and did not 
experience inconvenience in making their trip. A reflection of this is that only 11 % of 
respondents indicate they would change the number of nights spent away from home if 
a more 'ideal' timetable was available24• This is consistent with the a priori view that 
the journey the travellers are undertaking forms the major activity of the day and there 
therefore exists some flexibility in departure times. A comparison might be an air trip 
from a mainland location to central Europe. 
With eight SP questions per questionnaire and 252 returned questionnaires a potential 
2,016 responses to SP scenarios exist. Data cleaning however reduces this by 382 to 
1,634. Data is excluded where: 
Step 1: No response to SP question. This is because the reason for the non-
response cannot be determined. A valid reason for non-response would be 
that both ferry services offer equal value, however, as other reasons include 
not taking the survey seriously, these responses are excluded. 
Step 2: Respondent was a minor (under 18 years old). The reason for this is that the 
analysis is focussed on adults. 
Step 3: Respondent qualified for a concessionary fare (free travel for OAPs) and the 
two ferry fares in the SP scenario differed. This is because OAPs only get 
free ferry travel for a limited number of ferry trips. It is uncertain whether the 
respondent was travelling for free or had paid for their trip. This meant that 
only responses where the two ferries in the SP scenario differed in service 
quality only (no difference in ferry fare) are included in the analysis. 
Step 4: Group size is equal to or more than 5 (in adult fare equivalents: under 5 yrs 
24 Poor timetabling can mean that some travellers spend less or more time (including 
nights away from home) at their destination than they would wish in an ideal world. 
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old free, other children half price). This is because such parties include 
organised groups such as local football teams and school trips travelling by 
minibus. Such groups along with organised tour parties might be expected 
to behave differently from adult and family groups or business traffic - the 
focus of the analysis. Organised tour parties were not issued with 
questionnaires. 
Table 5.1 summarises the number of cases excluded by each of these steps. 
Table 5.1: Inter-island ferry dataset cleaning 
w 
Criteria for exclusion Number of Number of 
cases cases 
excluded remaining 
Total number of cases --- 2,016 
Step 1: No response to SP question 203 ---
Step 2: Respondent was a minor (under 18 years old) 16 ---
Step 3: Respondent qualified for a concessionary fare (free 67 ---
travel for ~APs) and the two ferry fares in the SP scenario 
differed. 
Step 4: Group size equal to or more than 5 (in adult fare 96 ---
equivalents: under 5 yrs old free, other children half price) 
Total cases excluded 382 ---
Total cases remaining 
---
1,634 
Note: coach tour parties and pre-paid excursions are excluded from survey at outset. 
Analysis of the SP responses indicates that 9 respondents (of the 252) choose the 
same ferry option in all 8 scenarios (e.g. Ferry A), whilst a further 10 choose the 
cheapest option (i.e. the lowest quality ferry) in each scenario and another 6 choose 
the most expensive option in each scenario (i.e. the highest quality ferry). The 
responses from these 'non-traders' (comprising 10% of the sample) are included in the 
model estimation. This is because they could be perfectly valid responses, albeit those 
who choose the same ferry option have not provided fully consistent responses 
between SP scenarios. Respondents are also included in the model estimation when 
the ticket price paid is significantly different from the prices faced in the SP scenarios 
and when better ferry times would mean a change in the number of nights spent away 
from home. 
To ensure that these respondents do not bias the model estimation process the models 
are firstly estimated including and excluding non-traders, and model structures that 
allow these respondents to hold different marginal utilities from other respondents are 
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examined. 
Table 5.2 gives further reassurance regarding the success of the survey, in that there is 
generally a good spread of respondents choosing either Ferry A or Ferry B in the 
stated preference (SP) scenarios. Neither ferry dominated the responses. This is 
good as it suggests that the design was successful in allowing people to trade between 
the lower cost alternative (usually Ferry A) and the alternative with the better service 
quality but higher cost (usually Ferry B). By comparing Table 5.2(a) and Table 5.2(b) it 
can also be seen that respondents travelling during the course of work typically prefer 
the ferry alternative with the better quality (and higher fare) than non-work travellers. 
This is expected as business travellers typically have higher marginal valuations of time 
and headway. 
Table 5.2: Responses to stated preference questions 
(a) By those travelling in the course of work 
SP Percentage of respondents choosing Percentage of returned 
Question Ferry A Ferry B questionnaires where question 
was not answered 
Qu . 1 36% 64% 4% 
Qu.2 30% 70% 9% 
Qu . 3 65% 35% 9% 
Qu.4 52% 48% 6% 
Qu. 5 56% 44% 9% 
Qu. 6 30% 70% 9% 
Qu.7 70% 30% 9% 
Qu . 8 50% 50% 11% 
Qu . 9 27% 73% 2% 
Qu.10 25% 75% 2% 
Qu.11 40% 60% 4% 
Qu. 12 52% 48% 4% 
Qu. 13 12% 88% 4% 
Qu.14 16% 84% 6% 
Qu.15 60% 40% 4% 
Qu.16 44% 56% 4% 
Average 41% 59% 6% 
Shaded cell identifies cheapest ferry option 
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(b) By those travelling for non-work purposes 
SP Percentage of respondents choosing Percentage of returned 
Question Ferry A Ferry B questionnaires where question 
was not answered 
Qu.1 27% 73% 9% 
Qu . 2 45% 55% 10% 
Qu. 3 64% 36% 9% 
Qu. 4 66% 34% 13% 
Qu.5 45% 55% 13% 
Qu.6 25% 75% 13% 
Qu.7 75% 25% 12% 
Qu.8 43% 57% 12% 
Qu.9 32% 68% 13% 
Qu. 10 22% 78% 18% 
QU. 11 77% 23% 14% 
Qu.12 81% 19% 17% 
QU.13 23% 77% 14% 
Qu.14 7% 93% 14% 
Qu. 15 90% 10% 14% 
Qu. 16 82% 18% 20% 
Average 50% 50% 13% 
Shaded cell identifies cheapest ferry option 
5.3 The econometric model and the distribution of willingness to pay 
Discrete choice models based in random utility theory are the dominant model form 
used to explain travel choices within the transport economic literature. Following Train 
(2003 Chapters 3 and 6). Hensher and Greene (2003) and Cirillo and Axhausen (2006) 
the properties of these models with reference to their application to these data are 
briefly recalled. 
Within random utility models the utility (U qi) derived by an individual q from travel 
alternative i comprises of an observed component Vqi and an unobserved term Gqi as 
follows: 
(5.1 ) 
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and x qi are observable variables that characterise the individual q and alternative i, 
whilst Q q is a vector of parameters relating these variables for individual q . 
A central tenet of the random utility model is that the probability of an individual q 
choosing alternative i from j alternatives is equal to the probability that utility is 
greater than that of the alternatives j (as in equation 5.2): 
Pqi = Pr ob((Vqi + cqi ) > (Vqj + Cqj )) for all j, j:;; i (5.2) 
By assuming that cqi is independently and identically distributed (110) with a type I 
extreme value (Weibull) distribution the probability Pqi that individual q will choose 
alternative i from j alternatives is: 
(5.3) 
This is the choice probability of the multinomial log it (MNL) model. For the present 
context a number of attributes of the data give rise to three limitations to this model 
form: 
(i) As each respondent answers eight different SP questions, the unobserved 
elements of each respondents utility (i.e. the Cqi) are correlated. This is known as 
the problem of repeated choices and violates the MNL condition of independence 
between cases. Correlations in Cqi between cases bias the standard errors of the 
coefficients downwards in an MNL, giving a false impression of the significance of 
the estimated parameters. 
(ii) Different respondents hold different marginal utilities for the attributes. Such taste 
variation can, in an MNL model, only be represented in a deterministic manner. An 
MNL model can for example reflect differences in the mean marginal utilities of 
different attributes by socio-economic category, but not the distribution of those 
marginal utilities. 
(iii) The data derives from three questionnaire types (car/LGV, foot and HGV) and as a 
consequence it is possible that the error variance in each of the datasets ( cql ) will 
have a different scale. For a joint estimation using all the datasets this violates the 
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MNL condition of homoscedasticity (identical variance) in all Eq/. 
A mixed logit (MXL) model resolves the first two of the identified problems associated 
with repeated choices and taste variation (Train, 2003 Chapter 6). Mixed logit models 
of course bring their own challenges, as will be discussed below. The innovation of the 
MXL model is that the observed component of utility Vq; (in equation 5.1) is assumed to 
have a distribution as expressed in equation 5.4. 
(5.4) 
where Vq;(n)= n'q xq; 
and the n'q parameters vary over individuals with density m(n). 
The third problem of merging data with different error variances (Le. hetroskedastic 
data) in a joint estimation can be resolved by using a nested logit model structure but 
with single alternative nests (Bradley and Daly, 1997). This 'trick' uses the estimated 
nest coefficient (9) to scale utility (Le. the coefficients and Eq/) to a common base. For 
the joint estimation of data from multiple questionnaire types, a base questionnaire is 
therefore chosen and each alternative from the other questionnaires is given its own 
nest. The nest coefficient (9) is common to each alternative from the same 
questionnaire. For the present context this means that respondents to each of the 
three questionnaires (car/LGV, foot and HGV) choosing between the alternatives Ferry 
A and Ferry B, gives four lower nests and two nest scaling coefficients (9CarIlGV and 
9HGV) (see Figure 5.3). 
The MXL can approximate any random utility model including the nested logit (Train, 
2003 Chapter 6). The Bradley and Daly (1997) scaling 'trick' to merge different 
datasets can therefore be employed in a MXL model. To approximate a nested log it 
the error components interpretation of the MXL model is adopted. In the context of the 
application of the Bradley and Daly trick to this study a dummy variable for each of the 
four 'nested' alternatives is introduced to the estimation. Within the MXL estimation 
each nest dummy variable is treated as random with a normal distribution of mean zero 
and a standard deviation (7 n (where n is the nest). For alternatives deriving from the 
same questionnaire (7n is forced to be equal during the estimation. In this application 
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Figure 5.3: Model structure for the merging of data from the foot, car/LGV, and 
HGV questionnaires 
Ferry AFoot Ferry BFoot 8Car/LGV 8Car/LGV 
Ferry AcarlLGV Ferry BCarlLGV Ferry AHGV Ferry BHGV 
Nest 1 Nest 2 Nest 3 Nest 4 
Within such a MXL model un is the 'scale' parameter. This scale parameter is not 
directly comparable with the Bradley and Daly scale parameter (8). To reconcile the 
tw025, following Batley, Toner and Knight (2004). the relationships developed by Ben-
Akiva and Lerman (1985 pp.289-290) between correlation between alternatives within 
a nest and the nest coefficient can be utilised26• The relationship is: 
(5.5) 
where Corr(U q/' U qj) is the correlation between the utility U for individual q of any two 
alternatives i and j in nest n and is given by: 
25 It is desirable to reconcile the MXL scale factor ( Un) and the Bradley and Daly scale 
factor (8) as the Bradley and Daly scale factor is much easier to interpret. If 8 is unity 
there is no scale difference between the different datasets. 
26 It should be noted that within this application no statistical or economic meaning 
should be attached to the correlation term in the Ben-Akiva and Lerman relationship. 
This is because correlation between alternatives within a single alternative nest Is 
nonsensical. In this application the Ben-Akiva and Lerman relationship Is just the 
medium through which the MXL scale factor (un) and the Bradley and Daly scale 
factor (8) can be compared. 
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(5.6) 
The final requirement for the employment of the Bradley and Daly trick in a MXL model 
is to identify the dataset with the lowest liD extreme error variance. This is because 
the MXL scale factor (t7n ) can only scale error variance downwards. The dataset with 
the lowest error variance forms the 'base' with the alternatives from the other datasets 
forming the nests. 
In estimating a MXL model there is a tremendous scope for interpretation by the 
analyst. The analyst has to choose the number of parameters that are allowed to have 
taste variation, the distributions assumed for these parameters and choose a preferred 
model from the several estimated. Whilst the analyst can systematically vary the 
model structure to test for taste variation on different parameters and which parameters 
have the most explanatory power, the lack of overall measures of goodness of fit for 
mixed logit models (Hess, Bierlaire and Polak, 2005; Hollander, 2006) make choosing 
the distribution function for taste variation difficult. 
The use of easily tractable distributions, such as the normal, can lead to significant 
proportions of the population being attributed a marginal utility with a counter-intuitive 
sign (e.g. positive for travel time). The normal distribution is also one of a class of 
distributions that are unbounded. That is, there is no limit to the size of the marginal 
utility of the attribute for which taste variation is to be estimated. Such properties are 
not particularly desirable in a model both from a theoretical and a practical perspective. 
For example, micro-economic theory indicates that travel time has a zero or negative 
marginal utility as it is either a leisure activity or an intermediate activity (for non-work 
travellers) and is as productive, or less productive, than normal work time (for business 
travellers). Hess, Bierlaire and Polak (2005) therefore strongly argue that negative 
marginal values of travel time are inconsistent with theory and primarily arise through 
model mis-specification. This mis-specification may of course result from a lack of 
explanatory power in the data. For example it may be difficult to separate out positive 
travel-experience attributes from that of travel time when the two are highly correlated. 
Unbounded distributions can also give rise to very large estimates of average marginal 
values. For example Cirillo and Axhausen (2006) find that a log-normal distribution 
(which is bounded at zero but unbounded in the positive tail) gives a mean between 5 
and 6 times the size of the median value for travel time savings. Such a large 
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discrepancy is problematic in a practical sense and also raises the question as to 
whether the nature of the distribution assumed can lead to mis-leading results -
something Hess, Bierlaire and Polak (2005) argue it can. 
The assertion that travel time cannot have a positive marginal utility, in the short term, 
has been challenged by Cirillo and Axhausen (2006). In the long term they argue that 
the time constraint will always bind and long run marginal utilities of travel time will be 
negative. In the short term the time constraint is unlikely to bind. This is because 
activity schedules are not optimised and "there is a large amount of buffer time and 
spontaneous activity performance in many persons' days" (Cirillo and Axhausen, 2006 
p.445). This would suggest at the minimum that a large number of people may have a 
zero marginal utility of travel time. Positive marginal utilities could also occur in the 
short term if a traveller wished to extend their journey because they "enjoyed the 
conversation with the passenger, liked cycling in the sun, dreaded the activity waiting at 
the end of the walk" (Ciri"o and Axhausen, 2006 p.445) or had a bad day at the office 
and needed more journey time to 'unwind'. Strictly speaking this is a confounding of 
the travel experience attribute with the travel time attribute. However, in these 
instances the travel experience attribute is unobserved and positive utilities for the time 
attribute can result from the model estimation. 
These arguments illustrate that the choice of the distribution function is not Simple, nor 
with the potential presence of mass pOints at zero will it naturally coincide with a 
relatively easy to estimate classic distribution function such as the normal, log-normal, 
uniform or triangular. A mass pOint in this context can be thought of as an Inflated 
probability of zero. Furthermore if fitting such a distribution function to a dataset, with 
say a mass point at zero, standard measures of overall model fit - such as maximum 
likelihood value - are not necessarily good indicators with which to choose between 
different model forms (Hess, Bierlaire and Polak, 2005; Hollander, 2006). Choice of 
model form therefore needs to be supported by a careful argument supporting the 
theoretical and behavioural rationale for the distribution function used. Endogenous to 
the problem of choosing the distribution function and choosing between model forms is 
the choice as to which attributes to assign taste variation to. The Identification of 
parameters exhibiting taste variation is an empirical matter, but the endogeneity of the 
problem means it is also dependent on the choice of model form and the choice of the 
distribution function. At the limit model identification issues can also imply restrictions 
on the number of parameters that can be specified as random. A comprehensive 
analysis of potential model variants is therefore also needed to support the choice of 
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the preferred MXL model. 
In the present context respondents make choices between two ferry services based on 
differences in three attributes fare, headway and operating hours. From a theoretical 
perspective any distribution for the marginal utility of cost is expected to give a 
distribution function that is always negative. A model that has positive marginal utilities 
of cost would imply that all else being equal respondents would always choose the high 
cost alternative despite the same service being available at a lower cost. This is 
implausible for rational acting economic agents as the difference in fare between the 
high and low cost alternatives represents an income loss if the high cost alternative is 
chosen. From theory therefore the maximum value that the cost parameter can take is 
zero. 
A similar argument can be extended to the attributes headway and operating hours. 
The shorter the ferry headways are and the longer the operating day is the more 
flexibility there is for travellers to arrange activities in a manner that increases utility. 
The attributes headway and operating hours, however, differ from the cost attribute in 
two ways. Firstly there is very probably a large body of travellers for whom changes in 
headway or operating hours make little or no impact on their activity schedule due to 
for example the existence of buffer time. Indirect evidence for the existence of this 
body of travellers in the survey sample can be found by analysing the response to ideal 
departure times. 80% of travellers indicated that ferry departure times on the outward 
and return legs are 'ideal'. Given the low headways (around 3 hours) and restricted 
operating hours of the services, it seems unlikely that for 80% of respondents ferry 
departure times happen to coincide with the travellers' first choice departure time. 
Instead it is more likely that the ferry departure time does not inconvenience the 
travellers, as they either have flexible activity schedules or have a significant amount of 
buffer time between activities - both of which are quite plausible within the context of a 
long distance trip. The existence of such a group of travellers implies a mass point at 
or close to zero in the distribution function for the marginal utilities of headway and 
operating hours. 
Secondly, . improvements in headway and operating hours may combine in such a way 
as to make the ferry departure time less convenient. This could mean that for some 
travellers a counter-intuitive positive utility is associated with an increase in headway or 
a reduction in operating hours. That is the distribution function would include both 
positive and negative elements. Deriving positive utility from a reduction in headway or 
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operating hours may seem counter-intuitive but can be easily illustrated with an 
example. A headway of four hours on a 12 hour operating day (from 7am to 7pm) 
would give morning departures for the Sound of Harris ferry from Leverburgh at 7am 
and 11 am. The 11 am departure would fit perfectly with leaving Stornoway (the main 
town on the Isle of Lewis) by car at gam. Without introducing a second boat a 
reduction in headway to three hours would mean that the ferry would leave Leverburgh 
at 1 Dam, requiring the traveller to leave Stornoway at the less desirable time of Bam. 
Alternatively the traveller could try and fill their time at the office or at home and leave 
Stornoway at 11 am to catch the next ferry at 1 pm. This could be even more 
inconvenient. It is therefore possible that increases in frequency (and a lengthening of 
operating hours) will, for some trips, combine in such a manner that the resulting ferry 
timetable is less convenient. The proportion of users that this situation is expected to 
apply to is felt to be low for the reasons outlined in the previous paragraph. 
The SP design allows a deeper analysis to be undertaken on the distribution of the 
willingness to pay. In the SP deSign there are four questions in which respondents are 
faced with a choice between ferries with the same operating hours but different 
headways and fares. Similarly, there are four questions where headways are common 
between the services but operating hours and fares differ. These eight SP questions 
therefore provide four fixed boundary values for the headway and operating hours 
attributes. Analysing the response to each question in turn allows the proportion of the 
sample with a marginal value of headway (or operating hours) above or below the 
boundary value to be identified. This is a form of 'bin' analysis (Fowkes, 2000). If the 
respondent chooses the cheapest ferry their marginal value of headway (or operating 
hours) lies below the boundary value, whilst if they choose the more expensive option it 
is equal to or above the boundary value. 
Table 5.3(a) and (b) present this analysis. These tables indicate the median value of 
headway lies between 2.7Bp and B.3p per minute, whilst the median value of operating 
hours lies between B.3p and 41.7p per hour closed (for respondents to the car/LGV 
questionnaire). A significant proportion of respondents have values of headway (26%) 
and operating hours (44%) below the lowest boundary value27• These proportions 
imply the existence of a large mass point at or close to zero, or a reasonable sized 
proportion of respondents holding a positive utility to a worsening in headway and 
27 The exclusion of those who always choose the cheapest ferry service, the most 
expensive service, ferry service 1 or ferry service 2 from this analysis does not alter 
these proportions by more than 2 percentage points. 
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hours closed. As discussed earlier 80% of respondents who indicate that existing ferry 
times are ideal is taken to imply that they are not inconvenienced by the existing ferry 
timetable, rather than implying any change in the existing timetable would have a 
negative impact on them. The large percentage of the willingness to pay distribution 
below the lowest boundary value is therefore felt to arise principally through the 
existence of a large number of values at or close to zero, though it is expected that for 
a small proportion of the sample for whom a change in departure time will cause 
inconvenience negative willingness to pay will also exist. 
Table 5.3: Distribution of willingness to pay for changes in headway and 
operating hours (boundary value bin analysis for cars/van) 
(a) Headway 
Bin for marginal value of Proportion of Cumulative 
headway (H) (p/min) sample frequency 
H<0.56 26% 26% 
0.56sH<1 .82 3% 29% 
1.82sH<2.78 6% 35% 
2.78sH<8.30 38% 73% 
8.30sH 27% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
(b) Operating hours 
Bin for marginal value of Proportion of Cumulative 
operating hours (OH) sample frequency 
(p/hour) 
OH< 8.3 44% 44% 
8.3s0H< 41.7 17% 60% 
41. 7s0H<137.5 3% 64% 
137.5s0H<214.3 26% 90% 
214.3s0H 10% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
Unfortunately it is not possible with the evidence available to state categorically the 
proportion of the distribution that has a negative willingness to pay for an improvement 
in operating hours and headway and the proportion that has a zero willingness to pay. 
The existence and relative size of these two categories of traveller is important to the 
shape of the willingness to pay distribution, as illustrated in Figure 5.4(a) and (b) for 
headway. In Figure 5.4(a) the 25% of the distribution that lies below the lowest 
boundary value (O.S6p/min) has been distributed uniformly between O.S6p/min 
and -10p/min). The overall distribution looks well behaved and can therefore be 
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approximated by a symmetrical or asymmetrical distribution based on say the triangular 
Figure 5.4: Probability distribution function of willingness to pay for headway 
(boundary value bin analysis for cars/van) 
(a) Assuming distribution bounded at -10p/min and 15p/min 
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or normal distributions. This contrasts with the distribution illustrated in Figure 5.4(b) 
which is bounded at zero. Here a large spike encompassing 25% of the observations 
exists at or close to zero. Clearly potential distributions for the survey data 
intermediate to those illustrated in Figure 5.4(a) and (b) could also exist. 
5.4 Estimation strategy 
MNL models are estimated to the data in the first instance before any MXL model 
estimation is attempted. This is for a number of reasons, but primarily because the 
MXL is a complex and onerous model to estimate. Unlike the MNL model the 
maximum likelihood function for a MXL model does not have a closed form and 
therefore has to be maximised through simulation. Computationally this is more time 
consuming than the direct estimation of an MNL model. This combined with the need 
to examine the impact of different distribution functions make the MXL an even more 
complex model to estimate. Most authors therefore recommend estimating an MNL 
model first and using this as a starting point for the estimation of the MXL - including 
using the MNL parameter estimates as a starting point. An MNL model also acts as a 
useful benchmark against which the MXL model can be compared. Confirmation that 
the MXL model estimation process is functioning as expected is obtained by estimating 
an MXL model with all parameters fixed (Le. non-random) and comparing it to an MNL 
model. 
Equation 4.1 in chapter 4 defines the utility function for the two ferry services used in 
the SP question design. This equation is not identified for the choice context of the SP 
questions due to the presence of the constant a k in the utility function of each ferry 
alternative. Given the interest is in the difference in utility between the two ferry 
services, for model estimation purposes this equation can be adjusted by subtracting 
the constant from both utility functions to give an identified model. Following the 
notation introduced in equation 5.1 the identified model has the form set out in equation 
5.7. The adjustment preserves the difference in utility between the two ferry services 
(Le. U~~:rry2 - U~~:rry2 = V:~':irr2 - V:~':irr2 ) but does not allow an estimate of the utility for 
each ferry service to be made. 
Vq~':,y1 = p;erryf(H) + z~erry g(OH)+ ¢;erry h(P) 
V:~':,y2 = p;erryf(H) + z~erryg(OH)+¢:erryh(p) 
(5.7) 
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where: 
U ferry - V ferry q,ferry1 - ak + q,ferry1 + £q,ferry1 (5.8) 
U ferry - V ferry q,ferry2 - ak + q,ferry2 + £q,ferry2 
A number of different functional forms for headway f(H} and operating hours g{H} can 
be envisaged. These give rise to range of possible model structures that include both 
linear and non-linear models. 
As reasoned above MNL models are estimated before estimating MXL models. The 
first MNL models to be estimated are linear in headway and operating hours and do not 
include any fixed effects associated with socio-economic groups. Models that examine 
variations in willingness to pay by socio-economic group and non-linearities in 
willingness to pay form the second group of models estimated. The model estimation 
for these fixed effect and non-linear models is slightly more complex and the following 
strategy is adopted: 
(i) Cases that meet the exclusion criteria (see Table 5.1) are excluded from the 
dataset; 
(ii) Dummy variables for population segments by household income, gender, journey 
purpose, travelling in a group, economic status (retired or of working age), 
whether driving a commercial vehicle and trip frequency are defined. Dummy 
variables are also defined to capture whether the respondent pays for the ferry 
ticket or is refunded the cost, whether the ticket prices in the questionnaire are 
similar to the ferry ticket purchased and whether an improved ferry timetable 
would result in spending less nights or more nights away from home; 
(iii) A model that includes all interaction terms between the headway and hours 
closed variables with the socio-economic and trip specific dummy variables is set 
out. The model also included all interaction terms between the cost variable and 
the dummy variables representing: income segments, who paid for the ferry 
ticket, how representative the ferry ticket prices in the SP scenarios were to the 
respondent and whether an improved ferry service would result in spending a 
different number of nights away from home. The model was refined by removing 
insignificant interaction variables from the model in the following manner: 
• Insignificant cost interaction variables are incrementally removed first; 
followed by 
• The most insignificant of the remaining frequency, gender, group size, 
retired status and journey purpose interaction variables; until 
104 
• All remaining estimated coefficients are statistically significant. 
A set of MXL models are also estimated using the best performing MNL model as a 
starting point. Various MXL models are estimated using different distribution functions 
for the random parameters. 
ALOGIT version 4.2 (ALOGIT, 2008) was used to estimate the MNL models. ALOGIT 
is relatively easy to use and is more than adequate for the estimation of MNL models. 
ALOGIT cannot be used to estimate MXL models or correct for the bias associated with 
panel data28• For the estimation of the MXL models the GAUSS code made available 
by Kenneth Train on his website is used (Train, 2006). This is an easy to use well 
tested and documented utility. A restriction with using Train's code is that only a limited 
number of distribution functions for the random parameters are available. These are 
the normal, triangular, uniform and the log-normal. Alternatives to both ALOGIT and 
Train's code would have been to use Biogeme (Bierlaire, 2008) or to develop bespoke 
Gauss code. As the main purpose of this section of the thesis is to examine whether 
scheduling costs and the risk premium are significant in sparse networks rather than 
develop discrete choice modelling methods per se the ease of use and industry 
standard nature of ALOGIT and Train's code were felt to offset any restrictions inherent 
in their application. 
5.5 Estimation results 
Table 5.4 presents a set of linear models with no fixed effects. Multinomial log it models 
IF-MNL 1, 3 and 4 are estimated on the data from each of the three questionnaires 
individually (car/LGV, foot and HGV). IF-MNL5 to IF-MNL7 are estimated on data 
merged from all three questionnaires. Models IF-MNL 1 and IF-MNL2, and models IF-
MNL6 and IF-MNL7 differ only in that the data on which IF-MNL2 and IF-MNL7 have 
been estimated exclude non-traders who may not treat the questionnaire seriously. 
A number of observations can be made from these results. All parameters bar one 
have the expected sign and in the main are statistically significant. The only 
28 ALOGIT includes a utility to estimate a model using the jack-knife technique. The 
jack-knife technique is often used to test for model mis-specification, and its 
employment can go someway to addressing the bias associated with treating panal 
data as cross-sectional data. Accounting for the correlation in panel data via a MXL 
model is preferred to employing the jack-knife technique as this method of estimation 
directly addresses the source of the bias during model estimation. 
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parameters that are not significant are for the small data sets (foot and HGV) and for 
the parameter with the wrong sign in model IF-MNL5. In mode11F-MNL5 differences in 
the scale of error variance (hetroskedasticity) between datasets have not been allowed 
for and this leads to a poor performing model. By allowing for scale differences (as in 
models IF-MNL6 and 7) the log likelihood improves and all parameters are statistically 
significant and have the correct sign. The marginal values of headway and operating 
hours are also statistically significant and of the correct sign where the parameters are 
well estimated (Le. for models IF-MNL 1, 2, 6 and 7). 
The level of model fit as given by the Rho-squared value is not particularly good. 
There is therefore a substantial amount of unexplained variation in the data. The 
exclusion of respondents who might not be taking the questionnaire seriously reduces 
the unexplained variation in the data giving higher rho-squared values for models IF-
MNL2 and IF-MNL7 compared to models IF-MNL1 and IF-MNL6. It also lowers the 
marginal values of headway and operating hours slightly. In the main though, the 
inclusion or exclusion of these data has limited effect on the model. On the basis that 
these data may potentially be valid the remaining analysis is conducted with them 
included. The estimated models indicate that, for the car/LGV dataset (model IF-
MNL 1), the marginal values 7p/minute (headway) and 50p/hour closed (operating 
hours) are consistent with but at the upper end of the range in which the anticipated 
median value was expected to lie (see Table 5.3(a) and (b». 95% confidence intervals 
for these values are +1-18% for headway and +1-34% for operating hours (model IF-
MNL 1). 
Marginal values for those travelling by foot are lower than for those travelling by 
car/LGV. For those travelling by HGV the marginal values for headway are higher than 
the car/LGV values, but for operating hours are lower. Possibly restrictions on HGV 
driver hours means long ferry operating hours have little value to the drivers surveyed. 
It should however be noted that due to the low level of significance of the parameter 
estimates the HGV marginal values cannot statistically be relied on. 
By pooling the data in a joint estimation (as in models IF-MNL6 and 7) the HGV and 
foot data can be utilised in a statistically robust framework. This provides more 
information on the willingness to pay of the sample. Looking at model IF-MNL6 the 
average willingness to pay of the sample for changes in headway is 7.2p/min (slightly 
higher than the car/LGV value) and for changes in operating hours is 40.9p/hour closed 
(lower than the car/LGV value). The nest coefficients in models IF-MNL5 to IF-MNL7 
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Table 5.4: Estimation results for linear models with no fixed effects 
Model e IF-MNL1 IF-MNL2~ IF-MNL3 IF-MNL4 IF-MNL5 IF-MNL6 
- -
Model type Multinomiallogit Multinomiallogit Multinomiallogit Multinomiallogit Multinomial logit Multinomial logit 
Data Car/LGV Car/LGV Foot HGV Foot and Foot, Car/LGV Car/LGV and HGV 
Non-traders included Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Attributes Cost -0.00094 (-9.0) -0.00108 (-9.6) -0.00497 (-4.2) -0.00010 (-1 .5) -0.00028 -5.0 -0.00048 (-2.4) 
Headway -0.00658 (-9.3) -0.00702 (-9.3) -0.00692 (-4.3) -0.00307 (-1.3) -0.00377 -7.2 -0.00343 (-2.5) 
Operating 
hours -0.04695 (-4.1) -0.04588 (-3.8) -0.04361 (-1 .7) -0.00204 (-0.1) 0.00925 1.2 -0.01953 (-2.5) 
Nest Car/LGV 1.85 (2.2) 
coefficient HGV 0.20 (1 .6) 
Sample Headway 7.0 (10.8) 6.5 (11 .3) 1.4 (5.1) 29.4 (1 .5) 13.7 (5.4) 7.2 (10.5) 
mean (p/min) 
marginal Operating 
values hours (p/hour 50.0 (5.7) 42.4 (5.1) 8.8 (2.3) 19.5 (0.1) -33.5 (1.0) 40.9 (3 .8) 
closed) 
Observations 1273 1137 253 108 1634 1634 
Log Likelihood -810.42 -706.06 -158.65 -71 .72 -1079.59 -1055.13 
Rho-squared wrt constants 0.073 0.099 0.088 0.042 0.038 0.060 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Significant at 99% level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1.96 and at the 90% level if the t-
statistic>1.65. Estimated using ALOGIT v4.2. T -statistics for marginal values calculated following Hess and Daly (2008). 
IF-MNL7 
Multinomial logit 
Foot, Car/LGV 
and HGV 
No 
-0.00073 (-3.0) 
-0.00476 (-3.2) 
-0.02477 (-2.7) 
0.15 (1.7) 
1.41 (2.8) 
6.5 (10.8) 
33.9 (3.6) 
1450 
-914.89 
0.083 
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act as scaling parameters, scaling the variance of the error term in the different 
datasets. A coefficient value of one means that the error variance in the upper and 
lower nest is equivalent, and there is no need to employ the NL trick to merge datasets. 
For the moment the nests with coefficients that are not significantly different from one 
are maintained in the model. This issue is returned to later. 
The aim of introducing fixed effects into the models is to reduce the unexplained 
variation evident. Non-linear model structures are also examined with the same 
purpose. Table 5.5 presents summary statistics for five further model structures that 
include fixed effects. The fixed effects examined are household income, gender, 
journey purpose, travelling in a group, economic status (retired or of working age), 
travelling on foot/bicycle, driving a commercial vehicle, trip frequency whether the 
respondent pays for the ferry ticket or is refunded the cost, whether the ticket prices in 
the questionnaire are similar to the ferry ticket purchased and whether an improved 
ferry timetable would result in spending less nights or more nights away from home. 
Table 5.5 shows that whilst the model fit improves (rho-squared is 0.14 and below) 
there still remains a substantial amount of unexplained variation. The best performing 
model in terms of log-likelihood and rho-squared is IF-MNL 11. This is a piecewise 
model as the functions f(H) and g(OH) are defined differently depending on the 
values taken by Hand OH. In IF-MNL 11 the car/LGV and HGV nest coefficients are 
all significantly different from 1.0. This contrasts with model IF-MNL6 where the 
car/LGV coefficient was not significantly different from 1.0. Clearly a degree of 
confounding occurs between the nest coefficient (scale factor) and the degree of 
disaggregation present within model IF-MNL6. Model IF-MNL 11, the preferred model 
from the set of fixed effect MNL models estimated, is presented in the first column of 
Table 5.6. The implied valuations for changes in headway and operating hours are 
presented in Table 5.7. Clearly different segments of the sample hold different 
valuations, but taking a weighted average of these valuations (based on sample 
proportions)29 gives an average marginal value for changes in headway when 
headways are 180 minutes or greater of 4.8p/min and a marginal value for an operating 
hour on an 8 hour operating day (9am to 5pm) of 50.3p/hr. There is insufficient 
information on the covariances between the marginal values of different population 
segments with which to calculate T-statistics and confidence intervals for this weighted 
29 For each model the value of headway and operating hours for each statistically 
significant population segment is calculated as in Table 5.7. A weighted average of 
these marginal valuations using the sample proportions is then calculated. This is the 
process of sample enumeration. 
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average. It is expected that the t-statistics and confidence intervals for the average 
marginal value and will be similar to those in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.5: Summary statistics for linear and non-linear MNL models including 
fixed effects 
Model Functional form for No. of Rho- Log 
Headway (H) and observations squared Likelihood 
Operating Hours (OH) (see 
table notes) 
Linear 
IF-MNL8 f(H)= H 1,634 0.105 -1005.04 
g(OH) = HC 
Non-linear 
IF-MNL9 f(H) = JH 1,634 0.106 -1003.77 
g(OH) = HC 2 
IF-MNL 10 f(H) = Ln(H) 1,634 0.095 -1015.90 
g(OH) = Ln(HC) 
IF-MNL 11 - 1,634 0.136 -970.06 f( H) = 0 if H < ~ 
=H H~x 
-
g(OH) = 0 HC<y if _ 
= HC HC~y 
Notes: Generic utility function is set out in equation 5.7. He is hours closed. All models include 
fixed effects by socia-economic group. For the piecewise model (IF-MNL 11) multiple steps in 
headway and operating hours are specified (e.g. the vector X = {60,120,180,240} and 
y = {O,7,12,16}), though only those that are statistically significant are retained in the final 
model. Estimated using ALOGIT v4 .2. 
As can be seen from Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 in common with many value of travel time 
studies (see for example Wardman, 2004) the preferred MNL model (IF-MNL 11) 
indicates that those who have low incomes and pay for the tickets themselves have 
higher marginal utilities of money than others (all else being equal). This implies that 
these socia-economic groups have lower values of headway and operating hours than 
other groups. Similarly in common with other evidence in the literature those who 
travel on business have higher valuations than those who are travelling on non-work 
purposes. Groups also have higher valuations than individuals. 
The interesting result that comes from this model is that inter-island ferry users making 
long distance trips appear to only be significantly inconvenienced if headways reach 
180 minutes and operating hours are restricted to between gam and 5pm (Le. the ferry 
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Table 5.6: Fixed effects models and comparable mixed logit models with fixed (non-random) coefficients 
-
IF-MNL11 IF-MNL12 IF-MXL1 IF-MXL2 IF-MXL3 
". - .. 
Model structure Multinomiallogit Multinomiallogit Mixed logit Mixed logit Mixed logit 
Data Foot, carfLGV and CarfLGV Foot, carfLGV and Foot, carfLGV and CarfLGV HGV HGV HGV 
Traders and non-traders Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment of repeated choices Cross-sectional Cross-sectional Cross-sectional Panel Cross-sectional 
Cost coefficient for all household incomes -0.00131 (-3.1) -0.00083 (-7.3) -0.00140 (-4.1) -0.00044 (-3.4) -0.00082 (-7.1) 
Increment on cost coefficient for: 
Household income over £35k 0.00079 (2.3) 0.00031 (2.2) 0.00076 (2.9) 0.00043 (2.9) 0.00031 (2.1) 
Ticket paid by self -0.00117 (-2.7) -0.00054 (-3.7) -0.00098 (-3.2) -0.00098 (-5.6) -0.00052 (-3.5) 
Fare paid differs significantly from 
fares in SP questions -0.00104 (-2.3) -0.00041 (-2.4) -0.00100 (-3.1) -0.00064 (-2.7) -0.00050 (-2.5) 
Headways ~ 180 minutes (all trips) -0.00439 (-3.7) -0.00380 (-4.1) -0.00457 (-4.0) -0.00362 (-3.7) -0.00428 (-4.8) 
Increment on headway coefficient for: 
Work trips -0.00447 (-1.7) -0.00116 (-1.3) -0.00436 (-2.3) -0.00081 (-0.7) -0.00087 (-1 .0) 
Respondent is a woman 0.00272 (2.3) 0.00159 (2.0) 0.00265 (2.3) 0.00178 (2.0) 0.00167 (2.1) 
Trips undertaken by groups -0.00365 (-2.6) -0.00193 (-2.3) -0.00352 (-2.8) -0.00173 (-1 .7) -0.00142 (-1.7) 
Closed for 16 hours (all trips) -0.06347 (-4.0) -0.06335 (-4.0) -0.04249 (-4.2) 
Increment on hours closed coefficient for: -0.05059 (-4.7) -0.05120 (-4.9) 
Work trips -0.10546 (-2.3) -0.04740 (-3.1) -0.10572 (-3.0) -0.03651 (-2.3) -0.04605 (-3.0) 
Mean carfLGV nest 0.00000 (0.0) 0.00000 (0.0) 
s.d. carfLGV nest 1.70674 (3.0) -0.41205 (-4.8) 
Mean HGV nest 0.00000 (0.0) 0.00000 (0.0) 
S.d. HGV nest 8.78066 (2.4) 0.26226 (0.7) 
, Bradley and Daly scale factor for car/LGV 0.55330 (3.2) 0.60075 (nfa) 0.95207 (nfa) 
Bradley and Daly scale factor for HGV 0.15198 (2.1) 0.14453 (nfa) 0.97973 (nfa) 
Observations 1634 1273 1634 1634 1273 
Log-likelihood -970.06 -748.65 -972.00 -974.84 -748.70 
------
Note: Scale factors for car/LGV and HGV ferry passengers in the MXL models are calculated using equations 5.5 and 5.6. T -statistics in parentheses. Parameter is 
significant at 99% level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1.96 and at the 90% level if the t-statistic>1 .65. T-statistics for MXL models calculated 
using robust standard errors. IF-MNL 11 and IF-MNL 12 estimated using ALOGIT v4.2. IF-MXL 1 to IF-MXL3 estimated using Train's Gauss code with 500 Halton draws. 
I 
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Table 5.7: Headway and operating hour marginal valuations derived from preferred fixed effects model (IF-MNL 11) (pence) 
-questionnaire ticket prices reflect ticket price Questionnaire ticket prices do not reflect ticket , T ~. ~ 
-
., 
,< 
" 
. paid by respondent price paid by respondent 
-
,. , ~. ...: . Pay for self Someorie' else pays Pay for self Someone else pays c , , Sample I 
, . , 
-
, 
.' 
t~.J ; , 
. - Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Gross Average i 
, 
" 
. ~ 
.. -.. Hhold Hhold Hhold Hhold Hhold Hhold ' Hhol" Hhold 
~ -, income to income income to income income to income income to income 
I . £35k £35k+ £35k £35k+ £35k £35k+ £35k £3Sk+ 
Marginal value per minute of headway (pence) 
When headways ~ All trips 1.8 2.6 3.3 8.4 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.8 
180 mins Increment: work trips 1.8 2.6 3.4 8.6 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.9 
4.8 
Increment: women -1.1 -1.6 -2.1 -5.2 -0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -1.7 
Increment: groups 1.5 2.2 2.8 7.0 1.0 1.3 1.5 2.3 
Marginal value for an operating hour (pence) 
During working day Work trips 25.6 37.6 48.3 121.8 18.0 23.2 26.9 40.6 
(Le. between gam Non-work trips 50.3 
and 5pm) 42.5 62.5 80.2 202.5 29.9 38.6 44.7 67.4 
Note: Sample average is a weighted average over socio-economic groups, 
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is unavailable for 16 hours). Ferry users do not therefore seem to value changes in 
headway from say a 60 minute headway to a 120 minute headway; nor do they value 
changes in operating hours from a 12 hour operating day to a 17 hour or 24 hr 
operating day. In interpreting this result it needs to be borne in mind that only existing 
ferry users have been interviewed. Such users may experience some inconvenience 
from the existing timetable but if it was highly inconvenient they would probably have 
chosen to fly, not to travel or to travel to a different destination. The activity patterns of 
the majority of the users of the ferry services are therefore expected to be able to 
accommodate long headways and slightly restrictive operating hours. This is also a 
reflection of the long distance nature of the trips involved. This self-selectivity therefore 
means that it is unlikely many respondents will have activity schedules requiring a 60 
minute headway or a 24 hour ferry. This is borne out in the model estimated. 
The preferred model only includes coefficients on variables which are significant at the 
90% level or higher. Clearly there is also variation in the data that cannot be described 
with a sufficient degree of precision in the preferred model. For example, the 
piecewise estimation indicated that increasing operating hours beyond 12 hours lowers 
dis-utility - as one would expect. It is just that the level of dis-utility could not be 
estimated with sufficient precision. Possibly this is due to the low incidence in the 
sample of those with constrained activity patterns. It was also found that commercial 
vehicles had higher valuations of headway than private vehicles, and those who would 
alter the number of nights away from home with an improved timetable also had higher 
valuations - but again these variations cannot be estimated with sufficient precision. A 
larger sample size would have gone some way to permitting the inclusion of such 
variables in the final model. 
As discussed previously two of the advantages of MXL models over MNL models are 
the ability to directly account for correlations in repeated choices during estimation and 
the ability to introduce taste variation. A series of MXL models are therefore estimated 
using the preferred MNL model as a starting point. In the first instance it is useful to 
demonstrate that the MXL estimation process is employed correctly by reproducing the 
preferred MNL model with an MXL model. Model IF-MXL 1 in Table 5.6 does this by 
demonstrating that the model IF-MNL 11 can be approximated by treating the data as 
cross-sectional. 
By correctly treating the data as panel data (modeIIF-MXL2) several interesting effects 
occur. Firstly the Bradley and Daly scale factor for the car/LGV and HGV nests tend to 
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1.0 in IF-MXL2. The implication of this is that the different scales in error variance 
between the questionnaire datasets apparent in all the MNL models are due to 
correlations between responses from the same individual. Secondly there is a 
worsening in the log-likelihood from -972.00 (in IF-MXL 1) to -974.84 (in IF-MXL2). This 
is counter-intuitive, as by correctly treating the data as panel data the log likelihood 
should improve. Between models IF-MXL 1 and IF-MXL2 there also occur some slight 
changes in the estimated parameters. This is most marked for the cost coefficients for 
those who come from households with a gross income in excess of £35,000 per annum 
and for whom someone else pays for the ferry ticket. For this sample segment the 
marginal utility of cost becomes very low and the corresponding marginal values of 
headway and operating hours become very high. Despite this population segment 
forming only a small proportion of the sample the change in their marginal valuations 
increases the weighted average for headway and operating hours across the sample 
by a factor of 10 compared to that suggested by I F-MNL 11. Such a large value is not 
only at odds with the other MNL models but most importantly is at odds with the 
observed distributions of willingness to pay (see Table 5.3(a) and (b». 
The latter two points, the worsening in the log likelihood and the unrealistic sample 
means, raise concerns about the validity of model IF-MXL2. Potentially they arise as 
an indicator that a MXL model estimated using the panel approach cannot correctly 
approximate a nested logit structure. This could occur as in a nested logit structure the 
errors are distributed across all observations whereas when estimating a MXL model to 
panel data the errors are kept constant across observations for the same respondent. 
This would mean that an error components model estimated using the panel approach 
is likely to reproduce different patterns of heteroscedasticity (Le. different scale 
differences) than those obtained under the nested logit approach. The proper treatment 
of panel data within a MXL framework is an active topic of research at the moment (see 
for example Hess and Rose, 2008), and a consensus as to the best econometric 
approach to adopt is still being sought. 
For this application it is clear there is evidence questioning the validity of model IF-
MXL2. The most probable reason for this is the difficulty in treating the 
heteroscedasticity (different error variances) across datasets in an adequate manner 
while simultaneously accounting for the panel nature of the dataset. Two solutions 
present themselves: focusing the analysis on one dataset or using alternative software 
(e.g. Biogeme) that can account for scale differences within a panel estimation without 
having to rely on error components. The former has been chosen, that is focusing the 
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analysis on one dataset - the car/LGV dataset. Primarily this is because it is a simple 
solution that meets the objectives of the study - namely the investigation of the 
existence of significant scheduling costs for long distance trips by ferry - and because 
there are valid economic reasons for excluding the HGV dataset from the analysis. 
The HGV dataset cannot be relied on to provide valid estimates for input into a cost 
benefit analysis for HGVs, as the willingness to pay values derived from HGV drivers 
often differs significantly from those of managers (see Fowkes et al., 2007 for an 
example). From the perspective of a cost benefit analysis it is the value to the firm 
(and therefore the logistics chain) that is important (Fowkes, 2001; Mackie, Jara-Oiaz 
and Fowkes, 2001), and as drivers are not well placed to provide such estimates there 
is little value in including the HGV dataset in the remainder of the analysis given the 
problems experienced. Model IF-MNL 12 in Table 5.6 therefore presents an MNL 
model with the structure of IF-MNL 11 estimated to just the car/LGV dataset. Model IF-
MXL3 reproduces this model using Train's gauss code. These models act as the 
starting point for introducing taste variation. It is left for future research the problem of 
undertaking a joint estimation of headway and operating hour marginal utilities using 
data from more than one dataset whilst correcting for any bias associated with panel 
data. 
Table 5.8 presents five random parameter logit models30• The distribution functions for 
the random parameters vary between the models from the normal (IF-MXL4 and IF-
MXL5), the lognormal (IF-MXL6) to the triangular (IF-MXL7 to 9). The data on which 
these models are based has been transformed by scaling it up by a factor 10,000 
compared to the models presented earlier. This is to assist the model estimation 
process, particularly the estimation of lognormal distribution functions. The cost, 
headway and operating hour data for the lognormal model (IF-MXL6) are also 
transformed by inverting their sign. This is because the lognormal distribution is always 
positive and negative parameters cannot therefore be estimated. 
Each of the models is developed incrementally using IF-MXL3 as the starting point. At 
each step in the process an additional parameter within IF-MXL3 is treated as random. 
Model IF-MXL9 also examines whether the restriction to only the car/LGV dataset and 
the incorporation of taste variation impacts on the 'levels' at which headway (e.g. 
30 A random parameter logit model, a type of MXL model, is mathematically equivalent 
to an error components logit model referred to in the discussion regarding merging 
different datasets. It differs from an error component logit model in the interpretation of 
the role of taste variation within the MXL model. 
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head ways greater than 120 minutes) and operating hours (e.g. operating hours greater 
or equal to 12) become significant. In the final models not all of the parameters are 
random, some are fixed. This arises for several reasons. In models IF-MXL4, IF-
MXL5, IF-MXL6 and IF-MXL7, the spread variable (c) is not significantly different from 
zero for some of the population segments. In IF-MXL5 the cost coefficient is treated as 
non-random (fixed) by design. This is one of the strategies that can be adopted to 
avoid the problem of the marginal utility of cost (income) being negative for some parts 
of the distribution. In the lognormal model (IF-MXL6) it is not possible to estimate a 
model in which the headway, operating hours and cost parameters are all random. 
This occurs as the maximum likelihood function of the lognormal is non-quadratic and 
the estimation process can have difficulty converging. Good starting values for the 
estimation of lognormal models are therefore essential31 , but even then it is possible, 
as in this instance, that identification of all random parameters in a single model 
remains impossible. 
The introduction of random parameters into the model captures some of the variation in 
willingness to pay that occurs by socio-economic population segment. As a 
consequence some of the fixed effect parameters in IF-MNL 11 lose their statistical 
significance. It is for this reason that the models presented in Table 5.8 have a lower 
level of disaggregation (by population segment) than the preferred MNL model (IF-
MNL 11). 
Each of the random parameter logit models has strengths and weaknesses. The best 
performing models in terms of log-likelihood are IF-MXL4 and IF-MXL7 - the models 
fitted with unconstrained normal or triangular distribution functions. In both of these 
models almost 20% of the distribution for the marginal utility of cost is positive (Le. has 
the wrong sign) (see first row in Table 5.9). As discussed earlier it is implausible with 
rationally acting economic agents that any portion of the sample should hold a positive 
marginal utility of cost. Within a modelling environment small proportions are often 
tolerated, but the existence of such a large proportion of the sample being attributed a 
positive marginal utility of cost is not satisfactory. It arises no doubt as an artefact of 
the distribution function imposed on the data and is indicative of the function not 
accurately reflecting the real underlying willingness to pay - particularly 
31 Starting values for band c with the lognormal distribution function were estimated by 
taking the mean and standard deviation estimated from MXL5 (normal distribution 
function) and inserting into the functions defining the mean and standard deviation of 
the lognormal. These equations are mean=exp(b+(c2/2) and st.dev.=mean x ..J(exp(c2)-
1) 
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Table 5.8: Random parameter mixed logit models 
0 
IF-MXL4 IF-MXL5 IF-MXLS IF-MXL7 IF·MXL8 IF-MXL9 
Distribution for random Normal (N) and As IF-MXL4 but with Lognormal (LN) Triangular (T) Triangular (T) Triangular (T) 
parameters Fixed (F) fixed (F) cost and Fixed (F) unconstrained and constrained constrained 
coefficient) Fixed (F) 
Treatment of repeated Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
choices 
Data Car/LGV Car/LGV Car/LGV Car/LGV Car/LGV Car/LGV 
Cost coefficient for all b -13.83 (-5.4) -10.08 (-5.6) 10.45 (5.9) -13.62 (-5.4) -12.79 (-5.5) T -16.11 (-6.3) ! N F F T T trips c -14.14 (-5.4) -33.20 (-5.5) -12.79 (-5.5) -16.11 (-6.3) 
Increment for those b -7.46 (-3.0) 9.16 (3.0) -5.78 (-1 .9) T -6.23 (-2.1) 
who paid for ticket F -10.35 (-3.0) F F F -10.46 (-3.0) T c -5.78 (-1.9) -6.23 (-2.1) 
Headway ~ 180 mins (all b -84.32 (-7.4) -70.25 (-7.7) 3.81 (18.5) -84.19 (-7.5) -84.45 (-7.7) T -94.58 (-7.9) 
trips) (per headway min) N N LN T T c -78.37 (-6.4) -68.43 (-6.6) 1.45 (6.2) -187.06 (-6.6) -84.45 (-7.7) -94.58 (-7.9) 
Increment for b 35.50 (2.7) T 35.19 (2.6) 
women respondents T c 35.50 (2.7) 35.19 (2.6) 
Operating hours (per b 
F 
-489.12 (-3.5) 
hour closed) c 
Increment for 16 b -842.52 (-4.0) -616.27 (-3.3) 5.44 (7.9) -832.65 (-4.0) -766.86 (-4.4) T -661 .71 (-3.5) 
hours closed N N LN T T c 1176.39 (4.6) 1147.77 (5.7) 2.37 (3.7) -2741.31 (-4.6) -766.86 (-4.4) -661 .71 (-3.5) 
Increment for work b -788.10 (-2.4) -812.07 (-2.9) 692.26 (3.0) -780.09 (-2.4) -631 .01 (-2.3) T -669.92 (-2.3) 
trips F F F F T c -631.01 (-2.3) -669.92 (-2.3) 
, 
No. of observations 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 1,273 
Log-likelihood -693.57 -715.62 -708.72 -694.31 -722.04 -714.30 
Notes: Data transformed by scaling by 10,000 for all models. For IF-MXL6 data is also transformed by inverting the sign on the cost, headway and operating hour 
parameters. F, N, LN and T indicate distribution function for parameters. F means fixed (i.e. no distribution function), N is the normal, LN is the lognormal and T is the 
triangular. For each random parameter two coefficients are estimated (b and c). For the normal distribution the mean=b and st.dev.=c; for the lognormal 
mean=exp(b+(c212) and st.dev.=mean x ..J(exp(c2)-1); and for the triangular mean=b and spread=c. T-statistics in parentheses. Parameter is significant at 99% level if the 
t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1.96 and at the 90% level if the t-statistic>1.65. T-statistics calculated using robust standard errors. Models estimated 
using Train 's Gauss code with 500 Halton draws. 
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point at zero. Treating the cost parameter as non-random, as in modeIIF-MXL5, is one 
solution to this problem. With a non-random cost parameter the distribution of 
willingness to pay for headway and operating hours is determined by the distribution 
function of the headway and operating hours parameters. With a fixed cost parameter 
almost 30% of the operating hours willingness to pay distribution has the wrong sign 
and just over 15% of the headway distribution now has the wrong sign (second column 
in Table 5.9). These are both sizeable proportions. Whilst there is no direct evidence 
as to the proportion of the sample that hold negative willingness to pay values it was 
earlier argued that this proportion is small. The 15.2% in IF-MXL5 who hold positive 
marginal utilities for a lengthening in headways could just about be tolerated , within the 
limitations of a modelling context, but the 29.6% with a positive marginal utility for a 
shortening in operating hours is unrealistic. 
Table 5.9: Percentage of cost, headway and operating hours random parameters' 
distribution with a positive sign 
IF·MXl4 IF·MXl5 IF·MXl6 IF·MXl7 IF·MXlB and 
IF·MXl9 
Ii' Normal Normal lognormal Triangular Triangular with fixed with fixed un· constrained 
cost cost constrained 
~ . coefficient coefficient 
Cost 16.4% Fixed Fixed 17.4% 0.0% parameter parameter 
Headway (~ 180 14.1% 15.2% 0.0% 15.1% 0.0% min) 
Operating hours (~ 23.7% 29.6% 0.0% 24.2% 0.0% 16 hours closed) 
Within Train's Gauss code two options are available for constraining a marginal utility 
distribution to be always negative thereby ensuring that willingness to pay values are 
positive. The first is that a lognormal distribution can be adopted, as in modeIIF-MXL6, 
whilst the second is to constrain the triangular distribution so that the spread is equal to 
the mean, as in models IF-MXLB and IF-MXL9. The log-likelihood values for these two 
models is worse than that for the models estimated using unconstrained normal or 
triangular distribution functions, though still better than the models with no random 
parameters (e.g. IF-MXL3). The main advantage associated with IF-MXL6, IF-MXLB 
and IF-MXL9 is that the resultant distributions for marginal utility are far more appealing 
as none of the distribution has the wrong sign. It was hypothesised earlier that a large 
mass point at or close to zero may exist in the willingness to pay distributions (see 
Figure 5.4(b)) holding up to 25% of the distribution for headway and 44% of the 
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distribution for operating hours. Neither the lognormal or the constrained triangular 
distributions reflect such a mass point. This is a weakness of these models. The fact 
that the log-likelihood values of IF-MXL6, IF-MXLB and IF-MXL9 have increased by 
only a maximum of 34 points with the inclusion of random parameters (Le. compared to 
IF-MXL3) is probably in part a reflection of the inability of the distribution functions 
imposed to capture this mass point. This is reflected in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 
which compares the proportion of the IF-MXL4 and IF-MXL9 fitted distribution functions 
lying below the headway and operating hour boundary values to the revealed 
proportions. As can be seen from this table the normal distribution appears to have the 
best fitting distribution function but this is achieved at the expense of having an 
unrealistic large proportion of the function having the wrong sign. The constrained 
triangular distribution function (as in IF-MXL9) fails to pick up the large proportion of the 
sample with very low marginal valuations but otherwise fits the revealed distribution 
reasonably well. 
Table 5.10: Comparison of observed and fitted cumulative distribution functions 
of willingness to pay for headway and operating hours 
(a) Headway 
Bin for marginal value of Observed IF-MXL4 IF-MXL9 
headway (H) (p/min) 
H<0.56 26% 25% 5% 
0.56~H<1.82 29% 35% 15% 
1.82SH<2.78 35% 45% 28% 
2.78sH<8.30 73% 78% 84% 
8.30sH 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
(b) Operating hours 
Bin for marginal value of Observed IF- IF-MXL9 
operating hours (OH) MXL4 
(p/hour) During In evening and 
working day night time 
(9am - 5pm) (5pm - 9am) 
OH< 8.3 44% 29% 0% 0% 
8.3s0H< 41.7 60% 49% 15% 83% 
41 .7s0H<137.5 64% 81% 84% 99% 
137.5~OH<214 .3 90% 88% 94% 99% 
214 . 3~OH 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Shaded cell indicates bin holding the median value 
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of observed and fitted cumulative distribution functions 
of willingness to pay for headway and operating hours 
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Mean willingness to pay values for each of the models IF-MXL4 to IF-MXL9 are 
presented in Table 5.11. Where the willingness to pay estimates are a ratio of two 
random distributions (e.g. a headway and a cost distribution), the willingness to pay 
estimate is derived from a monte carlo simulation of 10,000 individuals. Very low 
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values for the marginal utility of cost in all of these distributions can give rise to very 
high willingness to pay estimates. This is potentially problematiC as the mean value is 
quite sensitive to outlying high valuations (of either a positive or negative sign). For 
this reason there is a convention to exclude the highest and lowest 2.5% from the 
monte carlo simulation when calculating the mean (Hensher and Greene, 2003; Cirillo 
and Axhausen, 2006). No t-statistics or confidence intervals for the estimates of 
marginal values are presented in Table 5.11, as there is no method by which they can 
be derived for a mixed log it model. The robustness of the model is demonstrated 
solely by the robustness of the parameter estimates. The MXL models all have a 
superior model fit to the MNL models and it is therefore felt that the robustness of the 
marginal values of headway and operating hours in the MNL models will be an 
indicative, if slightly pessimistic, view of the confidence intervals of the mixed log it 
models. 
It is immediately apparent from Table 5.11 that the implied willingness to pay values 
are sensitive to the distribution function assumed for the random parameters. This is 
consistent with evidence in the literature (e.g. Hensher and Greene, 2003; Hess, 
Bierliare and Polak, 2005). The mean marginal value for a minute of headway (when 
headways are 1BO mins or greater) ranges from 3.9p/min in IF-MXL7 to 9.6p/min in IF-
MXL6, whilst the marginal value of an operating hour when an B hour day is operated 
(Le. 9am to 5pm) ranges from 4B.4 p/hour in IF-MXL7 to a value more than six times 
that at 310.3p/hr in IF-MXL6. In the absence of statistical indicators that measure the 
level of fit for the distribution functions (Hollander, 2006; Hess, Bierliare and Polak, 
2007) the choice of distribution function has to be justified with reference to an a priori 
function derived from theory and also some preliminary analysis of the data. In this 
respect distributions which give rise to large proportion of the population being ascribed 
a negative willingness to pay for an improvement in headway or operating cost are 
rejected in favour of distributions where almost the entire willingness to pay distribution 
is positive (Le. models IF-MXL6, IF-MXLB and IF-MXL9 are preferred to models IF-
MXL4, IF-MXL5 and IF-MXL7). Ideally the distribution should also have a mass point 
at or close to zero, though none of those tested have this property. All the models are, 
compared to a priori expectations, therefore mis-specified to a greater or lesser degree. 
The unbounded large positive tail associated with the lognormal distribution is primarily 
responsible for the large mean values for headway and operating hours that are 
associated with IF-MXL6. This is not a result unique to this study and the realism of 
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Table 5.11: Willingness to pay values for the random parameter logit models 
'"; IF- IF- IF- IF- IF- IF-
MXL4 MXL5 MXL6 MXL7 MXL8 MXL9 
Marginal value per minute of headway (pence) 
Mean 4.3 5.4 9.6 3.9 5.6 5.1 
When headways ~ 180 mins St. Dev. 10.0 4.9 12.5 10.3 3.7 3.4 
%age of distribution 21.6% 15.6% 0.0% 22.5% 3.1% 2.4% 
negative 
Marginal value per operating hours (pence) 
Mean --- --- --- -.-.- --- 30.1 
During evening and night (i.e. St. Dev. --- --- --- -.-- --- 14.4 
between 5pm and 9am) %age of distribution 
negative --- --- --- -.-.- --- 0.0% 
Mean 59.8 77.0 310.3 48.4 78.8 87.7 
During working day St. Dev. 157.9 89.0 370.4 154.9 55.3 51 .8 
(i.e.between 9am and 5pm) %age of distribution 
negative 25.3% 22.1% 0.0% 26.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
Notes: Mean and standard deviation estimated using a monte-carlo simulation based on a population of 10,000 (split into the statistically relevant socio-
economic groups from the model using sample proportions). Lowest and highest 2.5% are excluded from calculation of mean and standard deviation. Fixed 
cost coefficients in IF-MXL5 and IF-MXL6 mean that no monte-carlo simulation is needed for these models. 
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this tail has therefore been questioned by a number of authors. Comparing the 
willingness to pay values from the lognormal model (IF-MXL6) to those derived from 
the boundary value bin analysis (see Table 5.10 (a) and (b)) suggests that IF-MXL6's 
mean value for headway and operating hours lie in the upper bin of the sample (from 
the B3rd percentile for headway and the 90th percentile for operating hours). In 
comparison the values implied by IF-MXLB and IF-MXL9 lie in the bin that contains the 
median value for headway and the bin immediately above the median bin for operating 
hours. IF-MXLB and 9 are therefore preferred to IF-MXL6. On grounds of model fit 
(e.g. higher log-likelihood value) model IF-MXL9 is taken as the preferred model over 
model I F-MXLB. 
The above discussion has clearly highlighted the scope for improving the fit of the 
distribution functions used in the MXL models. The literature suggests a number of 
potential avenues. In the first instance more sophisticated distribution functions can be 
imposed. These would include the Johnson Sb distribution function and a censored 
normal distribution with a mass point at zero (see Train and Sonnier, 2005 and Cirillo 
and Axhausen, 2006 for examples). Such distribution functions should be better able 
to replicate the underlying willingness to pay distribution function that is expected to 
exist in this data. A second avenue for investigation would be the use of non-
parametric estimation methods such as a latent class model (Greene and Hensher, 
2003; Hess, Bierlaire and Polak, 2007) though such models do require a large dataset. 
Latent class models do not impose a distribution function on the random parameters. 
This is particularly appealing given the difficulty in knowing a priori what the shape of 
the willingness to pay distribution is. A final avenue of investigation would be the 
estimation of a model directly in willingness to pay space (see Train and Weeks, 2005 
for an example). Such an approach, whilst diverging from the theoretical link to utility, 
has advantages over estimation in preference space (coefficients in utility) as the latter 
can result in unrealistically high estimates of willingness to pay (as a consequence of 
obtaining very small estimates of the marginal utility of cost/fare). 
Further investigations along any of the above three avenues has been left for future 
research as it is felt that whilst improving the robustness of the models estimated the 
underlying conclusions in relation to the objective of this thesis will not be altered. That 
is there are circumstances where statistically significant scheduling costs for long 
distance (inter-island) trips exist. 
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5.6 Discussion of main findings 
None of the models estimated are entirely satisfactory. The parameters of the best 
performing multinomial logit model (IF-MNL 11) are biased by the repeated 
measurements problem and the preferred mixed logit model (IF-MXL9) is mis-specified 
in the sense that the distribution function assumed for the random parameters does not 
allow for a mass point at or close to zero. Whilst not desirable this is a common 
situation in discrete choice modelling. Care therefore needs to be made when drawing 
policy conclusions from the models. The interest in this study is whether or not 
significant values in a cost benefit analysis context can be attributed to scheduling 
costs. Within this context, and as discussed previously, the models estimated, while not 
perfect are helpful. The data suggest that for long distance trips users are only 
inconvenienced if headways reach 180 minutes. Furthermore, the inconvenience 
users experience from a shortening or lengthening in the operating day varies non-
linearly with the length of that day. For short operating days the value of an additional 
operating hour is higher than it is for long operating days. This is consistent with the 
conceptual idea that for trips utilising these ferry services travel forms one of the main 
activities of the day (undertaken in the middle of the day), around which a significant 
amount of buffer time exists. Users therefore are only inconvenienced once service 
levels drop below a relatively low threshold. 
The preferred MXL model indicates that the marginal value of headway when 
headways are 180 mins or greater is 5.1 p/min (model IF-MXL9 in Table 5.11). The 
marginal value of an operating hour for an operating day of 8 hours is 87.7p/hr and for 
operating days of 12 hours or greater it is 30.1 p/hr. It has not been possible to obtain 
statistically robust values for the marginal value of headway when headways are less 
than 180 mins. This is attributed to a degree of self-selectivity in the sample. The 
ferries surveyed had headways around the 3 hour mark and users appear not to be 
significantly inconvenienced below this level. There is however a degree of 
arbitrariness in the definition of the step-function within the models estimated. In reality 
one would not expect that travellers would have a zero marginal value for a headway 
minute when headways are 179 minutes but a value of 5.1 p/min when they are 180 
minutes. It is therefore expected that a value of 5.1 p/min would act as an upper bound 
for the marginal value of headway when headways are below 180 minutes. 
As can be seen from Table 5.12 the values of headway are a significant size in relation 
to the value of average car/LGV in-vehicle time in the sample (car/LGV-IVT) - at 
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around a seventh of car/LGV-IVT. The marginal value of operating hours is lower than 
that of headway but also significant with an additional operating hour being valued at 
between 0.8 and 2.4 of a car/LGV-IVT minute. A one hour reduction in headway 
therefore is equivalent to journey time reduction of just over 8 minutes whilst a one 
hour lengthening of the operating day has a journey time equivalent value of between 
0.8 minutes and 2.4 minutes (depending upon what part of the day the additional hour 
falls). The next step in determining if scheduling costs are significant components of 
economic benefit is to compare them to user benefits in an actual appraisal. As will be 
seen in the penultimate chapter, Chapter 9, where a case study of a Sound of Harris 
ferry proposal (Halcrow Fox, 1996) is presented, scheduling costs are important in ferry 
appraisals. 
Table 5.12: Inter-island ferry survey preferred willingness to pay values as a 
proportion of car in-vehicle-time (2005 perceived prices and values) 
(a) Headway 
When headways are Marginal value of a Equivalent car/LGV in-vehicle time 
between: headway minute minutes 
60 and 119 mins not significant ---
120 and 179 mins not significant ---
180 to 240 mins 5.1 p/min 0.14 car/LGV mins per headway min 
(306 p/hr) (8.4 car/LGV mins per headway hour) 
(b) Operating hours 
When operating day Is: Marginal value of Equivalent car/LGV In-vehicle time 
an operating hour minutes 
8 hours (9am to 5pm) 87.7 p/hr 2.4 car/LGV mins per hour 
12 hours (7am to 7pm) 30.1 p/hr 0.8 car/LGV mins per hour 
17 hours (6am to midnight) 30.1 p/hr 0.8 car/LGV mins per hour 
24 hours 30.1 p/hr 0.8 car/LGV mins per hour 
Notes: Marginal values derived from modeIIF-MXL9. Average car/LGV in-vehicle time is 
£21.83 per hour/per group (Le. 36.4 p/min/group) (2005 perceived prices and values) . Derived 
from standard value of travel time savings per passenger (OfT, 2007b) using sample 
proportions. 
The uniqueness of this work means that there are no similar studies against which the 
values obtained can be validated . As discussed in chapter 4 this was a source of 
difficulty in designing the SP questionnaire, where bus and train marginal values were 
used to estimate a range for headway and an educated 'guess' from the Norwegian 
evidence was used for operating hours. The derived values are towards the bottom 
end of the design range for headway and between the bottom and mid part of the 
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design range for operating hours (see Table 4.1). This is re-assuring as it both fits with 
a priori expectations and is within the range of marginal values which the SP design 
could recover. 
Whilst the willingness to pay values in Table 5.12 are higher than those implied by the 
preferred MNL model (IF-MNL 11) and the median values obtained from an analysis of 
responses to the SP boundary value questions, they are consistent with these values. 
The consistency between the different strands of analysis suggests that the main 
conclusion in this section of the thesis is robust. That is significant scheduling costs in 
the region of 8 car/LGV equivalent minutes per headway hour and between 0.8 and 2.4 
car/LGV equivalent minutes per operating hour exist. 
A number of potential future research directions present themselves. In terms of the 
data collection future survey work should consider at the outset collecting more 
information on the shape of the willingness to pay distribution than was collected in this 
study. In particularly a better understanding of the proportion of the distribution that 
has a negative willingness to pay and the size of the mass point at or close to zero 
would go someway towards helping form the decision regarding the most appropriate 
distribution function for the random parameters. There also remain opportunities to 
undertake a more sophisticated analysis of the data, as improvements to the models 
estimated will increase their robustness and the robustness of the willingness to pay 
values. A jOint analysis of all three datasets whilst accounting for both scale 
differences and the repeated measurements problem is a further line of investigation, 
whilst another line would be the introduction of more complicated distribution functions 
- such as the truncated normal or the Johnson Sb with a mass point at zero. Latent 
class models and estimations in willingness to pay space rather than preference space 
would also be of interest - the former makes no a priori assumption regarding the 
distribution function whilst the latter avoids the problem of unrealistically high 
willingness to pay values. 
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6 LOCAL FERRY AND FIXED LINK 
ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter of the first part of the thesis. The focus throughout this part has 
been on benefits associated with activity re-scheduling and the value attributed to the 
risk premium (that is the increased security often associated with transport links). 
These benefits are of great interest in the context of ferry travel as the constraints on 
lifestyles that limited hours of operation and low frequencies have on island residents 
can be large. In focussing on households on small islands with limited employment 
opportunities and services the analysis presented in this chapter differs from that of the 
previous chapter in two important ways. Firstly the focus is on local trips associated 
with the everyday functioning of a household (access to employment, shops, etc.), and 
secondly it examines whether households perceive a difference in risk between fixed 
link type infrastructure and ferry type infrastructure. 
The analysis presented in this chapter relates to the household survey data, the design 
of which has already been described in Chapter 4. Households on four of the fourteen 
populated islands in the Outer Hebrides are surveyed. These islands, Berneray, 
Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay, are all small. Scalpay with a population of just over 
300 people is more than double the size of the other three islands. The populations on 
all four islands have been under pressure in recent times and there was a general 
concern that they, like twenty two other islands in the last 150 years in the Outer 
Hebrides, might ultimately be abandoned. This concern led to the construction of fixed 
links (a bridge or a causeway) to all four islands (see Figure 6.1 to Figure 6.4). Eriskay 
got its fixed link most recently (in 2002), three years before the survey, whilst the 
Berneray causeway opened in April 1999 and the Scalpay Bridge in December 1997. 
The Vatersay causeway is the oldest fixed link of the four, as it was constructed in 
1991. None of the fixed links are really large. The longest is the Eriskay Causeway 
which links a series of small rocky islands and is just over 2km in length, whilst the 
Vatersay causeway is the shortest at 250m which is just smaller than the Scalpay 
Bridge at 300m in length. The Berneray Causeway is just over 1 km in length. 
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Figure 6.1: Berneray Causeway and Sound of Harris Ferry (from North Uist 
looking north towards Berneray) 
Source: author 
Figure 6.2: Eriskay Causeway (from Eriskay looking north towards South Uist) 
Source: author 
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Figure 6.3: Scalpay Bridge (from Scalpay looking north towards Harris) 
Source: author 
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Figure 6.4: Vatersay Causeway (from Barra looking south towards Vatersay) 
Source: SeanE http://www.panoramio.com/photo/3020997 [accessed 5th November 2009] 
The ferry services the fixed links replaced were quite varied . Vehicle ferries were 
operated to Berneray, Eriskay and Scalpay, but only a passenger ferry operated to 
Vatersay. Tidal conditions meant that on a daily basis some Eriskay sailings were 
operated using a rigid inflatable boat (passenger only). The passenger only ferry to 
Vatersay meant that, for the transport of bulk goods, boats needed to be hired. 
However, the pier and its access were difficult for such goods - particularly livestock. 
This led to cattle, in the age old tradition, being swum across the 250m channel to the 
island. In 1986 when undertaking this crossing a prized bull drowned. Whilst rightly 
attracting the condemnation of many animal welfare organisations this incident 
highlighted in the national press the economic circumstances that island residents, and 
Vatersay residents in particular, faced. 
Ferry service timings also varied by island. First sailings of the day were usually 
between 7.30am and 8am, though earlier sailings during school term time also 
occurred. Last sailings of the day were between 6pm and 6.30pm during the winter 
and 6pm and 9pm during the summer. Depending on the island there could be 
anything from 7 sailings a day to 13 giving a range in headways from 55 minutes to just 
over every 1.5 hours. For the islands in the northern part of the Outer Hebrides 
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(Berneray and Scalpay), which are strongly Presbyterian, there were no sailings on 
Sundays - so the islands were completely isolated on a Sunday. For Eriskay and 
Vatersay Sunday sailings did occur. 
The construction of the fixed links has been associated with a significant socio-
economic gain by the islanders. This includes increased employment amongst women, 
population stability against a background of falling populations, better delivery of social 
care, elimination of the requirement for secondary school children to live off the island 
during term-time and increased economic wealth (between £400 and £800 per 
household the majority of which has arisen through the elimination of ferry fares) 
(SaW, 2004; Reference, 2007). Indirect evidence of the benefit of the fixed links to the 
social and economic fabric of the islands can also be seen by the fact that traffic flows 
across the fixed links are 6 to 8 times higher than those carried by the ferries (Laird, 
Nellthorp and Mackie, 2004). Despite this increase, traffic flows across the fixed links 
are light (at between 250 and 400 vehicles per dal2) compared to flows found in more 
densely populated parts of Scotland. 
Following this introductory section, the second and third section in this chapter 
describes the dataset collected. The fourth section contains a discussion on the 
distribution of willingness to pay. As the methodology underlying the econometric 
analysis is the same as that used for the inter-island ferry survey, as described in 
Chapter 5, the fifth, sixth and seventh sections therefore only describe the analysis 
associated with each of the different elements to the household questionnaire. That is 
they respectively describe the local ferry stated preference game, the contingent 
valuation questions and the fixed link stated preference game. An interesting result 
from the analysis is a difference between annual willingness to pay and willingness to 
pay per trip. This issue is explored in the eighth section. The ninth section draws from 
the analysis in the previous four sections to derive an estimate of the risk premium for 
fixed link type infrastructure compared to ferry type infrastructure, whilst the final 
section brings together the main findings of this household survey and econometric 
analysis. 
6.2 The dataset 
149 households on Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay were interviewed. This is 
32 Adapted from annual traffic flows for 2004 presented by Reference (2007 p6) 
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48% of all households on these islands33. Simulations during the design of the survey 
(see Chapter 4) indicated that to obtain sufficiently robust estimates of the parameters 
of interest approximately 50% of the households on the islands would need to be 
surveyed. The previous ex-post work undertaken by saw (2004) indicated that such 
an ambitious sampling strategy was achievable, and therefore the sample target was 
set at 50%. 
Table 6.1 shows that the sample also captures the correct proportions of retired 
households and households with and without dependent children. The table 
additionally shows that household composition on Berne ray, Eriskay, Scalpay and 
Vatersay differs from the remainder of the Outer Hebrides and Scotland, in that there 
are more pensioner households and correspondingly less households with a working 
age adult. Average household size in the sample is 2.3, which is slightly above the 2.2 
persons per household average for the islands in the 2001 census but equivalent to the 
average for Scotland (GROS, 2008 Table UV51). 
Table 6.2 shows the median gross household income of the sample lies between 
£10,000 and £20,999. It also shows that 38% of households have a gross income of 
less than £10,000 per annum. Householders on Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and 
Vatersay are therefore poor relative to other householders in Scotland. This is 
because the median gross household income in Scotland was almost £22,000 in 
2005/6 (Scottish Executive, 2007 Table 5.2), whilst households with a net annual 
income of less than £8,339 fall into the poorest 20% of households in Scotland34. 
Car ownership on the islands is less than would be expected for a remote rural area. 
This can be seen from the fact that 32% of households do not have access to a car, 
which is similar to the Scotland average but significantly more than the 15% average 
for remote rural areas (Scottish Executive, 2006 Table 6.4). The low levels of car 
ownership are no doubt a reflection of the low incomes and the large proportion of 
pensioner households in the sample area. 
33 The 2001 census reports 310 households on Berneray, Eriskay, Scalpay and 
Vatersay (GROS, 2008 Table KS20) 
34 Source: 2003/4 Scottish Household Survey variable annetinc (MORI Scotland et al. 
2005). A gross household income of £10,000 for a single adult household gives a net 
income of about £8,500. 
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Table 6.1: Household composition 
Households Households Pensioner Total 
with with no households 
dependent dependent 
children children 
Sample 21% 38% 41% 100% 
Berneray, Eriskay, 
Scalpayand 25% 36% 39% 100% 
2001 Vatersay 
census Outer Hebrides 27% 47% 26% 100% 
Scotland 28% 48% 23% 100% 
Source: Survey data and 2001 census (GROS, 2008 Table KS20) 
Table 6.2: Gross household income (per annum) 
Proportion Proportion of those Frequency 
of sample declaring their Income 
Withheld 24 16% ---
<£10,000 47 32% 38% 
£10,000 to £20,999 45 30% 36% 
£21,000 to £35,999 26 17% 21% 
£36,000 to £50,000 3 2% 2% 
~£50,O01 4 3% 3% 
Total 149 100% 100% 
The number and type of trips householders make over the fixed link gives an indication 
of the day to day dependency households have on the link. Table 6.3 shows that this 
dependency varies significantly by island. This can be seen from the fact that on 
average householders make 6 return trips per week over the fixed link on Berneray to 
almost 28 trips per week on Vatersay. Some of the differences between the islands 
stem from the amount of time land uses and behaviour have had to adjust to the 
presence of the fixed link - the longer the period of adjustment the more well used one 
would expect the fixed link to be and the Vatersay link is the oldest. In the main though 
the level of use made of the fixed link by households is felt to reflect the social, 
educational and commercial services available on each island. Vatersay has neither a 
primary school nor shop, which the other three islands do. Eriskay has a pub and 
hotel, whilst Scalpay has a doctor's branch surgery. Employment opportunities on 
Vatersay are more limited than on the other islands, as evidenced by the fact that 86% 
of households in Vatersay have 1 or more household members working off the island 
compared to only 55% on Berneray and 68% on Scalpay. 
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Table 6.3: Total number of return trips across the bridge/causeway made by 
household in the week before the survey 
No. of 
households In Mean Median 
sample 
Scalpay 70 9.6 6.5 
Berneray 33 6.0 3 
Eriskay 28 7.6 5.5 
Vatersay 18 27.6 23.5 
All sample 149 10.6 7 
6.3 Stated preference and contingent valuation responses and data cleaning 
As can be seen from Table 6.4 there is generally a good spread of respondents 
choosing either Ferry A or Ferry B in the local ferry stated preference games. Neither 
ferry dominates the responses, though there is a slight preference for Ferry B. Further 
analysis indicates that over the whole questionnaire almost two thirds of responses are 
in favour of the most expensive ferry service (i.e. the one with the highest service 
levels). Additionally, it appears that only 7% of respondents exhibited non-trading 
behaviour in that they either choose Ferry A all the time (2 respondents) or Ferry B all 
the time (9 respondents). This is good as it suggests that respondents are treating the 
questionnaire seriously and the design is successful in posing scenarios that allow 
respondents to trade between a lower cost alternative (usually Ferry A) and a more 
expensive alternative with a better service (usually Ferry B). Given that the 11 
respondents who exhibit non-trading behaviour may also be treating the questionnaire 
seriously they are retained in the dataset for the econometric analysis. 
In contrast to the local ferry stated preference game the fixed link stated preference 
game indicates a much more marked preference for the second alternative (the fixed 
link) than for the first alternative (the ferry) (see Table 6.5). To a certain extent this was 
expected as it was felt unrealistic to present SP scenarios that included a council tax 
premium in excess of £1,000 (see section 4.3). The knock-on effect of this aspect of 
the design is that 54% of respondents exhibit non-trading behaviour - 9 respondents 
always choose the ferry and 71 always choose the fixed link. Th is could be for valid 
reasons in that the maximum council tax premium is too small to persuade respondents 
to choose the ferry alternative over the fixed link. A deeper analysis of the responses 
confirms this to a certain extent in that non-trading behaviour varies systematically with 
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income, car ownership and the number of trips across the fixed link per week. Those 
with high incomes, access to a car and who make a lot of trips across the fixed link are 
more likely to exhibit non-trading behaviour than other respondents. The analysis also 
indicates a systematic variation by island, in that Eriskay households are more than 
twice as likely to exhibit non-trading behaviour compared to other households. As 
discussed in section 4.4 a lot of the ferry alternatives in the Eriskay SP scenarios were 
considered unrealistic by respondents. The high incidence of non-trading behaviour by 
Eriskay householders is therefore considered to be an artefact of the lack of realism of 
the questionnaire in Eriskay rather than an indication of high willingness to pay for a 
fixed link. Eriskay households are therefore excluded from the econometric analysis. 
This reduces non-trading behaviour to 45% of respondents. This is still a large 
proportion of the dataset and the results from the fixed link stated preference game 
need to be interpreted against this statistic. Fortunately the contingent valuation 
questions provide the means by which respondents can reveal their true willingness to 
pay. The contingent valuation questions therefore act as an efficient validation of the 
fixed link stated preference game - as is discussed later in this chapter. 
Table 6.4: Responses to local ferry stated preference game 
SP From those who answered the Percentage of returned 
Question SP question the percentage questionnaires with 
choosing: question unanswered 
Ferry A Ferry B 
1 11% 89% 5% 
2 61% 39% 5% 
3 24% 76% 6% 
4 69% 31% 5% 
5 27% 73% 6% 
6 72% 28% 8% 
7 91% 9% 5% 
8 69% 31% 10% 
9 24% 76% 6% 
10 37% 63% 5% 
11 85% 15% 6% 
12 62% 38% 8% 
13 36% 64% 5% 
14 11% 89% 5% 
15 32% 68% 3% 
16 16% 84% 5% 
Average 45% 55% 6% 
. . Note: Shaded cell identifies cheapest option 
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Table 6.5: Responses to fixed link stated preference game 
SP From those who answered the Percentage of returned 
Question SP question the percentage questionnaires with 
choosing: question unanswered 
Ferry Fixed Link 
1 41% 59% 3% 
2 24% 76% 0% 
3 29% 71% 3% 
4 16% 84% 0% 
5 54% 46% 0% 
6 54% 46% 0% 
7 46% 54% 3% 
8 17% 83% 0% 
9 54% 46% 0% 
10 61% 39% 0% 
11 31% 69% 0% 
12 32% 68% 0% 
13 19% 81% 0% 
14 45% 55% 0% 
15 14% 86% 0% 
16 11% 89% 0% 
Extra 9% 91% 1% 
Average 29% 71% 1% 
Analysis of the responses to the contingent valuation questions indicates that 70% of 
respondents provided a valid willingness to pay (see Table 6.6) that can be used in the 
econometric analysis. As noted in the literature (Mitchell and Carson, 1989, pp.97-104; 
Bateman et al., 2002 pp.135-145) and discussed in section 4.3 open-ended elicitation 
contingent valuation questions can generate a lot of protest votes and non-responses 
due to the difficulty respondents face coming up with their true willingness to pay 'out of 
the blue' for something they are not familiar with valuing. Here protest votes against 
the payment mechanism (a council tax premium) account for between a fifth and an 
eighth of responses. Given the political sensitivity of council tax this is felt to be 
reasonably realistic and not excessive. Non-responses constitute between 9% and 
17% depending on the contingent valuation question. This level of non-response is 
much higher than that experienced in the stated preference games (see Table 6.4 and 
Table 6.5), but once the influence of the Eriskay households is taken into account it is 
not that much higher. The level of non-response to the contingent valuation questions 
is therefore also viewed as acceptable. The design strategy of preceding the 
contingent valuation questions with stated preference games set within a similar 
135 
context therefore appears to have been successful at minimising the number of invalid 
responses to the contingent valuation questions. 
Table 6.6: Responses to contingent valuation questions 
Contingent valuation Proportion of dataset 
question Valid WTP Protest Non- Total 
responses votes response 
12 to 24 hr ferry 68% 15% 17% 100% 
24hr ferry to fixed link 71% 13% 16% 100% 
Time saving 68% 22% 9% 100% 
A deeper analysis of the responses to the contingent valuation questions indicates that 
some households indicate a very high willingness to pay relative to their income. 
Values in excess of £5,200 are indicated despite some of the households having a 
gross income of less than £10,000 p.a. Such values are unrealistic and either result 
from a coding error on the part of the survey enumerator (e.g. coding a willingness to 
pay of £100 per annum as £100 per week) or as a result of the householder not 
treating the questionnaire seriously. Outlying willingness to pay values of £5,200 or 
more are therefore excluded from the econometric analysis. This gives a maximum 
willingness to pay of £2,000 per annum for the 12 to 24 hr ferry, £2,500 for the 24hr 
ferry to fixed link and £520 for the time saving. 
12% of the households interviewed moved to the islands surveyed after the fixed link 
had been constructed. The willingness to pay of such householders is of interest as, 
through the process of self-selection and all else being equal, households with high 
values for connectivity would choose not to live on an isolated island. Households that 
move to the island after the fixed link had been constructed are therefore expected to 
exhibit higher levels of willingness to pay, than households that were resident on the 
island before the fixed link was constructed. The appropriateness of the survey 
instrument for such householders though is uncertain. This is because the 
questionnaire is based around a series of 'ferry scenarios' for which households have 
no direct experience. Some evidence regarding inconsistency in willingness to pay by 
households that moved to the islands after the fixed links had been constructed is 
evident. Preliminary analysis indicated that on Scalpay households that moved to the 
island after the bridge had been constructed valued the bridge substantially less than 
existing residents, whilst the opposite was the case for Berneray and Vatersay. On the 
basis that 'incomers' to the islands post-fixed link could not properly relate to the ferry 
scenarios such respondents are excluded from econometric analysis. 
I' 
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Exclusion of cases from the sample based on the five criteria discussed above (non-
response, protest vote, Eriskay household, post-fixed link and outlier) reduces the 
sample size down to just over two thirds for the SP games and around a half for the 
contingent valuation questions. This is a larger reduction than is evident in the inter-
island questionnaire (where about 80% of the cases are retained) and has arisen 
primarily as a result of the problems experienced with the Eriskay households and the 
ambitious sampling strategy that included households that moved to the islands post-
fixed link. With valid SP samples in excess of 400 cases and contingent valuation 
samples in excess of 70 cases there is still though more than sufficient data with which 
to proceed with the econometric analysis. 
Table 6.7: Household survey dataset cleaning 
Local Fixed Contingent valuation 
ferry SP link SP 12 to 24 hr 24 hr ferry Time game game ferry to fixed saving 
link 
No. of households in sample 149 149 149 149 149 
No. of cases in sample 596 745 149 149 149 
Exclusion of cases by: 
Step 1: Eriskay households 112 140 28 28 28 
Households who 
Step 2: moved to island post- 68 85 17 17 17 
fixed link 
Step 3: Non-responses 12 3 8 8 8 
Protest votes/ Other 
Step 4: reasons for not N/A N/A 14 10 25 
providing WTP value 
Outlying values 
Step 5: where WTP <! £5,200 N/A N/A 3 2 1 
p.a. 
Valid cases 404 517 79 84 70 
6.4 Distribution of willingness to pay 
Drawing from the discussion and results from the inter-island ferry presented in the 
preceding chapter the main points of interest associated with the distribution of 
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willingness to pay are the existence of: 
• A mass point at or near zero; 
• Negative values; 
• Non-linearities (e.g. the marginal value of extending operating hours depends 
upon what the existing operating hours are); and 
• The shape of the distribution. 
The existence of a mass point in willingness to pay at or near zero occurs, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, because for a proportion of travellers activity schedules are 
either well adjusted and close to optimum or there exists a significant amount of buffer 
time. The long distance nature of the trips made on the inter-island ferries mean that 
for many travellers travelling is the major activity of the day around which other 
activities are centred. A reasonable sized mass point at or close to zero was therefore 
expected and found for the inter-island ferry (see Table 5.3(a) and (b)). This contrasts 
with local trips, the present interest, where travel costs can impose significant 
constraints on activities. A priori a smaller mass point at zero for the household survey 
is expected. Table 6.8(a) shows that between 4% and 11% of households have a 
value of headway less than 0.52p/min, compared to the 26% that was found in the 
inter-island survey. A zero mass point therefore exists but is smaller for local trips than 
for longer distance trips. There is an apparent discrepancy in the operating hours data 
in Table 6.8(b) as responses to two SP questions suggest that 40% of respondents 
have a value per hour closed less than 4.17p/hr closed, whilst responses to a different 
SP question suggest that only 13% of respondents have a value per hour closed less 
than 8.33p/hr closed. This apparent discrepancy is attributed to the fact that 
householders have a higher value of an additional operating hour if the ferry service 
has short operating hours (e.g. gam to 5pm) than if it has long hours (e.g . 11am to 
6pm). That is non-linearities exist for the marginal value of operating hours. This 
makes Table 6.8(b) difficult to interpret with respect to the size of a zero mass point, 
but suggests that such a mass point may vary in size depending on the existing 
operating hours of the ferry. The contingent valuation question comparing a 24 hour 
ferry to 12 hour ferry35 however indicates that 27% of the sample hold a zero value for 
operating hours above 12 hours (Le. 7am to 7pm). This is quite large but smaller than 
that observed for the inter-island ferry (44%) also as expected. 
35 Both ferries are free and run at 30 minute headways. 
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Table 6.8: Distribution of willingness to pay for changes local ferry schedules 
(boundary value bin analysis) 
(a) Headway 
Bin for marginal value Proportion Cumulative 
of headway (H) (p/mln) of sample frequency 
H<0.17 11% 11% 
0.17SH<0.52 -7% 4% 
0.S2sH<2.29 70% 74% 
2.29sH<S.00 13% 88% 
S.OosH 13% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
(b) Operating Hours 
Bin for marginal value Proportion Cumulative 
of operating hours(OH) of sample frequency 
(p/mln) 
OH<2.08 7% 7% 
2.08s0H<3.13 33% 40% 
3.13s0H<4.17 0% 40% 
4.17s0H<8.33 -28% 13% 
8.33s0H 88% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
A mass point at or close to zero is also evident in the value attached to a fixed link 
compared to a 24 hour ferry. This can be seen in Table 6.9 where 25% of SP 
responses indicated a value of the fixed link compared to a 24 hour ferry of no more 
than £60 per annum. The contingent valuation question revealed a similar but slightly 
higher proportion at 31%. The household survey data, just like the inter-island survey 
data, therefore points towards the existence of significant mass points in the 
willingness to pay functions at or close to zero. 
Zero responses account for between a fifth and a quarter of the valid responses to the 
ferry and fixed link contingent valuation questions (see Table 6.10). These are 
comparable but slightly higher than the identified mass points in the stated preference 
local ferry and fixed link datasets. There is therefore consistency between these 
datasets. Contrastingly 70% of respondents indicated a zero willingness to pay for a 
time saving of between 10 and 20 minutes36 . As each of these respondents also 
answered a subsequent question to indicate that the transport alternative with a lower 
level of service was perfectly adequate for their household these values may be a true 
36 Time saving varied by island 
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reflection of willingness to pay. Possibly however the large number of zero responses 
has arisen as a consequence of the 'unexpected' nature of the task respondents had 
been asked to perform. That is whilst they had developed some familiarity with 
choosing between different ferry and fixed link scenarios they had not developed a 
similar familiarity with placing a willingness to pay value on travel time savings. This 
characteristic of the data needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the econometric 
results of the time saving contingent valuation question. 
Table 6.9: Distribution of willingness to pay for fixed link compared to a 24 hour 
ferry (boundary value and contingent valuation bin analysis) 
Benefit of fixed link over Fixed Link SP Game Contingent valuation 24hr 
24 hr ferry ferry to fixed link 
(£ per annum) Proportion Cumulative Proportion Cumulative 
of sample frequency of sample frequency 
Benefit < £20 11% 11% 20% 20% 
£20::; Benefit < £60 14% 25% 11% 31% 
£60::; Benefit <£120 -3% 22% 8% 39% 
£120::; Benefit <£180 0% 22% 1% 40% 
£180::; Benefit <£220 3% 25% 1% 41% 
£220s Benefit <£300 36% 61% 17% 58% 
£300S Benefit 39% 100% 42% 100% 
Note: (1) Ferry operates at 30 minute headways, is free and 15 minutes slower than fixed link . 
(2) Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
Table 6.10: Observed distribution of willingness to pay - contingent valuation 
questions 
Contingent valuation Valid WTP responses 
question Negative Zero Positive Total 
willingness willingness willingness 
to pay to pay to pay 
12 to 24 hr ferry 2% 27% 71% 100% 
24hr ferry to fixed link 4% 20% 76% 100% 
Time saving 3% 70% 27% 100% 
Note: Proportion of valid WTP responses with a negative WTP is obtained through an analysis 
of the reasons given for preferring the alternative with the lower level of service. 
In addition to the existence of a mass point at or close to zero the contingent valuation 
data point towards the existence of a small number of negative values associated with 
improvements from a ferry to a fixed link, from a 12 hour to 24 hour ferry and in travel 
time to and from other villages (off the sampled island). This varies between 2 and 4% 
of all households (see Table 6.10). This small, but from an model estimation point of 
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view important, group of householders state they prefer isolation to improved 
connectivity and also attribute negative impacts to the transport improvements (such as 
other people speeding or visual intrusion). 
Figure 6.5(a) and (b) illustrates the implied distribution of willingness to pay for the 
ferry and fixed link contingent valuation questions and the fixed link stated preference 
questions (where a 24 hour ferry was compared to a fixed link). The large mass point 
at or close to zero, discussed at length above, is evident in each of these distributions. 
Interestingly the contingent valuation distributions appear to represent a form of decay 
function as willingness to pay increases. This contrasts with the distribution implied by 
an analysis of the fixed link SP game's boundary values (in Figure 6.5(b». Here aside 
from the mass point near zero there appears to be a second mass pOint between £220 
and £300. A cursory comparison between the distributions in Figure 6.5 with the 
normal, triangular and log-normal distributions suggests that, as with the inter-island 
ferry data, none of these three distribution functions appear well able to replicate the 
observed willingness to pay distributions. 
The analysis presented above allows median revealed willingness to pay values to be 
identified. From the local ferry SP game the median value for headway lies in the 
range of 0.5p to 2.3 pence per headway minute per household, whilst the median value 
of operating hours is in excess of 8.33 pence per hour closed per household. The fixed 
link contingent valuation question indicates that the median willingness to pay for a 
fixed link compared to a 24 hour ferry is between £220 and £300 per annum per 
household. This is the same as is indicated by the fixed link SP game. The 
consistency in median values for the same step change in transport quality between 
the two question types is reassuring. The local ferry contingent valuation question 
indicates that the median willingness to pay for a 24 hour ferry compared to a 12 hour 
ferry is between £100 and £150 per annum per household. 
6.5 Local ferry stated preference game - estimation results 
The estimation strategy used to estimate the model for the local ferry stated preference 
game is the same as that used for the inter-island ferry game described in detail in 
Chapter 5. Briefly MNL models are estimated to the data in the first instance with the 
structure for the best performing MNL model being used as a basis for the estimation of 
the MXL models. Different MNL models are estimated that examine whether utility 
varies linearly or non-linearly and whether interactions of the main attributes (cost, 
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headway, operating hours) with socio-economic characteristics assist in explaining 
Figure 6.5 Cumulative distribution function for willingness to pay 
(a) Ferry and fixed link contingent valuation questions 
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- 24 hr ferry to fixed link CV 
question 
- 12 hr to 24 hr ferry CV 
question 
£1 ,000 £1 ,200 
Willingness to pay (£ per annum) 
(b) Fixed link stated preference game (boundary value bin analysis for 
willingness to pay for fixed link relative to a 24 hr ferry) 
I- Fixed Link SP game Bvs l 
£0 £200 £400 £600 £800 £1 ,000 £1 ,200 
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behaviour. The socio-economic characteristics examined include whether the 
household has access to a car, the island they lived on, household type (family, 
working age adult(s) and retired}, household income and the number of trips made over 
the fixed link. 
The design of the local ferry SP game is similar to that for the inter-island ferry. The 
generic utility functions for the model estimation are therefore equivalent, which for 
completeness are reproduced below in Equation 6.1 . 
V:~':ry1 = p:erry f(H)+ x~erry g(OH) + ¢:erry h(P) + cq.ferry1 
V ferry = pferry f(H) + yferryg(OH) + ",ferry h(P) + £ q,ferry2 k If., k 'f'k q.ferry2 
(6.1 ) 
Six multinomial models have been estimated (see Table 6.11). Model LF-MNL 1 is a 
simple model linear in headway, operating hours and cost (fare). No fixed effects 
associated with household socio-economic characteristics are modelled. Models LF-
MNL2 to 4 are similar to LF-MNL 1 in that no socio-economic fixed effects are modelled 
but differ in that the models are non-linear in headway and operating hours. Model LF-
MNL5 introduces fixed effects to the piece-wise non-linear model (LF-MNL4), whilst 
model LF-MNL6 has the same structure as LF-MNL5 but is estimated on data that 
excludes non-traders (Le. those that always chose the cheapest ferry, etc.). 
Table 5.5 shows that the best-performing model structure is the piece-wise non-linear 
model. That is the model in which the function in headway f(H) and the function in 
operating hours g(OH) are defined differently depending on the values taken by H 
and OH. Including socio-economic characteristics into the model (model LF-MNL5) 
further improves the model fit. The latter model has an adjusted rho-squared statistic 
of 0.278. Whilst this implies that a SUbstantial amount of unexplained variation still 
exists in the data, such a statistic is fairly typical for SP data. 
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Table 6.11: Summary statistics for MNL models - local ferry SP game 
Model Functional form for Includes Includes No. of Rho- Log 
Headway (H) and fixed non- cases squared Likeli-
Operating Hours (OH) effects traders hood 
(see table notes) 
Linear 
LF- f(H) = H No Yes 404 0.161 -232.34 
MNL1 g(OH) = HC 
Non-linear 
LF- f(H) = Ln(H) No Yes 404 0.098 -249.74 
MNL2 g(OH) = Ln(HC) 
LF- f(H) =.JH No Yes 404 0.170 -229.93 MNL3 
g(OH) = HC 2 
LF- f(H) = 0 if H<x No Yes 404 0.239 -214.96 MNL4 
-
=H H~x 
-
g(OH) = 0 HC<y if _ 
=HC HC~y 
LF- As MNL4 Yes Yes 404 0.278 -200.08 
MNL5 
LF- As MNL4 Yes No 372 0.327 -172.38 
MNL6 
Notes: Generic utility function is set out in equation 6.1. He is hours closed . All models include 
fixed effects by socio-economic group. For the piecewise models (LF-MNL4 to 6) multiple steps 
in headway and operating hours are specified (e.g. the vector X = {60,120,180,240} and 
y = {0,7,12,16}), though only those that are statistically significant are retained in the final 
model. Estimated using ALOGIT v4.2. 
Table 6.12 presents models LF-MNL 1, 4, 5 and 6. All model coefficients have the 
correct sign and are statistically significant at the 90% level and above, aside from one 
coefficient in model LF-MNL6 which is based on a smaller sample (excludes non-
traders). Investigations into the socio-economic parameters that give the best model 
performance in terms of largest log-likelihood and adjusted rho-squared give rise to the 
inclusion of household trip-making characteristics in model LF-MNL5. Characteristics 
such as income, car ownership, off-island employment and household structure are 
important determinants of behaviour, however, when combined in a model with trip 
making behaviour these characteristics cannot explain any additional variation in the 
data (i.e. are not significantly different from zero). This occurs primarily because these 
characteristics are important determinants of trip-making behaviour. In a model for use 
as a forecasting tool it would be inappropriate to include an endogenous variable (such 
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as trip making behaviour) as an explanatory attribute in the model. In this instance it is 
acceptable as the interest is willingness to pay and the model with the most 
explanatory power is the preferred mechanism for deriving willingness to pay. 
The marginal utilities presented in Table 6.12 and marginal valuations presented in 
Table 6.13 indicate the models estimated exhibit a number of desirable and expected 
properties: 
• Those of low incomes have a higher marginal utility of income than those with 
high incomes (model LF-MNL4); 
• The larger the headway the lower the marginal utility of a headway minute is 
(models LF-MNL4 and 5). This is consistent with the fact that at low headways 
a larger percentage of the time between headways is spent waiting (e.g. at the 
pierhead). Such time could invariably be spent in a far more productive manner 
(e.g. leisure). At long headways the marginal utility of a headway minute is the 
difference between the marginal utilities of different leisure activities. As such it 
is less than the marginal utility at low headways; 
• Marginal utility and marginal value of an operating hour during the day (between 
7am and 7pm) is more than during the evening and night (between 7pm and 
7am) (model LF-MNL5). This is consistent with the fact that more activities are 
undertaken during the day than in the evening and at night; 
• For model LF-MNL 1, for which it is possible to calculate t-statistics for the 
marginal valuations, it can be seen that the marginal valuations are significant. 
95% confidence intervals for the marginal values in model LF-MNL 1 are +/-25% 
for the marginal value of headway and +/-22% for the marginal value of an 
operating hour. 
The best performing multinomial model is LF-MNL5 and this is used as the basis for 
the development of the MXL models. Excluding non-traders from the data reduces the 
amount of unexplained variation (as evidenced by the higher rho-squared value for 
model LF-MNL6). It does not have a large effect on the estimated parameters or 
marginal valuations. Non-traders are therefore maintained in the data for the 
estimation of the MXL models. 
Table 6.14 presents five random parameter mixed logit models. LF-MXL 1 reproduces 
the best performing multinomial model by treating the data as cross-sectional. In 
model LF-MXL2 the data is treated as panel data but no taste variation is included in 
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Table 6.12: Local ferry SP game estimation results for MNL models 
, .. LF-MNL1 LF-MNL4 LF-MNL5 LF-MNL6 _. 
, -
Cost coefficient for all household incomes -0.006 (-6.26) -0.003 (-2.92) -0.007 (-6.49) -0.008 (-6.88) 
Increment on cost coefficient for: 
Household income < £10,000 p.a. --- -0.004 (-2.26) --- ---
Household income withheld 
--- -0.009 (-2.57) --- ---
Headway coefficient 
-0.008 (-6.29) -0.058 (-4.16) -0.050 (-3.53) -0.048 (-3.06) (At all level of headways ~ 30 mins and S 240 mins) 
Increment on headway coefficient: 
When 60mins S headway < 240 mins 
--- --- 0.048 (3.63) 0.042 (3.14) 0.040 (2.72) 
When headways = 240m ins --- --- 0.004 (2.22) 0.004 (1 .85) 0.003 (1.23) 
For households making 5 or more trips per week over fixed link 
--- - --- ---
-0.007 (-3.17) -0.008 (-3.16) 
Operating hours coefficient (no. of hours closed) -0.131 (-7.80) --- -.-- ---
Increment on operating hours coefficient: 
When hours closed ~ 12 hours (i.e. during day after 7am and 
--- -0.129 (-8.06) -0.062 (-3.27) -0.071 (-3.58) before 7pm) 
For households making 3 or more trips per week over fixed link --- --- -0.132 (-4.18) -0.145 (-4.29) 
For households making 17 or more trips per week over fixed link --- --- -0.140 (-2.13) -0.187 (-2.21) 
Observations 404 404 404 372 
Log-likelihood -232.34 -214.96 -200.08 -172.38 
Adjusted rho-squared 0.161 0.239 0.278 0.327 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Significant at 99% level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1 .96 and at the 90% level if the t-
statistic>1.65. Estimated using ALOGIT v4.2. 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 6.13: Marginal values of headway and operating hours (local ferry SP game 
MNL models) 
LF- LF- LF- LF-
MNL1 MNL4 MNL5 MNL6 
Marginal value of a headway minute 
(pence/headway minute/household trip) 
At all level of headways ~ 30 mins and S 1.3 
--- --- ---240 mins (8.0) 
When 30 mins sheadway < 60 mins 12.3 7.2 5.7 --- (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
When 60mins S headway < 240 mins 1.8 0.9 0.7 --- (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
When headways = 240m ins 0.8 0.3 0.4 --- (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
Marginal value of an operating hour 
(pence/operating hour/household trip) 
At any time of day 22.41 (8 .9) --- --- -.--
Between 7pm and 7am (I.e. late evening 
---
0.0 18.5 17.4 
and night) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
After 7am and before 7pm (I.e. during 28.3 27.9 26.2 
---day) (N/A) (N/A) (N/A) 
Note: For each model the value of headway and operating hours for each statistically significant 
population segment is calculated . A weighted average of these marginal valuations using the 
sample proportions is then calculated . This is the process of sample enumeration . An 
operating day of between 7am and 7pm implies an operating day of 12 hours. 
T-statistics. in parentheses, calculated following Hess and Daly (2008) . For piecewise nonlinear 
models LF-MNL4. 5 and 6 t-statistics cannot be calculated as there is insufficient information on 
covariances between the marginal values of different population segments. 
the model. Taste variation is incorporated into models LF-MXL3 (normal distribution 
function). LF-MXL4 (triangular distribution function with no constraints on the spread) 
and LF-MXL5 (triangular distribution function with the spread constrained to the mean). 
Aside from model LF-MXL 1 where the data is treated as cross-sectional all the other 
models correctly treat the data as panel data, as up to four observations are obtained 
from each respondent. The log-normal distribution is not used as it results in 
unrealistically high estimates of the mean willingness to pay (see Section 5.5). 
As can be seen by comparing LF-MXL 1 to model LF-MNL5 (in Table 6.12) the MXL 
model gives a good approximation to the MNL model. This gives re-assurance that the 
mixed log it models are being estimated correctly. There is no difference between 
models LF-MXL 1 and 2. because without the introduction of a random parameter into 
the model the bias in the standard errors associated with panel data cannot be 
corrected. As can be seen from the log-likelihood values introducing taste variation 
into the model improves the level of fit significantly for the models fitted with the normal 
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Table 6.14: Local ferry SP game estimation results for MXL models 
- " , 
-
~ ~ ] r:c 
" , 'LF-MXL1 iLF-MXL2 LF-MXL3 LF-MXL4 LF-MXL5 ~ ,. ,"" 
" 
" --
_ ....... -.~ "!~- ~. -
Cost All trips b F -0.007 (-6.35) F -0.007 (-6.44) F -0.012 (-5.48) F -0.012 (-5.58) F -0.008 (-5.79) 
c --- --- --- --- ---
Headway coefficient b F -0.049 (-3.39) F -0.050 (-3.79) F -0.121 (-3.22) F -0.123 (-3 .29) TC -0.006 (3.25) 
(Headways ~ 30 mins) c --- --- --- --- -0.006 (4.11) 
Increment on headway coefficient for: 
b F 0.042 (3.00) 0.042 (3.30) 0.107 (3.07) 0.110 (3.14) ---Headways ~ 60 mins F N TU 
c --- --- -0.018 (-3.70) 0.044 (3.92) ---
b F 0.004 (1.75) 0.004 (2.08) --- --- ---Headways ~ 240 mins F 
c --- --- --- --- ---
Households making 5 or more b F -0.007 (-3.06) F -0.007 (-2.67) F -0.017 (-3.22) -0.017 (-3.20) F -0 .007 (-3.41) 
trips per week over fixed link F c --- --- --- -- --
Operating hours coefficient (no. of b 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 hours closed) 
Increment on operating hours 
c 
coefficient for: i 
b F -0.062 (-3.16) F -0.062 (-2.93) N -0.174 (-2.64) -0.178 (-2.66) TC -0.064 (-2.29) Hours closed ~ 12 hours TU 
c --- --- -0.281 (-3.56) -0.670 (-3.85) -0.076 (-2.29) 
Households making 3 or more b F -0.132 (-3.82) -0.132 (-2.86) F -0.228 (-3.77) -0.225 (-3.71) -0.201 (-4.03) F F TU trips per week over fixed link c --- --- --.- --- -0.501 (-3.46) 
Households making 17 or more b F -0.139 (-2.43) -0.140 (-2.50) -0.357 (-2.47) -0.349 (-2.68) F -0.154 (-2.43) 
trips per week over fixed link F F F c --- --- --- --- ---
No. of observations 404 404 404 404 404 
Log-likelihood -200.08 -200.08 -182.34 -182.26 -199.79 
-----
Notes: F, N, and TU and TC indicate distribution function for parameters. F means fixed (i.e. no distribution function), N is the normal, and TU is the triangular where the 
spread is not constrained in estimation and TC is the triangular with spread constrained equal to the mean. For each random parameter two coefficients are estimated (b and 
c). For the normal distribution the mean=b and st.dev.=c; and for the triangular mean=b and spread=c. T-statistics in parentheses. Parameter is significant at 99% level if the 
t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1.96 and at the 90% level if the t-statistic>1.65. T-statistics calculated using robust standard errors except model LF-MXL 1. 
Models estimated using Train's Gauss code with 500 Halton draws. 
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(LF-MXL3) and the unconstrained triangular (LF-MXL4) distributions. The 
improvement in fit over the MNL model using a constrained triangular distribution (LF-
MXL5) is marginal. In the models presented only some of the variables are treated as 
random. This is because some of the spread parameters are not significantly different 
from zero. It can also be seen that the introduction of taste variation reduces the 
number of variables (e.g. headway equal to 240 minutes) in the models. That is the 
distribution functions capture some of the variation in marginal utility that previously 
required an additional variable. 
The advantage of using the constrained triangular distribution in the model estimation 
is that no part of the distribution of willingness to pay values has the wrong sign 
(negative). This is not the case for the normal distribution and the unconstrained 
triangular distribution. The fitted distribution of willingness to pay for model LF-MXL4 
(triangular unconstrained) is set out in Table 6.15 and compared to the revealed 
distribution of willingness to pay. The comparison is also illustrated in Figure 6.6. The 
non-linear nature of the willingness to pay functions, and the mixture of fixed 
parameters and random parameters in the models make the fitted distributions hard to 
interpret and compare with the revealed distribution. It can however be seen that the 
fitted willingness to pay distribution has a part, between 11 % and 14% (depending on 
the attribute), with the wrong sign. The model LF-MXL3 (with a normal distribution) has 
a very similar proportion of the distribution with the wrong sign. As argued earlier in 
this chapter and in Chapter 5 it is not expected that such proportions of the population 
would hold negative willingness to pay for improvements in headway and operating 
hours. The proportions are, however, not excessive when considered against the 
objective of the study - the derivation of willingness to pay values. On grounds of 
better model fit (higher log-likelihood) models LF-MXL3 (normal) and LF-MXL4 
(triangular unconstrained) are therefore preferred to LF- MXL5 (triangular constrained). 
Model LF-MXL4 (triangular unconstrained) has a marginally higher log-likelihood than 
LF-MXL3 (normal) and the fitted distribution is also bounded which the normal 
distribution is not. This is more appealing as it is unrealistic to expect the marginal 
utility of headway and operating hours to tend to infinity for some members of the 
population. On these grounds LF-MXL4 is taken as the preferred model. It should be 
noted that if the models were to be used for forecasting a different preference might 
have been made as the proportions of the distribution that have a negative willingness 
to pay are, from a forecasting perspective, at the limits of acceptability. 
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Table 6.15: Comparison of observed and fitted cumulative distribution functions 
of willingness to pay for headway and operating hours 
(a) Headway 
Bin for marginal value Observed LF-MXL4 
of headway (H) (p/min) When When 
30 mlns S headway 60mlns S headway 
< 60 mins S 240 mins 
H<O.OO unknown 0% 14% 
H<0.17 11% 0% 16% 
0.17sH<0.52 4% 0% 21% 
0.52sH<2.29 74% 0% 57% 
2.29sH<5.00 88% 0% 97% 
5.00SH 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Shaded cell indicates bin holding the median value 
(b) Operating hours 
Bin for marginal value Observed LF-MXL4 
of operating hours (OH) During day In evening and (p/hour) (7am -7pm) night time 
(7pm -7am) 
OH<O.OO unknown 11% 0% 
OH<2.08 7% 13% 29% 
2.08S0H<3.13 40% 14% 29% 
3.13s0H<4.17 40% 15% 29% 
4.17S0H<8.33 13% 18% 29% 
8.33s0H 100% 100% 100% 
Notes: Shaded row indicates bin holding the median value 
Table 6.16 presents the willingness to pay values for the different MXL models. The 
second column of this table gives the marginal values for the preferred model (LF-
MXL4). Here it can be seen that when head ways are between 30 and 59 minutes, 
headways have a marginal value of 11.3 pence/headway minute/household trip, whilst 
when headways are between 60 and 240 minutes headways have a marginal value of 
2.0 pence/headway minute/household trip. It can also be seen that the marginal value 
of an operating hour during the day (between 7am and 7pm) is more at 34.7 
pence/operating hour/household trip than it is during the late evening and night (19.7 
pence/operating hour/household trip). As discussed in Chapter 5 it is not possible to 
calculate t-statistics and confidence intervals for the marginal valuations derived from a 
mixed logit model. The marginal values presented in Table 6.16 are justified as 
statistically robust on the basis that the model parameters are statistically robust. 95% 
confidence intervals for the MNL model LF-MNL 1, which has an inferior fit to the data, 
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are also less than +/-25%. 
Figure 6.6: Comparison of observed and fitted cumulative distribution functions 
of willingness to pay for headway and operating hours 
(a) Headway 
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Table 6.16: Properties of willingness to pay distributions for headway and 
operating hours (local ferry SP game) 
LF-MXL3 LF-MXL4 LF-MXLS 
Marginal value of a headway minute 
(pence/headway minute/household trip) 
When 30 mins :5 headway < 60 mins 
Mean 11.1 11 .3 As for 
Standard deviation 0.7 0.7 headways 
between 60 
Proportion with negative WTP 0% 0% and 240 mins 
When 60mins :5 headway :5 240 mins 
Mean 1.9 2.0 1.4 
Standard deviation 1.5 1.7 0.6 
Proportion with negative WTP 13% 14% 0% 
Marginal value of an operating hour 
(pence/operating hour/household trip) 
Between 7pm and 7am (Le. late evening 
and night) 
Mean 20.0 19.7 22.3 
Standard deviation 17.2 16.9 16.2 
Proportion with negative WTP 0% 0% 0% 
After 7am and before 7pm (Le. during day) 
Mean 34.4 34.7 30.7 
Standard deviation 25.3 28.5 16.5 
Proportion with negative WTP 11% ' 11% 0% 
Notes: Mean and standard deviation values estimated using a monte-carlo simulation based on 
a population of 10,000 (split into the statistically relevant socio-economic groups from the model 
using sample proportions). Lowest and highest 2.5% are excluded from calculation of mean 
and standard deviation for the unbounded normal distribution (LF-MXL3). Fixed cost 
coefficients and bounded distributions mean that all 10,000 simulations are used for LF-MXL4 
and LF-MXL5. 
6.6 Contingent valuation - estimation results 
The primary purpose of the contingent valuation questions is to provide a validation of 
the fixed link stated preference results. As such the primary interest is in the average 
willingness to pay in the sample. Non-parametric methods are perfectly adequate for 
this and there is therefore no need to fit a distribution to the contingent valuation data 
(Bateman et a/., 2002 pp.224-228, pp.237-242). Table 6.17(a) and (b) present non-
parametric summary statistics for each of the contingent valuation questions. The 
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highest willingness to pay (£483 per annum per household) is associated with the 
choice between a fixed link and a 24 hour ferry that is free, has a 30 minute headway 
and takes 15 minutes longer than the fixed link. In contrast the willingness to pay for a 
free 24 hour ferry with a 30 minute headway compared to a 12 hour ferry with 
otherwise the same attributes is £270. A 15 minute time saving on the other hand is 
only valued at £43 per household per annum. This value is likely to be a lower bound, 
as there are a large number of zero responses to this question no doubt arising as a 
consequence of the 'unexpected' nature of tasking respondents to valuing travel time 
savings (see Table 6.10 and associated discussion). 
95% confidence intervals for the mean willingness to pay values are presented in Table 
6.17(b). As a proportion of the mean the confidence interval is narrowest for the 24 
hour ferry to fixed link question (at +/- 25% of the mean). The 95% confidence interval 
for the willingness to pay for a 15 minute travel time saving is significantly larger than 
the other two intervals (at +/- 56% of the mean). This is most probably a direct 
consequence of the large number of zero responses. 
Table 6.17: Non-parametric estimates of mean and median willingness to pay for 
transport quality improvements (contingent valuation questions) 
(a) Summary statistics for willingness to pay (£ per annum per household) 
Contingent Valuation question Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max 
CV1: 24 hour ferry to fixed link 483.40 260.00 558.30 0.00 2500.00 
CV2: 12 hour ferry to 24 hour ferry 269.50 104.00 385.80 0.00 2000.00 
CV3: 15 minute time saving 43.40 0.00 104.50 0.00 520.00 
Note: For the time saving contingent valuation question householders were presented With 
either a 10, 15 or 20 minute time saving depending on the island they lived on. The willingness 
to pay has been scaled to a 15 minute time saving for analysis. 
(b) 95% Confidence intervals for the mean willingness to pay (£ per annum per 
household) 
No. of 
obs. 
84 
79 
70 
4 Lower bound Upper bound CI as percentage 
of 95% CI 0'95% CI of mean 
CV1 : 24 hour ferry to fixed link 364.00 602.80 +/-25% 
CV2: 12 hour ferry to 24 hour ferry 184.40 354.60 +/-32% 
CV3: 15 minute time saving 18.90 67.90 +/-56% 
-
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Note: 95% confidence intervals calculated as C ± 1.96)Var(C) where C is mean willingness 
- ~Var(C) 
to pay and Var(C) = IN . N is the sample size, C is the willingness to pay. 
It is reassuring to note that the median value for the 24 hour ferry to fixed link 
contingent valuation question is £260, which is entirely consistent with the revealed 
willingness to pay from the fixed link SP game (see also the discussion in Section 6.4 
and Table 6.9). This is pleasing as it suggests consistency in response by 
householders between the SP games and the contingent valuation questions. 
6.7 Fixed link stated preference game - estimation results 
The same estimation strategy to that used for the local ferry stated preference game 
and described in section 6.5 is used for the estimation of a model to the fixed link 
stated preference game data. The generic utility function underpinning the model 
estimation was set out in Equation 4.5 in Chapter 4, but for convenience is also 
reproduced below: 
(6.2) 
U FixedLink _ aFixedLink - Ferry + AI h(P) + £ FixedLink h - k 'l'k h 
Table 6.18 presents the results of the first stage of the model estimation, the estimation 
of multinomial logit models. FL-MNL 1 is a structurally simple model linear in operating 
hours with no interactions with socia-economic characteristics (Le. no fixed effects by 
socio-economic segment). FL-MNL2 includes fixed effects by socio-economic segment 
and FL-MNL3 excludes non-traders (e.g. those who always chose the fixed link). As 
can be seen from this table all variables are of the correct sign and are significant at 
the 90% level or above. Once again it is found that trip making behaviour is the best 
'fixed effect' variable to explain variations in marginal utility of operating hours by 
population segment. Trip making behaviour and island are the best variables to 
explain variations in the 'constant' utility of the fixed link. The adjusted rho-squared 
value for FL-MNL2 at 0.240 is not exceptionally high but, as mentioned earlier, is fairly 
typical for SP data. In contrast to the local ferry analysis it has not been possible to 
estimate a piece-wise model in operating hours to the data. That is a model in which 
the marginal utility associated with operating hours varied with the number of hours the 
ferry was available could not be estimated. Similarly no variation in the marginal utility 
of cost can be found. This difference between the local ferry and fixed link datasets is 
154 
Table 6.18: Fixed Link SP game estimation results for MNL models 
~ FL-MNL1 FL-MNL2 FL-MNL3 I 
I 
Cost coefficient for all household incomes -0.003 (-8.5) -0.003 (-8.8 -0.006 (-8.1) 
Fixed link constant 1.411 (7.5) 1.421 (6.4) 1.189 (5.4) 
Increment on fixed link constant for: 
Households on Bemeray --- -0.894 (-3.6) --.-
Households on Vatersay --.- -1.414 (-3.3) ---
Households making 5 or more trips per week over fixed link --- 0.776 (2.9) --.-
Households making 17 or more trips per week over fixed link --- 0.680 (1 .7) -.-.-
Operating hours coefficient (no. of hours closed) -0.046 (-2.6) --- -.-.-
Increment on operating hours coefficient for: 
Households making 3 or more trips per week over fixed link --- -0.085 (-4.1 ) -0.126 (-4.1 ) 
Value of fixed link constant (£ per annum per household) 
Constant -524.05 (7.3) -514.78 (N/A) -209.4 (6.7) 
Marginal value of operating hours (£ per annum per household) 
All times of the day 17.15 (2.8) 19.62 (N/A) 15.83 (4.4) 
Observations 517 517 282 
Log-likelihood -281 .66 -245.92 -124.64 
Adjusted rho-squared 0.130 0.240 0.362 
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Significant at 99% level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1 .96 and at the 90% level if the t-
statistic>1 .65. Estimated using ALOGIT v4.2. For each model the value of the fixed link constant and marginal value of operating hours for each statistically 
Significant population segment is calculated. A weighted average of these marginal valuations using the sample proportions is then calculated and presented 
in the table. T-statistics for marginal valuations calculated following Hess and Daly (2008). For the piecewise nonlinear model LF-MNL2 t-statistics cannot be 
calculated as there is insufficient information on covariances between the marginal values of different population segments. 
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attributed to the coarseness of the fixed link data given the large number of non-
traders. 
Average willingness to pay values for models FL-MNL 1 and FL-MNL2 are similar to the 
contingent valuation results presented in Table 6.1737 . For the models estimated to 
data including non-traders (FL-MNL 1 and FL-MNL2) the fixed link constant is just over 
£500 per household per annum whilst the marginal value of an operating hour is 
between £17 and £20 per household per annum. The confidence interval for the fixed 
link constant is +/-27% whilst that for operating hours is +/-70% (model FL-MNL 1). The 
marginal value for operating hours is therefore not as well estimated as that for the 
fixed link constant. 
Excluding non-traders from the data has a significant effect on the model estimated, as 
can be seen by comparing Model FL-MNL3 to model FL-MNL2. As expected the 
adjusted rho-squared statistic increases significantly, however the number of 
statistically significant explanatory variables is much lower and the implied willingness 
to pay values decrease significantly. Primarily this arises because a very large 
percentage of respondents (54%) exhibit non-trading behaviour with the majority 
always choosing the fixed link. As discussed in Section 6.3 non-trading behaviour 
varies systematically with income, trip making behaviour, car ownership and as such is 
viewed to be a valid reflection of householders choice. The mixed logit models are 
therefore estimated using data from both traders and non-traders. 
Table 6.19 presents six random parameter mixed logit models. The first model (FL-
MXL 1) as in the previous SP game analysis reproduces the MNL model (FL-MNL2). 
The second model allows for panel data in the set-up and the standard errors are also 
robust to heteroscedasticity. However, the lack of taste variation in the model means 
that the only difference with model FL-MNL 1 is that the standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Taste variation is introduced in models FL-MXL3 to FL-MXL6. The 
differences between these models relates to their structure, as it was not possible to fit 
any distribution aside from the triangular distribution with the spread constrained to the 
mean to these data. The estimation process did not converge if a normal distribution 
function is used (with or without constraints on the standard deviation) or an 
unconstrained triangular distribution function is used. As can also be seen from this 
37 The second contingent valuation question was concerned with extending ferry 
opening hours from 12 to 24 hours. The mean willingness to pay for this is £269.50 i.e. 
£22.46 per additional operating hour. 
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Table 6.19: Fixed Link SP game estimation results for MXL models 
(a) Models FL·MXL 1 to FL·MXL4 
, ~ , ,~ FL-MXL1 , 
~ " 
b 
Cost coefficient for all household incomes F 
-3.1(-8.80) 
F 
c -.-.-
b 1,421.1(6.14) 
Fixed link constant (all households) F F 
c ---
Increment on fixed link constant for: 
b -894.2( -3.57) 
Households on Bemeray F F 
c 
---
b -1,414.2(-3.44 ) 
Households on Vatersay F F 
c --.... 
Households making 3 or more trips per b -........ F F 
week over fixed link c --.-
Households making 5 or more trips per b 775.7(2.98) F F 
week over fixed link c --
Households making 17 or more trps per b 680.1(1.62) F F 
week over fixed link c -.--
Operating hours coefficient (no. of hours b .... --
closed) c ---
Increment on operating hours coefficient for: 
Households making 3 or more trips per b -85.3( -4.15) F F 
week over fixed link c --
No. of observations 517 
Log-likelihood -245,92 
FL-MXL2 FL-MXL3 FL-MXL4 
-3.1(-6.08) 
TC 
-28.5( -2.88) 
TC 
-8.8 (-4.97) 
--- -28.5(-2 .88) -8.8(-4.97) 
1,421.1 (3.65) 
TC 
36,367.5(3.1 3) 
F 
2,817.3 (6.33) 
--- 36,367.5(3.1 3) ... --
-894.2( -1 .88) 
F 
-23 ,1 49.4(-2.63) 
F 
-1,317.3(-2.11) 
--.- ---
-....... 
-1,414.2(-1.98) -20,385.0( -2 .35) -.--
F 
-.-- -
-.... .., 
-- --
.... --
.... -- --.... 
--
775.7(2.34) -..... - ---
-- --
-..... -
680.1(1.41 ) -- --
--
-........ 
---
-- -- ---
---
--.- ---
-85.3( -2.67) 
TC 
232.9(1.32) 
TC 
-291 .3(-2.09) 
--.- 232.9(1 .32) -291.3(-2.09) 
517 517 517 
-245.92 -112.88 -200.82 I 
---- - ------
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(b) Models FL-MXLS to FL-MXLS 
FL-MXLS FL-MXL6 
Cost coefficient for all household incomes 
b 
TC -9.8(-4.67) TC -4.3( -6.19) 
c -9.8(-4.67) -4.3( -6.19) 
b 2,530.8(5.22) -.--
Fixed link constant (all households) F 
c --- ---
Increment on fixed link constant for: 
b -1,850.6(-2.46) ---Households on Berneray F 
c --- ---
Households on Vatersay 
b --- ---
c --- ---
Households making 3 or more trips per b --- 1,336.2(3.34 ) 
week over fixed link F c --- ---
Households making 5 or more trips per b --- ---
week over fixed link c --- ---
Households making 17 or more trps b -- 867.3(1.87) 
per week over fixed link F c --- ---
Operating hours coefficient (no. of hours b -441.5(-2.03) ---TC 
closed) c -441 .5(-2.03) ---
Increment on operating hours coefficient 
for: 
Households making 3 or more trips per b --- -196.5( -2. 75) TC 
week over fixed link c --.- -196.5(-2.75) 
No. of observations 517 517 
Log-likelihood -196.98 -239.04 
Notes: F and Te indicate distribution function for parameters. F means fixed (i .e. no distribution function) and Te is the triangular with spread constrained equal to the mean. 
For each random parameter two coefficients are estimated (b and c). For the triangular mean=b and spread=c. T-statistics in parentheses. Parameter is significant at 99% 
level if the t-statistic>2.33; at the 95% level if the t-statistic>1 .96 and at the 90% level if the t-statistic>1 .65. T-statistics calculated using robust standard errors except model 
FL-MXL 1. Models estimated using Train's Gauss code with 500 Halton draws. 
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table only some of the parameters in each of the models include taste variation. This is 
because it is found that the spread of the distribution function was not statistically 
significant for many of the parameters. 
In model FL-MXL3 it was possible to include taste variation on three parameters: cost, 
the fixed link constant for all households and operating hours for households making 
more than three trips. This gives a large improvement in the log-likelihood but also 
leads to an unrealistic model, as the fixed link constant is unrealistically large (greater 
than £1,100 see the third column of Table 6.20) and leads to the operating hours 
coefficient to have the wrong sign and lose its statistical significance. Model FL-MXL4 
is therefore estimated without taste variation on the fixed link constant. This gives a 
substantial improvement in fit compared to the MNL model (FL-MNL2) as can be seen 
from the change in the log-likelihood value. In model FL-MXLS all households (not just 
households making 3 or more trips a week) are allowed to hold a marginal utility for 
operating hours. This gives a further, albeit slight, improvement in model fit as judged 
by the log-likelihood of the model. In the final model FL-MXL6 it is tested whether trip 
making behaviour can better explain the variation in the data for the fixed link constant. 
The log-likelihood of this model is much worse than that for FL-MXL4 and FL-MXL5. 
Table 6.20: Properties of willingness to pay distributions for fixed link constant 
and operating hours (fixed link SP game) 
FL·MNL3, FL· FL· FL· FL· FL·MXL1 and MXL3 MXL4 MXL5 MXL6 FL·MXL2 
Value of fixed link constant (£per household per annum) 
Mean 514.8 1153.1 333.6 248.5 295.7 
Standard deviation N/A 982.6 284.2 216.0 275.2 
Proportion with N/A 7% 0% 0% 0% 
negative WTP 
Marginal value of an operating hour (£per household per annum) 
Mean 19.6 -6.5 26.4 53.1 36.1 
Standard deviation N/A -5.7 23.0 44.0 31 .6 
Proportion with N/A 100% 0% 0% 0% 
negative WTP 
Notes: Mean and standard deviation values estimated using a monte-carlo simulation based on 
a population of 10,000 (split into the statistically relevant socio-economic groups from the model 
using sample proportions). Lowest and highest 2.5% are excluded from calculation of mean 
and standard deviation for models FL-MXL3 to FL-MXL5 where the cost parameter is treated as 
random. 
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In choosing between models FL-MXL4 and FL-MXL5 it can be seen that whilst the log-
likelihood for FL-MXL5 is the highest by a small margin, model FL-MXL4 is better able 
to reproduce the observed distribution of willingness to pay for hours closed (see 
Figure 6.7). On this basis FL-MXL4 is taken as the preferred model. It should of 
course be noted that in a manner similar to that observed for the inter-island ferry and 
the local ferry SP game analysis neither of these fitted distributions appear to reflect 
the revealed distributions particularly well. Further improving the fit of the distributions 
to that observed in the contingent valuation data is a topic for further research. 
Figure 6.7: Observed and modelled cumulative distribution function for hours 
closed 
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The different models produce different estimates of mean willingness to pay. The MNL 
model gives willingness to pay values that are very similar to the mean willingness to 
pay values derived from the contingent valuation questions. However, introducing 
taste variation into the model significantly lowers the value of the fixed link constant 
and increases the marginal value of an operating hour - aside from model FL-MXL3 
where the fixed link constant doubles and the marginal value of an operating hour has 
the wrong sign. 
The preferred model, model FL-MXL4, has a value for the fixed link constant of 
£333.60 per household per annum. This value is outside the 95% confidence interval 
(£364 to £602) for the mean willingness to pay as derived from the contingent valuation 
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question. The preferred model also has a marginal value for an operating hour of 
£26.40 (per household per ~nnum). This lies within the 95% confidence interval from 
the contingent valuation data. The discrepancy between the contingent valuation data 
and the stated preference results is felt to arise from the inability of the stated 
preference design to recover large values for the fixed link constant (see Table 4.13 
and associated discussion in Chapter 4). This stems from using a maximum council 
tax premium of £1,000 per annum. Whilst the design is quite able to recover values up 
to and slightly beyond the mean willingness to pay seen in the contingent valuation 
data it cannot recover values much larger. This results in a lowering in the mean 
willingness to pay as derived from the stated preference data. This is unfortunate but 
given the uniqueness of the study and lack of evidence on the value of fixed links for 
use during the design of the stated preference scenarios it is, perhaps, not surprising. 
The purpose of deriving the fixed link constant is to act as a starting point in the 
analysis for calculating the risk premium. Given the difference between the contingent 
valuation and stated preference results it will be necessary to use both results during 
the calculation, and examine if this materially effects the conclusion that can be made 
about the risk premium. 
6.8 Annual willingness to pay versus willingness to pay per trip 
The willingness to pay values derived from the local ferry stated preference game are 
couched in terms of per household trip, whilst the contingent valuation questions and 
fixed link stated preference game are couched in terms of the willingness to pay per 
household per annum. As a check for consistency it is important to reconcile these 
numbers against each other L It is also important to complete such a reconcilation as it 
is necessary to use the value for headway from the local ferry SP game (but in units of 
per household per annum) in the calculation of the risk premium. In converting a 
marginal value per trip to an annual value the usual procedure adopted within an 
appraisal is to multiply the per trip value by the number of trips made in a year. 
As discussed below with some fairly strong assumptions regarding the curvature of the 
demand curve it is possible to almost reconcile the per trip and per annum marginal 
values as a consequence of elastic demand only. The strength of the assumptions 
necessary though mean that other factors most probably also influence the relationship 
between the per trip and per annum values. These include biases in the survey results 
and income effects. These are each discussed in turn. The presence of these effects, 
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particularly the curvature of the demand curve and income effects, has important 
implications for the calculation of the economic impact of a transport project using the 
rule of a half (Le. a linear demand curve) and assuming income effects are negligible. 
This is discussed in more detail below. 
Elastic demand 
Under elastic demand the change in consumer surplus of a policy intervention is given 
by Area ABC01 in Figure 6.B. The more convex to the origin the demand curve is, the 
smaller the change in consumer surplus is, with the limit being Area ABC Do. The 
difficulty in estimating the change in consumer surplus in this instance comes from 
knowing the curvature of the demand curve and the demand before and after the policy 
intervention. This is because the data was not collected to facilitate the development of 
a model for forecasting demand. For illustrative purposes therefore four different 
demand curves have been fitted, ranging from a linear function to three curves from the 
negative exponential family. The negative exponential function is attractive as a 
demand curve as it is bounded, convex to the origin and analytically tractable. Table 
6.21 presents the estimated consumer surplus for the four demand curves assuming a 
different number of vehicle trips per household per week in the Do Minimum38• In the 
policy intervention being evaluated the Do Minimum (OM) is defined as a ferry with 12 
hour availability and 30 minute headway and the Do Something (OS) is a fixed link with 
a toll (similar to the ferry fare) but no time saving over the ferry. As can be seen it is 
only when a low number of person trips per household per week (Le. three) and a 
strongly convex demand curve is assumed does the 'area under demand curve' 
estimates of consumer surplus begin to approach the contingent valuation estimates39• 
More reasonable assumptions regarding the convexity of the demand curve and the 
number of person trips in the Do Minimum would suggest that the per trip marginal 
values of headway and operating hours overestimate the per annum values by a factor 
of around 2. 
38 The ex-ante and ex-post studies of the Berneray causeway (Halcrow Fox, 1996; 
saw, 2004) indicate that just over 4 vehicle trips were made per household per week. 
No information on household trip rates before construction of the fixed links is available 
for the other islands. 
39 The contingent valuation estimate of the change in consumer surplus also includes 
the risk premium. However, and as discussed in the following section, the risk 
premium is estimated to be zero. The contingent valuation estimate of consumer 
surplus and the area under the demand curve estimates are therefore directly 
comparable. 
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Figure 6.8: Change in consumer surplus under different demand curve 
assumptions - 4 person trips (1.2 vehicle trips) per household per week before 
improvement 
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Table 6.21: Estimate of willingness to pay (£ per annum per household) for 24 
hour availability and zero headway from 12 hour availability and 30 minute 
headway 
No. of person trips/week/household in Do 
Minimum (vehicle trips in parentheses) 
(£ per annum per household) 
3 4 6 
(0.9) (1 .2) (1.9) 
Contingent valuation estimate of change £666 in consumer surplus 
Area under demand curve (change in consumer surplus) 
Demand curve 1. Linear (Rule of half) £1,256 £1 ,348 £1,533 
Demand curve 2. Dl=oOe(·~ ·cost) £1 ,112 £1 ,251 £1,493 
Demand curve 3. Dl=ooe(-~ · [costl"O.5 ) £881 £1 ,048 £1,349 
Demand curve 4. Dl=OOe(-~ · [COstl"O . 3 ) £761 £938 £1,268 
Notes: 0 1 is demand after intervention, Do is demand in reference situation. Cost is cost 
difference between OM and OS. Contingent valuation estimate of consumer surplus is sum of 
CV1 + CV2 - 2*CV3 (see Table 6.17). OS demand is 10.6 person trips per week (see Table 
6.3). Average vehicle occupancy in presence of a fixed link toll is taken to be the same as for a 
ferry. Vehicle occupancy taken to be 3.24. Consumer surplus approximated for demand curves 
3 and 4 as no direct integration is possible. 
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Scoping effect bias 
Scoping effect bias occurs when respondents have difficulty valuing the size of the 
benefit, attributing similar values to large benefits as to small benefits. Difficulty in 
valuing the scale of the benefit means that values for small changes (per trip) maybe 
too high, whilst values for large changes (per annum) may be too low. The classic 
scoping bias study by Desvousges et al. (1993) found no significant difference between 
valuations to prevent the deaths of 2,000, 20,000 and 200,000 migratory waterfowl. 
Scoping effect bias also applies to situations in which a less than proportionate 
increase in willingness to pay occurs as the scale of the impact increases. This is 
relevant to this study, as a Significant difference exists between per trip and annual 
values but the annual value is less than a proportionate increase in the per trip values. 
A rational economic explanation for diminishing marginal benefits as found in this study 
(Le. the scoping effect) is one of satiation (see Bateman et al., 2002 pp.392-397 for a 
discussion). In this context satiation would imply that willingness to pay for some trips 
is higher than for other trips. Higher valued trips may for example include work trips or 
the first discretionary (non-work related) trip a week. Therefore whilst householders 
were asked to respond to the service provision in general they may have in fact 
focussed on the higher value trips when responding4o• Additionally householders when 
responding to the annual willingness to pay may have underestimated the full scale of 
the impact (an extra 12 operating hours a day is 4,380 extra hours a year). It is not 
possible to identify the impact of scoping effect bias ex-post without explicitly taking 
account of the effect in the survey design (which has not been done). All that can be 
done ex-post therefore is to treat the per trip values as an upper bound and the per 
annum values as a lower bound to the true willingness to pay. 
Income effects 
The measure of consumer benefits adopted in transport cost benefit analysis is that of 
consumer surplus - as illustrated in Figure 6.8. This is typically referred to as 
Marshallian consumer surplus. Such a measure of consumer benefits relies on 
nominal income being held constant. Holding utility (or real income) constant gives two 
alternative measures of consumer benefits - compensating variation if utility is held at 
40 Householders were asked which ferry service the household would prefer in general 
for the island. They were not asked which service would be preferred within the 
context of a specific trip. This is because the pilot survey identified that householders 
would choose a ferry service that was excessive for the needs of a particular trip (e.g. a 
service with long opening hours when the trip in question was completed by 4pm) .. 
164 
initial levels and equivalent variation if utility is held at post-intervention levels. As the 
policy interest is in the potential benefits from the consumer's existing position for an 
improvement in transport quality compensating variation is the most appropriate of the 
two Hicksian measures. For a fuller discussion see Mitchell and Carson (1989 pp.23-
26). Because it is much easier to estimate the Marshallian consumer surplus and for 
small income changes it is a suitable approximation to Hicksian compensating 
variation, Marshallian consumer surplus is used as a basis for transport cost benefit 
analysis. 
The contingent valuation questions, both of which are couched in terms of annual 
willingness to pay41, elicit the Hicksian compensating variation measure. This is 
because householders are asked to reveal the maximum they would be willing to pay 
for improved transport quality. The reference point is pre-intervention utility levels. In 
comparing the annual and the per trip willingness to pay values, as has been done in 
Table 6.21, a Hicksian compensating variation measure is therefore being compared to 
a Marshallian consumer surplus measure. For small income changes these would be 
expected to be similar. The Marshallian consumer surplus measures in Table 6.21 are 
not however small in relation to household incomes. Median gross household incomes 
are between £10,000 and £20,999 with 38% of households having a gross income of 
less than £10,000 p.a. Additional expenditure of between £1,200 and £1,500 per 
annum (as suggested by the Marshallian consumer surplus measure) therefore seems 
large. Across the UK average expenditure on transport by households in rural areas is 
£74.50 per week (or £3,874 per annum) (ONS, 2007 p.4). This includes vehicle 
replacement costs. Average expenditure on petrol and fuel is £17.50 per week (£910 
per annum). This is slightly higher in the Outer Hebrides at £960 per annum42. An 
increase in expenditure of between £1,200 and £1,500, as suggested by the more 
realistic demand curves used in Table 6.21 to estimate the Marshallian consumer 
surplus, therefore is equivalent to an increase between 125% and 160% of petrol and 
fuel costs and an increase of up to 40% of average UK rural household transport 
expenditure. The lower 'Hicksian compensating variation' measure of £666 estimated 
from the contingent valuation data in Table 6.21 seems a more realistic estimate of 
willingness to pay when set in the context of average household incomes and existing 
expenditure patterns. This would suggest that including the income effect in the 
41 Householders were presented with both weekly and annual increments to council tax 
payments. Annual increments were included to ensure the full impacts on the 
household budget are appreciated. 
42 Source: 2003/4 Scottish Household Survey variable HD19 (MORI Scotland et al. 
2005). 
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estimate of consumer surplus may erroneously double the estimate of benefit received 
by households. This is because, from the evidence presented here, the Hicksian 
compensating variation measure of consumer surplus is 50% of the Marshallian 
measure. This is larger than the 30% for low income people found by Cherchi and 
Polak (2007) based on simulated data. 
Summary 
Under strong assumptions, regarding the curvature of the demand curve, it is possible 
to reconcile the marginal values from the local ferry stated preference game against the 
willingness to pay values from the fixed link stated preference game and the contingent 
valuation questions. More realistic assumptions suggest a difference between the two 
values of about 2. It is however not possible to state categorically why such a 
difference occurs between these data sources. This is because these data have not 
been collected in a manner that permits investigation for scoping effect bias, 
diminishing benefits per additional trip or for income effects. From an appraisal 
perspective the existence of substantial income effects is quite worrying as an implicit 
assumption in the use of the Marshallian measure of consumer surplus is that income 
effects are small. The difference between per trip levels aggregated to an annual basis 
and annual willingness to pay values is an interesting result from this study. Given the 
importance of income effects to the measure of total economic impact further research 
explaining this discrepancy would be of value. 
6.9 The risk premium and non-use values 
Risk premia occur because for risk averse individuals or firms under conditions of 
uncertainty the ~xpected utility from an income is less than if that income was available 
with certainty. Option values are a form of risk premium and evidence of their 
existence for rail and bus services and the implications for economic appraisal in 
sparse networks have already been presented (in Chapter 3). It is expected that a risk 
premium will be attached to the availability of a transport link to and from an island. A 
fixed link is always available with certainty, whilst a ferry's availability is uncertain. It is 
therefore hypothesised that a risk premium for the fixed link will exist. 
As discussed in section 4.3 (in Chapter 4) the fixed link constant is used as a basis for 
estimating the risk premium. For the reasons set out in that chapter, this is not an ideal 
approach and the contingent valuation questions were therefore used as validating 
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mechanism. In addition to the risk premium the fixed link constant also includes 
elements of user benefit (reductions in journey time), scheduling costs (changes in 
headway) and non-use benefits (see Table 3.1 and discussion in section 3.1). To 
obtain an estimate of the risk premium we therefore need to subtract the willingness to 
pay for a headway reduction, for a journey time saving and for the non-use benefits 
from the value of the fixed link constant. However, to avoid overburdening respondents 
the risk premium and the non-use value are not separately identified, therefore only a 
combined estimate of the risk premium and the non-use value is obtained. 
The fact that income effects probably influence total willingness to pay over a year for 
headway means it is necessary to adjust the headway (per trip) values before making 
the risk premium and non-use value calculation. Analysis indicates that per annum 
values for operating hours are 124 times larger than per trip values43• Using this factor 
would suggest that a per trip marginal value of headway of 11.3p/min leads to a per 
annum value of £14.01. A reduction in headway from 30 minutes to zero therefore has 
a value of £420.36 per household per annum. 
Two values for the fixed link constant have been used given the difference between the 
value derived from the fixed link stated preference game and that derived from the 
contingent valuation question. The contingent valuation estimate is felt to be more 
robust as the fixed link stated preference game could not recover high values for the 
fixed link constant. Table 6.22 presents the estimate of the risk premium and the non-
use value. As can be seen from this table both estimates are negative, though the one 
based on the contingent valuation data is only just negative. The lack of confidence 
intervals for the marginal values derived from the mixed logit models means no 
confidence interval can be derived for the risk premium and non-use value estimate. 
However, from the confidence available from the contingent valuation data and the 
indicative ones available from MNL models it is anticipated that the confidence interval 
for the risk premium and non-use value would easily encompass zero. 
43 From local ferry SP game the marginal value of an operating hour is 19.7p per hour 
per trip(single) per household. From the fixed link SP game the marginal value of an 
operating hour is £26.40 per annum household. From the contingent valuation 
question the willingness to pay for 12 additional operating hours is £269.50 implying a 
marginal value of an operating hour of £22.46 per annum household. This suggests 
that per annum values are between 114 and 134 times bigger than per trip values, the 
average of which is 124. 
167 
Table 6.22: Risk premium and non-use value of fixed link compared to 24 hour 
ferry with a 30 minute headway 
Fixed link SP Contingent 
game valuation 
, (FL-MXL4) 
Fixed link constant 334 483 
(willingness to pay for an untolled fixed link from a 
(N/A) (364,603) 
base of a free 24 hour ferry with a 30 minute headway 
and a journey time that is 15 minutes longer (1-way)) 
Minus: 
Value of 30 min time saving (1-way time saving of 87 87 
15 mins) (38, 136) (38,136) 
(source: contingent valuation question) 
420 420 
Value of 30 min headway (N/A) (N/A) 
Risk premium and non-use value -173.60 -23.80 
(£ p.a. per household) (N/A) (N/A) 
Notes: Value of headway factored down by 8.9 to reflect difference between per annum and per 
trip valuations. 95% confidence intervals in parentheses were available. 
This result is interpreted as indicating that householders do not perceive a difference 
between a 24 hour ferry with a very high frequency and a fixed link beyond user 
benefits Uourney time savings) and scheduling benefits (headway costs). This could 
arise as both transport options offer a high quality service. With a free 24 hour ferry 
islanders do not feel cut-off from employment, services and leisure facilities and so on. 
This is an interesting result and would suggest that if a fixed link holds any risk 
premium over a ferry it is associated with operating hours. Such a line of investigation 
is left for further work, though it is noted that such a risk premium would be included in 
the willingness to pay value derived from the contingent valuation question on a 12 and 
24 hour ferry. 
6.10 Discussion of main findings 
An analysis of responses to the SP and contingent valuation questions suggest that 
mass points exist at or close to zero willingness to pay. That is a proportion of the 
sample have a zero willingness to pay for changes in headway and operating hours. 
This is consistent with activities for some of the sample being unconstrained by poor 
quality transport schedules. The large proportion of pensioner households with few 
time constraints on the islands could well give rise to this mass point. The mass points 
appear to be about half the size of those observed for the inter-island ferry. This is 
consistent with the fact that travel for users of the inter-island ferry forms the major 
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activity of the day, whilst for householders on Bemeray, Eriskay, Scalpay and Vatersay 
travel is a facilitator of the day's activity. Transport schedules will therefore act as more 
of a constraint than in the inter-island case. There is some evidence of negative 
willingness to pay for transport links in the data, though this is a small proportion of the 
total sample. The evidence for this comes from the contingent valuation data where 
between 2 and 4% of households cited a preference for isolation rather than paying a 
council tax premium for improved transport quality. This is considered to reflect a net 
willingness to pay of several confounding attributes rather than representing a negative 
willingness to pay for a time saving. Improved transport quality increases utility through 
better activity scheduling, but may decrease a householder's utility as some 
characteristics of an island can be lost - for example the increased accessibility of the 
island to the outside world may result in an increase (or a fear of an Increase) in crime. 
The estimated models have acceptable levels of fit, but do not seem to replicate 
particularly well the observed distribution of willingness to pay near to and at zero. 
Improving the fit of the distribution functions through the same lines of investigation as 
proposed for the inter-island ferry remains an outstanding research issue (see section 
5.5). 
The data suggests that the marginal value of a headway minute and an operating hour 
vary non-linearly with headway and the length of the operating day. When headways 
are short marginal values are higher than when headways are long. This is consistent 
with the fact that with short headways a larger proportion of the time will be spent in an 
unproductive manner (e.g. waiting) than if headways are long. When the operating day 
is short the marginal value of an operating hour is more than when the operating day is 
long. This is also consistent with a priori expectations as, because most activities take 
place in the core part of the day, a long operating day will not impose many constraints 
on activity schedules. 
Table 6.23 presents the marginal values for headway and operating hours on a per trip 
basis and their car in-vehicle-time equivalent minutes. The marginal values are, 
depending on headway length, 2.0 and 11.3 pence per headway minute and, 
depending on the length of the operating day, 19.7 and 34.7 pence per operating hour. 
These marginal valuations are within design range of the stated preference questions 
and this gives confidence in the validity of the results (see Table 4.7, 4.9 and 4.10 in 
Chapter 4). The calculation of car in-vehicle time minutes presented in Table 6.23 is 
dependent on vehicle occupancy for which there is no data. Using average 
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occupancies from the Berneray ferry suggests that a headway minute is valued 
between 0.07 and 0.42 of a car-IVT minute (depending on headway length), whilst an 
operating hour is valued between 0.73 and 1.28 car-IVT minutes. No confidence 
intervals are available for these results which derive from the preferred mixed log it 
models. The case for these results being robust therefore centres on how well the 
parameters of the distribution functions for the different marginal utilities have been 
estimated . Some confidence in the robustness of the results can also be gained from 
the preliminary MNL model where the confidence intervals for the marginal value of 
headway and operating hours are +/-25% or below. 
Table 6.23: Local ferry SP game preferred willingness to pay values as a 
proportion of car in-vehicle-time (2005 perceived prices and values) 
(a) Headway 
When headways are Marginal value Equivalent car In-vehicle time minutes 
between: of a headway (assumes average vehicle occupancy of 3.2) 
minute (per 
single trip) 
30 and 59 mins 11.3 p/min 0.42 car-IVT mins per headway min 
(678 p/hr) (25.2 car-IVT mins per headway hour) 
60 and 240 mins 2.0 p/min 0.07 car-IVT mins per headway min 
(120 p/hr) (4.2 car-IVT mins per headway hour) 
(b) Operating hours 
When operating day Marginal value Equivalent car/LGV In-vehicle time minutes 
Is: of an operating (assumes average vehicle occupancy of 3.2) 
hour (per single 
trip) 
8 hours 34.7 p/hr 1.28 car-IVT mins per hour 
(9am to 5pm) 
12 hours 19.7 p/hr 0.73 car-IVT mins per hour 
(7am to 7pm) 
17 hours 19.7 p/hr 0.73 car-IVT mins per hour 
(6am to midnight) 
24 hours 19.7 p/hr 0.73 car-IVT mins per hour 
Notes: Marginal values derived from model LF-MXL4. Average vehicle occupancy of 3.2 for an 
island residents' trip on a ferry - derived from analysis of Berneray Causeway ex-ante and ex-
post studies (Halcrow Fox, 1996 and saw, 2004 respectively). Average car occupant value of 
time is £5.07 per hour (Le. 8.5 p/min) (2005 perceived prices and values). Derived from 
standard value of travel time savings per passenger (OfT, 2007b) using non-work other value of 
time. 
In comparison to the inter-island ferry results the marginal values in pence per 
headway minute or pence per operating hour are a lot less, but as a proportion of car-
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IVT the results are comparable. It seems therefore that different values of time 
(primarily the presence of work related trips on the inter-island ferry) are the main 
reason for the differences in values between the two surveys. The major difference 
between the local ferry data and the inter-island data is that with the local ferry data 
headways below 180 minutes have a marginal value attached to them. 
The uniqueness of this research makes it difficult to make comparisons with other 
empirical evidence. The only empirical evidence in the literature to which it is directly 
comparable is that by Brathen and Hervik (1997) that has been adapted into 
Norwegian appraisal guidance (Brathen and Lyche, 2004). The latter give values for 
inconvenience costs (Le. scheduling costs and queuing costs imposed by headway and 
operating hour restrictions) of 22 NOK for non-city centre ferry links that are replaced 
by a fixed link. This compares to a value of time of 96 NOKlhr. For infrequent 
departures and for high dependence ferry links the Inconvenience costs are weighted 
by 1.5. The implication is that the inconvenience costs for replacing a 'lifeline' ferry 
with a fixed link is equivalent to a 21 minute time saving. The five case studies 
reported by Brathen and Hervik had ferries that operated from 0530 to 2400 and 
operated with peak headways of less than 30 mins and slightly more in the off-peak. 
Using the car-IVT results in Table 6.23 the Outer Hebrides data suggests replacing a 
ferry operating at a 45 minute headway from 0530 to 2400 with a fixed link would have 
a marginal value per vehicle of 17 car-IVT minutes..... This is similar to the Norwegian 
appraisal advice and gives confidence in the validity of the results. The added value of 
this research over the Norwegian research is that the results can be applied to any 
ferry enhancement (including replacement by a fixed link), whereas the Norwegian 
work only relates to a particular type of ferry service (high frequency and long operating 
hours) and its replacement by a fixed link. Saying that the results here are restricted to 
non-work trips only, whilst the Norwegian research encompasses business trips and 
trips by commercial vehicles. 
An interesting result that arises from this study is that the annual willingness to pay 
values surveyed are about· half what might have been expected 8 priori from the 
marginal values per trip derived from the local ferry stated preference game. Given the 
low household incomes evident in the islands this potentially arises as a consequence 
of an income effect. This is important from the perspective of modelling the economic 
44 Calculated as the sum of 30 headway minutes at 0.42 car-IVT mins per headway 
minute, 15 headway minutes at 0.07 car-IVT mins per headway minute and 5.5 hours 
at 0.73 car-IVT mins per operating hour. 
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impact of a transport project as it would suggest aggregating values up to an annual 
basis using marginal values per trip will overestimate the economic impact of the 
transport project. It could however result from a form of respondent bias - a scoping 
effect. With the existing data it is not possible to identify the exact cause of the 
difference and this avenue of investigation would form an interesting topic for further 
research. 
The data on annual willingness to pay is regarded as reasonably robust in that the fixed 
link stated preference game and the contingent valuation questions are consistent with 
one another. Furthermore there is a degree of consistency between the per trip values 
and the per annum values in that the proportion of consumer surplus attributed to a 
lengthening in operating hours and to headway is similar between the local ferry stated 
preference data and the contingent valuation and fixed link stated preference data. 
Given these consistencies and the potential for a significant income effect it is felt that 
willingness to pay values for island residents (who are always going to be frequent 
users of transport link to/from their island) should be based on the annual willingness to 
pay values. Such values are presented in Table 6.24. For occasional users of the 
transport link (namely those based off the island) per trip valuations are appropriate 
(see Table 6.23). Clearly these data relate to non-work trips only. There remains an 
evidence gap for business trips and for valuations associated with commercial vehicles, 
which future research should aim to fill. 
The final finding of the study is that the data suggest no risk premium is associated with 
a fixed link type of infrastructure compared to a ferry type of infrastructure (see Table 
6.24). This finding relates to the differences in infrastructure and not the level of 
service that is typically associated with each infrastructure type. That is the data 
indicates that householders attach no risk premium to a fixed link compared to a ferry 
service as long as that service offers a similar level of availability to the fixed link. This 
contrasts with the option value literature, where risk premiums are associated with 
transport type (bus or train). Potentially in the island context risk premiums may instead 
be associated with differing levels of availability (e.g. gam to 5pm or 24 hours). Further 
research, however, is needed to confirm this. 
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Table 6.24: Annual willingness to pay values for island residents (2005 perceived 
prices and values) 
Marginal value per annum per 
household 
When headways are between: 
30 and 59 mins £14.01 per headway min 
60 and 240 mins £ 2.48 per headway min 
When operating day is: 
8 hours (9am to 5pm) £43.02 per operating hour 
12 hours (7am to 7pm) £24.42 per operating hour 
17 hours (6am to midnight) £24.42 per operating hour 
24 hours £24.42 per operating hour 
Risk premium 
Fixed link infrastructure compared £0.00 
to ferry infrastructure 
Notes: Annual value of headway and operating hours is a factor of 124 times the per trip values 
(see Table 5.12). This is based off a comparison between annual will ingness to pay values for 
a change in operating hours compared to willingness to pay for a change in operating hours at 
the level of a trip (see footnote 43). 
These results have demonstrated that significant scheduling costs exist for households 
making short distance/local trips. Whether these are large relative to the other 
components of economic benefit is a different question, which the Berneray Causeway 
case study presented in the penultimate chapter addresses. If they are these results 
have important implications for the appraisal of ferries and new fixed links in the Outer 
Hebrides and Scotland in general. This chapter has brought to a conclusion the first 
part of the thesis in which benefits associated with activity re-scheduling and the value 
attributed to the increased security that households attribute to transport links have 
been examined. 
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7 WIDER ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms the start of the second part of the thesis. While the first part 
concerned the identification and quantification of benefits important in sparse networks 
but not included in an appraisal, this part concerns the economic impact of 
peripherality. Peripheral regions in a geographic sense are those that are located 
along the boundary of a nation, whilst peripheral in an economic sense are those of 
minor economic importance relative to other regions (the core). Here the concern is 
with regions that are both geographically and economically peripheral. Such regions 
are typically characterised by low population densities and incomes, and being located 
along the boundary of a nation, have high transport costs to the core. Sparse networks 
and geographic and economic peripherality tend to go hand in hand, though the effect 
of each characteristic on the economic impact of a transport project is distinct. 
The low economic wealth of peripheral regions means that any impacts of transport 
projects on the rest of the economy, particularly the labour market, have high policy 
relevance. Creating and maintaining employment along with population is often cited 
as one of the key reasons for investing in transport infrastructure in peripheral regions. 
Poor transport infrastructure, it is argued by politicians, results in consumers facing 
high prices, residents not being able to access jobs and businesses being inhibited in 
their growth. A strong policy goal of maintaining a distributed population in an 
economically sensible way and reducing regional disparities is explicit in government 
actions both in the promotion of lifeline transport links to remote areas (Scottish 
Executive, 2004 p.19; 2006 p.56) and promoting economic growth in the most remote 
parts of Scotland (Scottish Government, 2007 p.19, pp.36-39). To date wider 
economic impacts in peripheral areas have been largely ignored in the literature. This 
chapter asserts that this is a mistake and wider economic impacts are likely to be as 
important to transport improvements in peripheral regions as they are in core regions. 
In the literature a lot of consideration has been given to agglomeration externalities as 
the principal channel by which wider economic impacts will be felt (van Exel et al., 
2002; Laird, Nellthorp and Mackie, 2005; OfT, 2005; Eddington, 2006; Venables, 2007, 
Graham, 2007). This interest has led to a focus on urbanisation economies and 
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productivity gains in large cities. This is of little relevance to peripheral regions with 
their sparse populations and primary sector industries. In contrast localisation 
economies associated with industrial clusters can be important in a peripheral region. 
Transport projects can therefore generate localisation externalities in peripheral regions 
and these should be taken into account where relevant. Next in importance the 
literature suggests are the wider economic impacts associated with imperfect 
competition in the goods and services market (Venables and Gasiorek, 1999; DfT, 
2005). This impact is arguably more important in peripheral regions, as in peripheral 
regions markets are isolated and competition less intense. Labour economic literature 
would also suggest that two other market failures may be important in peripheral areas. 
These failures lead to involuntary unemployment (Elhorst and Oosterhaven, 2008) and 
thin labour markets (Findeis and Jenson, 1998; Vera-Toscano, Phimister and 
Weersnik, 2004; Pilegaard and Fosgerau, 2008). 
This chapter is organised as follows. To set the context of the later sections section 2 
discusses the benchmark competitive case. The next sections take each of the market 
failures in turn. They discuss the economic cause of the failure; the evidence to date 
on the additional transport related welfare benefits associated with the failure; and the 
relevance of the market failure to peripheral areas. Agglomeration economies are 
discussed in section 3, whilst additional impacts as felt in the product and services 
markets are discussed in section 4. Section 5 presents the labour market failures that 
lead to involuntary unemployment and thin labour markets. The final section brings the 
discussion together and identifies a future research agenda. This chapter also acts as 
a starting point for Chapter 8 which picks up one of the outstanding research issues 
and addresses it. 
7.2 The competitive case 
As transport is an intermediate good, the linkages between it and other sectors of the 
economy are numerous and varied. Changes in transport cost affect business 
operating costs, as the cost of transporting factor inputs to the production process, the 
costs of distributing finished goods and the productivity of employees travelling on 
company business are altered. A reduction in business costs in a perfectly competitive 
market reduces output prices and increases the demand for finished goods and 
services. This affects the labour market in that increased demand for goods and 
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services will shift the demand curve for labour upwards45• If labour supply is perfectly 
elastic there will be no change in the wage, however, if it is less than perfectly elastic 
the market wage will increase46• This is illustrated in Figure 7.1 for a reduction in 
freight costs. As well as indirectly affecting the labour market via the goods market 
transport cost changes directly affect the labour market. This is because the cost of 
accessing employment is part of the labour supply decision. In a perfectly competitive 
labour market a reduction in commuting costs will shift the labour supply curve 
downwards lowering the market wage. With less than perfectly elastic labour supply 
the reduction in the wage will be less than the reduction in commuting costs. As the 
market is competitive firms pass on the reduction in wages to consumers in the form of 
lower product prices and an expanded output. This is illustrated in Figure 7.2 for the 
case of a commuting cost reduction. The land market is also affected by transport cost 
changes, with rents adjusting to reflect changes in accessibility and associated 
changes in real income. 
These price and wage changes affect demand for goods, services and labour - all of 
which affect welfare. Demand is abstracted from competing goods and further rounds 
of price and output adjustments occur - all as a consequence of a transport investment. 
None of this is disputed; the important question from the perspective of a transport 
cost-benefit analysis is whether these effects have additional welfare impacts to those 
experienced by users, transport operators and the government (as set out in the 
economic identity in Chapter 1 - Figure 1.1). 
Measuring the economic benefits of a transport initiative in the transport market gives a 
correct measure of total economic impact when perfect competition and constant 
returns to scale exist in the wider economy (Le. outside the transport market) 
(Dodgson, 1973; Jara-Diaz, 1986). Changes in land values therefore double count 
transport user benefits (Mohring, 1961) and summing all the changes In profits for all 
firms in the supply and distribution chains (as conventionally reported in economic 
development reports) also represents duplication of the same benefit (Dodgson, 1973). 
Furthermore, if the price of land, labour or any factor input is less than perfectly elastic 
45 The size of the shift in the labour demand curve is a function of the labour-
technology relationship for each industry. 
46 Under perfect competition the supply of labour in the labour market can be elastic (as 
in Figure 7.1 (c)) or perfectly elastic, but the labour supply curve faced by the firm Is 
always perfectly elastic. 
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Figure 7.1: Wider economic impact of a reduction in freight costs with perfect 
competition 
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Figure 7.2: Wider economic impact of a reduction in commuting costs with 
perfect competition 
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only the transport market can be used to measure the full magnitude of the economic 
impacts (Nash and Mackie, 1990). This can be seen in Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2, 
where the surpluses in the labour market and product market can be less than the 
surplus in the transport market. 
Under perfectly competitive conditions and in the absence of external economies the 
transport market is therefore the only market which yields an accurate measure of the 
total economic impact of a transport project. The only alternative to measuring the 
economic impact in the transport market is to use a general equilibrium framework and 
measure the change in household utility. This is converted to monetary units via Hicks' 
concept of equivalent variation . The household is chosen as the point of reference as it 
brings together all facets of the economy. Householders own businesses and receive 
a share of the profit, householders receive wages, householders pay taxes and receive 
state social security and householders derive benefit or experience costs in non-traded 
items (e.g. environmental costs). 
Surpluses felt in markets other than transport only become additional to those felt in the 
transport market when price does not equal marginal social cost - i.e. a market failure 
occurs. Before proceeding to the discussion of different market failures it is worth 
emphasising a number of points with respect to Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. These 
affect the context in which the wider economic impacts depicted in the figures should 
be seen. The pOints relate to the scale of the changes depicted, the relative size of the 
effect on employment of a reduction in business and freight transport costs compared 
to that of commuting costs, the spatial dimension of transport schemes and the impact 
of an elastic labour supply and land market. 
Scale. Each of the figures (and the figures contained in the subsequent sections of 
this chapter) are drawn so as to enable understanding of the incidence and causation 
of the wider economic impact of a transport intervention. As a consequence they are 
not drawn to scale - the size of transport costs relative to other costs has been 
magnified to make the figures clear. To give the true scale of the impacts some 
context, there is a general view that transport costs form no more than 5% of business 
costs (e.g. McQuaid et al., 2004 p.3). A substantial 10% reduction of a firm's transport 
related costs, assuming perfect competition, would therefore only result in a 0.5% 
reduction in output prices (given competitive markets). With respect to the labour 
market Chapter 8 (Appendix D) shows that average one-way commuting costs in 
Scotland are £2.10, whilst average full-time salaries (net of deductions are £14,840 per 
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annum). This implies that commuting costs form about 6.5% of total full-time salary 
costs47 • A substantial 10% reduction in commuting costs, with a perfectly competitive 
markets and a perfectly elastic labour supply curve, would therefore only reduce wages 
by an average of 0.65%. 
Employment. The lack of a scale to the figures makes it difficult to ascertain whether 
the reduction in product prices has a bigger effect on employment than a reduction in 
commuting costs. For the illustrative case of perfect competition everywhere, perfectly 
elastic labour supply curve, constant returns to scale and a one region one sector 
economy, it is estimated that the effect of a reduction in transport costs faced by the 
firm on employment is about 3.5 times larger than it is for a reduction in commuting 
costs48 . Output effects are most likely therefore to be the main driver to changes in 
employment, and therefore the arguments regarding the effects of imperfect 
competition. 
The spatial dimension. Transport interventions invariably have a very focussed 
impact in a spatial sense. Only a proportion of the population will feel the impact of any 
intervention. A single intervention therefore has only a small impact on the whole 
economy. This is not to say that transport interventions have no impact, it is just that 
the overall impact on wages and product prices will be small relative to the size of a 
regional or national economy - possibly even too small to observe at an aggregate level 
(e.g. regional or national employment levels). The easiest place to observe a final 
impact of a transport project is in the land market, as this by definition has a strong 
spatial context. Introducing space into the analysis also has important economic 
implications because capital and labour is mobile. This can lead to shifts in the 
regional market demand curves, which in the presence of perfect competition have no 
additional wider economic impact, but in the presence of imperfect competition have 
important welfare implications. 
47 Assumes 5 commuting trips per week and a 48 week year. 
48 This calculation uses an average wage elasticity of labour supply of 0.1 (OfT, 2005 
p.53) and an average price elasticity of demand for goods of 0.5 (OfT, 2005 p49). A 
10% reduction in commuting costs, gives a 0.65% increase in the real wage 
unemployed workers will receive, thereby increasing labour supply by 0.065%. A 10% 
in business transport costs will reduce product prices by 0.5%, thereby increasing 
output and employment by 0.25%. The effect of a 10% reduction in business transport 
costs on employment is approximately 3.5 times that of the effect of a 10% reduction in 
commuting costs. 
180 
Elasticities of demand and supply. The benefits generated by changes in demand 
as a consequence of a change in input costs are heavily dependent on the elasticities 
of demand and supply. It should therefore be noted that Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 
have been drawn for quite elastic situations. The reality may be very different as 
output or employment may, for example, not be sensitive to changes in travel cost. 
This is of importance for two reasons. The elasticity of the supply curves determines 
the proportion of the transport benefit that feeds through into a particularly market as a 
final impact; and secondly the elasticities of the demand and supply curves determine 
the changes in outpuUlabour which act as the driver for any additional welfare impacts . 
that may be felt in imperfect markets. The relevance of wider economic impacts to a 
transport intervention is therefore heavily dependent on the elasticities of demand and 
supply. 
7.3 Agglomeration economies 
Agglomeration economies have been the main focus of attention in the literature on the 
wider economic impact of transport interventions (van Exel et a/., 2002; Laird, Nellthorp 
and Mackie, 2005; OfT, 2005; Eddington, 2006; Venables, 2007, Graham, 2007). They 
arise as a consequence of the positive consumption externalities that occur when 
economic agents in transport using sectors of the economy are brought closer together 
by a transport improvement. By bringing these agents closer together labour 
productivity is raised above and beyond what would be expected from the transport 
efficiency saving alone. The numerous micro-economic linkages between economic 
agents, brought closer together, generate the externalities which, collectively and at a 
localised level, give rise to aggregate increasing returns or agglomeration economies. 
Whilst Marshall (1890) is credited with the first description of the sources of 
agglomeration, the literature describing the exact micro-economic linkages and 
evidence for them is, almost 120 years on, still evolving - see Duranton and Puga 
(2004) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for reviews. 
Where agglomeration economies exist and where as a consequence of the transport 
intervention employment increases, Venables (2007) shows that two measures 
additional to transport user benefits are needed to capture the full welfare impact of the 
intervention. The first of the two additional measures relates to the productivity 
increase that occurs to existing and new workers. The second arises as a 
consequence of the distorting effects of taxation. The productivity effect is illustrated in 
Figure 7.3 for the case of an un congested transport network. Here an improvement in 
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transport quality lowers commuting costs, business transport costs and freight transport 
costs. With elastic labour supply some of the commuting cost reduction is passed on 
to the firm as a reduction in real wages - from Wo to W1 - via a shift in the labour supply 
curve. The reduction in business and freight transport costs leads to a fall in finished 
good prices, an expansion in output and an increase in employment from L1 to L2 
(given appropriate labour-technology ratios). This is as discussed in section 7.2 for the 
competitive case. This leads to the first upward shift in the labour demand curve. The 
increase in employment from Lo to L2 increases the economic mass of the 
agglomeration and therefore the productivity of all workers increases. This gives the 
second outward shift in the labour demand curve. The final equilibrium position is 
given with employment L3 and wages W 3• The benefit to firms from the reduction in 
wages and the benefit to workers from the increase in wages (due to the first shift in 
the demand curve) double count the commuter, business and freight traffic user 
benefits. The surplus to workers brought about by the second shift in the labour 
demand curve, that is Areas A and B, is additional to transport user benefits. This is 
Venables' first point. The presence of an income tax, by driving a wedge between the 
marginal product of labour (MPL) and the wage workers receive, creates an additional 
surplus to that depicted by Areas A and B when average (national) worker productivity 
increases. This surplus is received by the government in the form of additional tax 
revenue. This is Venables' second point. 
Figure 7.3: Transport quality improvement with an endogenous productivity gain 
(and no labour tax) 
Wage Demand31abour 
SupplyOlabour 
Labour 
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There exists a substantial literature on the variation in worker productivity with 
agglomeration size (see Rosenthal and Strange 2004 for a review), though much of 
this data is international rather than British in nature. Rice, Venables and Patacchini 
(2006) and Graham (2007, in press) present recent UK evidence on such relationships. 
There are two distinct approaches to the inclusion of transport/economy network 
effects in the literature. The first is to use a SCGE model to explicitly model the 
external economies of scale that arise through proximity in a detailed microeconomic 
framework, whilst the second is to use a partial equilibrium approach. The two 
principal examples of SCGE applications are the RAEM model in the Netherlands 
(Elhorst and Oosterhaven, 2008), and the CGEurope model which has been applied in 
a variety of European Commission (EC) research projects examining the economic 
impact of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) most notably in IASON49 
(Brocker et al., 2004). With respect to the TEN-T network the IASON research 
indicated that completion of all of the TEN-T priority infrastructure projects may 
generate between 20 and 30% more economic benefit than would be measured in a 
normal transport cost-benefit analysis. The additionality measured in CGEurope arises 
through productivity effects and imperfect competition in the goods and services market 
(as discussed in section 7.4), though it is not possible to disaggregate the results 
between the two effects. Elhorst and Oosterhaven (2008) find increases in labour 
productivity are between 12% and 21% of transport user benefits depending on the 
MAGLEV variant appraised. 
The second approach, as exemplified by the Department for Transport's appraisal 
guidance (OfT, 2005 pp.55-58), is to capture the productivity gain from increases in the 
size of the agglomeration, not through a detailed analysis of the underlying micro-
economic linkages, but through an aggregate relationship between agglomeration size 
and productivity. In essence the approach aims to measure the proportion of the wage 
increase (from Wo to W3. in Figure 7.3) that arises as a consequence of an 
agglomeration related productivity gain. This then allows Areas A and B to be 
calculated and added to transport user benefits. The success of the method rests on 
separating out the productivity gain due to increases in transport efficiency (lower 
business and freight transport costs) from the productivity impact of increased 
49 IASON was an EC fifth framework research project with the objective of improving 
the understanding of transportation policies on short- and long-term spatial 
development in the EU. 
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economic mass. The use of appropriate elasticities of productivity to economic mass is 
therefore critical otherwise some double counting will occur (see DfT, 2008 p.4 for a 
discussion). For Crossrail this method suggests that increased productivity generates 
an additional 24% of welfare benefits on top of transport user benefits. This increases 
to 52% when the income tax welfare effects associated with the additional employment 
and labour productivity are taken into account (OfT, 2005 p.8). As Crossrail re-
distributes employment to the most productive part of the UK its agglomeration related 
wider economic impacts are representative of the largest such impacts one would 
expect to find in the UK. 
As far as it can be ascertained the Department for Transport guidance has not been 
applied to a transport project in a peripheral region. The principal reason for this is that 
the guidance utilises Graham's research on the relationship between productivity and 
population mass. Graham's research, and Rice, Venables and Patacchini's research, 
relate to urbanisation economies - that is where the agglomeration economies are 
driven by pure economic mass (e.g. city size) rather than specific linkages between 
firms within a city. By definition urbanisation economies are those which are external 
to the firm and the industry but internal to the city (or region). Clearly such economies 
are of little relevance to sparsely populated peripheral regions. 
Localisation economies are a different form of agglomeration economy and in contrast 
to urbanisation economies may prove of some importance to the appraisal of certain 
transport projects in peripheral regions. Localisation economies are those that are 
external to the firm but internal to the industry. They are therefore driven by proximity 
of firms to firms within the same sector or related sectors and to the size of the industry 
specific workforce. Of the industries Graham (2004 Table 1) identifies as exhibiting 
strong tendencies towards localisation (or clustering) several of them are prevalent in 
the peripheral parts of Scotland. These include textile manufacturing, oil and gas 
extraction, fish processing and food and drink processing. In terms of the spatial 
distribution of these industrial clusters of the top 30 local authorities exhibiting industry 
localisation 6 of them are in peripheral regions of Scotland (Graham, 2004 Table 4). 
These regions include the Shetland Islands (oil) and the Scottish Borders (textiles). 
Fishing is the main clustered industry in Eilean Siar (Outer Hebrides) and Argyll and 
Bute. The other two areas that exhibit industrial clustering are the Orkney Islands and 
Dumfries and Galloway. Whilst an international literature on localisation economies 
exists this mainly focuses on the manufacturing sector (see Rosenthal and Strange, 
2004). Graham (in press) presents new evidence on localisation economies in the UK, 
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and importantly he does not confine his analysis to the manufacturing sector. Amongst 
the industries Graham finds statistically significant evidence of localisation economies 
are the food and drink sector (which includes fish processing) and the paper and pulp 
sector - both of which are important employers in the peripheral parts of Scotland. He 
reports an elasticity of productivity to industry employment of 0.074 and 0.059 
respectively for these industries. With respect to other industries in peripheral regions 
exhibiting localisation (fishing, oil extraction and service activities and textiles) he does 
not find any statistically significant localisation economies. For the primary sector 
industries this may have arisen as these industries are treated as a single sector. 
Graham also finds that localisation economies tend to attenuate quite rapidly with 
distance. Almost all localisation externalities are found within 10km of a firm. 
How localisation economies will impact on the appraisal of a transport project in a 
peripheral area is uncertain, as to date the data on elasticities of productivity to 
localisation have not been used in this context. It is expected that localisation 
economies will have a positive impact on the economic benefit of a transport 
intervention where they exist, but will probably be more muted than the effect of 
urbanisation economies. This is for several reasons: the elasticities of productivity to 
localisation are much smaller than the corresponding elasticities of productivity to 
urbanisation (Graham, in press): the effect of localisation economies dissipates quite 
rapidly with distance (a quite limiting factor in an area where populations are 
dispersed); and the proportion of the population that work in the clustered industries is 
small. For example, only 6% of the population work in the fishing sector in the Outer 
Hebrides and 5% in the Shetland Islands, whilst only 3% of the population work in the 
mining and quarrying sector (includes oil extraction) in the Shetland Islands (GROS, 
2008 Table UV77). This view is supported by the fact that Brathen (2001) found no 
evidence of external economies affecting the growth of four firms located near to 
recently constructed fixed link crOSSings. In the main therefore localisation economies 
are probably not going to be of significant relevance to an 'average' transport scheme 
in a peripheral area. Clearly, there will be exceptions to this, such as where a transport 
intervention specifically targets a known cluster (e.g. improving road links to/from 
Peterhead an important fishing cluster in Aberdeenshire). To understand the full 
relevance of localisation economies in these exceptional cases, further work is needed 
to expand the evidence base on the elasticities of productivity and to disaggregate it 
further (e.g. identify elasticities of productivity for known clusters in peripheral areas). 
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7.4 Market failure in the product and services markets 
If a market failure occurs in the product and services market then a transport induced 
expansion of output will give rise to an additional welfare impact stemming from this 
market. This is because with a market failure output is not at its socially optimum level. 
Two sources of market failure can be identified; that associated with taxation on final 
products (Le. indirect taxation) and that arising through the market power of firms. 
Since transport appraisal practice in the UK already takes account of the additional 
welfare impacts associated with indirect taxation (Sugden, 2002 pp.8-10; 2005) this 
issue will not be considered further. The remainder of this section focuses on market 
failure from imperfect competition (Le. the market power of firms). 
Firms may hold market power as they engage in product differentiation or become 
large relative to their market. The latter is particularly true in geographically isolated 
areas as exemplified by peripheral regions, where as a consequence of geography 
firms can act as local monopolists. Transport improvements by bringing regions closer 
together can also increase the intensity of competition between firms, eroding dominant 
market positions and reducing price-cost mark-ups. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7.4, which is the equivalent to Figure 7.1 (b) for the product 
market monopolist. Here before the reduction in freight costs (6 TC) the monopolist 
restricts output to 0 0 where the marginal revenue (MR) from additional output is equal 
to the marginal cost of producing more output. The reduction in freight costs generates 
freight user benefits equivalent to Area B. Some of this is passed on to consumers as 
a reduction in price (from Po to P1) and some of this increases the surplus of the firm. 
Compared to the perfectly competitive situation the expansion in output generates an 
additional surplus depicted by Area C. The transport improvement may also erode any 
geographically induced source of market power. At the limit, when all market power 
has been eliminated, price (P1) will equal marginal cost (MC1) and output will be at the 
optimum level (01*), If a freight cost reduction led to an erosion of all market power an 
additional surplus given by Area 0 would be generated. 
Venables and Gasiorek (1999 Table 2) using synthetic data estimate that in a two 
region one sector economy with imperfect competition Area C is between 30 and 40% 
of Area B. This should not be interpreted as a mark-up of 30 to 40% on user benefits 
from a normal transport cost benefit analysis, as Area B relates to trade flows only (Le. 
the consumer surplus derived by business and freight users). This result relates to a 
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partial equilibrium analysis, in that changes induced in other sectors of the economy 
(the general equilibrium effects) are of no net social value - that is price equals 
marginal social cost in all other sectors of the economy. If prices do not equal marginal 
social costs in other parts of the economy additional welfare effects will be felt - which 
could be both positive and negative. Additionally, if only some of the sectors in the 
product and services markets operated imperfectly (rather than all of them), the 30-
40% figure would represent an upper limit. That the 30-40% figure is an upper limit is 
re-enforced by Davies (1999), who undertook a review of the Venables and Gasiorek 
research. 
Figure 7.4: Welfare impact of a reduction in freight costs with a monopoly 
producer of goods 
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For the UK as a whole the Department for Transport estimate that on average Area C 
is 10% of Area B - where Area B relates to business and freight time and reliability 
savings (OfT, 2005 p.49). This is based on a UK wide price-cost margin of 0.2 and an 
elasticity of demand for goods and services of 0.5. These data are sourced from a 
range of studies on price-average cost and price-marginal cost margins for the UK plus 
an estimate of the elasticity of demand for goods and servicesso. It should be noted 
50 An assessment of imperfect competition should be based on price-marginal cost 
margins as the market failure occurs when prices do not equal marginal costs. Price-
cost margins and price marginal cost margins are only equivalent when industries 
exhibit constant returns to scale. 
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that this calculation rests on the assumption that the monopolist does not price 
differentiate. If a monopolist is able to discriminate between consumers they will 
expand output towards the socially optimum level (Q* 1) and convert some of the 
surplus under the demand curve to producer surplus. In this scenario there will be a 
lower, and at the limit zero, additional welfare impact in the product market. With a 
price differentiating monopolist average price-cost margins will not be a good indicator 
of market power. To date this issue has not been explored in the literature, but such an 
argument may undermine the general case for wider economic benefits in the product 
market. 
Market isolation in peripheral areas mean that firms can hold more market power in 
these areas than they do in core regions. Prices are certainly higher in peripheral 
regions. In 2003 petrol prices were on average 9.7% higher than in urban areas whilst 
food was 11.0% higher (Sneddon Economics, 2003 p.1). Not all of this price difference 
can be attributed to differences in market power as the cost of transporting goods to 
the region and differences in economies of scale in retailing account for some of this 
difference. With respect to petrol prices the Office of Fair Trading concluded that some 
of the price difference is definitely attributed to a lack of competition (i.e. market power 
of petrol wholesalers, BP, and the independent petrol retailers) (OFT, 1998 pp.69-72). 
There is no reason to expect the petrol wholesale and retail market to be different from 
other markets in peripheral areas, therefore it is contended that market power is a more 
relevant issue in peripheral areas than it is in core regions. 
Aside from the reported studies there is a notable lack of evidence on price-cost 
margins specific to the remoter parts of the UK. The most disaggregate data available 
separates Scotland and Wales from the English regions (e.g. Harris, 1999) but does 
not disaggregate further. This is too coarse, as in a Scottish context there needs to be 
disaggregation between North West Scotland and the islands and the rest of Scotland. 
To understand the full wider economic impact of imperfect competition in peripheral 
areas it will therefore be necessary to undertake new research into price-cost margins 
in these areas. Consideration also needs to be given to the ability of firms to price 
discriminate, as with price discrimination the wider economic impact of a transport 
intervention will be reduced. 
7.5 Market failure in the labour market 
Three potential sources of market failure in the labour market exist. The first derives 
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from the presence of a labour tax that distorts the supply of labour from the social 
optimum, the second can occur in the presence of involuntary unemployment, and the 
third occurs in the presence of thin labour markets. 
It is important to realise that wider economic impacts will only be felt in the labour 
market if either employment expands at a national level, or employment is re-
distributed between regions and there exist differences in the scale of market failure 
between regional labour markets. As very few transport projects are expected to 
increase employment at a national level the case that a transport project will generate 
wider economic benefits in the labour market rests on demonstrating that regional 
employment levels alter and regional differences exist between labour markets 51.52. 
Excess labour supply (involuntary unemployment) 
If involuntary unemployment exists and a transport project both reduces commuting 
costs and increases the demand for labour a calculation of the welfare impact in the 
transport market (using the rule of a half) will incorrectly estimate the benefit attributed 
to the generated traffic. This can be illustrated by drawing on an example in which 
wages in the labour market exceed the market clearing wage - that is wages are sticky 
in a downwards direction and a labour supply surplus exists. With reference to Figure 
7.S(b) involuntary unemployment exists as the wage (Wo) is higher than the equilibrium 
wage (W* 0)' A transport project that lowers commuting costs results in a downward 
shift in the labour supply curve. With sticky wages employment levels and wages 
remain unaffected (Le. L1 = La and Wi = Wo). The welfare impact of the transport 
improvement equals Area A. This is the benefit felt by existing workers travelling to 
work more easily and can be correctly measured in the transport market - as can be 
seen in Figure 7.5(b). Now if business and freight transport costs also reduce, regional 
output and employment will expand (as in the competitive case Figure 7.1 (c)). This is 
akin to a rightward shift in the regional labour demand curve. The final level of 
employment becomes L2 and the level of involuntary unemployment is reduced. A 
51 For this to hold the marginal product of labour of the worker holding a job that is re-
distributed to a different region, as a consequence of the transport intervention, has to 
be the same in different regions. This does not imply that average regional labour 
Eroductivity across different regions has to be the same. 
2 Interestingly OfT (2005 pp.51-52) appear to assume that all transport projects can 
expand employment at a national level as they include the additional tax revenue 
generated by improved labour supply as a wider economic impact. It is understood 
that this guidance may alter in the near future, in the sense that its application maybe 
restricted to certain 'large' schemes. 
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welfare gain equivalent to the shaded area Area D, is therefore felt by workers, no 
longer involuntarily unemployed, in the form of wages paid over and above the 
reservation wage. A welfare gain is also felt by employers, equivalent to Area C, as 
they enjoy an increase in producer surplus - their willingness-to-pay for the additional 
labour exceeds the wage they pay. A conventional transport user benefit analysis that 
correctly estimated the increase in commuting trips would, however using the rule of 
half, incorrectly assign half the economic benefit of existing trips to these generated 
trips (Le. Area B in Figure 7.5(a)) - when in fact the benefit is given by the sum of Areas 
C and D. The total welfare impact of the transport cost reduction and the associated 
increase in employment is given by the sum of Areas A, C and D of which only Area A 
can be measured in the transport market. 
Elhorst and Oosterhaven (2008) show in their appraisal of four variants of a MAGLEV53 
line that labour market effects in peripheral areas can have a substantial impact on 
scheme benefits. Depending on the route of the MAGLEV line under consideration, 
they found that wider economic impacts may change benefits as measured in a 
conventional transport cost benefit analysis by between -1 % and +38%54. Their results 
are very interesting in a number of ways. Firstly, they demonstrate that including wider 
economic impacts into an appraisal can lower as well as increase economic welfare, 
and secondly they indicate that for what appear to be very similar projects (each project 
variant is a MAGLEV line) very different levels of additionality can be obtained. The 
differences between the project variants arise as a result of the different impacts they 
each have on the labour market. The two variants that provide a high speed link 
between the four cities of the Randstad, that is the variants that re-enforce the 
Randstad agglomeration, have positive impacts for overall productivity of the Randstad 
region, as discussed in the previous section, however, these variants also have a 
negative welfare impact on the regions from which labour is extracted. The opposite is 
the case for the variants that link the periphery (Groningen) to the core (the Randstad). 
As the welfare gain from improving the efficiency of the labour market exceeds the 
productivity decrease from shifting employment from the core to the periphery, the 
MAGLEV variants which link the Randstad (the core) to Groningen (the periphery) have 
more net positive additionality than the projects that link the four cities of the Randstad. 
53 Magnetic levitation train 
54 Oosterhaven and Elhorst (2003) report a wider range (-15% to +83%) derived from 
earlier versions of the model. 
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Figure 7.5 Welfare impact of a commuting cost reduction and shift in regional 
labour demand under regional labour supply surplus (with no labour tax) 
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This example on the face of it suggests that there could be substantial additional 
economic impacts for transport projects in peripheral regions. The results are, 
however, case dependent. In this instance they arise as a consequence of both the 
characteristics of the regional labour markets, the manner that the project variants ra-
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distribute employment between regions, and the manner that national wages by 
industry prevail in the Netherlands. The latter point is extremely important. In the 
Netherlands there is a legal mechanism, the setting of national wages by industry, 
which means an excess supply of labour will prevail in peripheral regions when the 
market clearing wage is below the minimum industry wage. In contrast there is no 
legal mechanism in the UK that keeps the wage above the market clearing wage. This 
combined with the fact that those losing jobs in rural areas are thought to have a higher 
propensity to migrate away from the an area completely rather than remain in an area 
and search for a job (Monk and Hodge, 1995) mean that in the UK this market failure 
probably has less relevance to peripheral areas despite the evidence from the 
Netherlands. Evidence for this position includes the fact that of the eight local 
authorities that might be considered peripheral in Scotland only one (the Outer 
Hebrides) has an unemployment rate in excess of the Scottish average. Furthermore, 
three of the lowest five regional unemployment rates are associated with peripheral 
areas. Falling population levels as evidence of out-migration are also certainly evident 
for all the Scottish island groups55 and the north and north-west coasts of Scotland 
(Sutherland, Caithness and Lochaber) (HIE, 2003b Table 2). This would suggest that 
in peripheral areas of Scotland there is no significant discrepancy between the wage 
and the market clearing wage. Unlike the Netherlands there is therefore no market 
failure that brings about involuntary unemployment in peripheral areas. In the UK 
market failures that bring about involuntary unemployment may be more relevant to 
urban areas where unemployment is high (e.g. Glasgow). 
Thin labour markets 
Labour markets in rural areas are often viewed as thin as job opportunities are limited 
(Findeis and Jenson, 1998; Vera-Toscano, Phimister and Weersnik, 2004). The 
limiting case of a thin labour market is the monopsony case where only one employer 
exists for labour. This illustrative case is worth examining as whilst it is not a realistic 
depiction of a modern labour market the consequence of the market failure (a wedge 
between the marginal product of labour and the wage) is relevant to thin labour 
markets. 
A monopsony employer faces an upward sloping labour supply curve. If it cannot 
discriminate then to recruit additional workers it needs to raise the wage paid to all 
55 The population of the Outer Hebrides (Eilean Siar) dropped by 10% between 1991 
and 2001 
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workers. This implies that the marginal cost (MC) of labour supply to the firm lies 
above the average cost of labour supply (AC). Th is is illustrated in Figure 7.6. To 
maximise profits the firm will therefore employ Lo workers and pay them Woo This is 
because when employment is at Lo profits for the fi rm are maximised with the marginal 
cost of labour equal to its marginal revenue product (MRP,abour). Employment levels 
(Lo) are therefore below those of full employment. That is the labour market is 
inefficient. In equilibrium therefore a wedge exists between the marginal revenue 
product of labour and the wage received by workers. The surpluses felt in the labour 
market are therefore given by Areas B and C. Area B double counts commuter user 
benefits (Area A in Figure 7.2(a)), whilst Area C, the welfare benefit of expanding 
employment, is additional to transport user benefits. 
Figure 7.6: Welfare impact of a commuting cost reduction under monopsonistic 
competition (with no labour tax) 
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The limiting monopsony case of a single employer is not in itself of direct relevance to 
modern economies or peripheral areas. For example, only 26.2% of workers in the 
Highlands and Islands work in a firm with more than 100 workers (HIE, 2003b). The 
modern monopsony literature in which (a lot of) competing firms have some market 
power over workers, is of relevance to modern economies (Bhaskar, Manning and To, 
2003; Manning, 2003a). In this literature it is argued that a large number of 
independent and competing firms are able to exert market power over workers due to: 
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the presence of imperfect information on the part of workers and firms; the 
heterogeneous preferences of workers; and workers' mobility costs. Job search 
models (see Rogerson , Shimer and Wright, 2005 for a survey) encapsulate some 
aspects of this source of market power. In these models unemployed workers have 
difficulties in finding information on job vacancies, and even if there are many jobs 
within the workers' neighbourhood only a small percentage of them become vacant at 
anyone time. From the perspective of the employee labour markets are therefore thin, 
even if there are many firms. 
The wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labour is critical to the 
estimation of the wider economic impact of a transport project in a thin labour market 
(i.e. Area C in Figure 7.1). The wedge itself depends on the elasticity of the labour 
supply curve faced by the firm (noting under perfect competition it should be perfectly 
elastic), however, a good estimate of this elasticity still eludes labour economics. On 
average what estimates that are available suggest that wages will on average be about 
17% below the marginal product of labour (Manning, 2003a Chapter 4). With reference 
to Figure 7.6 this implies that the average difference between W'o and Wo represents 
17% of W'o. This suggests that if employment generation effects are significant (Le. the 
difference between Lo and L1 is important) the size of Area C may well be substantial. 
This hypothesis is confirmed by Pilegaard and Fosgerau (2008) who implement a 
Pissarides (1990) type job search model into a spatial computable general equilibrium 
(SCGE) model populated with Danish economic data. The model is then used to 
evaluate a transport quality improvement that increases labour supply at a national 
level. They report significant additional benefits of around 30% of commuter user 
benefits arising from the labour market (for an economy with no labour tax) as a 
consequence of search imperfections. 
From the perspective of modelling the wider economic impact of a transport project in a 
peripheral area, where there is no net increase in employment at a national level, a key 
issue is whether the size of the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the 
wage is bigger in peripheral regions than it is in core regions. This is because if there 
is no difference in the wedge re-distributing employment between the regions will have 
no net impact (in much the same way that a labour tax wedge has no net impact on a 
re-distribution of employment). High mobility costs and high job search costs would 
suggest that labour markets are thinner in peripheral areas than in core areas and this 
would suggest that the wedge is larger in peripheral areas. Mobility costs are high in 
peripheral areas as workplace density is low and commuting distances are long. Job 
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search costs for workers and firms are also higher in peripheral areas, as workers do 
not have ready access to job centres, vacancies are often not advertised, and 
successful job search is often attributed to contacts and networks (Monk and Hodge, 
1995; Lindsay, Greig and McQuaid, 2005). The presence of higher search and mobility 
costs in peripheral areas is therefore expected to lead to a larger degree of inefficiency 
in peripheral and rural labour markets, with the result that an increase in employment in 
a peripheral labour market will have a positive wider economic impact. This form of 
wider economic benefit it is asserted may have a significant effect on the economic 
benefits of a transport project in a peripheral region. 
7.6 Measuring wider economic benefits in practice 
An initial review of the literature would suggest that localisation economies, imperfect 
competition, involuntary unemployment and thin labour markets maya" act as sources 
of wider economic benefit for transport interventions in peripheral areas. A deeper 
analysis of each of the market failures and the underlying economic conditions in 
peripheral parts of Scotland indicates that of these four sources thin labour markets 
and imperfect competition will be the most important. Localisation economies will be 
important for certain transport interventions when the scheme is specifically aimed at 
an industrial cluster. There is no evidence of significant involuntary unemployment in 
peripheral areas despite the poor economic performance of many of these areas, 
probably due to outward migration. It is therefore asserted that wider economic 
impacts are of importance to transport projects in peripheral regions. 
The framework for capturing wider economic impacts set out by the OfT (2005) can 
accommodate wider economic impacts resulting from imperfect competition and those 
resulting from localisation economies. There is however an absence of detailed data 
with which the framework can be implemented. The best data on localisation 
economies in the UK is that presented by Graham (in press), but this does not 
separately identify clustered industries. of most relevance to the peripheral parts of 
Scotland (e.g. oil and fishing). The evidence on price-cost margins which forms the 
basis of the imperfect competition calculations relates to the core regions of the UK. 
Evidence from North West Scotland and the Scottish islands suggests that a lack of 
competition in the periphery allows firms to mark prices up further than they do in core 
regions. There is therefore a need to expand the existing evidence base to include 
data pertinent to peripheral areas. 
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The existing OfT guidance does not include what is expected to be an important source 
of wider economic benefit in peripheral areas, that associated with thin labour markets. 
In thin labour markets search frictions (i.e. costs associated with job search), amongst 
other things, drive a wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage. This 
argument is based on the fact that mobility costs in peripheral areas are high due to the 
long distances of travel and the need for workers and firms to engage in informal 
methods to make a job match. There is therefore a need to investigate objectively 
whether such market failures occur in peripheral areas. Such an investigation is 
reported in the next chapter, Chapter 8. Further research is also needed to understand 
the size of the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage in 
peripheral areas. 
It is important to recognise that wider economic impacts will only occur if surpluses are 
felt in markets other than the transport market. For this to happen supply and demand 
in other markets has to be elastic (but less than perfectly elastic) and transport user 
benefits have to pass through from the transport market to the product and labour 
market. The two principal mechanisms for the linkages between the transport market 
and other markets, as discussed in the competitive case, are that business and freight 
time savings reduce business costs and a reduction in commuting costs reduces 
wages. Both outcomes lead to a reduction in product prices and an expansion in 
output. Frictions that block these linkages include wages that are sticky in a 
downwards direction and firms not being able to take advantage of small time savings. 
Evidence for the existence of such frictions include that on average 55% of workers in 
the UK exhibit real or nominal wage rigidity (Barwell and Schweitzer, 2007) and that 
small time savings for road freight lie below the lorry drivers' wage rate (e.g. Fowkes et 
a/., 2007). In such situations the wider economic impact of transport projects in 
peripheral areas will be much smaller than might have first been thought, unless 
alternative mechanisms exist by which transport user benefits can be passed through 
into final markets. One such alternative mechanism comes from the job search 
literature. In this literature a reduction in commuting costs means that workers expand 
their area of search, leading to a reduction in search costs and an expansion in 
employment (even in the presence of sticky wages). A further mechanism by which 
regional output can expand in the presence of frictions is that businesses can re-Iocate 
from one region to another in response to a change in transport costs. It can therefore 
be seen that surpluses can still occur in the product and labour markets when search 
frictions are introduced into the competitive case. This is of most relevance to 
peripheral areas as it is those areas where it is argued search frictions are greatest. 
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As just mentioned Chapter 8 takes the review presented here forward with an 
investigation as to whether a failure in the labour market occurs in peripheral areas as 
a result of the labour market being thin. In thin labour markets models of job search 
indicate that workers are not paid their marginal product and are only partially 
compensated for commuting costs. Evidence of partial compensation of commuting 
costs in peripheral areas of Scotland is therefore looked for. Chapter 9 brings together, 
in a case study, estimates for relevant market failures. It therefore gives some context 
to the relative importance of the different market failures with respect to user benefits 
and also to scheduling costs. 
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8 EVIDENCE OF LABOUR MARKET 
FAILURE IN PERIPHERAL 
AREAS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents research that uses the Scottish Household Survey dataset (Mori 
Scotland et al., 2005) to investigate whether a failure in the labour market occurs in 
peripheral areas. In thin labour markets models of job search indicate that workers are 
only partially compensated for commuting costs (Manning, 2003b; van Ommeren and 
Rietveld, 2005; Rouwendal and van Ommeren, 2007). This chapter therefore looks for 
evidence of partial or zero compensation for the commute. This is taken as evidence 
that search costs prevail, and a wedge exists between the wage and the marginal 
product of labour in peripheral areas. Such a wedge has implications for the existence 
of wider economic impacts (see section 7.5 in Chapter 7). As also discussed in 
Chapter 7 net wider economic impacts will only be felt with a re-distribution of 
employment between regions if the size of this wedge varies between regional labour 
markets. Therefore the ancillary hypothesis being tested is that the level of 
compensation will be lower for workers in peripheral compared to central areas (Le. the 
wedge will be larger in peripheral areas). As discussed in Chapter 7, in peripheral 
areas mobility costs and search costs are higher than in central areas, and therefore 
the labour market is expected to be thinner and workers are less likely to be 
compensated for their commute. The labour market literature suggests that workers in 
peripheral regions are not the only ones to face thin labour markets. Women, ethnic 
minorities and unskilled or low skilled workers, also face thin labour markets as a 
consequence of restricted geographic search areas (Madden, 1981, 1985; Zax, 1991; 
Ihlanfeldt, 1992; McQuaid, Greig and Adams, 2001). Evidence for partial rates of 
compensation for these groups is also therefore investigated. 
The investigation into a failure in the labour market in peripheral regions focuses on 
commuting costs rather than directly on the wedge between the wage and the marginal 
product of labour (via the elasticity of the labour supply curve to the firm) for two 
reasons. Firstly the elasticity of the labour supply curve to the firm (and therefore the 
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wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labour) is difficult to estimate. 
This is due to the lack of an appropriate instrument to control for the endogeneity 
between employment and wages. Manning (2003a chapter 4) for example cites only 
eight studies in the whole labour economic literature where the labour supply curve to 
the firm has been estimated directly. He tries to estimate the labour supply curve to the 
firm indirectly via wage elasticities of job separations to employment and non-
employment and in a different study through the wage elasticity of recruitment costs 
(Manning, 2003a chapter 4; 2006). The second reason is that the datasets available 
for such empirical work, the Labour Force Survey and the Labour Turnover Survey, do 
not provide data at a sufficiently detailed geographic level to Identify those who live in 
peripheral areas and those who do not. The approach adopted for this thesis has 
therefore focussed on finding evidence of an outcome of thin labour markets (partial 
compensation for the commute) rather than identifying the presence of the market 
failure itself. It is therefore left for future research the task of describing the actual size 
of the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage between peripheral 
and central areas. 
Manning (2003b) and Rouwendal and van Ommeren (2007) present evidence of partial 
compensation for commuting costs for the UK and the Netherlands respectively. This 
evidence is based on the level of compensation received by workers per hour (or 
minute) of the commute. From this Manning infers partial compensation as the rate of 
compensation is less than the wage rate, whilst Rouwendal and van Ommeren infer 
partial compensation as the rate of compensation is less than the average value of 
travel time. Neither Manning nor Rouwendal and van Ommeren are able to explicitly 
determine the actual rate of compensation as they do not use the full cost of the 
commute in their econometric analysis. The first contribution of the present research is 
therefore to estimate the rate of compensation by using the full cost of the commute. 
From this starting point the second contribution is to examine whether the rate of 
compensation varies by region (peripheral or central) and by socio-economic status 
(gender and occupation). 
The direction of causation between generalised commuting costs (Le. commuting costs 
that include both time costs and money costs) and income is ambiguous. Job search 
models imply that wages are a function of commuting costs, whilst the travel time and 
travel demand literature emphasises that commuting costs are a function of income. 
The latter occurs as not only is the value of travel time a function of household income 
and commute length (see for example the empirical work of Algers at a/., 1995; Mackie 
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et a/., 2003; Axhausen et a/., 2004; Wardman, 2004), but the demand for travel, as with 
other economic goods, is also a function of household and personal income. For the 
UK, for example, Goodwin, Dargay and Hanly (2004) in a meta-analysis of published 
studies found long run income elasticities of demand of between 0.49 and 0.73 for car 
vehicle-kms over all trip purposes (depends on estimation method). Given this 
endogeneity the third contribution of the research is therefore to use the method of 
instrumental variables (IV) to estimate the rate of compensation. 
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows: sections 2 and 3 introduce the 
economic model and the dataset respectively. Section 4 presents wage equations 
estimated using the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) and section 5 presents the 
wage equations estimated using the IV method. As is discussed in the final section, 
section 6, the estimated earnings function for workers in peripheral areas imply a rate 
of compensation for the commute that is not significantly different from zero. The 
estimates are not particularly precise, possible arising as a consequence of the 
instruments used in the IV estimations not being particularly strong. It is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions regarding the other labour market groups due to the problem of 
weak instruments and the inability to test competing hypotheses from the urban 
economics literature. It does appear though that women and low skilled occupations 
receive little compensation and men and those in central areas receive more 
compensation. What is also evident is that the endogeneity of commuting costs and 
income can introduce a large bias into any estimate of the rate of compensation for the 
commute, and OLS estimates should therefore be treated with caution. 
8.2 The model 
The literature on job search models is large (Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 2005 
present a recent survey). Briefly, job search models are characterised by workers 
facing two potential pay-offs, one associated with unemployment and the other 
associated with employment. Workers seek to maximise their lifetime payoff 
(discounted) given that job offers arrive at a particular rate. The wage associated with 
each job offer derives from a wage distribution. The reservation wage (the wage above 
which a job offer will be accepted) becomes a function of the payoffs, the arrival rate of 
job offers and the wage distribution associated with those job offers. Worker turnover 
is achieved through the use of a separation rate - that is jobs end for some exogenous 
reason - and through on the job search. The rate of job offers to those in employment 
and out of employment can differ. Job search models also include assumptions 
200 
regarding how firms and workers meet (a matching function) and how wages are 
determined (a bargaining function). In different models workers and firms meet 
randomly or actively choose a search method. Once workers and firms have met 
different models assume wages are either determined through a bargaining process 
(e.g. Nash bargaining) or wages are posted ex-ante by either the firm or the worker. 
The behaviour of the firm in this process is dictated by the fact that creating a vacancy 
is costly and the expected value of a job to the firm is a function of the amount of time 
that the job will be occupied. Occupied jobs become vacant as workers engage in on 
the job search and time is needed by a firm to fill a vacancy. An important 
characteristic in some job search models is to allow for heterogeneity amongst 
workers, through heterogenous leisure. This gives rise to heterogeneity in reservation 
wages (Le. the expected payoff when unemployed). 
The model makes the assumption that workers cannot change residential location and 
there exists homogeneity in space, that is it assumes a uniform distribution of 
residences and firms. With this assumption and in perfect competition workers are fully 
compensated for their commute by a wage premium. In perfect competition the arrival 
rate of job offers is infinite so full employment always occurs and vacancies fill 
instantaneously. Firms also employ the workers living closest to them, so commuting 
is minimised. As the job search literature indicates a finite arrival rate of job offers 
(within a search area), jobs ending for exogenous reasons, the costs of opening a 
vacancy and the need to search for a job lead to the co-existence of unfilled vacancies 
and unemployment. Different search based models can also explain other labour 
market phenomena such as the relationship between tenure, wages and staff turnover, 
the existence of wage dispersion and the characteristic that high wage firms are larger 
than low wage firms ceteris paribus. Within a transport context job search models offer 
an explanation of the phenomena of excess or wasteful commuting by which firms 
employ workers who do not reside close to them (Le. workers in region A commute to 
work in region B, whilst equivalent workers from region B commute to equivalent jobs in 
region A). 
Search frictions dependent on commuting costs can be introduced into these models in 
several ways. Firstly commuting costs affect the payoff received when employed and 
therefore the reservation wage (Manning, 2003b; van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005; 
Rouwendal and van Ommeren, 2007). Commuting costs can also affect the search 
strategy of workers (Pilegaard and Fosgerau, 2008) and the search strategy of firms 
(Rouwendal and van Ommeren, 2007). Increasing search over larger areas for both 
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workers and firms increases the arrival rate of job offers - as whilst the arrival rate of 
job offers is infinite only a finite number are within an acceptable commuting distance to 
the worker. A lowering of commuting costs increases the size of the area which is 
searched over, and therefore reduces the expected periods of unemployment and the 
expected duration vacancies remain unfilled. Rouwendal and van Ommeren also allow 
the rate at which workers quit a job for another job to be dependent on the commuting 
distance. 
If search frictions exist it can be shown that commuting costs will only be partially 
compensated (Manning, 2003b; van Ommeren and Rietveld, 2005; Rouwendal and 
van Ommeren, 2007). This result holds despite the different assumptions made in 
each of the job search models presented in these papers. These models indicate that 
in the presence of search frictions wages are an increasing function of commuting 
costs (TCcommute). A hedonic earnings function can therefore be expressed as in 
Equation 8.1. 
(8.1 ) 
Here, earnings for individual q (I q) are a function of a vector of pre-determined 
variables (Xq ), including human capital variables and job type variables, as well as 
location specific variables, and commuting costs (TCq ). For full compensation of 
commuting costs a £1 rise in annual commuting costs leads to a £1 increase in the 
annual wage (net of deductions). Clearly therefore when estimating (8.1) the income 
units used must reflect the perspective of the worker (Le. income after deductions) and 
secondly must cover an elapsed time (e.g. per week, per year rather than per hour) to 
have a sensible relationship to the number of commuting trips made. 
Commuting costs themselves are a function of a vector of journey attributes (Yq ), an 
associated vector of journey attribute valuations (Zq) and out of pocket costs (the 
price) (Pq ) as indicated in Equation 8.2. The endogeneity of commuting costs and 
income can be seen with the aid of this equation as Zq, the vector of journey attribute 
valuations, is a function of amongst other things the marginal utility of income. 
(8.2) 
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The hedonic earnings function (8.1) acts as an econometric specification for the 
empirical work that follows. The model estimated is specified as: 
(8.3) 
where a is the rate of compensation to commuting costs and is the main variable of 
interest; P is a matrix of the rates of return of each of the human capital variables, job 
type variables and location specific variables; and Eq is a term representing 
unobserved attributes of each individual q that is distributed i.I.d normal. 
It is important to note that the urban economic literature has had a long standing 
interest in the relationship between wages and commuting costs (Muth, 1969 chapter 
2; Mills, 1972 chapter 6). In the monocentric model, where all employment is located in 
the city centre, house price differentials compensate workers for their commuting costs. 
In such a model there is no compensation for commuting through the wage (Le. 0=0 in 
Equation 8.3). When employment is spread more widely through the city, firms in the 
city centre must pay higher wages than those in suburban areas, for equivalent jobs, if 
they are to attract suburban residents who would be faced by a longer commute. 
Commuting costs therefore lead to the presence of wage 'gradients' as well as house 
price gradients in urban areas. With perfectly functioning markets the wage and house 
price differentials arising from the respective gradients perfectly compensate for 
commuting costs incurred. In such a model wages would not necessarily compensate 
for commuting costs, even for full compensation to occur. In fact Timothy and Wheaton 
(2001) show that only variations in average commuting costs between those employed 
at different locations are capitalised into wages. From this it follows that to test for 
partial wage compensation in areas where cities have a strong influence one should 
analyse the relationship between individual earnings and the average commuting costs 
of all those employed at the same workplace location (Tew). Equation 8.5 therefore 
sets out an alternative model specification to Equation 8.3 for an area dominated by a 
city. 
(8.4) 
where individual q works at work place w. 
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8.3 The data 
The primary difficulty with empirical work in this field is obtaining a dataset with 
sufficient information in it at an appropriately disaggregate level. Invariably for reasons 
of data confidentiality geographic information is suppressed if detailed income data is 
available, or if detailed geographic data is available detailed income data or 
worker/household attribute data is suppressed. The requirement for detailed 
commuting data upon which the full cost of the commute can be constructed adds a 
further dimension to this problem. 
Three UK datasets contain income data at an appropriately fine level (Le. not banded) 
and some commuting information. These are the Scottish Household Survey (SHS), 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and the Labour Force Survey (LFS). The 
advantage of the SHS over the BHPS and LFS is that it contains more information on 
the commute. For example, data regarding whether the commuting journey is between 
home and the main place of work or whether ancillary tasks are undertaken as part of 
the commute (e.g. dropping children off at school or going shopping) is available via 
the travel diary. Commuting distance is also available in the SHS, and whilst parking 
fees and public transport fares are not available it is possible to identify those who do 
not have to pay anything other than vehicle operating costs as part of their commute. 
At a geographic level, which is of particular relevance to this thesis, the SHS offers the 
ability to identify 'accessible' households that live up to 30 minutes from an urban area 
(of more than 10,000 people), 'remote' households that live between 30 and 60 
minutes from an urban area and 'very remote' households that live more than 60 
minutes from an urban area (see Figure 1.2). With the SHS it is therefore possible to 
quite easily distinguish households that reside in a peripheral area from those that 
reside in a central area. This is not possible with the BHPS or the LFS. The sampling 
strategy of the SHS also aims to provide sufficient data at a local authority level for the 
calculation of robust statistics. This therefore provides a reasonable number of cases 
for the estimation of a model of a peripheral region. Nothing of course is gained 
without something being lost. The BHPS and the LFS are large panel surveys and 
contain more information on the type of job, the experience of the worker and 
remuneration for the job than does the SHS. The panel aspect of these surveys could 
also be advantageous in addressing some of the endogeneity between wages and 
commuting costs. 
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Five years of data relating to the years 1999 to 2003 are used. The dataset and the 
process of obtaining a representative sample are described more completely in 
Appendix O. Briefly, the SHS is a continuous cross-sectional household survey. The 
1999-2003 data contain 75,746 households, however, in only 23,564 households was 
the selected random adult a full-time employee (the focus of the econometric analysis). 
After cleaning the commuting data and restricting the sample to full-time workers for 
whom both commuting and income data is available, a potential sample of 6,747 cases 
is obtained. Elimination of cases with imputed income data and restricting the sample 
to those fully immersed in the labour market gives a final sample of 4,417. Of this 
2,520 are men and 1,897 are women, while 528 live and work in a peripheral area and 
3,805 live in a central area. Peripheral area cases are defined as those who both live 
and work more than 30 minutes drive from a conurbation with 10,000 people or more. 
Central area cases are defined as those who live in an urban area or within 30 minutes 
of a conurbation with 10,000 people or more (see Figure 1.2). 
Commuting costs were constructed as the sum of the value of journey time plus, for the 
car/van mode only, an estimate of vehicle operating costs. Unit values for this 
calculation were sourced from Mackie et a/. (2003) and OfT (2007b). Values of 
commute time for each individual are a function of income, commute distance and 
mode. Vehicle operating costs for both the fuel and non-fuel elements of costs are a 
function of speed and distance. 
8.4 Ordinary least squares estimation 
Two methods are used to estimate the earnings function (8.3); each of which assumes 
a different structure to the endogeneity problem: ordinary least squares (OLS) which 
assumes all variables are exogenous and instrumental variables (IV) which controls for 
potential endogeneity of commuting costs. In each method personal earned income 
(net of deductions) is regressed against commuting costs and human capital variables 
(including 3 qualification categories and two age/experience variables), as well as 
controls for 9 occupation classes, 16 industrial categories, temporary job status and 
size of work place. Variations in labour market operation and agglomeration effects are 
controlled for through dummy variables on workplace location representing each of the 
32 local authorities in Scotland. Aside from commuting costs these variables are 
classic components of a reduced form wage equation. As under perfect competition 
economic theory indicates annual earnings increase by £1 if annual commuting costs 
increase by £1, no transformation on income or commuting costs has been undertaken 
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in the models estimated. 
Results for a limited number of variables from the OLS estimation of the earnings 
function are presented in Table 8.1. A full description of the models estimated is 
contained in Appendix E. As can be seen from this table in all the models, except the 
peripheral model, the coefficient on commuting costs is positive and significantly 
different from zero at the 1 % level. In the peripheral model the coefficient on 
commuting costs is positive but only significant at the 5% level. 
The coefficient on commuting costs is interpreted as the level of compensation required 
per annum (£) for a 1 pence change in one-way commuting costs. Thus in the all 
worker model, column (a), for every 1 pence of one-way commuting costs full-time 
workers are on average compensated with £2.82 per annum (net of deductions). This 
compares to, for example, the £3.52 that managers, professionals and technical 
occupations receive, column (d), the £2.16 that other occupations receive, column (e), 
and the £2.46 that women receive, column (g). A pattern therefore emerges: men 
receive more compensation than women, and those with 'higher skilled' occupations 
receive more compensation than 'lower skilled' occupations for every penny of 
commuting costs incurred. Such a pattern is consistent with the arguments that labour 
market frictions arise because of thin labour markets, familial constraints and market 
power. Contrary to these arguments, however, are model results that suggest the level 
of compensation is higher for those living and working in peripheral areas (£3.15) than 
for those living in Central areas (£2.58). 
I 
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Table 8.1: Full-time employees' earnings function - ordinary least squares estimation 
• =' - ..i -
~ Men and women -, Men Women 
.~-
- -
-
~ ~ 
-- -- - - (f) (g) 
~ All -, Central Peripheral Managers, Other 
, - (a) (b) (c) professionals and occupations I I , 
.' 
technical (e) 
~ occupations , 
, 
: (d) 
~ -~. . . ., .. 
- -- -
.-. - ~ .. ~ .. - - ~ .. -
Generalised cost of 
one-way commute 2.821 (6.43) 2.583 (5.30) 3.154 (2.25) 3.517 (4.88) 2.158 (4.61) 2.945 (4.31) 2.463 (3.9?) 
(pence) 
Potential experience 453.6 (10.12) 475.1 (9.94) 333.2 (5.78) 783.9 (11 .26) 244.9 (5.88) 543.5 (8.92) 341.2 (6.20) (yrs) 
Potential experience 
squared (yrs2/1000) -7,430 (-8.55) -7,884 (-8.45) -5,221 (-4.04) -12,722 (-8.87) -4,152 (-4.75) -8,917 (-7.42) -5,522 (-5.14) 
School certificate or no 
qualification (dummy -1,933 (-9.18) -2,044 (-8.47) -1,141 (-3.70) -3,333 (-6.00) -1 ,525 (-6.51 ) -1,831 (-6 .69) -2 ,096 (-9.85) 
variable} 
Degree or higher 2,849 (10.69) 3,111 (13.18) 542 (0.67) 3,051 (9.93) 2,276 (4 .63) 3,072 (7.01) 2,639 (9.86) (dummy variable) 
Female (dummy 
-4,762 (-11.93) -4,634 (-10.60) -4,802 (-5.65) -4,647 (-13.01) -2,516 (-5.49) --- (---) --- (---) 
variable} 
Constant 13,232 (20.25) 12,910 (18.84) 12,787 (18.27) 8,478 (8.84) 9,420 (17.34) 11,721 (14.75) 10,021 (12.06) 
Sample size 4,417 3,805 528 1,865 2,552 2,520 1,897 
R-squared 0.428 0.424 0.521 0.310 0.283 0.391 0.455 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual earned income net of deductions (£). T -statistics calculated using robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are also adjusted for spatial correlation in the residuals by clustering on local authority of workplace. T-stat>2.58 
indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at <1 %, T -stat >1.96 at <5% level (two tailed t-test). Models also include dummy variables for 
occupation (9), industrial sector (16), temporary job, size of workplace and local authority of workplace (33). Estimated using STATA9 econometric 
software. 
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To understand whether or not any socio-economic group is receiving full compensation 
we need to compare the level of compensation received by different socio-economic 
groups to that required for full compensation56 . As can be seen from Table 8.2 the 
level of compensation for commuting costs incurred varies from 74% for managerial, 
professional or technical occupations to 45% for those with other occupations, with the 
average level of compensation across all full-time workers at 59%. This average level 
of compensation across all full-time workers is statistically different from exact 
compensation at the 5% level. This suggests that frictions occur thereby preventing 
workers receiving full compensation for their commuting costs. There is also variation 
by socio-economic group as the hypothesis of partial compensation is rejected for 
managerial, professional or technical occupations and accepted at the 1 % level for 
those with 'other occupations' and those living in central areas. The weaker level of 
precision in the estimates of the compensation received by women and those living and 
working in peripheral areas means that the hypothesis of partial compensation is 
rejected for these groups. 
Table 8.2 : Compensation for commuting costs - OLS estimation 
Model Estimated annual compensation Level of T-stat of 
for 1 p change in one-way compensation difference 
commuting costs (£ per annum) (a)/(b) between 
Required for full (a) and Received compensation (b) (a) (b) 
Men All 2.82 4.751 59.4% 2.49 
and Central 2.58 4.751 54.4% 2.69 
women Peripheral 3.15 4.751 66.4% 1.03 
Managers. 3.52 4.751 74 .0% 1.28 
professionals and 
technical occupations 
Other occupations 2.16 4.751 45.4% 3.27 
Men 2.94 4.801 61 .3% 1.97 
Women 2.46 4.665 52.8% 0.87 
Notes: T-statistic calculated assuming covariance between the two distributions is zero. T-stat>2.58 
indicates level of compensation is significantly different from 100% at <1%, >1.96 at <5% level {two 
tailed t-test}. 
56 The SHS does not contain data on the total number of commuting journeys made in 
a year by each respondent. This variable is therefore estimated from the Labour Force 
Survey for 2006 Spring quarter (variable dayspz - the number of days usually worked 
per week). Assuming that two one-way commutes occurred on each day worked and a 
46 week working year the number of days usually worked in a week can be aggregated 
to an estimate of the number of one-way commuting trips per year. This gives the 
mean number of one-way commutes per annum of 475.1 (64.0) for all full-time 
employees, 480.1 (65.0) for men and 466.5 (61.2) for women - standard deviations in 
parentheses. 
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8.5 Instrumental variable estimation 
As argued earlier there is good reason to believe that commuting costs are 
endogenous to earnings, and consequently, as is standard, the method of instrumental 
variables has been employed to account for this endogeneity. The instruments 
employed are based on the categories of residential rural/urban classification contained 
within the SHS data57• 
Good instruments in non-experimental data (i.e. natural data like the SHS) are difficult 
to identify in practise. This is a consequence of the inter-relationship of most 
observable economic variables. A strong instrument will be good at predicting 
variations in the endogenous variable58 - in this instance commuting costs - and will 
not be correlated with the error term in the regression. The instrument will not 
therefore be correlated with the dependent variable (income) except through its effect 
on the endogenous variable (commuting costs). For that reason good instruments are 
often found to be the endogenous variable but with a very long lag. This requires time 
series data as may be found in a long standing panel dataset, but not unfortunately in 
the SHS. Other good instruments are those associated with a naturally occurring 
'experiment'. An exogenous change in policy that shocks one part of the system but 
not another part can often act as a good instrument. Bearing in mind that wages are 
sticky downwards such a policy shift to instrument commuting costs would need to 
increase the cost of travel. This would suggest Instruments such as a congestion 
charge or a large and sudden increase in parking charges in one part of the country but 
not another might be effective. No such exogenous price changes occurred during the 
period (1999-2003) and in the geography (Scotland) to which the data relate. The 
instrument used therefore is one of the 'naturally' occurring cross-sectional variables 
contained in the SHS dataset. 
Rural/urban classification of the household is used as an instrument, because 
57 The eight rural urban classifications are: (1) Large urban areas; (2) Other urban; (3) 
Small accessible towns; (4) Small remote towns; (5) Very remote small towns; (6) 
Accessible rural; (7) Remote rural; (8) Very remote rural. Peripheral areas in this study 
have been defined as remote or very remote (see Figure 1.2). 
58 In the context of simultaneous-equation models the jointly dependent variables are 
called endogenous variables and the variables that are either truly non-stochastic or 
can be so regarded are called exogenous variables. In a simultaneous equation 
model, endogenous variables can therefore appear on the right hand side of the 
equation estimated. This is the case for the model estimated here. 
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commuting costs are dependent on the geography of the location the worker resides in. 
If the area is sparsely populated (e.g. rural) invariably distances between origins and 
destinations are long. If an area is densely populated (e.g. urban) distances are short. 
There is also no reason to expect that preference for a rural or urban environment to be 
correlated with income. It might be argued that an educated household with high 
earning potential may locate in a large city to be close to the arts, but a counter 
argument would run that an educated household would desire the tranquillity of a rural 
environment. At lower income and educational levels preferences will be just as mixed. 
There will be those that prefer to be close to lots of different shops and pubs, and there 
will be those that like clean air. Unfortunately in natural data such as the SHS 
preferences are unobserved, only choices are observed. In the SHS the choice that is 
observed is the environment of the residence (Le. the eight categories of residential 
rural/urban classification given to the household). These give a good indication of 
preferences for a rural/urban environment. As can be seen in Table 8.3 each area has 
close to 20% of each income quintile in its area. This is reflective of the fact that 
preferences for household location are not dependent on income. Two small trends 
are however visible. Large urban areas have lower number of low income earners and 
higher number of high income earners, whilst very remote small towns have the 
opposite trend. These trends are attributed to the fact that industry and productivity 
has a spatial dimension. For example, jobs in the financial sector (which pay more) are 
in urban areas, whilst jobs in agriculture (which pay less) are in rural areas. Jobs in 
productive agglomerations are also likely to be in large urban areas. By controlling for 
the industry classification characteristics of a job and also workplace location the 
instruments should then be uncorrelated with the remaining error term in the IV 
equation. 
The validity of the chosen instrument can be assessed by the results from the first 
stage linear regressions and the Sargan test as summarised in Table 8.4. In all 
instances the Sargan test accepts the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, 
that is they are independent of the error term. The Sargan test is a weak test, In the 
sense that acceptance of its null hypothesis does not constitute a valid IV estimation, 
though rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence of a poor performing IV regression. 
This is because weak instruments, that is instruments that are only weakly correlated 
with the endogenous variable (in this instance commuting costs), can pass the Sargan 
test. If instruments are weak the sampling distributions of the IV statistics are non-
normal and the resulting IV point estimates, hypothesis tests and confidence intervals 
become unreliable. There is no robust statistical test for weak instruments, though a 
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rule of thumb proposed by Stock, Wright and Yoga (2002) is that the F-statistic from 
the 1st stage regression should be large. If it is small, less than 10 they suggest, then 
the instruments should be considered weak. As can be seen from Table 8.4 the 1st 
stage F-statistic is just greater than 10 for four of the models, but less than 10 for three 
of the models. The instruments therefore appear borderline acceptable - they are not 
categorically weak, but neither are they strong. 
Table 8.3 : Income qulntiles by rural/area area type 
Income qulntile 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
(lowest) (highest) 
Instruments for whole area and central areas 
1. Large urbc;m areas 18% 19% 21% 22% 22% 100% 
2. Other urban 20% 21% 21% 21% 18% 100% 
Rest 22% 20% 19% 18% 20% 100% 
Scotland 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 
Instruments for central areas 
1. Large urban areas 18% 19% 20% 21% 21% 100% 
2. Other urban 21% 21% 20% 21% 17% 100% 
Rest 22% 20% 19% 18% 21% 100% 
Central area 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 
Instruments for peripheral areas 
1. Remote small towns 22% 16% 22% 18% 22% 100% 
2. Very remote small 
towns 18% 21 % 24% 20% 17% 100% 
Rest 20% 20% 18% 20% 21% 100% 
Peripheral area 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 100% 
Results for a limited number of variables from the IV regression are presented in Table 
8.4. The full regression results and results for men and women by region and socio-
economic class are contained in Appendix E along with the the first stage regressions. 
As can be seen from Table 8.4 the rate of compensation for commuting costs is 
significantly different from zero for four of the models and not significantly different from 
zero for three of the models - the peripheral model, the 'other' occupation model (i.e. 
workers with low skills) and the female model. The latter group of models reflect those 
who a priori are expected to face thin labour markets due to reasons of geography or 
lack of mobility due to familial constraints or inability to move house. 
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Table 8.4 FUll-time employees' earnings function - instrumental variables estimation 
-Men and women Men Women 
-
\ - All - - - - Central Peripheral Managers, Other (m) (n) , \ -
(h) (I) (j) professionals occupations 
I technical (I) 
I occupations 
.. 
- - -
. _. . .~ 
(k) 
- . ~ -
IV Regression 
Generalised cost of one-way 7.042 (3.44) 8.107 (3.33) -7.429 (-0.49) 9.667 (3.65) 1.333 (0.55) 11 .22 (3.37) -1.077 (-0.41) commute (pence) 
Potential experience (yrs) 443.7 (9.88) 467.5 (10.00) 385.1 (3.13) 747.7 (9.73) 245.0 (5.86) 519.1 (7.86) 353.1 (6.34) 
Potential experience squared 
(yrs2/1000) -7,246 (-8.36) -7,729 (-8.55) -6,095 (-2.71) -11,957 (-7.56) -4 ,147 (-4.68) -8,605 (-6.87) -5,834 (-5.41) 
School certificate or no 
-1,808 (-8.08) -1 ,900 (-7.37) -1,478 (-2.36) -3,189 (-5.3) -1 ,550 (-6.67) -1 ,586 (-4.83) -2,203 (-10.31) qualification (dummy variable) 
Degree or higher (dummy 2,622 (8.55) 2,828 (10.12) 989 (1.06) 2,742 (7.82) 2,330 (4.16) 2,605 (4.65) 2,803 (8.38) variable) 
Female (dummy variable) -4,686 (-11.94) -4,517 (-10.51) -4,829 (-5.64) -4,557 (-12.81) -1,440 (-1.45) -(-) -(-) 
Constant 12,111 (16.81) 11,307 (14.1) 13,994 (15.13) 6,943 (7.24) 9,804 (10.61) 9,887 (9.56) 11 ,077 (9.94) 
Sample size 4,417 3,805 528 1,865 2,552 2,520 1,897 
R-squared 0.415 0.402 0.462 0.282 0.282 0.343 0.445 
Wu-Hausman test (p-value) 0.028 0.009 0.137 0.028 0.748 0.001 0.246 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.236 0.124 0.350 0.340 0.484 0.14 0.549 
Number of instruments 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1 st stage regression 
R-squared 0.129 0.123 0.165 0.146 0.104 0.145 0.147 
F-test on instruments (F2.sarJ1lIe 10.42 10.78 11 .32 6.27 8.43 10.70 6.61 
size) 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual eamed income net of deductions (£). Dependent variable in 1st stage regression is commuting cost. T-statistics (in 
parentheses) based on robust standard errors adjusted for spatial correlation in residuals by clustering on local authority of workplace. T-stat>2.58 indicates 
coefficient is significantly different from zero at <1 %, T -stat >1.96 at <5% level (two tailed t-test). Instruments are dummy variables for large urban areas 
(population>125,000) and urban areas (population> 10,000) except for Peripheral model - where instruments are dummy variables for remote small towns and 
very remote small towns (population> 3,000). Models also include dummy variables for occupation (9), industrial sector (16), temporary job, size of workplace 
and local authority of workplace (33). Estimated using STATA9 econometric software. 
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The IV estimation is preferred for all the models estimated despite the Wu-Hausman 
test suggesting that for three models the OLS models are sufficient. This is because 
there is a systematic relationship between the role of commuting costs in the earnings 
function and the results of the Wu-Hausman test for exogeneity. For the models in 
which the Wu-Hausman test indicates commuting costs are endogenous to income (p-
valuesO.05) the coefficient on commuting costs is significant (at less than the 1 % level). 
Where the Wu-Hausman test indicates commuting costs are exogenous to income (p-
value>0.05) the coefficient on commuting costs is not significant. A classic 
interpretation of acceptance of the null hypothesis (variable exogeneity) in the Wu-
Hausman test is that an OLS estimation would not have a deleterious effect on the 
model and is therefore preferred on grounds of efficiency. However, for the labour 
market segments where the null hypothesis is accepted (women, low-skilled and 
peripheral areas) commuting costs have no explanatory power. It is for this reason that 
the Wu-Hausman test accepts the null hypothesis, rather than a lack of endogeneity 
between commuting costs and income. Where commuting costs appear in an earnings 
function (men, highly skilled and central areas) they are clearly endogenous. The IV 
estimation is therefore preferred for all market segments. 
Aside from the insignificance of the role of commuting costs in explaining earnings for 
those in peripheral regions, for women, and those in low skilled occupations the other 
clear difference with the OLS results is that the coefficient on commuting costs, where 
significant, has increased significantly with an IV estimation. A 1 P increase in one-way 
commuting costs is associated with a £7.02 increase in annual earnings (after 
deductions) across the whole sample, an £8.11 increase in central areas and £11.22 
for men. Comparing the rate of compensation for commuting costs with that required 
for exact compensation (see Table 8.5) indicates that, for each of the four labour 
market segments in which the rate is significant, it is larger than that required for exact 
compensation. Statistically however we only accept the hypothesis of over 
compensation for one of these segments - the male model. 
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Table 8.5: Compensation for commuting costs - IV estimation 
Model Estimated mean annual compensation for 1 p Mean level of T -stat of difference 
change in one-way commuting costs (£ per compensation between mean 
annum) compensation received 
. 
and mean of that needed 
Received Required for full 
... 
compensation 
Men and All regions 7.04 4.75 148.2% -1.07 
women Central regions 8.11 4.75 170.6% -1.33 
Peripheral regions -7.43 4.75 -156.4% 0.80 
Managers, 
professionals and 9.67 4.75 203.5% -1.80 technical 
occupations 
Other occupations 1.33 4.75 28.0% 1.35 
Men 11.22 4.80 233.7% -2.35 
Women -1.08 4.67 -23.1 % 2.28 
Notes: The t-statistic is calculated assuming that the covariance between the two distributions is zero. T-stat>2.58 indicates level of compensation is 
significantly different from 100% at <1 %, >1 .96 at <5% level (two tailed t-test). 
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For the other three models the point estimates of the rate of compensation are either 
negative (the peripheral and female models) or just above zero (the 'other' occupations 
model). Clearly these models predict under compensation. As mentioned earlier the 
rate of compensation for each of these models is not significantly different from zero, 
however, only one of the models (the female) has a rate that is significantly different 
from full compensation. That is only the female model statistically demonstrates a rate 
of compensation below full compensation. The standard errors of the point estimates 
are too large therefore to reject either the hypothesis of zero compensation or full 
compensation for the peripheral model and the other occupations model. The results 
of these different hypothesis tests are summarised in Table B.6. 
Table 8.6: Full and zero rate of compensation hypothesis testing 
Model Rate of Hypothesis: Hypothesis: 
compensation HO:Full HO: Zero 
(point estimate) compensation compensation 
(e.g. 0=4.75 (I.e. 0=0) 
II for both 
genders) 
Men All regions Over- Accept Reject 
and compensation 
women Over-Central regions compensation Accept Reject 
Peripheral regions Negative Accept Accept compensation 
Managers, Over-
professionals and compensation Accept Reject 
technical occupations 
Other occupations Under- Accept Accept compensation 
Men Over- Reject Reject compensation 
Women Negative Reject Accept compensation 
8.6 Discussion 
The picture presented by the IV model estimations regarding the rate of compensation 
is less than clear. There are a number of reasons for this: weak· instruments is one, but 
possibly some of the models are mis-specified. Taking each model in turn. 
The peripheral model (column (j) in Table 8.4) has acceptable 1st stage regression 
statistics, so the estimates can be considered reliable, though the instruments are not 
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strong. Surprisingly, the rate of compensation is on average negative, though there is 
a lot of uncertainty in the estimate with the t-statistic indicating that there is only a 34% 
chance that the value is significantly different from zero (i.e. there is a 66% chance of 
positive compensation). Examination of the rate of compensation in peripheral areas 
by gender indicates that the negative rate is primarily driven by women, as men receive 
a rate that is negative but very close to zero (see Tables E and F in Appendix E). The 
1 st stage regression for men in peripheral areas also produces acceptable Sargan and 
F-statistics. Whilst the data suggest that zero compensation is the most likely 
hypothesis it is worth exploring whether a negative rate of compensation is plausible. 
The implication of a negative rate of compensation is that some workers have a job 
which pays a lower wage and has a longer commute than an identical job that is closer 
to home. This might seem irrational at face value, but the plausibility of the result can 
be illustrated with an example. Workers might accept a lower paying job with a longer 
commute if for example there were no opportunities for other employment and/or on 
the job search is more effective than off the job search (that is firms are more likely to 
employ those in employment than those out of work). A characteristic of job search 
models is that if on the job search is more effective than off the job search workers will 
accept a wage that is below the 'unemployed' payoff (Rogerson, Shimer and Wright, 
2005). This can lead to the wage gross of commuting costs decreasing in the 
commute. The lack of precision in the estimate of the rate of compensation is a 
weakness of the peripheral model that ideally stronger instruments would have 
addressed, but there is no reason to consider the result of the peripheral model 
unreliable. 
The whole study area model, the central area model, the high skilled occupation model 
and the male model (columns (h), (i), (k) and (m) in Table 8.4) all predict rates of 
compensation that exceed the commuting costs incurred. This seems unrealistic. The 
IV estimates are also higher than the OLS estimates. This runs counter to the bias that 
endogeneity between income and commuting costs would be expected to induce. The 
overly high rate of compensation found cannot be purely attributed to weak 
instruments, as only one of the models, the high skilled occupation model, has 151 stage 
regression statistics that are indicative of weak instruments. Neither can it be attributed 
to measurement error - in the sense that the SHS contains insufficient data on job 
descriptions to distinguish between the very high paying jobs held by high skilled 
workers. This is because the problem is evident in all four models, not just that 
associated with high skilled workers. It is for this reason that the model for these socio-
economic segments may be mis-specified. The urban economic literature would 
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suggest an alternative specification as set out in Equation 8.4 earlier in the chapter. 
Unfortunately the lowest level of geographic detail available in the data is the local 
authority level. This is too coarse a level to re-specify the earnings function to test the 
urban economic hypotheses regarding the rate of compensation via the wage for 
commuting. For example the lowest level of disaggregation for Scotland's four main 
cities is the cities themselves. It is also difficult to predict the bias that this mis-
specification has on the rate of compensation in the estimated earnings function due to 
correlations with the workplace dummy variables (see Timothy and Wheaton, 2001). 
The evidence from the IV estimation and urban economic theory cast sufficient doubt 
on the results for the models containing city workers for these models (and the 
corresponding OLS models) to be considered unreliable. The fact that in peripheral 
areas workers and firms are much more evenly spread through space means that the 
concerns regarding the validity of the estimated earnings function are not pertinent to 
the peripheral model. It is interesting to note that whilst the scale of the IV estimates 
for the rate of compensation for commuting is large enough to raise questions over 
their validity this is not the case for the OLS estimates. The criticisms associated with 
these models are also pertinent to Rouwnendal and van Ommeren (2007) and 
Manning (2003b) as they use a model specification as in Equation 8.3 (a job search 
specification) to estimate an earnings function for the Netherlands and the UK 
respectively rather than the urban economic specification as in Equation 8.4. 
The two remaining models, the female model and the low skilled occupations model 
suggest a low rate of compensation or negative rate of compensation. Neither rate of 
compensation is significantly different from zero. For the reasons set out earlier a 
negative rate of compensation is viewed as plausible. The low and even negative rates 
of compensation are consistent with a priori views regarding the socio-economic 
groups that face thin labour markets due to restricted mobility (and therefore 
geographic search areas). The weaknesses of these models are that the instruments 
fail the Stock, Wright and Yogo rule of thumb test, in that the 1st stage F-statistic is less 
than 10. The instruments are therefore weak and the point estimates cannot be viewed 
as reliable. The models are also estimated to data that includes city workers. 
Consequently these models can also be viewed as mis-specified. Interestingly if 
women and low skilled workers do not receive compensation for commuting costs (i.e. 
a = 0) the job search specification and the urban economics specification collapse 
down to the same model as set out in Equation 8.5 below: 
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(8.5) 
It is tempting to believe that this is what is happening in the female and low skilled 
occupation models. Further research using the urban economic model specification 
and stronger instruments is needed though to make this a firm conclusion. 
8.7 Conclusion 
To summarise, evidence from Scotland indicates that those living and working in 
peripheral areas face a wage that appears independent of the commute. This is taken 
as evidence that those in peripheral labour markets face thin labour markets and firms 
therefore have market power. Alternative hypotheses contained in the urban economic 
literature, that predict zero or partial wage compensation for the commute in perfectly 
competitive markets, are not applicable to peripheral regions as employment and 
population are dispersed. 
As such firms in peripheral areas face a rising labour supply curve, rather a perfectly 
elastic supply curve as in the competitive case. From a transport appraisal perspective 
this is important as it means that if employment expands as a consequence of a 
transport improvement, wider economic impacts will occur in the labour market. Of 
course the fact that workers in peripheral areas receive no compensation for the 
commute blocks one mechanism for expanding employment, and as discussed in 
Chapter 7 unless employment expands there will be no wider economic impact. Job 
search models identify an alternative mechanism by which employment can expand, in 
that a lowering of commuting costs increases the geographic area over which workers 
and the unemployed will search. A lowering of commuting costs can therefore expand 
employment even if workers are not compensated for their commute. The relevance of 
this to scheme appraisal is explored in the next chapter with a case study of the 
Berneray Causeway. 
This research has only partially answered the questions raised at the outset of the 
chapter. Whilst evidence for a zero rate of compensation for workers in peripheral 
regions has been found it is subject to a large degree of uncertainty. A stronger set of 
instruments would have been beneficial. Furthermore the data do not allow the 
specification of an earnings function consistent with the urban economic hypotheses of 
wage compensation for the commute. This means it is difficult to draw any conclusions 
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regarding how the rate of compensation varies between regions and workers. What 
indicators there are suggest that compensation for women and low skilled occupations 
is low (possibly zero), whilst compensation for men in central areas is higher. How 
much higher is difficult to say. Further research is needed. The key challenge for 
future research is to obtain data that contain sufficiently detailed income and 
commuting information with a large enough sample size to be able to calculate average 
commuting costs of all workers at a workplace (or small work zone). It seems unlikely 
that one of the national datasets (the LFS, the BHPS or the SHS) will ever be able to 
provide such data given the need to protect confidentiality. Future research may 
therefore need to consider commissioning surveys and analysing behaviour at 
particular firms or organisations. This combined with a good transport or traffic model 
may provide sufficient data on the commute. 
An ever present problem will be the need to account for the endogeneity between 
commuting costs and income. This research has identified the importance of the bias 
introduced by endogeneity, as apparently sensible OLS estimates show significant 
scope for change under an IV estimation. This bias can also be counter-intuitive 
thereby indicating model mis-specification. The need for strong instruments may well 
mean that future research has to wait until a large exogenous change in transport 
prices occurs in one region or area but not in another. Given sticky wages in a 
downward direction this change probably needs to be an increase in price. A good 
instrument might therefore be the implementation of a congestion charge if 
implemented in one city but not in any other city. It is also left for future research the 
task of describing the actual size of the wedge between the marginal product of labour 
and the wage between peripheral and central areas. 
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9 AN APPRAISAL CASE STUDY 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the different thoughts, arguments and findings of the 
earlier chapters into a single case study. The previous chapters have argued that there 
are theoretical grounds for including scheduling costs, the risk premium and wider 
economic benefits in an economic appraisal. Evidence has also been presented, some 
of it surveyed as part of this research, demonstrating the existence of statistically 
significant welfare costs for these benefit categories in sparse networks and peripheral 
regions. These arguments however do not demonstrate that scheduling costs, the risk 
premium and wider economic benefits give rise to a significant proportion of the total 
economic impact of a transport project. Such a demonstration can only be undertaken 
through a comparison with user benefits using a realistic case study. The contribution 
of this chapter is therefore to make this comparison. In doing so it not only highlights 
the relevance of the research to a real transport intervention but identifies the areas 
where further research is needed. The case study, the Berneray Causeway and the 
Sound of Harris ferry appraised ex-ante by Halcrow Fox (Halcrow Fox, 1996)59, has 
been chosen as each of the issues researched, scheduling costs, the risk premium and 
wider economic benefits, is relevant. 
The Berneray Causeway, which opened in April 1999 at a capital cost of £6.6 million, is 
just less than 1 km in length and is free to use (Le. there is no tOil). As illustrated in 
Figure 9.1 the causeway replaced the Berneray ferry (between Berneray and North 
Uist) and shortened the Sound of Harris ferry crossing between Harris and North Uist. 
The shorter crossing for the Sound of Harris ferry was expected to lead to an increase 
in service frequency in the summer (to two hourly). As is standard the economic 
impacts included in the ex-ante appraisal were: 
• travel time savings for users of the Berneray and the Sound of Harris ferries; 
• vehicle operating cost increases due to the increased distance spent driving 
(equivalent to the length of the causeway and access roads); and 
59 It should be noted that this case study uses the ex-ante data developed by Halcrow 
Fox including traffic forecasts, journey purpose proportions and expected time savings. 
It does not use ex-post data on actual traffic volumes, or Sound of Harris ferry realised 
time savings and ferry frequency. In comparison to the ex-ante data traffic volumes are 
higher than expected, but the Sound of Harris ferry time savings and frequency 
increases are lower than expected. 
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• ferry fare savings for users of the Berneray ferry who no longer have to pay to 
cross between North Uist and Berneray. 
The ex-ante appraisal also included ferry operating cost and capital cost calculations, 
which when combined with the above user benefit calculations gives an estimate of the 
total economic impact of constructing the causeway and altering the operation of the 
Sound of Harris ferry. 
Figure 9.1: Berneray Causeway and Sound of Harris ferry: Do Minimum and Do 
Something 
DO MINIMUM 
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North Uist 
DO SOMETHING 
Source: Halcrow (1996, Figure 1.3) 
The proposition made in this thesis is that an economic impact appraisal based on time 
and cost savings and capital and maintenance costs will understate the true economic 
impact of a transport intervention by excluding scheduling costs, changes in the risk 
premium (or option value) and wider economic impacts. Each of these 'additional' 
impacts is considered in this chapter and quantified where possible. The comparison is 
made for the first full year of operation (2000) and, for ease of comparison, has been 
undertaken in the price base of the original ex-ante appraisal. That is prices are 1996 
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resource prices at year 2000 values. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the benchmark ex-ante appraisal undertaken by 
Halcrow Fox is summarised in Section 2, whilst Section 3 considers the benefits that 
arise as a consequence of a reduction scheduling costs, and Section 4 the benefits that 
occur as a consequence of a change in the risk premium. Wider economic impacts are 
considered in Section 5. The overall economic impact of widening the scope of the 
appraisal is set out in the final section, Section 6, along with recommendations for 
enhancing the evidence base. 
9.2 The benchmark case 
The Do Something delivers the following benefits compared to the Do Minimum 
(Halcrow Fox, 1996 p.4 Table 2.4): 
Berneray traffic 
• a time saving of 12 minutes and the elimination of queuing time; 
• a fare saving of 48p per passenger and £1 .92 per car (for residents) and 75p 
per passenger and £2.60 per car (non-resident) 
• no net vehicle operating cost saving. 
Sound of Harris ferry traffic 
• a time saving of 16 minutes and no change in queuing time; 
• no fare saving; and 
• increase in vehicle operating costs associated with increased causeway length 
and access roads on North Uist (0.9km) 
In the opening year (2000) this delivers a single year's user benefits of £200,000, of 
which just over 60% come from traffic to/from Berneray and the remaining 40% comes 
from traffic using the Sound of Harris ferry (see Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 User benefits by market segment, Year 2000 (£ 1996 resource prices) 
Berneray Sound Total 
Traffic of Harris traffic 
traffic 
Time savings 51,000 80,000 131,000 
Fare savings 75,000 0 75,000 
voe savings 0 -6,000 -6,000 
Total 126,000 74,000 200,000 
Source: Halcrow Fox (1996, Table 2.5) 
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9.3 Scheduling costs 
Scheduling costs are the costs imposed on activity scheduling by the existence of 
transport constraints. When these are confounded with use costs (e.g . queuing time or 
interchange time) the confounded value is sometimes known as inconvenience costs 
(Brathen and Hervik, 1997). The headway and operating hour constraints that give rise 
to scheduling costs in this case study are as follows: 
Berneray traffic 
• The Berneray ferry had an average headway over the year of 89 minutes. This 
reduces to zero with the construction of the causeway; and 
• The ferry had an average operating day of 12 hours, whilst the causeway is 
available for 24 hours. 
Sound of Harris traffic 
• In May, June, July and August the Sound of Harris ferry had an average 
headway of 3hrs 45mins. This reduces to 2 hrs with the service re-cast after 
construction of the causeway. 62% of the ferry's annual demand occurs in 
these four months; 
• In April and September the Sound of Harris ferry had an average headway of 
3hrs 13mins. This also reduces to 2 hrs with the service re-cast. 18% of the 
ferry's annual demand occurs in these two months; 
• There is no change to the ferry timetable in the winter months; and 
• There is no change to the operating hours of the ferry. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present values of headway and operating hours derived from 
travellers undertaking long distance journeys and from householders making short 
distance trips. The results presented in Chapter 5 are pertinent to the Sound of Harris 
ferry traffic, whilst those in Chapter 6 are pertinent to the Berneray traffic. The 
valuations presented in these chapters are in 2005 perceived prices and as a 
consequence need to be converted to 1996 resource prices in 2000 values for use in 
the case study. This is undertaken using the procedures set out in the Department for 
Transport's guidance on values of time and vehicle operating costs (OfT, 2007b). 
Table 9.2 presents the sources for the marginal values used in the case study. As can 
be seen from this table the surveys presented in Chapters 5 and 6 do not cover all the 
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market segments affected by the transport intervention. Marginal values for those 
Table 9.2 Marginal values for scheduling costs used in case study 
Marginal Values used in case study 
values 
available from 
research 
Berneray Traffic 
Resident Derived from fixed link stated preference 
Non-work Yes game. These are annual values per household . See Table 6.25 in Chapter 6. The 
values need adjusting to resource prices. 
Assumed zero. The fixed link stated 
preference game only surveyed household 
trips and not business trips . The estimates 
Work --- from the local ferry stated preference game 
and the inter-island stated preference game 
are not appropriate for high frequency local 
business trips . 
Non-resident Derived from the local ferry stated preference 
game (see Table 6.24 in Chapter 6) . These 
Non-work values relate to non-work trips made by 
residents . They are taken as a best estimate 
of non-resident values. As non-work values 
they are also assumed to be a conservative 
estimate of business/work and commercial 
Work 
vehicle values. The values are adjusted in two 
--- ways: 
(i) to resource prices; 
(ii) to reflect the fact that non-residents will not 
value high frequencies and long operating 
Commercial days in the way that residents do. It is 
vehicle assumed that non-residents attach no value to 
headways less than 30 mins and operating 
hours longer than 6am to 11pm. 
Sound of Harris traffic 
Resident Non-work Yes Derived from inter-island ferry stated 
preference game (see Table 5.12 in Chapter 
Work Yes 5). Non-work trips have resource price 
correction applied . 
Commercial As resident work 
vehicle ---
Non-resident Non-work Yes Derived from inter-island ferry stated 
preference game (see Table 5.12 in Chapter 
Work Yes 5) . Non-work trips have resource price 
correction applied. 
Commercial As non-resident work 
vehicle ---
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market segments not included in the surveys have been transferred from the data that 
is available. Clearly to undertake a complete appraisal there remains an evidence gap. 
This is most acute for non-residents making short/local trips (both business and non-
work trips), for residents making short/local business trips and for commercial vehicles 
making both long distance and short distance trips. 
Table 9.3 presents the additional value that scheduling costs add to the appraisal of the 
Berneray causeway and the Sound of Harris ferry. As can be seen from the first 
column of this table, the benefits to Berneray traffic are substantial relative to the 
traditional elements of user benefit - the scheduling benefits are just under 50% of user 
benefits (comparing the first columns of Table 9.1 and Table 9.3). The scheduling 
benefits to the Sound of Harris traffic are much smaller, despite the higher marginal 
values per trip (14% of user benefits). This arises as the change to the Sound of Harris 
service is not as large as that to the Berneray service, but also because users of the 
Sound of Harris service only value changes in headway up until headways of 3 hrs. 
The benefit is therefore driven by reductions in headway to 3hrs since, as seen in 
section 5.6, further reductions (to 2 hours) hold no value. It is interesting to note that 
the proposal to reduce headways to 2 hours was never implemented - possibly in 
recognition of the preferences of the existing customer base. 
The values of headway include both scheduling costs and use costs - the latter 
associated with queuing time at the pier. To avoid double counting , the proportion of 
time savings attributed to queuing time is deducted from the total scheduling benefits. 
This gives the portion of scheduling benefits that are additional to user benefits, as 
calculated in a standard appraisal. 
Table 9.3 Additional benefits due to scheduling costs (£ 1996 resource prices 
2000 values) 
Berneray Sound Total 
of Harris Traffic traffic traffic 
Queuing time at pier 
-£18,000 £0 -£18,000 (double counted with time savings) 
Residents £49,000 
Non-residents £31,000 £10,000 £90,000 
Total £62,000 £10,000 £72,000 
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9.4 Risk premium 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the risk premium is the maximum amount individuals would 
be willing to pay to have a certain income when currently faced with an uncertain 
income without being any worse off (in utility terms). A change in the risk premium is 
additional to transport user benefits in a cost benefit analysis. The risk premium is 
analogous to the option value - case studies for which were presented in Chapter 3. 
As presented and discussed in section 6.9 no difference in risk premium between a 
fixed link and a free 24 hour ferry with a high frequency could be identified using the 
data from the household surveys. This was surprising as it is imagined that a ferry 
would be unavailable more often than the causeway due to for example bad weather 
and mechanical failure/servicing, and as such a difference, even if small, between the 
risk premia should exist. The data collected as part of the household survey cannot 
however pick up this difference. The main reason for this is that it is felt that the 
difference in risk premia due to unavailability of the ferry in times of bad weather and 
mechanical failure (noting that a fixed link can also be unavailable in bad weather) is 
too small to detect with these surveys, possibly due to the methodology adopted. It is 
however also felt that the primary driver behind the result is that islanders do not feel 
cut-off from employment, services, leisure facilities, etc. with a high quality ferry 
service. If large risk premia exist for ferry services and fixed links this would suggest in 
the main that they are driven by operating hours and headway rather than 
infrastructure per se. To the extent that annual willingness to pay values of households 
for operating hours and headway are used in the calculation of scheduling costs (in the 
previous section) these may already include the risk premium associated with any 
change in operating hours - as also discussed in section 6.9. 
No change in risk premium is therefore attributed to the construction of the Berneray 
causeway. 
9.5 Wider economic impacts 
Chapter 7 identified three wider economic impacts that may be relevant in a peripheral 
region. These are localisation economies, imperfect competition and thin labour 
markets. As discussed in that chapter, two methods exist to incorporate the effect of 
these market failures in a transport cost benefit analysis: the partial equilibrium 
approach, as exemplified by OfT (2005), and a more sophisticated general equilibrium 
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approach using SCGE models. To date the partial equilibrium approach has been 
applied to more projects than the alternative SCGE approach - of which, as far as it 
can be ascertained, there are only two 'real' transport project examples in the literature 
(as discussed in Chapter 7). 
Conceptually the use of SCGE models is preferable as with the partial equilibrium 
approach changes induced in other sectors of the economy (the general equilibrium 
effects) are assumed to have no net social value. However, SCGE models are only in 
the infancy of their development and as such, are not widely available, with the few in 
existence typically having been developed in universities (Gunn. 2004). Furthermore 
simplifications in the representation of labour markets, labour migration, household 
behaviour, the product market, the land market and the level of industrial 
disaggregation have to be made. This and the need to interact it with a transport 
model mean that the application of a SCGE model to the appraisal of a transport 
improvement is a far from trivial task (Laird, Nellthorp and Mackie, 2005). Whilst a 
SCGE model is conceptually preferable for the modelling of the wider economic impact 
of a transport project a substantial research effort would be required to undertake such 
an exercise that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. The wider economic impacts of 
localisation economies. imperfect competition and thin labour markets are therefore 
calculated using the partial equilibrium approach. with its inherent assumption that 
impacts induced in other sectors of the economy have no net social value. 
Localisation economies 
Businesses within certain sectors cluster together as by sharing a pooled labour 
market, sharing common suppliers and utilising knowledge spillovers between firms 
they can increase productivity and reduce exposure to demand shocks. As discussed 
in Chapter 7 (Section 7.3) transport interventions can make a positive contribution to 
this clustering process and in so doing create externalities (agglomeration externalities) 
that are additional to transport user benefits. Graham (2004) identifies the Outer 
Hebrides as an area in which the fishing sector is clustered. No elasticity of 
productivity to increased employment that is significantly different from zero for the 
primary sector has been identified to date (e.g. Graham. in press). This would suggest 
that no localisation externalities would be associated with the Berneray causeway . 
. The proportion of the working population employed in the fishing sector on Berneray 
and North Uist is 21 % and 10% respectively (GROS. 2008). though the absolute 
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numbers are small - 8 people on Berneray and 38 people on North Uist. This 
comprises of about 7% of those working in the fishing sector in the Outer Hebrides. 
The main fishing industry in the Outer Hebrides is based in the Isles of Lewis and 
Harris, which between them have about 50% of those employed in the fishing sector in 
the island group. The main deep water harbour in the island group is also located on 
Lewis. As the Berneray causeway does not impact on transport costs of businesses in 
Lewis (the location of the main cluster), and the fishing sector in Berneray and North 
Uist is small, the Berneray causeway is not expected to enlarge the existing cluster. 
This view is supported by the evidence gathered by Halcrow Fox who did not identify 
any employment impacts of the Berneray causeway for businesses in the agriculture or 
fishing sectors (Halcrow Fox, 1996 Table 3.1). The Berneray causeway is not 
therefore expected to generate any wider economic impacts due to localisation 
externalities. 
Imperfect competition 
Wider economic impacts are felt in product markets with imperfect competition when a 
transport intervention leads to an expansion in output. The Department for Transport 
(OfT, 2005) estimate that this wider economic impact is equivalent to about 10% of 
business and freight user benefits, on average, in the UK. This is still an emerging 
area and as discussed in Chapter 7 this may in fact be an overestimate if producers 
are able to price discriminate. For a peripheral region where markets are isolated it 
was argued in Chapter 7 that price-cost margins are higher due to a lack of 
competition. The petrol wholesale and retail market was cited as an example of a 
sector where this occurs. This would suggest that the wider economic impact of an 
expansion of output in peripheral areas will be higher than it is in more central areas. 
Given these competing hypotheses, and in the absence of alternative evidence, the 
Department of Transport estimate is used here to calculate the wider economic impact 
of imperfect competition. 
A wider economic impact arising from imperfect competition in the product market can 
only occur if there is an expansion in output. There is only indirect evidence that such 
an expansion in output occurs as a consequence of the Berneray causeway. Halcrow 
Fox found evidence that businesses on and off Berneray expected turnover to 
increase, whilst a real cost of living reduction was also anticipated by Halcrow Fox. If 
households experience a cost of living reduction then the surplus can be used to 
purchase other goods that were not previously available (Le. expand output). The 
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saw (2004) ex-post study confirms that such a cost of living reduction did occur, as it 
finds that households through reduced transport costs and lower prices were £407 
better off per year (in 2003). 
A wider economic impact of £17,000 (1996 resource prices and 2000 values) attributed 
to imperfect competition is estimated for the first full operating year (2000). This is 10% 
of the sum of user benefits and scheduling costs accruing to businesses. 
Thin labour markets 
If the wage does not equal the marginal product of labour then changes in employment 
lead to wider economic impacts in the labour market. Once again wider economic 
impacts will only be felt if employment levels change. Halcrow Fox estimate that 
construction of the Bemeray causeway leads to a net increase of 38.5 full-time 
equivalent jobs. If the marginal product of labour therefore does not equal the wage in 
the Outer Hebrides a wider economic impact in the labour market is expected. 
If labour markets in the Outer Hebrides are thin, in the sense that there are limited job 
opportunities and vacancies only appear intermittently, job search models indicate that 
a wedge will exist between the marginal product of labour and the wage. This is 
discussed in Chapter 7 (section 7.5). Chapter 8 investigated whether a symptom of 
thin labour markets, partial or non-compensation for commuting costs, was evident in 
peripheral regions (including the Outer Hebrides). Evidence of this is found. 
To take these findings and apply them within a transport appraisal, within a partial 
equilibrium context, requires knowledge of two other important pieces of data: 
• The size of the wedge between the marginal product of labour and the wage; 
and 
• Whether the size of the wedge varies between regions. 
These data are needed because the additional surplus that is felt in the labour market 
(Area C in Figure 7.5) is a function of the gap between the wage and the marginal 
product of labour and the increase in regional employment. 
Importantly, as discussed in Chapter 7, there is only limited data on this. The best 
estimates are that wages lie 17% below the marginal product of labour (Manning, 
2003a Chapter 4), but there is no firm evidence as to how this gap varies by labour 
229 
market segment. Ideally Chapter 8 would have helped illuminate this issue, however, 
data limitations mean that the findings of the empirical work presented there are 
inconclusive regarding the rate of compensation for commuting costs outside of 
peripheral regions. The indications are that, aside from those in peripheral regions, 
women and those in low skill occupations also face thin labour markets and receive no 
compensation for the commute. In comparison it was felt that the indications were that 
men in medium and high skilled occupations face a thicker labour market. Primarily 
this is because men in medium and high skilled occupations are more mobile than 
other segments of the labour force. 
It is therefore difficult, without further research, to give more than an indicative estimate 
of the wider economic impact of additional employment. Such an indicative estimate 
can be made with the following assumptions: 
• Workers in peripheral regions, women and those of low skill levels face thin 
labour markets and receive wages 17% below their marginal product; 
• Men with medium and high skills working in a central area face thick labour 
markets and are paid their marginal product; 
• Employment does not increase at the national level. That is all the jobs created 
by the project are re-distributed from other parts of the UK; and 
• The additional jobs are re-distributed from central areas. 
This gives an estimate of the wider economic impact due to efficiency gains in thin 
labour markets for the first full operating year of £16,000 (1996 prices and 2000 
values). This is based on an assumption that 22% of the 38.5 full time equivalent jobs 
created by the causeway will be held by men in medium to high skilled occupations. 
This proportion derives from the Scottish Household Survey dataset analysed in 
Chapter 8. The estimate is also based on a median gross weekly wage in the Outer 
Hebrides for all full time employees of £445 in July 2008 (Scottish Government, 2008). 
This is equivalent to a gross weekly wage of £263 in 1996 prices and 2000 values. 
Clearly the wider economic impact estimate of £16,000 is sensitive to the gap assumed 
between the wage and the marginal product as well as the wage assumed for the 
additional jobs created. 
9.6 Conclusions 
The revised economic impact of the Berneray causeway and re-cast of the Sound of 
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Harris ferry is summarised in Table 9.4. As can be seen from this table, the inclusion 
of scheduling costs and wider economic impacts increases the overall benefit of the 
project by just over 50%. Two thirds of these additional benefits derive from scheduling 
costs. Wider economic impacts are estimated to give an economic benefit that 
comprises 17% of user benefits. If scheduling costs had been included in an appraisal 
in addition to user benefits, wider economic benefits would have added an additional 
12% to the estimated total economic impact of the project. 
Table 9.4 Benefits of the Berneray causeway and Sound of Harris ferry service 
enhancement in first full operating year (2000) 
Economic Impact 
Existing Extended 
approach scope 
User Benefits 200,000 200,000 
Scheduling costs N/A 72,000 
Risk premium N/A 0 
Localisation N/A 0 
Imperfect competition N/A 17,000 
Thin labour markets N/A 16,000 
Total 200,000 305,000 
Note: 1996 resource prices and 2000 values 
This case study and the rail case studies presented in Chapter 3 provide the final piece 
of evidence in support the hypothesis of the thesis: that standard transport cost benefit 
analysis methods significantly understate the economic impact of transport projects in 
sparse networks and peripheral regions. The proposition that wider economic impacts 
are only relevant to big projects in big cities is also refuted. Whilst existing methods 
significantly understate the economic impact of a transport project, user benefits still 
appear to form the majority of the total economic impact of the project. The missing 
benefits do not therefore appear to be of different order of magnitude to user benefits. 
The case study has also emphasised the evidence gaps identified in earlier chapters. 
In terms of scheduling costs there is a need for evidence on the values held by non-
residents making short/local trips and the values that should be attributed to 
commercial vehicles. With respect to the wider economic impacts there remains an 
evidence gap regarding the level of imperfect competition within the regional economy 
and also how the gap between the wage and the marginal product vary between 
different segments of the labour market. Furthermore, ideally the wider economic 
impacts should be modelled using a general equilibrium method that allowed second 
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order changes induced in other sectors of the economy to have value. This can be 
done with a SCGE model. Such models are not widely available and therefore their 
application will represent a significant future research effort. 
On the basis of the evidence available, it is found that the wider economic impacts in a 
peripheral region are Significant. However, in the particular case of a ferry replaced by 
a fixed link, it is more important for the appraisal to be specified to measure all relevant 
transport benefits, including those associated with activity re-scheduling, than to 
attempt to model wider economic impacts. This is because scheduling costs form two 
thirds of the missing benefits, whilst the two wider economic impacts modelled here 
only contribute a third of the missing benefits between them. Clearly for other projects, 
such as upgrades in road quality or the opening of new rail stations and strengthening 
of train services, the balance between the benefit categories will be different. 
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10 CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 The contribution ofthis thesis 
The research question addressed by this thesis is whether cost benefit analysis 
methods need to be adapted to deal with the special case of transport projects in 
sparse networks and peripheral regions. It is motivated by the fact that this geography 
is distinct from the inter-urban routes and urban areas upon which cost benefit analysis 
methods were developed. The principal distinguishing feature of the geography is a 
lack of alternatives (or choices). Route choices, mode choices and departure time 
choices are limited in sparse networks. Furthermore job opportunities for workers, 
choices between workers for firms and choice of suppliers/retailers are limited in 
peripheral regions. From the perspective of modelling the economic impact of a 
transport project, this lack of alternatives brings to a prominence a particular set of 
issues: scheduling costs, the treatment of uncertainty and the existence of wider 
economic impacts. 
This thesis has therefore brought together several different strands of the literature to 
demonstrate a theoretical argument for the inclusion of scheduling costs, uncertainty 
and wider economic benefits when modelling the economic impact of transport projects 
in sparse networks and peripheral regions. The argument draws on the literature on 
time use (Becker, 1965; Oort, 1969; De Serpa, 1971; Evans, 1972), departure time 
choice (Vickrey, 1969; Small, 1982) and activity scheduling (Winston, 1982; Wilson, 
1989) to identify that some activities can be constrained by transport constraints. This 
gives rise to the existence of scheduling costs. The argument for the inclusion of 
uncertainty in the analysis draws from the large body of literature concerned with the 
cost that uncertainty places on economic decision-makers. These costs give rise to the 
analogous concepts of the risk premium (Pratt, 1964) and option values (Weisbrod, 
1964). It has been argued that these concepts are relevant to transport networks and 
have a particular resonance to sparse networks in peripheral regions. This is because 
in these networks supply side uncertainty and demand side uncertainty exist and 
alternatives are limited. Supply side uncertainty exists as random shocks to the 
transport network reduce supply and in extreme cases completely sever supply. 
Demand side uncertainty exists as future preferences are unknown and demand side 
shocks (e.g. closure of place of work) can occur. As a consequence it is not known for 
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example where one's place of employment will be in 10 years time, nor whether one 
will need to access specialist healthcare in the next year. This uncertainty places a 
burden on economic agents, which can be reduced if the transport network is either 
more resilient to supply side shocks or for example can connect economic agents to 
more opportunities for obtaining employment. Wider economic impacts are also 
relevant to transport interventions in sparse networks and peripheral regions. In 
contrast to the other literature drawn on in this research, the literature on wider 
economic impacts of transport projects is much smaller (SACTRA, 1999; Venables and 
Gasiorek, 1999; OfT, 2005; Venables, 2007; Graham, 2007; Elhorst and Oosterhaven, 
2008; Pilegaard and Fosgerau, 2008). A significant contribution of this work has 
therefore been to bring the different strands relevant to peripheral regions together. 
The lack of alternatives in peripheral regions mean that economic agents can face 
monopolistic conditions in the supply of goods and services and have difficulty finding 
employment as labour markets are thin. Such conditions lead to prices departing from 
marginal social costs. In such conditions any expansion in output or employment as a 
result of a transport intervention will lead to additional impacts in the goods market 
and/or the labour market. Furthermore industrial clusters are evident in peripheral 
regions. If a transport intervention strengthens such a cluster an increase in 
productivity beyond that expected from a reduction in transport costs may arise as a 
result of localisation economies. This too is a wider economic impact. 
The empirical research presented in this thesis has then demonstrated that these 
effects can be quantitatively Significant. From the case studies undertaken they appear 
for public transport projects, in totality, to be of a similar order of magnitude to user 
benefits. A clear case therefore exists for widening the scope of a cost benefit analysis 
of a transport project in a sparse network and peripheral region to a model as set out in 
Figure 10.1. The additional costs that should be 'incorporated into the analysis are 
highlighted in italics. This is the main finding of the thesis. 
This conclusion is based on a series of reviews, experiments, econometric analysis 
and case studies presented in different chapters throughout the thesis and brought 
together in this chapter, the concluding chapter. The contribution of each element of 
the research is detailed in this section. Ancillary findings relevant to empirical 
investigation in the transport field in general are also presented in this section. The 
limited research previously undertaken in the field means that many of the issues 
raised warrant a much more thorough investigation than has been possible here. 
Suggested extensions to this research are therefore proposed in the second and final 
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section of this chapter. 
Figure 10.1: A revised economic identity 
Change in Changes in Change in Transport Users' Transport external 
Economic Benefit Operators' Government costs (e.g. 
= + + grants and + Benefit (Consumers' Profits indirect tax accidents, Surplus) (Producers' 
revenue pollution, Surplus) etc.} 
+ 
Change in 
scheduling costs 
Change in risk 
+ premium / option 
value 
Wider economic Wider economic Wider economic 
+ 
impact due to 
+ 
impact due to 
+ 
impact due to 
imperfect thin labour localisation 
competition markets economies 
Scheduling costs 
Scheduling costs, in a transport analysis context, are the welfare costs imposed upon 
activity scheduling by transport constraints. They arise as activities cannot be 
undertaken at the desired time, or for the desired duration in the presence of transport 
constraints. These welfare costs are additional to user benefits in a transport cost 
benefit analysis. With an emphasis on the timing and duration of activities as the 
source of the welfare cost temporally sparse networks are likely to give rise to the 
largest scheduling costs. That is networks that are sparse in terms of departure time 
choices are those in which scheduling costs will be the highest. This leads to a focus 
on public transport networks. There are of course instances where long journey times 
arising through limitations in route or mode choice will also give rise to scheduling 
costs, but in the main restrictions in departure time choices will be the primary driver to 
scheduling costs. There is a close relationship between departure time choice, 
headway and some forms of use costs, such as queuing time. Consequently surveys 
that directly elicit willingness to pay values for marginal changes in transport 
constraints (e.g. headway) will include some elements of use costs. This needs to be 
borne in mind when undertaking survey work in support of a transport cost benefit 
analysis. 
Headway and operating hours are two of the most important determinants of departure 
time constraints in public transport networks and therefore two of the most important 
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determinants of scheduling costs. An evidence gap, however, exists for long 
headways (2 hours plus) and the effect of operating hours in general, and for ferry 
services in particular - issues of particular relevance in peripheral regions of the UK. A 
contribution of this research is to start to fill that evidence gap. The surveys 
undertaken found evidence of Significant marginal values for headway and operating 
hours of a ferry service. For long distance trips the marginal value of headway was 
found to 5.1 p/min/veh-trip for headways of 3 hours or more, whilst the marginal value of 
an operating hour varies between 30.1 to 87.7p/hr/veh-trip. For local non-work trips the 
marginal value of headway varies between £2.48 and £14.01 per min/household/year, 
whilst the marginal value of an operating hour varies between £24.42 and £43.02 per 
hr/household/year. 
Evidence that marginal values depend on both the journey purpose (work and non-
work) and socio-economic characteristics of the traveller (gender, whether someone 
else pays for the ticket and trip-making characteristics) is also found. Furthermore 
evidence that the marginal values are non-linear in headway and operating hours is 
found. This is as expected and gives rise to the range of values described above. The 
marginal value of increased availability is more during the day (e.g. 87.7p/hr/veh-trip) 
than at night (e.g. 30.1 p/hr/veh-trip), when increased availability is less useful. A priori 
the marginal value of a headway minute is expected to increase the smaller the 
headway between services is. Primarily this is because the marginal value of headway 
is confounded with use costs associated with waiting time - usually one of the least 
productive uses of time. At small headways a marginal change in headway will affect 
queuing time, which it does not at long headways, as at long headways arrivals are 
planned. This leads to the expectation that the v~lue of a marginal change in headway 
will be larger at short headways than at long headways. This result is found for local 
short distance trips where the marginal value of headway is £14.01 per 
min/household/year for headways of 60 minutes or less compared to £2.48 per 
min/household/year for headways greater than 60 minutes. Interestingly it is not 
evident for long distance trips, where the oppOSite is the case. For long distance trips 
the data indicate that for headways up to 3 hours a marginal change in the headway 
has no value, whilst the marginal value of a change in headway when headways 
exceed 3 hours is found to be 5.1 p/min/veh-trip. This is attributed to the fact that when 
the trip is the major activity of the day, as it is for long distance trips, there exists a 
reasonable amount of flexibility and/or buffer time in the day's activity schedule. 
Variations in marginal valuations also occur by journey purpose with business trips and 
long distance trips having higher marginal values than short distance and non-work 
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trips. 
These findings have important implications for the economic appraisal of ferry services 
and fixed links. By applying the findings to a case study of the Berneray Causeway 
and Sound of Harris ferry scheduling costs are shown to be between 14% and 50% of 
forecast user benefits. The upper end of the range is associated with the reduction in 
scheduling costs of travellers to/from Berneray when the short ferry crossing is 
replaced with a fixed link. The lower end of the range is associated with an increase in 
frequency of the Sound of Harris ferry which serves long distance trips, for which there 
is found to be no benefit from reducing headways below 3 hours. 
A further important finding of the survey work is a substantial difference of about 50% 
between the estimated annual Marshallian consumer surplus felt by householders 
(calculated using marginal values per trip) and the surveyed willingness to pay value 
per year. This is very important in the context of an economic appraisal where it is 
standard practice to aggregate per trip marginal valuations up to an annual basis: This 
difference derives from a number of characteristics including the curvature of the 
demand curve and income effects. The first effect, the curvature of the demand curve, 
emphasises the importance of forecasting demand correctly and avoiding the 
assumption of a linear demand curve when estimating the change in consumer surplus 
in the economic appraisal. The income effect is important where the annual willingness 
to pay value calculated using marginal values per trip forms a significant percentage of 
annual income. In the geography of interest high frequency users of a new fixed link 
combined with the low household incomes typically found in peripheral regions makes 
it extremely likely that an income effect will be important. Here for example it is 
estimated that the annual Marshallian consumer surplus felt by households was 
equivalent to approximately 40% of average UK household expenditure on transport (or 
about 6% of average household expenditure), whilst household incomes are well below 
average UK levels. For this reason, when modelling the economic impacts of a 
transport project in a sparse network and a peripheral region, it is important to give due 
consideration to the curvature of the demand curve and the potential for income 
effects. 
Uncertainty 
In the presence of uncertainty, either supply side uncertainty or demand side 
uncertainty, a risk premium exists. On the supply side alternative routes and mode 
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choice are limited, whilst on the demand side employment, leisure, shopping and 
healthcare opportunities can be limited within close proximity to place of residence. 
The risk of closure of any of these facilities, including loss of employment, creates the 
demand side uncertainty. The risk premium is defined as the difference between the 
maximum willingness to pay to have a certain income when faced with an uncertain 
income without being any worse off (in utility terms). Option values are analogous to 
the risk premium for the situations where alternatives exist. Risk premia (and option 
values) are always additional to transport user benefits in a cost benefit analysis. The 
concept of the risk premium and option value is relevant to households and businesses 
reliant on a sparse network in a peripheral region due to the limited number of 
alternatives in such networks. There is no evidence on the risk premia of transport 
infrastructure and services aside from that associated with option values - which is in 
itself restricted to a handful of studies on rail and bus services. In a review of the 
evidence base on transport option values the research presented in the thesis is able 
to qualitatively reconcile the apparent wide range in empirical values on the basis of: 
survey year; mode; quality; and availability of alternatives. Case studies of rail 
proposals also demonstrated the importance of option values to rural rail projects on 
lightly trafficked lines, as are found in thinly populated peripheral regions. Option 
values are equally applicable to rail projects in more densely populated areas and on 
busy lines. However, the scale of user costs on such lines means that the inclusion of 
option values in the appraisal has only a small effect on total benefits. This is in 
contrast with the Highland case studies which demonstrated an increase in benefits of 
between 60% and 120% from the inclusion of option values. 
Survey work was undertaken to examine the size of the difference in risk premia 
between a fixed link and a ferry. Interestingly no difference could be identified. It is felt 
this arises as islanders are comfortable with the access they have to employment, 
services, leisure facilities, etc. with a high quality ferry service (in this case a half hourly 
24 hour ferry free at the point of use). That is they perceive little or no difference in 
demand side and supply side uncertainty between a fixed link and a high quality ferry 
ferry. There may of course be differences, but if such differences exist they were too 
small to detect in these surveys. This is possibly a consequence of the method 
adopted. If large risk premia exist for ferry services and fixed links this would suggest 
that, in the main, they would be driven by operating hours and headway rather than 
infrastructure per se. Thus one might expect a difference in risk premia between a 
ferry that is available for 12 hours a day with an hourly frequency and a fixed link that is 
available for 24 hours a day. 
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The applicability of scheduling costs and risk premia as sources of welfare benefit is 
not solely confined to transport projects in sparse networks and peripheral regions. 
The concepts are universally applicable to all transport projects and regions. However 
in terms of having a significant effect on an economic appraisal, scheduling costs and 
risk premia are only likely to be of relevance to the appraisal of public transport 
projects, and furthermore risk premia are only likely to be important on lightly trafficked 
parts of the network. As a consequence, aside from ferries, scheduling costs are likely 
to be applicable to the appraisal of air, rail and bus projects, but probably not road 
projects. This research identified that for services serving the long distance market 
where the trip can often form the main activity of the day there is a threshold (e.g. 
services every 3 hours) below which marginal changes in headway have limited value. 
It is imagined that such a finding would also be applicable to long distance rail, bus and 
air services involving overnight trips. This is because for these trips the journey will 
form the main activity of the day. It is also expected that risk premia would be 
applicable to air services as well as ferry, rail and bus services, though as discussed 
above if the services are busy and use costs are large then risk premia, like option 
values, may only form a small percentage of the total economic value of a transport 
project. Furthermore part of the benefits of having a public transport network resilient 
to shocks in demand or supply, including the loss of supply through natural disaster or 
terrorism, would be captured in a risk premium. 
Wider economic impacts 
Wider economic impacts are the economic impacts that occur in markets other than 
transport as a result of prices not equalling marginal social cost in these markets. The 
literature on wider economic impacts has to date focussed on large projects in big cities 
as the main incidence of where these benefits will typically be found. The conclusion of 
this research is that this focus is too narrow as sparsely populated peripheral regions 
with their isolated markets also exhibit economic conditions that mean prices do not 
equal marginal social costs in the wider economy. A review of the literature indicates 
that three wider economic impacts can be of relevance to a transport project in a 
peripheral region. These are localisation economies, imperfect competition and thin 
labour markets. Localisation economies occur when a transport project specifically 
benefits an industrial cluster of which several are noted in peripheral regions, often 
associated with the exploitation of natural resources. Imperfect competition is 
expected to be more extensive in peripheral regions due to the isolated nature of the 
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markets allowing retailers to mark prices up more than they do in more central areas. 
The petrol retailing and wholesale market is an example of a market where this occurs. 
The long distances and sparse populations lead to thin labour markets in peripheral 
areas. This increases job search costs and leads to a wedge appearing between the 
marginal product of labour and the wage. 
Evidence on each of these impacts is scarce and the argument of relevance is 
therefore also based on persuasion. For example, whilst some evidence on 
localisation economies and imperfect competition already exists there is nothing 
specific to peripheral regions. Furthermore there is no evidence suggesting that labour 
markets are thinner in peripheral regions than elsewhere in the economy. Search 
costs are one of the main factors that give rise to thin labour markets, and job search 
models suggest that in the presence of search costs commuting costs will only be 
partially compensated. One of the contributions of this thesis therefore has been to 
look for evidence of partial compensation of commuting costs for workers in peripheral 
areas. 
Wage equations estimated to data from the Scottish Household Survey indicate that 
workers in peripheral regions are not compensated through their wage for the time and 
money commuting costs they incur. In line with an economic model of job search this 
is interpreted as evidence that labour markets are thin in peripheral areas and a wedge 
exists between the marginal product of labour and the wage. Data limitations meant 
that it was not possible to ascertain a rate of compensation for workers in central areas. 
The indications. are, however, that women and those in low skilled occupations also 
face thin labour markets and receive no compensation for the commute, whilst men in 
-_.--- "-..., 
medium and higher skilled occupations face a thicker labour market. The reason that 
differences exist between the labour markets faced by different segments of the 
population is that men in medium and high skilled occupations are more mobile than 
other segments of the labour force. They have sufficient income to afford to travel, 
choose between residential locations and typically their household will re-Iocate to be 
near to their job .. It is for this reason that they have the largest choice. of jobs and face-' 
the thickest labour markets. 
It is estimated that wider economic impacts associated with imperfect competition and 
thin labour markets have an economic value that is about 17% of forecast user 
benefits. This is based on the case study of the Berneray causeway and Sound of 
Harris ferry. A 17% increase in modelled economic benefit is not as large an increase 
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as can be obtained through the inclusion of scheduling costs in a ferry appraisal or the 
inclusion of option values for rail projects but nonetheless is significant. Furthermore it 
is likely to apply to roads as well as public transport. The claim that wider economic 
impacts are only significant for large projects in big cities is therefore refuted. Wider 
economic impacts are also relevant to transport projects in peripheral regions. 
Empirical methods 
A key issue in the econometric analysis of stated preference data is the treatment of 
the distribution of marginal utilities of each attribute. The distribution of willingness to 
pay is dependent on the distributions of the marginal utilities. A weakness of current 
methods is that the distribution function is adopted a priori based on the anticipated 
shape of the distribution. In part, this is because little is known about the actual 
distribution of willingness to pay. This research by using fixed boundary values in the 
design of the stated preference questions and through the use of contingent valuation 
questions allows the researcher to have a much better understanding of the observed 
distribution of willingness to pay. For the attributes of headway and operating hours it 
is apparent that a large proportion of the observations exhibit a zero or very low 
willingness to pay. Such observations can be used to guide the researcher towards a 
preferred distribution function when estimating the model. A further area of contention 
in the literature is whether the distribution of willingness to pay can be negative. Often 
a negative willingness to pay arises as consequence of a confounding of highly 
correlated attributes - for example a willingness to pay to maintain isolation and a 
willingness to pay for travel time savings. The use of very low boundary values and 
contingent valuation questions with follow-up questions regarding zero willingness to 
pay can help in understanding the proportion of the sample with negative willingness to 
pay. For example, in the household survey in this research between 2 and 4% of 
respondents indicated a negative willingness to pay for improved connectivity to their 
island. 
The final contribution of the research is in demonstrating the endogeneity of commuting 
costs and income. This has implications both for research on the rate of compensation 
for commuting costs in the wage, but also for research on the role of income in 
determining the demand for commuting. As far as it can be ascertained no research to 
date has controlled for this endogeneity either in the derivation of wage equations or In 
the derivation of income elasticities for the demand for commuting. 
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10.2 Suggestions for further research 
The limited research previously undertaken in the field means that many of the issues 
raised warrant a much more thorough investigation than has been possible here. The 
suggestions cover the need for more evidence on each of three main sources of 
missing economic benefits for a transport project in a sparse network and peripheral 
region - namely: scheduling costs; the risk premium and option values; and wider 
economic impacts - as well as the potential for undertaking new methodological 
research. Research priorities are also identified. 
Scheduling costs 
There is a need for more evidence on scheduling costs associated with ferry services. 
For short distance trips this research focussed on non-work values for island residents, 
whilst for longer distance trips it looked at business and non-work values. There 
therefore remains an evidence gap for business and commercial vehicles making short 
distance trips, non-residents making short distance trips and commercial vehicles 
making long distance trips. The results presented in this research are also based on 
relatively small sample sizes from one geographic location. Obtaining evidence from 
other locations and from ferry services with different attributes and performing different 
roles within the transport network (e.g. linking an island to the mainland rather than just 
linking it to another island) is therefore needed. Scheduling costs are of course not just 
confined to ferry services. There remains an evidence gap across all modes, rail, bus 
and air, concerning the willingness to pay for changes in infrequent services. 
Furthermore, how such valuations vary by day of the week and hour of the day is not 
fully understood. 
Uncertainty 
A similar story is evident for option values. There exists only a handful of studies on 
transport related option values. From these it is possible to see that the range of 
potential values varies by mode, quality, availability of alternatives and access to large 
employment and service centres. This variation is important in the context of a cost 
benefit analysis, but to date there is no evidence as to the exact relationship between 
marginal changes in these characteristics and option values. Furthermore the 
evidence is confined to bus and rail values with no evidence on air values. There is 
243 
also no evidence on the values that businesses may attribute to the rail network either 
for the carriage of freight or for employees travelling on company business. Option 
values are applicable to all types of transport services not just services linking outlying 
areas to a regional centre - which are the types of services that have been studied in 
the literature. What values communities attach to mainline or 'hub' stations is also 
therefore of interest. Filling these evidence gaps will be an important contribution of 
future research. 
This research was not able to identify a difference in risk premium between a high 
quality ferry and a fixed link. This may have arisen as a consequence of the method 
adopted. An alternative method to that adopted here would be to estimate the risk 
premium associated with a fixed link and with a ferry separately. This would require 
surveys in at least two locations - one with a fixed link and another with a ferry. Such a 
method is recommended for future research, though it is more resource intensive than 
the method adopted here. The result found here can also be explained by the fact that 
the risk premium may in fact be driven by the quality of a ferry (including opening 
hours, headway and fare) rather than the existence of a ferry per sa. This is because it 
is unfettered access to employment opportunities, services and healthcare that 
probably act as the main drivers to the value the risk premium takes. Further research 
is needed to confirm this hypothesis. A risk premium is also expected to exist for any 
infrastructure that may have some uncertainty in supply. Transport systems are 
potentially vulnerable to prolonged large scale disruption due to a long term failure In a 
critical link or an important hub. Such failure may occur due to a natural disaster (e.g. 
bridges being washed out in floods, earthquakes or volcanic lava flows) or as a 
consequence of say terrorist activity. The risk premium is the economic mechanism by 
which the willingness to pay of the population to obtain a transport network resilient to 
such supply shocks can enter into a cost benefit analysis. There has however been no 
research to date on such risk premia. 
Wider economic impacts 
There remain a substantial number of new research avenues that can be explored In 
the field of the wider economic impacts of transport projects in peripheral regions. The 
research presented in this thesis was notable to satisfactorily Identify the level of 
compensation for commuting costs for workers outside of peripheral areas. In part this 
is due to the strength of the instruments used to control for the endogeneity between 
commuting costs and income, but also because the dataset was not disaggregate 
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enough to calculate average commuting costs of all workers at a workplace (or small 
work zone). The lack of an appropriate dataset means that future research will need to 
consider commissioning surveys and analysing behaviour at particular firms or 
organisations. This combined with a good transport or traffic model may provide 
sufficient data on the commute and incomes. An ever present problem for future 
research in this area will be the need to account for the endogeneity between 
commuting costs and income. The need for strong instruments means that future 
research may have to wait for a natural experiment (such as a large exogenous change 
in transport prices occurring in one region or area but not in another). A good 
instrument might be the implementation of a congestion charge if implemented in one 
city but not in any other city. 
A key difficulty when including wider economic impacts due to thin labour markets is 
the difference between the marginal product of labour and the wage and how this 
varies by region and labour market segment. There is very limited evidence on this. 
This is not due to a lack of interest in the topiC but because it is very difficult to find data 
with which an estimate of the elasticity of the labour supply curve to the firm can be 
made. This is problematic from the perspective of a transport cost benefit analysis 
trying to include wider economic impacts arising through thin labour markets. An 
alternative approach may be to model the wedge between the marginal product of 
labour and the wage via job search models implemented within a spatial computable 
general equilibrium (SCGE) model. 
This of course opens up the enormous research field of applying SCGE models to 
transport projects, of which there are very few examples in the literature. Conceptually 
SCGE models are preferable to the partial equilibrium approach to modelling wider 
economic impacts, as in the partial equilibrium approach changes in other sectors of 
the economy (the general equilibrium effects) are assumed to have no net social value. 
The scale of the task however is large as SCGE models are only in the infancy of their 
development. Some small (in the sense of the number of regions/zones) SCGE 
models in the UK exist such as the AMOS60 model in Scotland (Harrigan et al., 1991). 
The AMOS model has also been applied to small island economies (the Channel 
Islands and the Shetland Islands) as well as being used to model the UK economy. 
Given the regional trade background to SCGE models significant methodological 
development of these models is required before they can usefully be applied in a 
60 AMOS stands for A Macro-Micro Model of Scotland. 
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transport cost benefit analysis context. This can be illustrated using the AMOS model 
as an example. For example if the AMOS model was to be used to model the wider 
economic impacts of thin labour markets three particular areas stand out as requiring 
methodological development. First, as consumption in AMOS is modelled in an input-
output type system AMOS does not output changes in welfare (economic efficiency). 
Household utility functions would therefore need to be introduced to the modelling 
system. Secondly, a job search model would need to be implemented which 
endogenised wage determination, commuting costs and unemployment. Currently 
AMOS uses a macroeconomic approach to modelling the labour market, based on a 
wage curve that relates the wage rate to the level of unemployment. Future wage rates 
are determined through the use of different wage bargaining assumptions. Thirdly the 
role of transport costs within the model would need to be enhanced. In a manner 
consistent with other trade models AMOS focuses on the direct costs of transporting 
goods. This would need to be enhanced to reflect the time and other components of 
generalised cost for business travel and commuting. Clearly all this development 
represents a substantial research effort. 
Imperfect competition is an important source of wider economic impact in peripheral 
regions. There is however a notable lack of evidence on price cost margins specific to 
the remoter parts of the UK. The most disaggregate data available separates Scotland 
and Wales from the English regions but does not disaggregate further. This it has 
been argued is too coarse, as it is only the most peripheral parts of each of these 
regions that experience isolated markets with limited competition. There also remains 
the general point, that has received limited if any discussion in the transport economic 
literature, on the role of a price discriminating monopolist. If price discrimination occurs 
output will be much closer to the optimal level than it would without price discrimination, 
and the wider economic impact of transport cost reduction would therefore be smaller. 
The role of localisation economies in peripheral regions has also received limited 
attention in the literature. Localisation economies will be important for transport 
projects located in or close to specific industrial clusters. There is therefore a need to 
examine whether evidence of localisation economies can be found in certain primary 
sector industries and any associated production industries (e.g. fishing, fish processing 
and oil exploration). This may well be a problematic avenue to pursue due to the 
difficulty in obtaining an appropriate dataset. 
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Methodological 
From an economic appraisal perspective any significant difference between the 
Marshallian consumer surplus measure and the Hicksian compensating variation 
measure is very important. This is because the former measure is used to approximate 
the latter in cost benefit analysis. The research presented in this thesis identified that 
this issue is significant for this study, but was not able to resolve why the difference 
occurs as the stated preference survey was not designed with the objective of testing 
for any difference between the two measures. New data therefore needs to be 
collected. These data need to be collected in a manner that will allow the estimation of 
a model for forecasting, as well as evaluation, and for the inclusion of income effects. 
The inclusion of income effects (or budget constraints) in a discrete choice model is a 
particularly interesting research area. One of the questions that such research should 
look to answer is at what point do income effects become important, that is how large 
does the change in generalised cost have to be relative to incomes for income effects 
to produce a significant bias in annual willingness to pay estimates. The rising 
prominence of congestion charging in a policy context adds further interest to this 
research area. 
In designing a stated preference survey to examine differences in the two measures of 
annual willingness to pay care needs to be made to eliminate as far as possible 
scoping effect bias, or if scoping effect bias cannot be eliminated then it should at least 
be tested for. Scoping effect bias results from respondents having difficulty valuing the 
size of the benefit, attributing similar values to large benefits as to small benefits. This 
will involve the use of focus groups and ex-post de-briefing of respondents, as well as a 
survey designed to elicit willingness to pay for several different quantities of the good. 
An additional strategy that can be adopted, if the task is felt to be too complex for 
respondents, is to try and break it down into manageable component parts, though this 
can be quite labour intensive. 
Research priorities 
Whilst this research has focussed on the Highlands and Islands of Scotland the 
findings have implications for other peripheral regions. Within the UK this would 
include West Wales and Cornwall and, looking further afield, the remoter parts of the 
European Atlantic fringe countries. Thus this research has implications for the 
appraisal of transport projects in places including the west coast of Ireland, the north 
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and west coast of Norway, Brittany and the north west coasts of Spain and Portugal as 
well as the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. Priorities for further research within 
these areas are mode specific. For public transport networks this thesis indicates 
scheduling costs and option values are the largest 'missing' elements of benefit. These 
issues should therefore form the priority for future research efforts in public transport 
networks. Where scheduling costs and uncertainty are not important issues, such as in 
the appraisal ~f road infrastructure projects, wider economic impacts have more 
relevance as a 'missing' benefit category. That is not to say wider economic impacts 
will be larger for road investments than other forms of transport investment, it is just 
that the existing appraisal methods are more complete for road infrastructure than for 
public transport projects. Of the three different wider economic impacts identified as 
being relevant to a sparse network and peripheral region it is felt that research into thin 
labour markets is probably the most interesting and important. Research into the 
impact of thin labour markets will most likely require a considerable effort due to the 
likely need to use some form of SCGE model. 
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APPENDIX A - THEORY OF 
SCHEDULE CONSTRAINED 
ACTIVITIES 
The utility function is: 
Individuals maximise utility subject to: 
Money budget constraint: wtw + Y ;::: L c( 5 j ) + pX 
j 
Time resource constraint: T ~ tw + L t j (s j ) 
j 
Time consumption constraint: t j (5 j ) ;::: t j. (5 j ) 
Scheduling constraint: F(sj,tw,tj(Sj );w,lC, TC) = 0 
where: w = wage rate, 
y = unearned income; 
X = a single numeraire good 
p = price of numeraire good X 
T = total time 
tj = time spent in activity j 
tw = time spent at work 
ti = minimum amount of time for activity 1, where t/ ~ 0 
5J = start time of activity j 
TC = transport scheduling constraints (e.g. operating hours) 
(A1) 
IC = institutional/cultural constraints (e.g. work hours, shop opening 
hours) 
Forming the Lagrangian: 
L = U(X,tw ,t1 .... 1J,s1 .... sJ) 
+A(wtw + Y - Le{s})- pX) 
j 
+p{T-tw - Ltj(Sj» 
j 
+ L1Jj(t j {Sj )-t/ (Sj» 
j 
+ LVjF(Sj,tw,tj(Sj ):w,/C, TC) 
j 
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Differentiating and finding the conditions for a maximum when all constraints bind: 
~ = au _).p = 0 (A2) 
ax ax 
From Equation A4: 
Dividing through by A 
(A6) 
Where the left hand term is the marginal valuation of time in activity j. From this 
equation four different valuations for such time can be derived: 
(i) All constraints bind: 
aUlA, = J1 _ 1/J _!:.L aF 
at J A, A, A, at J 
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(ii) Time consumption constraints not binding: 
aUlA = J.l _ vJ aF 
atJ A A atJ 
(iii) Scheduling constraints not binding: 
aUlA, = J1_~ 
atJ A, A, 
(iv) Time consumption and scheduling constraints not binding: this is equivalent 
to the Becker model for time. 
aUlA, = J1 
atJ A, 
Re-arranging Equation A6 to form an expression for the value of the difference in the 
resource value of time and the marginal value of time spent in activity j. it can be seen 
that the marginal value of time in a non-work activity only equals the resource value of 
time if the time consumption and scheduling constraints do not bind. 
(A7) 
Using Equations A2 to AS expressions relating the manner that utility varies with each 
of the variables of interest can also be formed: 
au =).p 
ax 
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Now approximate the indirect utility function 
(AS) 
Substituting for aau . aau . au and au in (AS) 
X tw at) as) 
(A9) 
Substituting constraint (A2) into (AS) 
(A10) 
For the simple case of a single activity j - equivalent to the standard case of the work-
leisure choice: 
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(A11) 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
BLANK PAGE IN ORIGINAL 
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APPENDIX B - INTER-ISLAND FERRY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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FERRY TRAVEL SURVEY 111~ 
Institute for Transport Studies 
Dear Passenger 
Thank you for agreeing to answer this short questionnaire about your journey today. This survey is being 
undertaken by the Institute for Transport Studies at the University of Leeds as part of a research project on the 
economic value of transport services in the Highlands and Islands. The information you provide will be treated as 
confidential. 
THIS JOURNEY 
• Please Indicate which Island you are travelling from and to on today's journey. (NB For day return 
trips please Indicate the Island you are visiting before returning home). 
Barra or 
Vatersay 
Eriskay, 
South Uist, 
Benbecula, 
Grimsay, 
North Uist, or 
Berneray 
Harris, 
Lewis, 
Scalpay, or 
Great Berneray 
Mainland Other (Please 
Specify) 
From ••• 
Pie ••• tick one o o o o 
To ... 
Plea •• tick one o o o o 
• Are you on the outward or return part of your journey? 
Outward •....•.... 0 Return ..................... 0 Neither (one-way/circular journey) ....... O 
What Is the purpose of your Journey? 
Employer's Business ................ 0 Self-employed business ......................... 0 
Commuting to/from Work .......... 0 Shopping ................................................ 0 
Visiting Friends/Relatives ......... 0 Personal Business (e.g. hospital) ......... 0 
Social/Recreation ...................... 0 Holiday/Short Break ............................... 0 
Other (Please Specify) ____________ _ 
• How often do you make this journey? 
5 or more days a week ..... 0 Once a week ................... 0 Less than once a month ............ 0 
2 to 4 days a week ............ 0 1 to 3 times a month ....... 0 First time .................................... 0 
• How many other people are travelling with you as part of your group? 
None .... O Adults_ Children aged 5-15_ Children under 5_ 
• What lort of ticket does your group have? 
Single ......... 0 Saver 5 Day Return ........ 0 6 Journey ................... 0 10 Journey ....... O 
Concessionary fare ticket (OAP travel) ........... 0 Island Hopscotch ....... 0 
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How much did the ticket for your group cost? £, _____ _ Don't know .......... 0 
Who paid for your ticket? 
yourself ....................................................... 0 Employer ...................................... 0 
Family member ........................................... 0 Healthboard (NHS patient' ........... 0 
Concessionary fare ticket (OAP travel) ...... 0 
Other (Please Specify) ___________ _ 
As part of this trip will your group be spending nights away from home? 
yes .................. 0 No ........................... 0 
If yes: How many nights will you be spending away from home? ___ _ 
How much will be spent on dinner, bed and breakfast? £, _____ per night 
: e> What type of vehicle has your group got on this ferry? 
Type of vehicle Please tick one 
Car o 
Van or Light Goods Vehicle o 
Heavy Goods Vehicle o 
Motorcycle o 
Bicycle o 
None - foot passenger o 
Other (Please Specify) 
THINKING BACK TO WHEN YOU WERE PLANNING THIS JOURNEY 
Old you or a member of your group plan this journey (such as choollng which ferry •• lIIng to 
depart on)? 
Yes .................. 0 No ........................... 0 
On two days a week (except mid-May to mid-September) there Is another ferry .ervlc. b.tw •• n 
North Uist and Harris (from Lochmaddy to Tarbert). If the frequency of that •• rvlc. wllincr .... d 
and return trips from Tarbert to Lochmaddy were possible, how would you (or tho p.rlon who 
planned this journey) have chosen which ferry servlc. to us. for your CURRENT JOURNEY? 
Cheapest (ferry fare plus petrol costs or bus fares) ........................................................... 0 
Best departure times, service frequency and journey time ................................................ 0 
Mixture of cheapness, departure times, service frequency and journey time .................... 0 
G!) For the OUTWARD leg of your journey did the ferry depart at an Ideal tim. for you? 
yes .................. 0 No ........................... 0 
If no please indicate when you would Ideally have liked the ferry to have left ____ ,am/pm (del." ••• 
IIPPfOPrift'. ) 
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• For the RETURN leg of your Journey will/did the ferry depart at an Ideal time for you? 
Yes .................. 0 No ........................... 0 N/A (one-way/circular journey) ............ 0 
If no please indicate when you would ideally like the ferry to depart ___ .....;am/pm (delete as appropriate) 
If you had been able to travel at your Ideal times would you have spent the same number of nights 
away from home or more or less? 
Same ............. 0 More ................... 0 Less ...................... 0 
We would now like to know how you would react if the travel conditions were as 
described in the tables below. In each of the 8 situations presented, we would like you to 
indicate which type of ferry service you would prefer for THIS JOURNEY. If travelling on 
employer's business please bear in mind your company's travel policy. 
SITUATION 1 
Single Fare Frequency and hours of operation Choice 
(for your group) (Mon - Sat) Please tick one 
Ferry Service 1 £31.00 Every 3 hrs 40 mins 7am to 7pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700.1040.1420.1800 
Ferry Service 2 £25.00 Every hour 9am to 5pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0900. 1000. 1100 ..... etc ....• 1500. 1600 
SITUATION 2 
Single Fare Frequency and hours of operation Choice 
(for your group) (Mon - Sat) , Please tick one 
Ferry Service 1 £20.00 Every 3 hrs 30 mins 9am to 5pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0900. 1230. 1600 
Ferry Service 2 £25.00 Every 3hrs 10 mins 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600. 0910. 1220. 1530. 1840. 2200 
SITUATION 3 
Single Fare Frequency and hours of operation ' Choice' 
(for your group) (Mon. Sat) Please tick one 
Ferry Service 1 £30.00 Every hour 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600. 0700. 0800 .... etc ...• 2000. 2100. 2200 
Ferry Service 2 £25.00 Every 4 hours 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600. 1000. 1400. 1800.2200 
I 
I 
i 
J 
SITUATION 4 
Ferry Service 1 
Ferry Service 2 
J SITUATION 5 
I , 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Ferry Service 1 
Ferry Service 2 
SITUATION 6 
Ferry Service 1 
Ferry Service 2 
SITUATION 7 
Ferry Service 1 
Ferry Service 2 
SITUATION 8 
Ferry Service 1 
Ferry Service 2 
Single Fare 
(for your group) 
£20.00 
£35.00 
Single Fare 
(for your group) 
£20.00 
£20.00 
Single Fare 
(for your group) 
£20.00 
£21.00 
Single Fare 
(for your group) 
£25.00 
£40.00 
Single Fare 
(for your group) 
£25.00 
£26.00 
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Frequency and hours of operation. Choice 
(Mon. Sat) Please tick one 
Every 3 hrs 40 mins 7am to 7pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700. 1040. 1420. 1800 
Every 2 hours 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600. 0800. 1000 •.•. etc ...• 1800. 2000.2200 
Frequency and hours of operation Choice 
(Mon. Sat) Please tick one 
Every 4 hours 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600, 1000, 1400. 1800.2200 
Every 1 hr 45 mins 9am to 5pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0900,1045.1230.1415.1600 
Frequency and hours of operation Choice 
(Mon· Sat) Please tick one 
Every 4 hours 24 hours 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700.1100.1500.1900,2300.0300 
Every hour 24 hours 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700.0800. 1900, .•. etc .... 0300,0400,0500 
Frequency and hours of operation Choice 
(Mon. Sat) Please lick one 
Every 4 hours 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600. 1000. 1400. 1800.2200 
Every hour 6am to 11pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0600, 0700. 0800, ... etc .... 2000. 2100, 2200 
Frequency and hours of operation Choic. 
(Mon. Sat) Please lick one 
Every 2 hours 7am to 7pm 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700, 0900.1000.1200.1400.1600,1800 
Every 2 hours 24 hours 0 
E.g. Sailings at: 0700, 0900, 1100 .... etc .... 0100. 0300. 0500 
i 
I 
, / 
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ABOUT YOU 
• Are you male ..... 0 or female ..... O? 
In what age group do you belong? 
Less than 18 ..•................. 0 26-35 ............................... 0 
18-25 ................................. 0 36-50 ...........•................... 0 
51-65 ...................................• 0 
over 65 ............................•..... 0 
., What Is the annual Income of your household before the deduction of tax? 
We appreciate the personal nature of this question. The answer is important to understand the value people place 
on ferry services in relation to their income. All information in this questionnaire is confidential. 
Less than £10k •......•....... 0 £21 k-£35k ....................... 0 over £50k .............................. 0 
£10k-£20k ......................... 0 £36k-£50k ...•................... 0 Withheld ................................ O 
Thank you fo,. you,. assistance 
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APPENDIX C -HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
SCALPAY HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Date 
Time at start of 
interview 
1 12005 
Household surname: •••••• I ••• I •••••••••••• I ••••••••••• II •• I ••••••• I ••• 
Household address: •.•.••..••.•••...••.••..••••.••.•••.•••••..•..•.•.• 
Time at end of Interview (24hr clock) 
DECLARATION: Interview conducted by me with respondent named 
above in accordance with Instructions and MRS code of conduct. 
Signature.......................... ........ ....... Date"1 •••••••.•..••..•.•.•..•.•.• 
INTRODUCTION 
(24hr) 
Hello, I am carrying out some research for the University of Leeds on the Impact of the bridge 
tolfrom Scalpay and the value that the people of Scalpay place on it. We are interested in your 
views so that we can better understand the potential impacts of similar changes for other island 
communities. 
I hope you received the letter, we sent recently, letting you know we were planning to call. 
Would you be prepared to answer some questions now? I can assure you that what you say will 
be kept completely confidential and used only for the purpose of an overall report. 
Arrange call back if appropriate. 
Explain M.R.S. code of conduct and show the leaflet 
[show a generic copy of letter, if appropriate] 
If the respondent answers yes, then continue. If no, complete refusal sheet & withdraw 
Q1: Can I Just ask are you the householder? 
[Single response only] 
yes .............. O 
No ................ O 
GO TO SECTION A 
ENQUIRE IF THE HOUSEHOLDER IS AVAILABLE. 
IF HOUSEHOLDER IS NOT AVAILABLE, ARRANGE A TIME TO COME 
BACK, OR IF NOT POSSIBLE COMPLETE REFUSAL SHEET AND 
WITHDRAW. 
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I 
J 
I 
I ) 
I 
I 
A1 Did you or a member of your household live on the island before the bridge was 
constructed? 
[Single response only] 
yes .............. O No ...................... 0 
A2 How many cars does your household have for personal use (including the Journey to 
work)? 
[Single response only] 
No car ........ 0 One car .......... 0 Two or more cars ..... 0 
, A3 
~ I would now like to find out how many people are in the household and some Information about them particularly where they go to work or school and how many return trips they 
made across the bridge last week. I 
I Household members 
Include: Students at college/university off the island 
Off-shore workers whose home is on the island 
Exclude: 
Contract workers off-shore or on the mainland whose home is on the island 
Contract workers working on the island whose home is off the island 
Members of the armed forces who are based off the island (i.e. their base is not in the 
Western Isles). 
Relationship to interviewee, gender and age 
Use a logical approach to go through household, for example: (1) interviewee, (2) spouse, (3) children, 
(4) interviewee's or spouse's parents/grandparents, (5) others (but exclude paying guests). 
Location of jobs 
Record ISLAND rather than village, settlement or town. Record multiple jobs. Exclude jobs last 
undertaken over 12 months ago. Probe for seasonal self-employed part-time work, e.g. bed and 
breakfast and crofting. 
Note 1: location of workplace for fishermen is the port where the boat is berthed. 
Note 2: if job involves travelling record only the workplace at which the person reports for work (e.g. base 
office for businessman, or depot for lorry driver). 
Number of trips 
Record all person-trips occurring in personal time (leisure time). That is do not record any trips that form 
part of a job including self-employed (i.e. any trip for which the household member is receiving a wage 
whilst travelling). 
Take a logical and systematic approach. Take each member of the household in turn. 
If a single trip was made (with no return trip within the week), e.g. someone leaving or returning from 
working off-shore, or someone leaving or returning from holiday record '%'. 
Sum row totals and check it makes sense with the interviewee. 
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TABLEA1 
Relationship Gender Age " Location of Location of' No. of return trips across the BRIDGE made LAST WEEK (but not including trips 
, , to 
' [circle [circle workplace of workplaces of that form part of a job) " 
, interviewee MAINjob/ ,OTHER jobs " ' .' " ,,' J " , answer] 'answer] " school. ' Commute " Shopping Leisure lifts to Other Total 
(work! others " journey 
" 
' .. , . 
school) . " purposes 
Person 1 <5, 
(interviewee) N/A M/F 5-16, 16 -retired, 
Retired 
Person 2 <5, 
M/F 5-16, 16 -retired, 
Retired 
Person 3 <5, 
M/F 5-16, 
16 -retired, 
Retired 
Person 4 <5, 
M/F 5-16, 16 -retired, 
Retired 
Person 5 <5, 
M/F 5-16, 
16 -retired, 
Retired 
Person 6 <5, 
M/F 5-16, 16 -retired, 
Retired 
Total household trips 
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SECTION B - STATED PREFERENCE AND CONTINGENT VALUATION QUESTIONS 
B1. I am now going to show you a number of HYPOTHETICAL situations. 
I would like you to take you imagine the situation before the bridge was constructed but 
YOUR HOUSEHOLD could choose whether this Island was to be connected to Harris with 
a FREE ferry or with a bridge. However, as the bridge has to be constructed by the local 
council, council tax must go up to pay for it. 
In each situation I would be grateful if you could choose the transport and council tax 
option that YOUR HOUSEHOLD would most prefer. 
Emphasise if necessary that extra council tax is a household expense and stress that it is additional to 
existing household expenditure. It would not be accompanied by a corresponding increase in income 
(e.g. pensions). 
Re-assure if necessary that this is a university research project and will not affect local council tax. The 
survey is confidential and the results will be used to understand the value people place on different types 
of transport service. 
Try to get people to answer the question honestly and within the context of their household budget. 
USE GREEN CARDS. 
Card No. Option A (Ferry) Option B (Bridge) 
[For each card tick the option preferred] 
GREEN 1 o o 
GREEN 2 o o 
GREEN 3 o o 
GREEN 4 o o 
GREEN 5 o o 
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B2 I would now like to find out what the maximum amount YOUR HOUSEHOLD would be 
willing-to-pay in ADDITIONAL council tax if this Island had a free 24 hour ferry with a half 
hourly frequency, but through additional council tax contributions a bridge could be 
constructed. The Increase in council tax would fund construction of the bridge. 
How much more Council Tax would you be willing-to-pay to have a bridge constructed if it 
was to replace a free 24 hour ferry service with a half hourly frequency? 
[SHOW CARD GREEN 6] 
Once again emphasise the constraints of the household budget. If necessary re-assure regarding the 
confidential nature of the survey. 
If respondent has difficulty answering question using the iterative bidding procedure as follows: 
Would your household be willing-to-pay: 
£0.50 per week (£26 per year) ~ council tax for a bridge instead of a free 24 hr half hourly ferry? 
£1 per week (£52 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£2 per week (£104 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£3 per week (£156 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£4 per week (£208 per year) ~ council tax ..... . 
£5 per week (£260 per year) more council tax .... .. 
£6 per week (£312per year) ~ council tax ..... . 
£7 per week (£364 per year) more council tax .... .. 
£8 per week (£416 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
etc. 
[ 
...... .1 .. "" ..... ·..,.11""11. ""'_"" ......... i • "'" "'".1"'*" ... ·. . . .. . .. .. .. 
. . 
. . . 
. . ADDITIONAL COUNCIL TAX [indicate if per week or per year - tick one] 
.~~~·.'I.!ioi"".i.rA·t)4-:.;;.;..·'. 'iF -Mo' ;"'..c,,~~""'tc..-+!.!.t't ..... _~-~~.:...~~~.., ", .. "," ~. 
~ ....•..•.•..••••• Per week 0 Per year o 
B3 Why would your household not pay anymore Council Tax for a bridge? 
[READ OUT] 
A free 24 hour a day half hourly ferry service is perfectly adequate for 
IF£O GOTO 83 
ELSE GOTO 84 
this household. We don't need a bridge with such a service ........................... 0 
The household pays enough council tax as it is ............................................... 0 
Other (please state) ____________ .............................. 0 
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I 64 I would now like you to imagine a situation in which the road either side of the bridge had 
been improved at the same time that the bridge had been built. A return trip to Tarbert 
would have been 15 minutes quicker than it is today (I.e. 7.5 minutes quicker each way). 
If such a road improvement was funded through Council Tax what would be the maximum 
amount YOUR HOUSEHOLD would be willing-to-pay In ADDITIONAL council tax. 
" 
If respondent has difficulty answering question using the iterative bidding procedure as follows: 
Would your household be willing-to-pay: 
I £0.50 per week (£26 per year) for an improved road. £1 per week (£52 per year) more council tax ..... . £2 per week (£104 per year) more council tax ..... . I £3 per week (£156 per year) more council tax ..... . 
I £4 per week (£208 per year) more council tax •..... 
, 
£5 per week (£260 per year) more council tax ..... . 
£6 per week (£312per year) more council tax ..... . I £7 per week (£364 per year) .!:!JQm council tax ..... . 
I £8 per week (£416 per year) more council tax ..... . 
....... etc. 
ADDITIONAL COUNCIL TAX [indicate if per week or per year - tick one] 
.' ' ............. *,W'".e t *to# .... :l~.tt#--. I { ....... 19 ... * 
~ ................ . Per week 0 Per year o IF £0 GOTO 85 ELSE GOTO 86 
65 Why would your household not pay anymore Council Tax for an Improved road? 
[READ OUT] 
The existing road and journey time is perfectly adequate for this household ... 0 
The household pays enough council tax as it is ............................................... 0 
Other (please state} ____________ .............................. 0 
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86. I am now going to show you some more HYPOTHETICAL situations. 
This time I would like you to imagine that this island was still only connected to Harris by 
ferry. I will show you two types of ferry service, which differ In fares, frequency and hours 
of operation. 
In each situation I would be grateful If you could choose the ferry service that YOUR 
HOUSEHOLD would most prefer. 
If necessary re-assure that there are no plans to close the bridge and re-introduce a ferry. 
If queried state that we are trying to understand the value to households of different types of ferry 
service. 
Try to get people to answer the question honestly and within the context of their household budget. 
USE GREEN CARDS. 
Card No. Option A (Ferry 1) Option 8 (Ferry 2) , 
. [For each card tick the option preferred] 
GREEN 7 o o 
GREEN 8 o o 
GREEN 9 o o 
GREEN 10 o o 
I 
I 
I 
J 
I 
B7 
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I would now like to find out what the maximum amount YOUR HOUSEHOLD would be 
willing-to-pay in ADDITIONAL council tax if this island had a ferry linking It to Harris and 
that ferry service was improved. 
If the Island had a free ferry operating for 12 hrs (from 7am to 7pm) at a half hourly 
frequency, but through additional council tax contributions the service could be extended 
to 24 hrs. However to extend the hours of the ferry would require an Increase In the 
subsidy from the council, therefore Council Tax would have to go up. 
How much more Council Tax would you be willing-to-pay for such an Improvement to the 
ferry service? 
I [SHOW CARD GREEN 11] 
I 
I 
I 
Once again emphasise the constraints of the household budget. If necessary re-assure regarding the 
confidential nature of the survey. 
If respondent has difficulty answering question using the iterative bidding procedure as follows: 
Would your household be willing-to-pay: 
£0.50 per week (£26 per year) .!JJ.Q.rn council tax to extend a free 12 hr hourly ferry service to 24hrs? 
£1 per week (£52 per year) ~ council tax ..... . 
£2 per week (£104 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£3 per week (£156 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£4 per week (£208 per year) ~ council tax ..... . 
£5 per week (£260 per year) ~ council tax .... .. 
£6 per week (£312per year) .!JJ.Q.rn council tax ..... . 
£7 per week (£364 per year) .!:!!Qm council tax .... .. 
£8 per week (£416 per year) .!:!!Qm council tax ..... . 
etc. 
[
'" '""": ,",0' .... i>. ... , .. , ... ,""54"",:,"« , ..... ' *-.> .... * .. .,.no R'" .' ....... ,." ' ... ' " ......... "'''''','- w .......... 1. 
' ADDITIONAL COUNCIL TAX [Indicate If per week or per year - tick one] 
~iIIOid HP'". '$ 'tit', ·~~,v-.e.."'·,;l··&w"~~""""·1: ii·'·" ...... 4~ ... lIjJI· ... · .. ""~I ..... ' ."<a~ 
1: ................ . Per week 0 Per year o IF £0 GOTO 88 ELSE GOTO C1 
B8 Why would your household not pay anymore Council Tax to extend a free 12 hr hourly 
ferry service to 24hrs? 
[READ OUT] 
A free 12 hour a day half hourly ferry service is perfectly adequate for 
this household. . .............................................................................................. a 
The household pays enough council tax as it is ............................................... 0 
Other (please state), ____________ .............................. 0 
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SECTION C - VOLUNTARY HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION 
C1 If you don't mind, I would be grateful if you could indicate the range which approximates 
most closely to the household's Income (before tax). 
We appreciate the personal nature of this question. The answer is Important to 
understand the value people place on ferry services in relation to their income. All 
Information In this questionnaire is confidential. 
[READ OUT] 
f . Household Income [tick income range] 
Withheld ..................................... 0 
Less than £10,000 ................... 0 
£10,000 to £20,000 ..................... 0 
£21,000 to £35,000 ..................... 0 
£36,000 to £50,000 ..................... 0 
over £50,000 .............................. 0 
THIS IS THE END OF THE INTERVIEW 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND ATTENTION 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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APPENDIX D - THE SCOTTISH 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
Five years of data, relating to the years 1999 to 2003, from the SHS are used. The 
SHS is a continuous cross-sectional survey based on a sample of the general 
population in private residences in Scotland. Its aim is to provide representative 
information about the composition, characteristics and behaviours of Scottish 
households. The questionnaire is in two parts. The householder or spouse/partner of 
the householder completes the first part which deals with general household issues, 
whilst the second part of the questionnaire is completed by a random adult in the 
household. This section deals with amongst other things transport, earned income and 
employment. Importantly for this research this part of the questionnaire also includes a 
travel diary. There are approximately 15,000 households interviewed each year. The 
data files are published by the Scottish Executive and distributed by the Economic and 
Social Research Council Data Archive at the University of Essex. 
Two data files for each survey year were obtained from the data archive. The first 
contains the household and random adult variables, and the second is a trip diary (by 
journey). A representative sample was obtained by firstly manipulating and cleaning 
the travel diary information, then matching the commuting data to the household and 
random adult data. The household and random adult data Is also cleaned, before 
commuting costs are calculated. The final stage involves excluding outliers and cases 
with missing data (from the random adult data). The process Is summarised In Table 
D.1. 
The 1999-2003 SHS has data on 75,746 households, however, the sample used In the 
empirical work relates to only 4,417 full-time workers. Of this 2,520 are men and 1,937 
are women, while 528 live and work in a peripheral area and 3,805 live In a central 
area. Peripheral area cases are defined as those who both live and work more than 30 
minutes drive from a conurbation with 10,000 people or more (see Figure 1.2 In 
Chapter 1). Central area cases are defined as those who live In an urban area or 
within 30 minutes of a conurbation with 10,000 people or more. The focus Is restricted 
to full-time employees for two main reasons. The self-employed are excluded as their 
income can include a component representing a return on capital. Part-time 
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Table 0.1: Sample Size 
Step Restriction Travel Household 
Diary and random· 
. adult data file 
Travel diary 139,298 
one-way 
trips 
Step 1 Eliminate all non-commuting trips and keep commuting 24,367 
trips to/from home and workplace only 
Step 2 Eliminate trips with distance or duration missing, negative 23,527 
or zero 
Step 3 Eliminate trips with imputed distance/duration data, very 19,977 
slow (S1 km/hr slow modes; S2km/hr motorised modes) or 
high speeds (> 130km/h motorised modes) or very long 
durations (~60 mins slow modes; ~180mins motorised 
modes) 
Step 4 Convert trips to persons 11,407 
Step 5 Calculate mean distance and duration per person 11,407 
Step 6 To exclude those undertaking other activities on their 11,161 
commute eliminate trips where out and return commuting 
trips differ in distance and duration by more than 60 mins. 
Step 7 Remove trips where a fare is paid (public transport) and 9,660 
non-standard modes (e.g. horse-riding) 
Household and random adult data file 75,746 
random 
adults 
Step 8 Merge travel diary and household data file (matched by 9,660 
uniqid). Eliminate observations with no commuting data. 
Step 9 Eliminate observations where a parking charge is paid 8,666 
Step 10 Derive random adult income for 1999/2000 survey year 8,666 
Step 11 Eliminate observations which are not full-time employees 6,747 
Step 12 Eliminate observations where income is negative, zero, 6,241 
missing or imputed 
Step 13 Keep only those fully immersed in labour market 4,723 
(22 S age ~ 59 and income ~ £5,000 per annum) 
Step 14 Eliminate outlying high income observations (~£50,00O 4,704 
net of deductions) 
Step 15 Calculate commuting costs 4,704 
Step 16 Add variables for council area of workplace (matched by 4,704 
uniqid). Band 10 qualification variables into 3 bands. 
Step 17 Eliminate cases where data on one of regressors is 4,497 
missing 
Step 18 Eliminate cases where commuting costs are outliers 4,417 
«£0.05 and >£10.00 one way cornmuting costs) 
employees are excluded as the preferred income unit is annual earnings rather than 
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the hourly wage. Annual earnings offer a better link to the number of commuting trips 
than the hourly wage does, as the length of the working day will differ between 
workers. As there is significant variation between the number of days worked per week 
between different part-time workers and between part-time and full-time workers, and 
there is much less variation in the number of days worked a week between different 
full-time workers part-time workers are excluded from the sample. 
As can be seen from Table 0.1 the primary reason for the large reduction in sample 
size is the availability of commuting data - there are only just over 24,000 one-way 
commuting trips between the home and the main place of work in the travel diary. 
Restricting the data to full-time employees, excluding observations where the income 
data was imputed or missing and excluding those not fully immersed in the labour 
market are the other. main reasons that dataset then reduces down in size. Table 0.2 
and Table 0.3 demonstrate that the reduced sample, aside from including only full-time 
employees, is not selective. From Table 0.2 it can be seen that the cleaning process 
has not affected the cross-sectional characteristics of the data, though there is a 
slightly larger proportion of women in the cleaned dataset, a corresponding reduction In 
skilled tradesmen (and increase in professional occupations) and a reduction in 
salaries. As can be seen from Table 0.3 the lack of data in the SHS on public 
transport fares and car parking charges has resulted in the exclusion of almost all 
public transport trips and some car trips. This distorts the mode split of the cleaned 
data compared to the complete SHS data. However, the relative modal proportions 
between walk, car (driver and passenger), bicycle, motorcycle and works bus have not 
been affected by the data cleaning process to any significant degree. 
In line with standard practice commuting costs are calculated as a generalised cost 
using an additively separable function of time and vehicle operating costs (where 
relevant) as in the equation below. 
Commuting 
costs = 
Value of 
time * 
Journey 
time + 
Vehicle operating costs 
(car/van mode only) (0.1) 
The value of time is sourced from the most recent UK national value of time study 
(Mackie et a/., 2003 Table 22) the main recommendations of which are now embodied 
in UK demand forecasting and appraisal guidance, whilst the formulation of vehicle 
operating costs is sourced from the OfT (2007b). In the first instance values of time are 
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Table 0.2: Comparison of commuter characteristics between SHS and cleaned 
data - full-time employees only 
- SHS Cleaned 
(full-time Data 
employees) 
Gender Male 58% 57% 
Female 42% 43% 
Age 25% quartile 31 32 
Median 39 39 
75% quartile 48 48 
Occupation Managers and senior officials 14% 15% 
Professional occupations 12% 14% 
Associate professional and technical 
occupations 13% 13% 
Administrative and secretarial 
occupations 15% 14% 
Skilled trades occupations 14% 14% 
Personal service occupations 13% 12% 
Sales and customer service occupations 10% 10% 
Process, plant and machine operatives 7% 7% 
Elementary occupations 2% 2% 
Income Mean £15,613 £14,840 
(after tax 25% quartile £10,560 £10,296 
and other 
deductions) Median £14,000 £13,200 
75% quartile £18,200 £18,000 
Rural/Urban Large urban areas 34% 30% 
classification Other urban 31% 33% 
Small accessible towns 10% 10% 
Small remote towns 2% 2% 
Very remote small towns 3% 4% 
Accessible rural 12% 13% 
Remote rural 2% 2% 
Very remote rural 5% 7% 
Household Single adult 23% 27% 
type Small adult 28% 28% 
Single parent 4% 4% 
Small family 21% 23% 
Large family 8% 8% 
Large adult 13% 9% 
Older smaller 3% 1% 
Single pensioner 0% 0% 
Total 
Records 23,564 4,417 
• !O 
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Table 0.3: Comparison of commute mode split proportions between SHS and 
cleaned data - full-time employees only 
SHS usual mode used to Cleaned Data 
get to work (variable rd3) (Actual mode 
used on day of 
• travel diary -
Total Excluding variable 
fare paying malnmode_1) 
modes and 
I' parking 
charges I' 
Walking 11.3% 14.3% 12.8% 
Driver car/van 60.0% 68.7% 69.4% 
Passenger car/van 9.8% 12.4% 12.9% 
Motorcycle/moped 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 
Bicycle 1.8% 2.3% 2.4% 
School bus 0.0% 
Works bus 1.4% 1.7% 1.8% 
Ordinary (service) 
bus 10.1% 
Taxi/minicab 0.5% 
Rail 2.7% 
Underground 0.2% 
Ferry 0.2% 
Aeroplane 0.5% 
Horseriding 0.0% 
Other 1.1% 
Total records 23,564 17,524 4,417 
derived for each observation by gross household income61 and commute distance. 
These values have to be converted from 1997 prices and values to the survey year's 
prices and values using the relationship with real GOP/capita growth derived by Mackie 
et al. and data on inflation over the relevant period62 • The values of time derived by 
Mackie et al. by income and distance are not applicable to slow mode travel (walking 
and cycling). For these modes the standard value of time used in appraisal was 
61 SHS household income is net of deductions whilst Mackie et al. base values of time 
on gross household income. Net to gross salary ratio is 0.779. Source: UK National 
Accounts The Blue Book 2005 (National Statistics, 2005) 
62 Annual inflation to 1998 = 3.42% , 1999 = 1.53% , 2000 = 2.96% , 2001 = 1.76% , 
2002 = 1.67% , 2003 = 2.89%. Annual GOP growth in basic prices to 1998 = 4.1 % , 
1999 = 3.3% , 2000 = 3.7% , 2001 = 4.1% , 2002 = 5.3% , 2003 = 4.9%. Real GOP 
growth to 1998 = 0.66%,1999 = 1.74%,2000 = 0.72%,2001 = 2.30%,2002 = 3.57%, 
2003 = 1.95%. Source: Office of National Statistics (ONS) website 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk [accessed 4th May 2007] 
Real value of commuting time grows at 0.8 of the rate of real GOP/capita. Source: 
Mackie et a/. (2003); OfT (2007b). 
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doubled (Wardman, 2001; OfT, 2007b) and converted to the relevant price and value 
base. 
For drivers and passengers in cars and vans vehicle operating costs are calculated 
using the formulae used in UK transport appraisals (OfT, 2007b). This method involves 
calculating the fuel and the non-fuel element of vehicle operating cost. Both cost 
elements depend on vehicle type and speed. As the precise vehicle type used by the 
random adult is not known an average vehicle was assumed. The fuel element covers 
petrol/diesel costs, whilst the non-fuel element covers oil, tyres, vehicle maintenance 
and mileage related depreciation. It is also assumed that drivers pay all the operating 
costs of the vehicle and passengers pay none unless the survey respondent indicates 
that they are part of a car sharing scheme in which they either contribute to the cost of 
the journey or take a turn at driving. In such instances it is assumed that both the 
driver and the passenger pay half the operating costs. 
Table 0.4 sets out some descriptive statistics for the dataset. As can be seen from this 
table average commuting costs are 210 pence (one-way commute) for the sample. 
The average distance commuted is 9.0 km, whilst the average time spent commuting is 
23 minutes. These data are however heavily negatively skewed. Analysis of 
commuting costs for car drivers also indicates that time costs comprise almost half of 
total commuting costs whilst total vehicle operating costs comprise the other half. The 
fuel related component of vehicle operating costs comprises 35% (of total commuting 
costs). There are clear gender differences in both commuting behaviour and earnings 
between men and women - women earn less, commute less and incur less commuting 
costs than men. Similar differences also occur between peripheral and central areas 
with those in peripheral areas earning less, commuting less and incurring less 
commuting costs. 
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Table 0.4: Average annual income and commuting costs by gender (fu"-time 
employees) 
All Peripheral Central Men Women 
regions regions regions 
Earned income (after tax and £14,840 £14,285 £14,905 £16,018 £13,275 
deductions) 
Commute distance (km) 9.0 8.2 8.9 9.8 7.9 
Commute time (mins) 23.0 18.0 23.6 23.5 22.3 
Commuting costs (generalised 210.4 167.1 213.7 220.0 197.6 
cost) (pence) 
Sample size 4,417 528 3,805 2,520 1,897 
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Table A: Earnings Function OLS Men and women 
Men and woman 
All C.ntral Peripher.' 
Co· Std Error T·stat Co· Std Error T·. tat Co· Std Error T·stat 
efficient efficient efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 2.82 0.44 6.43 2.58 0.49 5.30 3.15 1.40 2.25 
Potential experience (yrs) 453.60 44.80 10.12 475.14 47.79 9.94 333. 19 57.6 1 578 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) ·7430.09 869.22 ·8.55 ·7884.40 932.70 -8.45 ·5220.92 1293.30 ~~ 
School certificate or no qualification ·1932.58 210.60 ·9.18 ·2043.68 241 .31 -8.47 ·11 40.57 308.55 ·370 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2849.06 266.62 10.69 3110.55 235.98 13.18 54 1.50 806.62 0.67 
Female (dummy variable) ·4761 .50 398.97 · 11 .93 ·4634.04 437.13 · 10.60 -4801 .64 850.53 ·585 
Temporary job ·1307.66 432.24 ·3.03 ·1324.97 426.35 · 3.11 -1719.32 1605.86 · 1.07 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 814.42 185.56 4.39 795.61 223.04 3.57 916.24 543.9 1 1.68 
Agriculture. hunting and forestry ·1926.79 943.13 ·2 .~ -2230.87 857.32 ·2.60 3617.14 5327.93 0.68 
Fishing ·1797.55 694.79 ·2.59 ·3003.20 545.52 ·5.51 · 1231.35 1148.87 · 1.07 
Mining and quarrying 5254.1 1 1240.31 4.24 5351 .94 1433.77 3.73 2846.78 1845.33 1.54 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and waler supply 2486.88 759.06 3.28 2121 .36 777.34 2.73 7341 .24 1432.95 5 12 
Construction 279.11 325.03 0.86 248.25 391.23 0.63 417.90 456.18 0.92 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades ·2345.90 251.40 ·9.33 ·2277.34 250.60 ·9.09 ·2777.05 509.60 ·5 45 
Hotels and restaurants -2761.33 282.63 ·9.77 ·2903.95 299.29 ·9.70 ·2226.46 948.10 ·2.35 
Transport, storage and communication ·304.77 310.52 ·0.98 ·581.54 304.62 · 1.91 1301.51 11 53.74 1.1 3 
Financial intermediation 1915.62 859.61 2.23 1812.93 877.51 2.07 5674.69 2015.06 282 
Real estate, renting and business activities · 1445.07 289.34 -4.99 ·1443.74 299.48 ·4.82 · 1455.71 1036.37 · 1.40 
Public administration and defence; 134.34 385.10 0.35 50.42 424.91 0.12 630.27 538.59 1.17 
compulsory social security 
Education · 1626.55 418.13 ·3.89 · 1531.36 477.91 ·3.20 · 18 16.97 1175.71 · 1.55 
Health and social work ·841.18 408.60 ·2.06 · 1062.36 422.03 ·2.52 1056.56 931.97 1.13 
Other community, social and personal ·2092.78 589.05 ·3.55 ·2208.70 653.86 ·3.38 · 1102.71 1444.75 -0.76 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 556.52 1230.95 0.45 755.04 1395.34 0.54 ·66.58 778.47 ·0.09 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations ·353.19 463.64 ·0.76 ·267.42 491.53 ·0.54 ·602.96 1459.19 -0.4 1 
Associate professional and technical ·2824.86 511 .83 ·5.52 ·2595.43 590.81 ~.39 ~198. 96 872.78 -48 1 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations ·7062.06 584.08 · 12.09 ·71 02.87 629.70 · 11 28 ·5105.51 1445.34 ·353 
Skilled Irades occupalions -4706.90 357.48 · 13.17 -4318.45 361.38 · 11 .95 ·7134.02 506.87 . 14 07 
Personal service occupations ·5048.79 476.56 · 10.59 -4696.15 479. 15 ·9.80 ·7581.70 1396.23 . ~ 43 
Sales and customer service occupations ·5835.32 459.59 · 12.70 ·5518.39 489.17 · 11 28 ·7608.06 973.77 ·78 1 
Process, plant and machine operatives ·6896.89 485.03 · 13.81 -6577.53 454.43 · 14.47 -86 19.26 1726.26 -499 
Elementary occupations ·6703.79 590.62 · 11 .35 ·6461.37 618.76 · 10.44 ·8524.71 960.17 -aea 
Female Managers and senior officials 
Female Professional occupations 2581.41 539.86 4.78 2402.62 622.66 3.88 2307.15 1895.43 1.22 
Female Associate professional and 3075.26 735.60 4.16 3094.85 821 .21 3.77 1960.78 1953.07 1.00 
technical occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial 3457.75 749.11 4.62 3558.36 842.01 4.23 160.11 111 8.10 0.14 
occupations 
Female Skilled trades occupations 1670.78 813.05 2.05 1412.13 983.48 1.44 2763.00 625.87 441 
Female Personal service occupations 1449.03 584.25 2.57 1216.90 627.29 1.94 2112.17 825.38 2.M 
Female Sales and customer service 1344.14 494.35 2.72 1131.61 529.12 2.14 2580.61 1018.42 2 . ~ 1 
occupations 
Female Process , plant and machine 2231.1 3 543.45 4.11 2527.57 581.73 4.34 552.80 1117.07 0.49 
operatives 
Female Elementary occupations 3313.76 903.29 3.67 3477.26 1035.78 336 123 1.39 1580.72 0.79 
Council area could not be derived -421.73 61.67 -6.84 ·376.09 62.40 -603 
Aberdeen City 1103.54 121.96 9.05 934.86 124.47 7.51 
Aberdeenshire 26.08 97.50 0.27 75.95 105.06 0.72 
Angus ·512.82 73.19 ·7.01 ·553.74 82.49 -8.71 
Argyll & Bute · 178.34 123.80 ·1 .44 621.59 214.11 2.90 2599.52 542.89 4 70 
Clackmannanshire ~5.96 85.51 -0.54 ·90.63 100.63 -0.90 
Dumfries and Galloway ·1 318.40 89.51 · 14.73 · 1160.95 99.20 · 11 .70 
Dundee City ·718.70 77.72 ·9.25 ·719.99 88.10 -8.17 
East Ayrshire ·318.57 84.70 ·3.76 · 140.32 91.38 · 1.54 
Easl Dunbartonshire ·818.95 99.35 ·8.24 ·841.65 116.34 ·7.23 
East l othian ·778.58 102.ot .7.63 ·356.00 11 1.09 ·3.20 
East Renfrewshire ·838.97 102.80 -8.16 ·893.22 112.43 ·7.94 
Edinburgh. City of 487.25 86.83 5.61 491.22 88.94 552 
Eilean Siar · 188.74 127.00 · 1.49 27 18.61 379.27 7 10 
Falkirk ·93.75 69.01 · 1.36 ·93.68 74 .35 · 1.26 
Fife -478.67 62.53 ·7.66 ~95.91 69.34 ·7.15 
Glasgow City 
Highland ·812.99 78.45 · 10.36 ·920.85 99.71 ·924 2027.61 440.07 4 55 
Inverclyde ·633.62 66.24 ·9.57 -604.52 67.52 ·895 
Midlolhian ·705.94 61.36 · 11 .51 ·710.17 63.48 · 11.19 
Moray 661.07 72.99 9.06 546.49 92.13 593 3933.27 831.20 023 
North Ayrshire 8.19 93.43 0.09 -0.68 1 00.~ -0.0 1 
North Lanarkshire · 263.11 60.24 ~.37 · 257.90 88.17 ·3 70 
Orkney Islands · 116.30 104.08 · 1.12 2751.63 681.12 4 74 
Perth & Kinross · 1643.74 72.86 ·22.62 · 1502.43 71.26 ·21 08 ·314.57 635.07 -0.49 
Renfrewshire ·223.42 53.56 ~. 17 · 165.71 55.87 
·297 
Scottish Borders · 1517.32 88.83 · 17.08 · 1454.31 93.54 · 15.55 256.97 438.14 059 
Shetland Islands 580.96 64.72 8.67 3516.09 335.53 10 40 
South Ayrshire ·568.83 57.89 ·9.83 ·444.24 64 .46 -a 89 
South Lanarkshire ·310.20 61.63 ·5.03 ·373.45 68.58 ·5.45 
Stirling 420.60 60.29 6.98 388.76 69.05 560 
Wesl Dunbartonshire 716.66 65.62 10.92 698.94 73.21 955 
Wesl Lothian 330.62 74.58 4.43 390.80 78.72 4 0e 
Constanl 13232.36 653.30 20.25 12909.54 685.07 18 ft4 12787.15 699.82 tft '1 
Sample size 44 17 3805 528 
R·sQuared 0.428 0.424 0.52 1 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual earned income net of deductions (£). Robusl standard error, reported in parentlle, I . SUlnd rd "ora Are 
adjusted for spatial correlation in the residuals by clustering on local authority or workplace. Red t·stallndlcate, coolflClent II .Igniflcantly d,"erenllrom 
zero at <1%. blue at 5% level (two tailed I-test). Estimaled using STATA9 econometric software. eon,tant relate. 10 a male employe WIth a 
qua~flCahon other than a degree wor1dng full- time as a manager or senior official in manufacturing. Has I permanent job, 'NQf1(.a In a wor~p(&ee Ye'ith 25 
or roore othe r people in Glasgow City (except Ihe Peripheral model where the constant rela te. to . workplace In Dumfrie. and Galloway). 
• 
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Table A: Earnings Function OLS Men and women (Contd) 
Man and women 
Managers, prof.ssionats and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co- Std Error T-stat Co- Std Error T-stat 
efficient efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 3.52 0.72 4.88 2.16 0.47 4.61 
Potential experience (yrs) 783.94 69.62 11 .26 244.92 41.66 5.S! 
Potential experience squared (yrs 2/1000) -12722.32 1433.93 -8.87 -4 151 .52 874.13 -4.7 
School certificate or no qualification -3333.19 555.52 -6.00 -1525.42 234.16 -6.51 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 3050.59 307.21 9.93 2275.57 491.95 4.6 
Female (dummy variable) -4646.94 357.09 -13.01 -2515.94 457.91 -5.4 
Temporary job -788.22 831 .13 -0.95 -1736.42 420.16 -4.1 
Penmanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 2Speople 
Wort< in a large wort<place .> 25 people 1179.06 426.88 2.76 609.00 177.53 3.4 
Agriculture , hunting and forestry -2595.40 3614 .00 -0.72 -1866.28 909.83 -2.05 
Fishing -2835.74 1152.33 -2.46 -365.24 817.08 -0.45 
Mining and quarrying 5953.38 1631 .28 3.65 3543.73 1212.49 2.92 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply 3864.79 1276.91 3.03 1836.20 897.78 2.05 
Construction -395.59 972.50 -0.41 371 .39 340.75 1.09 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2288.37 480.59 -4.76 -2299.38 237.44 -9.61 
Hotels and restaurants -3080.11 885.78 -3.48 -2811 .82 341 .94 -8.22 
Transport, storage and communication 468.27 909.88 0.51 -530.15 332.69 -1.59 
Financial intermediation 3426.58 1233.18 2.78 197.76 560.29 0.35 
Real estate, renting and business activities -918.18 455.41 -2.02 -1582.65 490.21 -3.2 
Public administration and defence; -289.75 695.63 -0.42 461.38 443.52 1.04 
compulsory social security 
Education -1306.19 655.94 -1.99 -2425.03 383.57 -6.32 
Health and social work 39.94 780.30 0.05 -1702.21 321.62 -5.2! 
Other community, social and personal -1858.43 867.26 -2.14 -2098.59 446.17 -4.7( 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 2154.56 2283.40 0.94 -520.89 556.76 -0.94 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -774.60 434.50 -1 .78 
Associate professional and technical -3089.48 525.84 -5.88 
occupations 
Administrati\le and secretarial occupations 
-214.97 461.83 -0.47 
Skilled trades occupations 1942.16 331 .19 5.86 
Personal service occupations 1630.37 416.15 3.92 
Sales and customer service occupations 808.83 316.43 2 .~ 
Process, plant and machine operatives 
Elementary occupations 194.19 580.24 0.33 
Female Managers and senior officials 
Female Professional occupations 2527.74 542.11 4.66 
Female Associate professional and 2668.58 795.25 3.36 
technical occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial 1269.68 611.48 2.01 
OCOJpations 
Female Skilled trades occupations -840.42 793.00 -1.06 
Female Personal service occupations 
-486.56 559.19 -0.87 
Female Sales and customer seNice 
-859.68 566.02 -1.52 
occupations 
Female Process, plant and machine 
operati\l8S 
Female Elementary occupations 1089.07 951 .17 1.14 
Council area could not be derived -1099.19 141 .65 -7.76 101 .30 73.21 1.38 
Aberdeen City 1667.04 246.73 6.76 500.82 57.91 8.65 
Aberdeenshire 387.71 223.59 1.73 144.83 98.12 1.48 
Angus -18.63 141 .77 -0.13 -688.50 100.21 -6.87 
Argyll & Bute 43.77 239.18 0.18 -243.42 99.73 -2.44 
Clackmannanshire -2161.92 151 .15 -14.30 1875.39 116.71 16.07 
Dumfries and Galloway -1703.14 195.54 -8.71 -977.78 89.64 -10.91 
Dundee City -71 2.33 119.09 -5.98 -784 .51 108.46 -7.23 
East Ayrshire -367.05 164.64 -2.23 -323.16 67.50 -4.79 
East Dunbartonshire -1536.44 307.11 -5.00 -63.72 95.90 -0.66 
East l othian -2257.05 220.66 -10.23 168.70 113.37 1.49 
East Renfrewshire -1303.59 222.76 -5.85 
-318.78 100.96 -3.16 
Edinburgh, City of 204.12 151 .35 1.35 723.40 52.83 13.69 
Eilean Siar -548.62 108.34 -5.06 
Falkirt< -132.18 184.28 -0.72 -47.13 78.50 .(l.60 
Fife -1022.75 107.39 -9.52 -148.38 79.03 -1 .88 
Glasgow City 
Highland -1592.45 138.74 -11 .48 -240.03 85.93 -2.79 
Inverclyde -488.44 197.09 -2.48 -852.82 68.44 -12.46 
Midlothian -1213.41 181.27 -6.69 -446.99 84.24 -5.31 
Moray 11 57.36 144.70 8.00 252.57 52.17 4.84 
North Ayrshire -414.88 188.90 -2.20 139.68 113.44 1.23 
North l anart<shire -1394.92 172.68 -8.08 281.59 72.16 3.90 
Orl<ney Islands -1077.77 115.36 -9.34 
Perth & Kinross -1839.28 126.08 -14.59 -1284.01 87.49 -14.68 
Renfrewshire -585.51 118.93 -4.92 67.59 81.97 0.82 
Scottish Borde rs -1518.21 224.41 -6.77 -1589.91 86.81 -18.32 
Shetland Islands 1125.87 69.49 18.20 
South Ayrshire -1289.76 158.93 -8.22 52.00 74.64 0.70 
South l anarkshire 
-1501.13 125.23 -11 .99 358.79 79.48 4.51 
Stirling 696.57 174.03 4.00 -17.79 82.73 -0.21 
West Dunbartonshire 176.10 164.57 1.07 854.43 74.85 11 .42 
West lothian 236.36 93.37 2.53 372.31 96.49 3.86 
Constant 8477.85 958.99 8.84 9419.91 543.15 17.34 
Sarnole size 1885 2552 
R-sQuared 0.31 0 0.283 
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Table B: Earnings Function OLS Men 
All 
Co- Std Error T-s tat 
efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 2.94 0.68 4.31 
Potential experience (yrs) 543.49 60.96 8.92 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) -8917.21 1201 .93 -7.42 
School certificate or no qualification -1830.89 273.55 -6.69 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 3072.45 438.37 7.01 
Temporary job -2042.52 594.89 -3.43 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace :> 25 people 11 38.83 225.62 5.05 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -2253.71 1083.62 -2.08 
Fishing -1630.79 835.75 -1.95 
Mining and quarrying 5749.67 2048.56 2.81 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply 2399.57 935.79 2.56 
Construction 248.83 355.24 0.70 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2230.19 387.74 -5.75 
Hotels and restaurants -4284.99 575.92 -7.44 
Transport, storage and communication -493.24 396.1 0 -1 .25 
Financial intermediation 2638.55 924.37 2.85 
Real estate, renting and business activities -1786.05 356.32 -5.01 
Public administration and defence; 35.30 423.31 0.08 
compulsory social security 
Education -2477.84 534.33 -4.64 
Health and social \Iw'Ork -585.91 787.36 -0.74 
Other community, social and personal -2547.48 553.47 -4.80 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 1043.69 2174.23 0.48 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -178.80 552.71 -0.32 
Associate professional and technical -2842.63 501.99 -5.66 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -7015.14 589.20 -1 1.91 
Skilled trades occupations -4616.79 365.52 -12.63 
Personal service occupations -4754.37 455.03 -10.45 
Sales and customer service occupations -5788.71 455.94 -12.70 
Process, plant and machine operatives -6612.42 498.82 -13.26 
Elementary occupations -6632.82 585.48 -11 .33 
Council a rea could nol be derived -299.52 101.26 -2.96 
Aberdeen City 1813.09 177.64 10.21 
Aberdeenshire 1021 .78 152.96 6.68 
Angus -85.85 97.12 -0.88 
Argyll & Bule 455.65 170.90 2.67 
Clackmannanshire 540.58 137.11 3.94 
Dumfries and Ga lloway -1012.30 166.95 -6.06 
Dundee City -736.72 145.55 -5.06 
East Ayrshire -305.08 129.02 -2.36 
East Dunbartonshire -779.70 136.48 -5.71 
Easl Lolhian -787.31 163.30 -4.82 
East Renfrewshire -1429.63 167.49 -8.54 
Edinburgh, City of 467.51 80.93 5.78 
Eilean Siar -951.67 193.90 -4.91 
Falkirk -16.09 102.53 -0.16 
Fife -822.08 97.47 -8.43 
Glasgow City 
Highland -865.44 104.78 -8.26 
Inverclyde -180.71 139.81 -1.29 
Midlothian -133.93 107.61 -1.24 
Moray 311 .81 119.78 2.80 
North Ayrshire 368.99 135.47 2.72 
North l anarkshire -233.43 95.75 -2.44 
Orkney Islands 20.22 147.43 0.14 
Perth & Kinross -1775.50 74.16 -23.94 
Renfrewshire -350.37 110.80 -3.16 
Scottish Borders -592.65 170.88 -3.47 
SheUand Islands 952.71 79.40 12.00 
Soulh Ayrshire -191.10 110.87 -1 .72 
South Lanarkshire -614.77 90.18 -6.82 
Stirling 171.13 114.25 1.50 
West Dunbarlonshire -284.84 136.68 -2.08 
West Lothian 467.80 110.15 4.25 
Constant 11720.50 794.62 14.75 
SarTllle size 2520 
R-sQuared 0.391 
Mon 
Central Peripheral 
Co- Std Error T-sta t Co- Std Error T-Ita t 
efficient efficient 
2.58 0.67 3.86 3.51 1.88 1.87 
582.60 63.78 9.13 216.94 150.56 1.44 
-9658.23 1300.93 -7.42 -3473.29 3055.26 -1.14 
-1981.36 322.95 -6.14 -959.37 309.95 -3.10 
3471.67 382.62 9.07 -66.82 1527.19 -0.04 
-2103.62 64 1.21 -3.28 -2971.56 965.99 -3.08 
1072.60 276.70 3.88 1766.85 643.35 2.75 
-2562.49 922.43 -2.78 4819.59 6325.74 0.76 
-3711 .13 426.54 -8.70 -954.96 1490.34 -0.64 
6128.28 2541.51 2.41 27 14.89 2486.24 1.09 
2017.43 926.25 2.18 7795.80 1209.69 6.44 
147.87 434.90 0.34 945.39 455.55 2.08 
-2075.61 384.86 -5.39 -3275.02 1222.25 -2.66 
-4186.48 624.07 -6.71 -4258.85 1978.44 -2.15 
-849.31 378.94 -2.24 1889.53 1164.26 1.62 
2468.98 936.28 2.64 11646.23 1006.15 11 .58 
-1862.57 404.73 -4.80 -1057.93 1755.01 -0.80 
43.06 445.73 0.10 184.26 690.11 0.27 
-2489.67 639.65 -3.89 -1924.94 1971 .80 -0.98 
-961.52 793.59 -1 .21 2990.83 2815.39 1.06 
-2595.87 613.47 -4.23 -923.36 1865.65 -0.49 
1005.12 2397.53 0.42 545.73 1431 .52 0.38 
-106.94 596.50 -0.18 -675.28 1713.82 -0.39 
-2570.51 577.38 -4.45 -4485.39 992.83 -4.52 
-7022.23 640.48 -10.96 -5050.10 1371.34 -3.68 
-4174.62 346.71 -12.04 -7543.32 620.12 -12.16 
-4450.56 432.00 -10.30 -7253.95 t436.80 -5.05 
-5405.45 469.86 -1 1.50 -7844.30 1087.94 -7.21 
-6427.87 435.50 -14.76 -9083.20 1781 .11 -5.10 
-6380.56 598.84 -10.65 -8304.03 1024.29 -8.11 
-168.21 100.20 -1.66 
1541.00 192.08 8.02 
976.38 142.47 6.85 
-154.57 107.23 -1.44 
731.98 291 .45 2.51 2874.09 780.31 3.68 
442.64 154.93 2.86 
-936.63 188. 17 -4.98 
-700.97 159.78 -4.39 
-66.95 145.27 -0.46 
-691.92 160.29 -4.32 
-12.81 152.04 -0.08 
-1485.25 177.56 -8.36 
503.27 83.61 6.02 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 2227.80 555.28 4.0t 
6.14 111.82 0.05 
-835.14 11 0.92 -7.53 
-1179.10 154.40 -7.64 2499.34 597.36 4.18 
-11 9.82 128.30 -0.93 
-97.76 110.47 -0.88 
279.1 0 135.80 2.06 1808.16 645.49 2.80 
374.87 136.11 2.75 
-201 .84 104 .01 -1.94 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 2798.20 689.03 4.06 
-1688.47 72.90 -23.16 -707.91 919.07 -0.77 
-211.92 124.97 -1.70 
-304.35 211.80 -1.44 673.55 476.14 1.41 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 3973.43 509.55 7.80 
-92.52 124.13 -0.75 
-723.71 93.88 -7.71 
138.56 118.12 1.17 
-282.02 147.80 -1.91 
581.38 121.23 4.80 
11197.62 774.07 14.47 13914.71 1752.93 7.94 
2150 313 
0.392 0.478 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual earned income net of deductions (£). Robust standard errors reported In parentheses. Standard errors are 
adjusted for spatial correla tion in the residua ls by cluslering on local aulhority of workplace. Red t-slal indicales coefficienl ls signiflcanUy differenl from 
zero at <1%, blue at 5% level (two taUed t-test). Estimated using STATA9 econometric software. Constant relates to a male empk>yee with a 
qualification olher Ihan a degree working ful~lime as a manager or senior official in manufacluring. Has a permanenl job, wor1<. In a workplace wilh 25 
or more other people In Glasgow City (exceptlhe Peripheral model where the constant r. lales 10 a workplace in Dumfries and Galloway). 
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Table B: Earnings Function OLS Men (Contd) 
MIn 
Manage .. , professionals and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co· Std Error T·stat Co· Std Error T·stat 
efficient efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 3.54 1.07 3.30 2.18 0.75 2.91 
Potential experience (yrs) 957 .02 98.49 9.72 332.24 59.56 5.56 
Potential experience squared (yrs211000) ·15470.92 2119.31 ·7.30 ·5695.21 1225.68 ·4.65 
School certificate or no qualification ·2783.79 845.65 ·3.29 · 1510.84 278.86 ·5.42 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 3470.36 472.71 7.34 2267.51 758.00 2.99 
Temporary job · 1959.78 1314.47 · 1.49 ·2258.90 550.56 -4.10 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 1934.50 573.21 3.37 946.77 263.03 3.6C 
Agriculture, hunting and larestry ·3073.53 4172.43 ·0.74 ·2121 .80 1041 .88 ·2.04 
Fishing · 1695.97 1760.98 ·0.96 ·267.08 849.15 ·0.31 
Mining and quarrying 6604 .53 2674.33 2.47 3357.88 1602.29 2.10 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 4445.12 1629.90 2.73 1305.98 1052.60 1.24 
Construction ·519.77 1067.55 ·0.49 378.89 374.32 1.01 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades ·2255.29 841.28 ·2.68 ·2092.21 341 .83 -6.12 
Hotels and restaurants ·6746.94 1497.98 -4.50 ·3828.22 789.19 -4 . 8~ 
Transport, storage and communication 639.42 1012.46 0.63 ·699.12 379.98 · 1.84 
Financial intermediation 4424 .18 1552.63 2.85 ·505.61 1614.15 ·0.31 
Real estate, renting and business activities ·382.65 645.94 ·0.59 ·2681 .96 578.28 -4.64 
Public administration and defence; -404.51 752.07 ·0.54 606.37 688.70 0.88 
compulsory social security 
Education ·1769.58 756.88 ·2.34 ·3246.01 714.80 -4.54 
Health and social work 1786.16 1387.82 1.29 ·3771 .95 512.18 ·7.36 
Other community, social and personal · 1557.56 979.57 · 1.59 ·2700.87 461.17 ·5.86 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 2407.08 3335.00 0.72 · 103.37 520.24 ·0.20 
Managers and senior offidals 
Professional occupations ·970.91 488.20 · 1.99 
Associate professional and technical ·3369.83 501.1 1 ·6.72 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 
Skilled trades occupations 2256.16 607.26 3.72 
Personal service occupations 2232.16 690.19 3.23 
Sales and customer service occupations 1056.27 524.86 2.01 
Process, plant and machine oper~tjves 379.51 532.59 0.71 
Elementary occupations 614.95 763.30 0.81 
Council area could not be derived · 1232.09 234.90 ·5.25 734.55 149.85 4.9C 
Aberdeen City 3175.74 435.67 7.29 763.10 66.92 11.4C 
Aberdeenshire 1945.82 497.31 3.91 1138.22 149.81 7.60 
Angus 1702.08 188.74 9.02 ·953.60 135.59 ·7.03 
Argyll & Bute 370.39 453.53 0.82 449.81 179.13 2.S1 
Clackmannanshire · 1694.01 372. 13 -4.55 2302.63 140.20 16.42 
Dumfries and Galloway 600.72 397.36 1.51 · 1440.33 168.97 -8.52 
Dundee City · 1054.49 244.76 -4.31 ·549.65 H4.73 ·3.80 
East Ayrshire ·272.02 367.98 ·0.74 ·312.82 96.81 ·3.23 
East Dunbartonshire 4.79 344.42 0.01 · 1145.04 200.22 ·5.72 
East Lothian ·2525.53 434.73 ·5.81 · 194.81 142.54 · 1.37 
East Renfrewshire ·3603.41 505.96 .7.12 · 115.71 132.12 -0.88 
Edinburgh, City of 184.47 160.42 1.15 931 .09 95.85 9.71 
Eilean Siar · 1219.92 451.81 ·2.70 · 1439.80 147.85 ·9.74 
Fa lkirk 254.40 242.70 1.05 ·2.02 151.36 -0.01 
F~e ·943.97 225.62 -4.18 ·721 .55 101 .59 ·7.10 
Glasgow City 
Highland · 1398.42 266.56 ·5.25 ·332.16 123.23 ·2.70 
Inverclyde 3223.65 337.62 9.55 · 1575.46 131.89 · 11 .95 
Midlothian ·846.26 384.64 ·2.20 56.78 136.51 0.42 
Moray ·202.78 279.25 ·0.73 332.70 101 .95 3.26 
North Ayrshire 329.33 275.87 1.19 468.74 179.71 2.61 
North Lanarkshire · 1925.62 234.33 ·8.22 697.31 105.47 6.61 
Orkney Islands 2409.78 341 .63 7.05 ·1983.58 209.28 ·9.48 
Perth & Kinross · 1374.03 176.12 ·7.80 ·1769.67 123.66 ·14.31 
Renfrewshire ·125.44 199.60 -0.63 · 189.59 159.04 · 1.19 
Scottish Borders 2096.61 446.90 4.69 · 1884.95 127.27 · 14.81 
Shetland Islands ·312.25 264.10 ·1.18 1392.74 88.41 15.75 
South Ayrshire · 1430.84 238.97 ·5.99 513.97 113.46 4.53 
South Lanarkshire ·2615.69 216.83 ·12.06 227.02 94.64 2.40 
Stirling 683.06 425.81 1.56 110.37 165.05 0.67 
West Dunbartonshir. ·3261 .56 399.64 ·8.16 305.14 104.22 2.93 
West Lothian 1380.29 271 .09 5.09 306.19 123.84 2.47 
Constant 5040.07 1384.44 3.64 7958.85 682.60 11 .66 
SaJ11P!e 5iz. 959 1561 
R,sQuared 0.302 0.226 
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Table C: Earnings Function OLS Women 
All 
Co- SId Error T-slal 
efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 2.46 0.62 3.97 
Potential experience (yrs) 341.18 55.02 6.20 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1OOO) -5521.51 1073.22 -5.14 
School certificate or no qualification -2096.24 212.73 -9.85 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2638.77 267.61 9.86 
Temporary job -329.52 596.26 -0.55 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 427.31 264.38 1.62 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -151.66 1490.47 -0.10 
Fishing -1047.91 474.27 -2.21 
Mining and quarrying 3092.22 404.67 7.64 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply 2384.75 1266.51 1.88 
Construction 830.30 1107.96 0.75 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2151 .28 399.68 -5.38 
Hotels and restaurants -1635.14 396.47 -4.12 
Transport, storage and communication 90.14 774.72 0.12 
Financial intermediation 1560.89 1132.21 1.38 
Real estate, renting and business activities -800.26 564.13 -1 .37 
Public administration and defence; 427.14 575.11 0.74 
compulsory social security 
Education -662.24 618.26 -1.07 
Health and social work -512.41 407.53 -1.26 
Other community, social and personal -1200.58 649.21 -1.41 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 223.49 1054.53 0.21 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations 1932.60 439.71 4.40 
Associate professional and technical 378.73 435.14 0.87 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -3599.51 379.64 -9.48 
Skilled trades occupations -2823.29 835.70 -3.38 
Personal service occupations -3804.52 331.64 -11 .46 
Sales and customer service occupations -4124.13 539.25 -7.65 
Process, plant and machine operatives -4428.70 517.76 -8.55 
Elementary occupations -3151.72 854. 15 -3.69 
Council area could not be derived -543. 16 126.81 -4.28 
Aberdeen Cily 68.85 122.62 0.56 
Aberdeenshire -1155.07 lSO.18 -7.69 
Angus -1 199.83 152.64 -7.86 
Argyll & Bute -981.54 129.80 -7.56 
Clackmannanshire -923.93 143.25 -6.45 
Dumfries and Galloway -1589.13 105.05 -15.13 
Dundee City -796.66 123.49 -6.45 
East Ayrshire -485.15 93.64 -5.18 
East Dunbartonshire -897.70 172.07 -5.22 
East Lothian -563.33 221.75 -2.54 
East Renfrewshire -160.67 177.54 -0.90 
Edinburgh, City of 566.78 156.78 3.62 
Eilaan Siar 836.25 177.74 4.70 
Falkirk -262.20 149.62 -1.75 
Fife -1 78.68 94.51 -1.89 
Glasgow City 
Highland -1057.59 155.58 -6.80 
InvercJyde -880.23 145.15 -6.06 
Midlothian -1805.35 124.89 -14.46 
Moray 970.97 103.30 9.40 
North Ayrshire -313.68 195.10 -1 .61 
North Lanarkshire -2SO.81 11 8.82 -2.11 
Orkney Islands -561.22 162.92 -3.44 
Perth & Kinross -1464.83 155.25 -9.44 
Renfrewshire -235.34 111.47 -2.11 
Scottish Borders -281 9.77 164.43 -15.29 
Shetland Islands -158.16 147.89 -1 .07 
Soulh Ayrshire -1023.69 117.49 -8.71 
South Lanarkshire 61 .06 128.43 0.48 
SliMing 496.43 79.67 6.23 
West Dunbartonshire 1862.57 182.24 10.22 
Wesl Lolhian 78.22 139.26 0.56 
constant 10021 .40 831.02 12.06 
Sample size 1897 
R-squared 0.455 
Women 
Central Peripheral 
Co- SId Error T-slal Co- SId Error T-slal 
efficient efficient 
2.58 0.65 3.98 1.66 1.26 1.32 
340.73 57.61 5.91 465.64 187.13 2.49 
-5598.13 1112.64 -5.03 -7178.33 3968.42 -1.81 
-2096.54 246.58 -8.SO -1994 .75 731 .69 -2.73 
2779.92 296.61 9.37 1651 .59 587.70 2.81 
-284.37 617.42 -0.46 -1054.51 2116.58 -O.SO 
514.71 269.01 1.91 -466.77 851 .61 -0.55 
-493.76 1831 .94 -0.27 2969.92 1269.13 2.34 
-1562.15 411.44 -3.80 -386.91 802.06 -0.48 
2947.69 419.80 7.02 No observations 
2131 .98 1332.39 1.60 4258.32 588.35 7.24 
1235.76 1095.70 1.13 -3631 .94 1073.86 -3.38 
-2223.45 440.48 -5.05 -1063.40 335.08 -3.17 
-1863.90 419.40 -4.44 -563.44 447.03 -1.26 
52.78 813.57 0.06 146.20 1917.37 0.08 
1478.91 1190.79 1.24 3642.69 2536.72 1.44 
-722.SO 585.71 -1 .23 -1462.64 666.98 -2.19 
220.70 627.90 0.35 2698.56 1082.28 2.49 
-463.65 674.04 -0.69 -1499.34 1314.42 -1 .14 
-690.05 407.61 -1.69 1168.07 539.78 2.16 
-1401 .19 943.32 -1.49 209.29 1676.22 0.12 
497.70 1165.29 0.43 188.20 1164.65 0.16 
1763.55 461.20 3.82 2057.32 1711 .09 1.20 
562.69 448.85 1.25 -1649.63 1473.02 -1.12 
-3564.35 404.71 -8.88 -4506.62 927.29 -4.86 
-2710.35 989.73 -2.74 -3808.63 624.55 -6.10 
-3751 .93 345.22 -10.87 -5159.76 1139.41 -4.53 
-4127.60 604.70 -6.83 -3882.53 653.32 -5.94 
-4163.49 583.26 -7.14 -6639.77 1315.68 -5.05 
-2924.00 966.00 -3.03 -5106.62 2098.30 -2.43 
-606.59 139.28 -4.36 
120.63 135.20 0.89 
-972.SO 163.22 -5.96 
-1175.03 164.71 -7.13 
-888.64 367.09 -2.42 1585.11 1025.14 1.55 
-952.44 156.82 -6.07 
-1368.19 120.73 -11 .33 
-644.01 123.19 -6.85 
-430.27 105.37 -4.08 
-938.01 188.63 -4.97 
-746.37 270.26 -2.76 
-240.64 198.01 -1 .22 
533.13 165.25 3.23 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 3371.41 664 .73 5.07 
-228.92 152.03 -1 .51 
-191.73 99.99 -1.92 
-724.85 193.61 -3.74 708.55 740.69 0.96 
-859.54 160.58 -5.35 
-1787.22 135.67 -13.17 
786.01 124.05 6.34 9388.77 S03.31 18.65 
-326.06 207.96 -1.57 
-254.22 123.35 -2.06 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 1807.46 1016.50 1.78 
-1254.63 179.66 -6.98 -119.28 946.98 -0.13 
-247.74 121.79 -2.03 
-2942.17 202.97 -14.SO 913.08 802.16 1.14 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 2583.55 702.37 3.68 
-814.17 128.38 -6.34 
SO.41 132.34 0.38 
494.12 83.67 5.91 
1868.54 190.76 9.80 
53.18 149.81 0.38 
9997.31 648.60 11 .78 6500.12 1769.40 3.67 
1655 215 
0.447 0.622 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual eamed income net of deductions (£), Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
adjusted for s patial correlation in the residuals by clustering on local authority of workplace. Red t-slat indicates coefficient is Significantly differenl from 
zero at <1%. blue at 5% level (two tailed I-test). Estimated using STATA9 econometric software. Constant relates to a female employee with a 
qualification other than a degree working full-time as a manager or senior official in manufacturing. Has a permanent job, works in a workplace with 25 
or more other people in Glasgow City (excepl the Peripheral model where the constant relales to • workplace in Dumfries and Galloway). 
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Table C: Earnings Function OLS Women (Contd) 
Women 
Managers, profe.llonals and Other occupations 
technical occupation. 
Co- Std Error T-stat Co- Std Error T-Itat 
efficient efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 3.11 1.08 2.87 1.72 0.75 2.26 
Potentiat experience (yrs) 618.41 93.37 6.62 107.78 41 .04 2.63 
Potentiat experience squared (yrs' /I000) -10195.15 1841 .81 -5.54 -1743.19 887.83 -1.96 
School certificate or no qualification -4404 .53 668.53 -6.59 -1455.27 242.99 -5.99 
(dummy variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2673.77 394 .63 6.78 2453.66 526.08 4.66 
Temporary job 515.94 970.83 0.53 -1171 .81 533.83 ·2.20 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 717.98 445.43 1.61 194.79 217.56 0.90 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry . -3974.49 677.65 -5.87 282.89 1788.98 0.16 
Fishing -3390.78 2305.98 -1.47 610.76 1773.70 0.34 
Mining and quarrying 2442.37 730.23 3.34 4587.30 399.43 11 .48 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and waler suppty 1571 .52 1852.00 0.85 2734.49 1673.80 1.63 
Construction 2071 .38 2165.11 0.96 -587.59 1025.09 ·0.57 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2134.17 738.26 -2.9C -2380.49 41 6.03 -5.7. 
Hotels and restaurants -1327.81 1217.09 -1.09 -2026.28 508.35 -3.99 
Transport, storage and communication -376.53 2473.30 -0.15 -362.07 619.41 ·0.58 
Financial intermediation 1967.99 1380.46 1.43 706.17 802.75 0.88 
Real estate, renting and business activities -1745.84 912.42 -1.91 -220.17 496.97 ·0.44 
Public administration and defence; -109.62 962.31 -0.11 428.00 646.51 0.66 
compulsory social security 
Education 
-868.33 941.13 -0.92 -1767.86 533.33 -3.31 
Health and sociat work -726.24 805.80 -0.90 -763.74 466.02 -1.64 
Other corTVTlunity. social and personal -1623.95 1230.94 -1.32 -1244.59 721.34 -1.73 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 1275.23 2371.73 0.54 -449.27 795.67 -0.56 
Managers and senior officials 
Professooal occupations 1684.03 456.55 3.69 
Associate professional and technical 215.53 519.39 0.41 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 1244 .05 448.03 2.78 
Skitted trades occupations 1557.90 722.14 2.16 
Personal service occupations 1070.88 462.04 2.32 
Sales and customer service occupations 509.96 517.81 0.98 
Process, plant and machine operatives 
Elementary occupations 1571 .81 835.83 1.88 
Council area could not be derived -379.74 346.87 -1.09 -989.46 192.57 -5.14 
Aberdeen City 55.29 200.56 0.28 -27.83 127.29 ·0.22 
Aberdeenshire -11 31.84 270.06 -4.19 -1024.72 159.20 -6.44 
Angus -2801.03 200.05 -14.00 -332.06 204.16 ·1.63 
Argytt & Bute -35.33 231 .08 -0.15 -1412.28 200.80 -7.03 
Clackmannanshire -2423.39 265.56 -9.12 855.99 232.13 3.69 
Dumfries and Gattaway -2989.08 174.32 -17.15 -801 .17 151.54 -5.29 
Dundee City -814.11 202.69 -4 .02 -1496.70 176.09 -8.50 
Easl Ayrshire -373.59 215.95 -1 .73 -527.24 157.60 -3.35 
East Ounbartonshire 
-3295.38 597.07 -5.52 595.07 205.94 2.89 
East Lothian 
-1520.64 31 4.53 -4.83 2521.80 391.06 6.45 
Easl Renfrewshire 2765.43 296.67 9.32 -781.Q7 241.30 -3.24 
Edinburgh, City of 434.55 191.28 2.27 553.11 152 .83 3.62 
Eilean Siar 1429.29 370.59 3.86 665.02 267.32 2.49 
Falkirk 
-453.92 222.59 -2.04 -253.43 155.47 ·1 .63 
Fife -1204.91 123.73 -9.74 585.82 144.05 4.07 
Glasgow City 
Highland -2006.28 207.96 -9.65 -465.34 225.98 -2.06 
Inverclyde -1848.17 213.66 -8.65 -193.47 193.69 -1 .00 
Midlothian -1777.35 291 .60 -6.10 -1686.86 243.68 ·6.92 
Moray 2043.85 192.04 10.64 -483.10 135.99 -3.55 
North Ayrshire 
-1217.30 268.89 -4.56 13.06 206.86 0.06 
North Lanarkshire -716.39 305.44 -2.35 -277.65 159.11 -1.75 
Orkney Islands -702.66 312.44 -2.25 -91 .57 216.92 -0.42 
Perth & Kinross 
-2000.57 193.68 -10.33 -747.67 206.30 ·3.62 
Renfrewshire 
-1127.78 127.52 -8.84 341 .35 143.58 2.38 
Scottish Borders -5247.57 366.62 -14.31 -1509.87 205.04 -7.38 
Shetland Islands -757.26 159.37 -4.75 258.92 198.31 1.31 
South Ayrs hire 
-1021 .57 299.56 -3.41 -864.45 156.47 -5.52 
South Lanarkshire 
-738.15 136.06 -5.43 630.77 165.01 3.82 
Stir1ing 768.76 239.05 3.22 -210.20 176.78 -1.19 
West Dunbartonshire 1504.57 269.80 5.58 2033.10 203.07 10.01 
West Lothian 
-691.50 282.05 -2.45 231.23 193.73 1.19 
Constant 6905.63 1435.51 4.81 8376.45 722.83 11 .59 
Sample size 906 991 
R-sQuared 0.284 0.224 
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Table 0 : Earnings Function IV Men and women 
Men and women 
All Cent,al Peripheral 
Co- Std Error T .. ta t Co- Std Erro r T .. tat Co - StdError T ... tat 
efficient efficient efficient 
G eneralised cost of commute 7.04 2.04 3.44 8.11 2.43 3.33 -7.4 3 15.1' -<l .49 
Potential experience (yrs) 443.68 44.89 9.88 467.46 46.72 10.00 385.08 122.97 3 13 
Potentia l experience squared (yrs2/ 1000) -7245.72 866.26 -8.36 -7729.49 904 .47 -8.55 -6094.83 2252.64 -2.71 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -1808.11 223.87 -8.08 -1899.69 257.76 -7.37 -1478.08 627.61 -2.36 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2621 .90 306.79 8.55 2827.66 279.44 10.12 988.80 930.54 1.06 
Female (dummy variable) -4686.22 392.54 -11 .94 -4516 .55 429.61 
-10.51 -4828.90 855.82 -5.64 
Temporary job -1410.97 447.20 
-3.16 -1450.10 441 .13 -3.29 -927.80 2349.35 -<l .39 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 812.52 193.13 4.21 814.04 226.44 3.59 1177.47 746.70 1.58 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -2056.71 901 .22 -2.28 -2306.99 850.60 -2.71 5126.22 4856.04 1.06 
Fishing -1952.64 695.89 -2.81 -4400.43 730.16 
-6.03 -721.42 1648.25 -<l .44 
Mining and quarrying 5163.60 1281.44 4.03 5338.72 1492.04 3.58 4715.02 2884.15 1.63 
Ma nufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 2524 .81 741 .43 3.41 2220.85 773.12 2.87 7667.75 2308.53 3.32 
Construction 291 .99 326.81 0.89 290.85 392.30 0.74 555.00 787.63 0.70 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2303.73 273.14 -8.43 -2181 .78 287.45 -7.59 -2496.23 718.48 -347 
Hotels and restaurants -2616.72 297 .70 -8.79 -2744.51 314.79 -8.72 -2493.71 884.58 -282 
Transport, storage and communication -323.84 316.48 -1.02 -572.32 318.67 -1 .80 1701 .60 1281.71 1.33 
Financial intermediation 1885.33 836.36 2.25 1799.74 852.57 2.11 5895.27 2628.64 2.24 
Real estate , renting and business activities -1414.54 300.40 -4 .71 -1387 .97 318.35 -4.36 -1480.83 891.76 -1.66 
Public administration and defence; 127.64 386.28 0.33 65.67 437.79 0.15 823.00 805.61 1.02 
compulsory social security 
Education -1421.07 448.67 -3.17 -1271 .37 520.19 -2.44 -2387.75 1315.75 -1.81 
Health and social work -755.17 414.37 -1.82 -920.78 443.90 -2.07 1300.16 1484.38 0.88 
Other community, social and personal -1984 .17 607.34 -3.27 -2021 .93 685.97 -2.95 -744 .77 2005.14 -<l .37 
service activities 
Private households and extra· territorial 697.19 1204.65 0.58 930.47 1369.30 0.68 -41.1 5 101 5.90 -<l .04 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -349.57 466.93 -<l .75 -214 .20 517.51 -0.41 168.60 1919.37 0.09 
Associate professional and technical -2853.67 505.18 -5.65 -2594.02 589.22 -4 .40 -4147 .59 937.34 -<1 42 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -6911.46 594 .19 
-11 .63 -6871 .51 653.46 -10.52 -4813.02 14 25.58 -3.38 
Skilled trades occupations -4596.23 366.14 -12.55 -4126.70 385.20 -10.71 -6858.00 675.58 -10.15 
Personal service occupations -4859.64 471 .85 
-10.30 -4423.04 495.59 -8.92 -7657 .61 1742.30 -<1 40 
Sales and customer service occupations -5604 .01 514 .09 -1 0.90 -5150.21 585.58 -8.80 -7699.93 1078.74 -7.14 
Process, plant and machine operatives -6496.29 495.60 -13.11 -6278.53 492.79 -12.74 -8689.10 1808.72 -<180 
Elementary occupations -652 1.62 610.55 -10.68 -6171 .87 675.14 -9.14 -8211 .84 1236.52 -6.84 
Female Managers and senior officials 
Female Professional occupations 2647.96 546.24 4.85 2481 .43 636.71 3.90 232 1.06 2018.08 1.1 5 
Female Associate professional and 3169.88 682.33 4.65 3186.65 765.46 4.16 1947 .23 2224.71 0.88 
technical occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial 3454 .38 755.05 4.58 3563.99 845.78 4.21 331.63 111 2.83 0.30 
occupations 
Female Skilled trades occupations 1829.17 814 .30 2.25 1728.75 984 .90 1.76 2763.27 473.93 583 
Female Personal service occupations 1373.21 569.93 2.41 1102.62 636.12 1.73 2157.42 777.80 2.77 
Female Sales and customer service 1370.16 484 .23 2.83 1126.26 521.79 2.16 2439.67 1331.52 1.83 
occupations 
Female Process, plant and machine 2110.68 528.82 3.99 2358.86 553.86 4.26 81 0.96 1646.51 0.49 
operatives 
Female Elementary occupations 3344.51 918.92 3.64 3492.20 1071 .47 3.26 768.00 211 3.98 0.36 
Council area could not be derived -212.50 101 .33 -2.10 -78.28 130.58 -<l .60 
Aberdeen City 1229.72 135.13 9.10 1173.28 165.31 7.10 
Aberdeenshire 328.67 144 .62 2.27 508.94 180.80 2.81 
Angus -228.10 116.91 -1.95 -190.95 129.08 -1.48 
Argyll & Bule 145.83 146.01 1.00 718.40 197.39 3.64 1908.37 596.18 320 
Clackmannanshire 356.75 195.05 1.83 424 .79 229.50 1.85 
Dumfries and Galloway -1001 .81 147.05 
-6.81 -718.10 173.79 -<1 .13 
Dundee City -539.93 92.68 
-5.83 -492.90 109.30 -<1 .51 
East Ayrshire -164.40 82.39 -2.00 59.22 91 .28 0.65 
East Dunbartonshire -622.61 103.75 -7.93 -852.09 124.12 -6.87 
East Lothian -777.21 102.84 -7.56 -514 .74 122.37 -<1 .21 
East Renfrewshire -746.69 111.13 
-6.72 -785.48 121 .09 -6.49 
Edinburgh. City of 500.77 90.92 5.51 524.06 101 .45 5.17 
Ellean Slar 378.75 231.70 1.63 1612.73 11 38.14 1.42 
Falkir1< 217.10 131 .79 1.65 300.01 158.71 1.91 
F~e -177.92 156.93 -1.13 -110.59 181 .85 -<l .81 
Glasgow City 
Highland -<154.48 142.91 
-3.18 -376.50 206.14 -1.83 1563.27 424.63 3Ge 
Inverclyde -<121 .74 100.96 
-<1 .18 -339.83 109.58 -3.10 
Midlothian -382.58 176.84 -2.16 -269.45 199.92 -1.35 
Moray 876.75 91 .92 9.54 897 .08 129.67 6.92 5738.84 29 17.84 1.87 
North Ayrshire 188.81 89.64 2.11 241.12 102.33 2.38 
North Lanarkshlre 18.21 134.17 0.14 99.85 156.18 0.64 
Or1<ney Islands 305.95 180.28 1.70 2120.60 595.79 356 
Perth & Kinross -1501.28 104.45 -14.37 -1334.31 111.92 -11 .92 -385.12 605.04 -0.64 
Renfrewshire -116.81 58.21 -2.01 -17.76 66.72 -<l .27 
Scohish Borders -1299.89 103.58 -12.55 -1149.70 121.68 -9.45 450.85 847.10 0.70 
Shelland Islands 906.80 142.55 6.36 3058.98 367.14 833 
South Ayrshi re -299.59 124.60 -2.40 -98.70 141 .44 -<l .70 
South Lanarkshlre -36.20 138.89 -<l.26 -27 .54 155.49 -<l .18 
Slirting 618.66 118.16 5.24 638.59 136.75 4.67 
West Dunbartonshlre 854.04 79.66 10.72 869.02 87.83 9.89 
West Lothian 443.43 96.79 4.58 560.16 115.11 4.87 
Constant 121 10.85 720.47 16.81 11307.28 801 .69 14.10 13993.63 924.74 15 13 
Sample size 4417 3805 528 
R-squared 0.415 0.402 0.462 
Wu·Hausman test (p-value) 0.028 0.009 0.137 
Sargan lest (p-value) 0.236 0.124 0.350 
Number of instruments 2 2 2 
1st at_g. ,..gr • •• k)n 
R·squared 0.129 0.123 0.165 
F-stali5l:ic on instruments (F2,n) 10.42 10.78 11 .32 
Noles: Dependent vartable Is annual eamed Income net of deduc1ions (t). Dependenl variable In hi slage regression Is commullng COIl. RobuI I 
standard errors reported In parentheses. Standard errors are adjusled for spatial correlation In the residuats by dustertng on local authority of workplace, 
Red t-staVF-stat indicates coefficient is significantly different from zero at <1 Yo, blue at 5% level (two tailed 1·18I t). Instruments are dummy vanables for 
large urban areas (populalion>12S,DOO) and urban areas except for Peripheral model whereinstNments are dummy variable. for remote smoll town and 
very remote small town. Estimated using STATA9 econometric software. Constant relates to a male employee wUh a quallrb tlon other than a degree 
working fUll-time as a manager or senter official In manufacturing. Has a permanent job, worica In a workptace with 25 or more other people In Glasgow 
Clly (except the Peripheral model where the conslant relales to • wor1<place In Dumfries and Galloway). 
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Table 0: Earnings Function IV Men and women (Contd) 
Men and women 
Managers, professionals and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co· Std Error T ... tat Co· Std Error T ... t,t 
emelent efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 9.67 2.65 3.65 1.33 2.44 0.55 
Potential experience (yrs) 747.75 76.85 9.73 245.00 41 .84 5.86 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) · 11957.22 1582.43 ·7.56 -4146.70 885.55 -4 .68 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy ·3188.82 602.13 ·5.30 ·1549 .83 232.32 -6.67 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2742.45 350.84 7.82 2330.22 560.39 4.16 
Female (dummy variable) -4557.04 355.76 ·12.81 ·1439.61 995.70 · 1.45 
Temporary job ·1004 .93 854 .94 ·1.18 -1718.52 424 .97 -4 .04 
Permanent job 
Works In a small workplace < 2Speople 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 1163.55 482.36 2.41 610.70 178.13 3.43 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry ·2402.12 3351.41 .Q.72 ·1832.91 934.40 . 1.96 
Fishing ·2825.23 1256.67 ·2.25 ·327.43 847 .94 .Q.39 
Mining and quanying 5929.76 1629.21 3.64 3603.26 1189.38 3.03 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply 4233.67 1267.62 3.34 1849.22 902.23 2.05 
Construction 
·180.99 1043.42 .Q.17 375.65 344 .34 1.09 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades ·2137.16 556.30 ·3.84 ·2305.69 233.24 ·9.89 
Holels and restaurants ·2671.35 885.28 ·3.02 ·2834 .93 341 .31 ·8.31 
Transport. storage and communication 232 .58 914.38 0.25 ·534 .35 330.64 · 1.62 
Financial intermediation 3580.64 1149.16 3.12 231 .57 561 .43 0.41 
Real estate, renting and business activities ·795.31 413.34 ·1 .92 ·1581.33 491 .41 ·3.22 
Public administration and defence; ·282.20 704.94 .Q.40 461 .76 446.76 1.03 
compulsory social security 
Education ·967.75 696.33 ·1 .39 ·2456.38 413.57 ·5.94 
Health and social work 139.88 746.54 0.19 ·1727 .91 335.38 ·5.1 
Other community, social and personal ·1675.66 866.68 ·1 .93 ·2120.91 445.98 -4.76 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 2339.98 2130.02 1.10 ·565.05 576.09 .Q.98 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations ·797 .68 458.45 ·1 .74 
Associate professional and technical ·3112.33 519.90 ·5.99 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial ~pations 
-403.29 775.88 .Q.52 
Skilled trades occupations 1764.01 560.51 3.15 
Personal service occupations 1435.41 654.92 2.19 
Sales and customer service occupations 609.81 54809 1.11 
Process, plant and machine operatives . 193.71 590.52 .Q.33 
Elementary occupations 
Female Managers and senior officials 
Female Professional occupations 2612.31 555.54 4.81 
Female Associate professional and 
technical occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial 180.37 1175.35 0.15 
occupations 
Female Skilled trades occupations ·1963.07 1319.25 · 1.49 
Female Personal service occupations 
·1559.22 1061 .82 ·1 .47 
Female Sales and customer service 
·1955.85 1049.14 · 1.86 
occupations 
Female Process, plant and machine 
·1068.55 948.15 ·1.13 
operatives 
Female Elementary occupations 
Council area could not be derived -615.16 186.30 ·3.30 74 .84 103.16 0.73 
Aberdeen City 2004 .85 297.71 6.73 495.64 61 .64 8.04 
Aberdeenshire 764.02 208.53 3.66 83.03 205.80 0.40 
Angus 181 .89 150.14 1.21 ·754 .14 212.33 ·3.55 
Argyll & Bute 710.76 191 .62 3.71 ·290.07 162.76 ·1.78 
Clackmannanshire ·1574.73 238.63 -6.60 1799.87 210.55 8.55 
Dumfries and Galloway ·1 291.99 176.96 ·7.30 ·1040.54 189.96 ·5.48 
Dundee City ·359.89 161.09 ·2.23 -809.22 139.05 ·5.82 
East Ayrshire ·100.51 152.70 .Q.66 ·348.97 93.82 ·3.72 
East Dunbartonshire ·1813.85 402.28 -4.51 
-89.40 118.56 .Q.75 
East Lothian ·2738.23 296.02 ·9.25 117.09 186.84 0.63 
East Renfrewshlre ·1311.74 237.17 -5.53 ·341 .31 106.02 ·3.22 
Edinburgh. City of 344 .95 199.46 1.73 739.41 70.95 10.42 
Ellean 51ar 
-634 .03 268.10 ·2.36 
Falklrl< 479.97 235.32 2.04 ·92.47 154.51 .Q.60 
FKe -656.80 215.03 ·3.05 ·211 .93 204.08 ·1 .04 
Glasgow City 
Highland 
-898.71 261 .07 ·3.44 ·295.56 181 .33 · 1.63 
Inverctyde ·356.47 196.00 · 1.82 ·911 .07 112.51 ·5.28 
Midlothian -810.52 284 .85 ·2.85 ·511 .40 209.15 ·2.45 
Mofay 1545.00 112.04 13.79 218.49 121.85 1.79 
North Ayrshire ·394 .54 181.48 ·2.17 87.88 195.33 0.45 
North lanarkshlre -960.44 246.12 ·3.90 228.88 170.33 1.34 
Orl<ney Islands 
·1139.33 217.58 -5.24 
Perth & Kinross ·1668.41 159.48 ·10.46 ·1314.96 129.20 ·10.18 
Renfrewshire .·218.94 172.95 ·1 .27 63.78 85.23 0.75 
Scottish Borders ·1055.60 238.49 -4.43 ·1615.92 118.41 ·13.65 
Shetland tslands 1067.80 197.12 5.42 
South Ayrshire 
-638.77 232.38 ·2.75 20.96 116.63 0.18 
South lanarkshire 
·1032.36 248.73 -4.15 313.11 151 .09 2.07 
StI~lng 836.53 202.85 4.12 -66.67 157.84 .Q.42 
West Dunbartonshire 356.63 127.13 2.81 828.60 106.58 7.77 
West Lothian 149.37 96.62 1.55 330.70 161 .08 2.05 
Constant 6943.06 958.95 7.24 9804.44 923.76 10.61 
Sample size 1865 2552 
R·squared 0.282 0.282 
Wu-Hausman test (p-wlue) 0.028 0.764 
Sargan te .. (p.wlue) 0.340 0.010 
Number or In$lruments 2 2 
1a. atage r.o,...6on 
R-squared 0.146 0.104 
F· ... 1iIIic on Inllrumonla (F2.n) 6.27 8.43 
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Table E: Earnings Function IV Men 
Men 
All Centr.1 Per1ph.r.1 
Co- Std Error T .. tat Co- Sld Error T .. tat Co- Std Error T ... tat 
efl1clent ofl1clent ofl1clent 
Generalised cost of commute 11 .22 3.33 3.37 12.37 3.71 3.34 -<l .91 11 .24 
-<l .08 
Potential experience (yrs) 519.06 66 .01 7.86 568.82 68 .29 8.33 253.66 160.09 1.58 
Potential experience SQuared (yrs2J1000) -8605.14 1253.10 -6.87 -9551 .45 134 1.76 -7.12 -4075.65 2924 .67 -1.39 
School certificate or no Qualification (dummy -1585.54 328.00 -4 .83 -1733.57 378.38 -4.58 -11 33.12 523.43 -2.16 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Oegree or higher (dummy variable) 2604.99 560.44 4.65 2995.68 486.41 6.16 158.55 1588.49 0.10 
Temporary job -2431.48 610.94 -3.98 -2476.48 634 .90 -3.90 -2465.75 1357.38 -1 .82 
Permanent job 
WOrXs in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 1088.46 236.64 4.60 1072.91 282.67 3.80 1927.15 909.07 2.12 
Agriculture. hunting and forestry -2573.70 1005.75 ·2.56 -2715.72 983.28 -2.76 5866.38 4866.24 1.21 
Fishing -1999.87 881.05 -2.27 -5844 .40 2025.71 -2.89 -614.01 21 41.11 
-<l .29 
Mining and quarrying 5394 .02 2130.55 2.53 5933.57 2673.19 2.22 3441 .94 3474.65 0.99 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 2400.16 861 .46 2.79 2185.88 869.27 2.51 8041 .23 1571.54 5.12 
Construction 167.54 363.88 0.46 101 .51 450.08 0.23 1063.91 776.90 1.37 
Wholesa le and retail trade; repair trades -2293.31 428.56 -5.35 -2069.75 439.19 -4 .71 -3097.86 1349.96 -2 .~ 
Hotels and restaurants -4106.00 625.18 -6.57 -4133.61 726.69 -5.69 -4 518.48 1777.75 -2.54 
Transport, storage and communication -544.66 425.60 -1.28 -882.24 438.76 -2.01 2023.91 1387.85 1.46 
Financial intermediation 2418.21 1023.10 2.36 2314 .64 1063.25 2.18 12577.08 2962.15 4 .2~ 
Real estate. renting and business activities -1848.94 401 .71 -4 .60 -1945.21 442.82 -4 .39 -1104.81 1692.34 
-<l .65 
Public administration and defence; 57.50 434.05 0.13 104.86 483.57 0.22 230.75 893.57 0.26 
computsory sociat security 
Education -2302.74 555.74 -4 .14 -2275.76 674.36 -3.37 -1977.50 1837.79 -1.08 
Health and social work -409.05 832.25 -<l.49 -726.71 878.86 -<l .83 3036.30 2932.49 1.04 
Other community, social and personal -2253.51 591 .28 -3.81 -2180.99 678.33 -3.22 -930.69 1900.98 -<l.49 
service activities 
Priva te households and extra· territorial 1247.40 2024.31 0.62 1238.60 2218.62 0.56 299.68 1575.60 0.19 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -85.63 588.67 -<l .15 47.50 668.36 0.07 -4 37.82 1849.26 -<l.24 
Associate professional and technical -2919.45 499.03 -5.85 -2603.53 580.53 -4 .48 -4431.06 1076.05 -4 .12 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -6711 .74 634.30 -10.58 -6606.44 713.96 -9.25 -4963.91 1346.51 -369 
Skilled trades occupations -4421 .80 390.88 -11 .31 -3846.05 397.70 -967 -7455.01 640.47 -1164 
Personal service occupations -4436.75 456.10 -9.73 -4011 .96 460.37 -8.71 -7268.59 1545.32 -470 
Sales and customer service occupations -5365.63 562.28 -9.54 -4778.94 640.08 -7.47 -7869.90 1096.48 -7.18 
Process. plant and machine operatives -6249.55 528.08 -11 .83 -5923.60 493.75 -12.00 -9 145.00 1893.25 -483 
Elementary occupations -6243.21 622.74 -10.03 -5805.69 692.89 -8.38 -8 151.34 1064 .21 -768 
Council area could not be derived -19.22 109.61 -<l .18 173.65 128.38 1.35 
Aberdeen City 1883.85 180.04 10.46 1813.16 226.77 8.00 
Aberdeenshire 1388.49 189.66 7.32 1522.03 246.73 6.17 
Angus 420.99 204.75 2.06 457.65 225.18 2.03 
Argyll & Bute 884.33 161 .08 5.49 725.93 288.92 2.51 3146.53 1227.31 2.5& 
Clackmannanshire 1522.77 414.16 3.68 1587.83 454 .74 3.49 
Dumfries and Galloway -130.41 360.51 -<l.36 78.08 355.77 0.22 
Dundee Cily -392.27 156.44 -2.51 -302.37 174.23 -1.74 
East Ayrshire -149.46 116.86 -1 .28 154.89 129.26 1.20 
East Dunbartonshire -1666.60 397.58 -4.19 -1726.07 447.53 -3.88 
East lothian -387.32 221.06 -1.75 137.13 148.67 0.92 
East Renfrewshire -1228.42 209.58 -5.86 -1273.60 221 .26 -5.76 
Edinburgh. Cily of 387.01 91 .34 4.24 471 .50 91 .07 5.18 
Eilean Siar 112.18 411 .69 0.27 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 222 1.65 575.24 3 118 
Falkir1< 305.81 144.27 2.12 374 .95 160.78 2.33 
Fife -260.11 251 .59 -1.03 -174.37 280.71 -<l .62 
Glasgow City 
Highland -245.83 245.76 -1 .00 -338.52 317.50 -1.07 2811 .13 1239.9 1 2.27 
Inverclyde 145.60 142.71 1.02 267.42 141 .35 1.89 
Midlothian 298.10 215.27 1.38 486.25 248.36 1.96 
Moray 544.25 108.03 5.04 677.55 153.99 4.40 2804.38 2275.05 1.23 
North Ayrshire 561 .52 137.34 4.09 629.98 141 .42 4.45 
North lanarkshire 76.20 143.31 0.53 164.29 162.72 1.01 
Or1<ney Islands 839.16 291 .44 2.88 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 292 1.47 968.32 302 
Perth & Kinross -1762.77 70.17 -25.12 -1746.81 82.01 -2130 -40 1.25 1283.97 .(l.36 
Renfrewshire -596.93 178.58 -3.34 -462.86 191.73 -2.41 
Scol1ish Borders -431 .19 170.33 -2.53 -93.84 204.63 -<l.46 1211.34 1518.2 1 0.80 
Shetland Islands 1582.47 246.17 6.43 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 4215.69 998.08 422 
South Ayrshire 285.06 208.51 1.37 458.77 227.83 2.01 
South Lanarkshire -157.10 214 .64 -<l.73 -197.63 224.40 -<l.88 
Stir1ing 553.03 186.42 2.97 623.96 220.90 282 
West Dunbartonshire -93.24 141 .34 -<l.66 -59.73 155.46 -<l .38 
West lothian 544.14 118.77 4.58 736.48 141 .02 5.22 
Constant 9886.83 1034.70 9.56 8694 .76 1173.99 741 13749.27 2018.55 n ft, 
Sample size 2520 2150 313 
R-squared 0.343 0.324 0.469 
Wu.Hausman lest (~value) 0.001 0.000 0.577 
Sargen test (jrWlue) 0.140 0.106 0.245 
Number of instruments 2 2 2 
1.t .tag. rear ... km 
R·squared 0.145 0.133 0.228 
F·staUSlic on lnJ.(ruments (F2.n) 10.70 1 31 11 " 
Noles: Dependent variable is annuai earned income nel of deduC1lons(£). Robusl . landard errors reported In parenthOIG •. Standard Orrot1 II 
adjusled for spalial correlation In the residuals by cluslering on local aulhority of wor1<place. Rod 1-llaVF-. lal Ind lce, •• coeNlclen' II IlgnlflconUy 
different from zero at < 1 %. blue al 5% level (two lalled l-tesl). in . lrumenl. are dummy variables fOf' large urban .rea.(popula,Ion' 125.000) Inc! urban 
areas except for Peripheral model where instruments are dummy variables for remote smalilown and very remote arnaillown. e,tlmalod using STATA 
economelric soflware. Conslant reiales 10 a maie employee wllh a qualification other than I degree wor1<lng full-lime I •• manager Of' IGniOr oN olin 
manufacturing. Has a pennanent job, works In 8 worf(place with 25 or more other peop~ In Glasgow City (except the Pertphoral mod~ wh .... the 
constant reiales to a worl<place in Dumfries and Galloway). 
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Table E: Earnings Function IV Men (Contd) 
Mon 
Managers. professionals and 
technical occupations 
Co- SId Error T,,'a' 
efficient 
Generalised cost of commute 15.67 6 .0 1 2.61 
Potential experience (yrs) 887.49 112.65 7.88 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/ 1000) -14318.04 2319.63 ~.17 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -2371 .05 1027.69 -2.31 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2818.12 685.64 4.11 
Temporary job -2674.65 1544.35 -1.73 
Pennanent job 
Worl<s in a sma Ii worl<place < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 1868.23 681 .95 2.74 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -2545.56 3476.95 -0.73 
Fishing -1435.69 21 38.69 -0.67 
Mining and quarrying 6291 .07 2718.20 2.31 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 5451 .64 1582.27 3.45 
Construction -396.13 1258.07 -0.31 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair. trades -2237.18 1008.55 -2.22 
Hotels and restaurants ~181 .28 1955.26 -3.16 
Transport, storage and communication 238.99 1102.37 0.22 
Financial intermediation 4486.54 1457.71 3.08 
Real estate. renting and business activities -359.66 632.17 -0.57 
Public administration and defence; ·21 1.38 859.01 -0.25 
compulsory social security 
Education -1384 .16 797.45 -1.74 
Health and social wo", 2024 .71 1469.47 1.38 
Other community, social and personal -1103.15 872.95 -1.26 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 2350.77 2862.62 0.82 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupalions -1l76.63 593.16 -1.48 
Associate professional and technical ·3447.20 540.79 ~.37 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 
Skilled trades occupations 
Personal service occupations 
Sales and customer service occupations 
Process, plant and machine operatives 
Elementary occupations 
Council area could not be derived -251 .16 533.24 -0.47 
Aberdeen Cily 3425.41 495.76 6 .91 
Aberdeenshire 2200.61 439.57 5.01 
Angus 1940.11 218.80 8 .87 
Argyll & Bule 1052.06 382.53 2.75 
Clackmannanshire -205.74 670.94 -0.31 
Dumfries and Galloway 2190.81 783.26 2.80 
Dundee City 
-272.13 311 .71 -0.87 
Easl Ayrshire 308.39 260.28 1.18 
East Dunbartonshire -1 421.15 939.74 -1.51 
East Lothian -2763.38 433.49 ~.37 
East Renfrewshlre 
-3313.24 567.51 -5.84 
Edinburgh, Cily of 298.73 190.70 1.57 
Eilean Siar 894.01 869.68 1.03 
Falkirl< 1001 .81 320.64 3.12 
Fife -138.43 515.89 -0.27 
GlasgowCl1y 
Highland -23.12 642.13 -0.04 
Inverclyde 2598.46 529.86 4.90 
Midlothian -249.67 589.73 -0.42 
Moray 223.27 244 .89 0.91 
North Ayrshire -239.39 489.49 -0.49 
North Lanarl<shlre 
-1 085.14 425.80 -2.55 
Or1u1ey Islands 3889.56 569.60 6 .83 
Perth & Kinross -1504.98 208.81 -7.21 
Renfrewshire -250.45 221 .12 -1.13 
Scottish Borders 3042.94 457.95 6 .64 
Shetland Islands 968.84 585.65 1.65 
Soulh Ayrshire 
-101 .67 568.87 -0.18 
South lanar1c.shire -1789.43 496.64 -3.60 
Slirllng 915.53 439.55 2.08 
Wesl Dunbartonshlre 
-3134 .9 1 398.20 -7.87 
Wesl Lolhlan 583.17 482.66 1.21 
Constant 2459.01 1855.55 1.33 
Sample size 959 
R-squared 0.205 
Wu-Hausman test (p-.value) 0.002 
Sargan lest (p-.value) 0.370 
Number of instruments 2 
1. t atag. retl re •• lon 
R-aquared 0.154 
F-slaUstic on instruments (F2,n) 4.43 
Other occupations 
Co- SId Error T,,'a' 
efflcJent 
8.95 9.14 0.98 
322.74 64.65 4.95 
-5656.16 1305.25 -4.3 
-1 330.40 367.28 -3.6 
1803.28 1096.87 1.64 
-2543.68 680.71 -3.74 
888.84 286.04 3.11 
-2496.24 918.02 -2.7 
-1l42.72 1182.21 -0.71 
2872.41 2064.60 1.39 
1008.92 1030.16 0.98 
274 .99 395.03 0.70 
-2168.67 368.30 ·5.89 
-3722.09 768.87 -4.84 
-711.84 414.92 ·1 .72 
-1144.66 1779.04 -0.64 
-2758.19 579.65 -4.76 
568.57 688.55 0.83 
-3367.13 778.50 -4 .33 
-3554.09 594.22 ·5.98 
-2486.49 556.88 -4.47 
420.61 923.20 0.46 
-l;53.30 676.96 -0.97 
1469.00 566.30 2.59 
1569.22 579.26 2.71 
443.73 424.88 1.04 
-271.75 509.64 -0.53 
762.97 139.59 5.47 
776.86 69.81 11 .13 
1480.84 467.10 3.17 
-426.08 749.62 -0.57 
768.36 519.32 1.48 
3056.56 995.80 3.07 
-1l08.90 836.25 -0.97 
-347.92 314.37 ·1 .11 
-266.49 109.88 -2 .43 
-1767.82 895.49 ·1.97 
248.42 626.72 0.40 
43.28 253.54 0.17 
751 .41 261.78 2.87 
~79 .06 1060.78 -0.64 
179.79 288.77 0.62 
-276.04 612.77 -0.45 
16.20 485.82 0.03 
-1 11 1.53 624 .33 ·1.78 
398.52 425.82 0.94 
489.13 251.36 1.95 
948.74 677 .70 1.40 
842.54 228.09 3.69 
-1 385.22 781.35 -1 .77 
-1667.12 168.25 -9.91 
-457.00 394.77 -1 .16 
-1973.6 1 186.68 -10.57 
1804.87 580.50 3.11 
706.68 272.68 2.59 
550.00 448.75 1.23 
451.80 471.23 0.96 
450.08 240.99 1.87 
567.78 382.21 1.49 
7383.26 1850 .58 3.99 
1561 
0.171 
0.81 4 
0.273 
2 
0.119 
8 .37 
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Table F: Earnings Function IV Women 
All 
Co- Std Error T .. tat 
efficient 
Generalised cost of commute -1.08 2.63 -<l.41 
Potential experience (yrs) 353.08 55.68 6.34 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) -5833.73 1078.16 -5.41 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -2202.90 213.66 -10.31 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2803.20 334 .38 8.38 
Temporary job -317 .91 576.57 -<l.55 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 394 .86 275.78 1.43 
Agricu lture, hunting and forestry -239.72 1424 .91 -<l .17 
Fishing -847.58 647.25 -1.31 
Mining and quarrying 2932.84 389.09 7.54 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply 2327.19 1322.18 1.76 
Construction 463.04 1042.93 0.44 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2309 .17 397 .69 -5.81 
Hotels and restaurants -1850.23 410.28 -4.51 
Transport. storage and communication 30 .90 772.63 0.04 
Financial intennediation 1466.27 1185.59 1.24 
Real estate, renting and business activities -941 .72 578.04 -1.63 
Public administration and defence; 400.72 564 .87 0.71 
compulsory social security 
Education -970.46 641.91 -1 .51 
Health and social wori<. -662.81 391.90 -1 .69 
Other community, social and personal -1321.33 845.40 -1 .56 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 104.89 1120.19 0.09 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations 1947.08 426.43 4.57 
Associate professional and technical 324.27 458.98 0.71 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -37 18.51 345.95 -10.75 
Skilled trades occupations -3087.57 853.03 -3.62 
Personal service occupations -3890.01 323.40 -12.03 
Sales and customer service occupations -4376.58 545.78 -8.02 
Process. plant and machine operatives -4468.51 521 .38 -8.57 
Elementary occupations -3314 .87 841.36 -3.94 
Council area could not be derived -791 .31 235.87 -3.35 
Aberdeen City -1 11.22 199.00 -{l.56 
Aberdeenshire -1529.45 325.27 -4.70 
Angus -1461.82 277.68 -5.26 
Argyll & Bute -1351.34 326.68 -4.14 
Clackmannanshire -1125.09 202.85 -5.55 
Dumfries and Galloway -1776.60 199.35 -8.91 
Dundee City -913.60 167.43 -5.46 
East Ayrshire -687.46 189.06 -3.64 
East Dunbarton shire -1260.46 367.62 -3.43 
East Lothian -187.17 316.14 -{l .59 
East Renfrewshire -235.36 195.28 -1 .21 
Edinburgh, City of 509.20 156.67 3.25 
Eilean Siar 348.00 459.9 1 0.76 
Falkirk -690.51 380.24 -1 .82 
Fife -440.82 226.25 -1 .95 
Glasgow City 
Highland -1 411 .19 357 .84 -3.94 
Inverclyde -1104.59 252.06 -4 .38 
Midlothian -2214 .85 357.90 -6.19 
Moray 691 .46 264 .27 2.62 
North Ayrshire 
-556.28 300.55 -1 .85 
North Lanarkshire -617.13 301.39 -2.05 
Orlmey Islands -943.61 367.50 -2.57 
Perth & Kinross -1714.50 241.53 -7.10 
Renfrewshire -568.41 291.04 -1.95 
Scottish Borders -3142.24 340.28 -9.23 
Shetland Islands -468.36 316.87 -1 .48 
South Ayrshire -1279.63 255.26 -5.01 
South l anarkshire -226.51 264 .83 -{l .86 
Stirling 314.24 169.00 1.86 
West Dunbartonshire 1712.21 24 1.96 7.08 
West Lothian -102.61 178.53 -<l .57 
Constant 11077.00 111 4.51 9.94 
Sample size 1897 
R-squared 0.445 
Wu-Hausman test (p-value) 0.246 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.549 
Number of instruments 2 
1,t stage regre .. ton 
R-squared 0.147 
F-statistic on Instruments (F2,n) 6.61 
Women 
Central Perlpherll l 
Co- Std Error T .. tat Co- Std Error T __ tat 
efficient efflclent 
0.04 2.58 0.02 -6.01 17.34 -<l.35 
348.45 57 .89 6 .02 487 .18 214 .39 2.27 
-5813.84 1119.06 -5.20 -7579.84 4389.18 -1.73 
-2 177.29 255.04 -8.54 -2034 .53 595.59 -3.42 
2898.62 359.61 8 .06 2022.50 581.61 3.48 
-264.67 604.75 -<l.44 -921.21 2172.22 -<l .42 
487.35 279.78 1.74 -381.75 11 60.70 
-<l .33 
-499.28 1779.65 -<l .28 2 14 2.75 3689.68 0.58 
-767.82 875.59 -<l .88 -830.15 2493.74 -<l.33 
2853.60 406.04 7.03 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 
2115.99 1374.61 1.54 3116.52 3298.52 0.94 
963.02 1067.44 0.90 -4437.60 2587.99 -1.71 
-2354 .65 445.87 -5.28 -1078.27 858.73 -1.26 
-2013.54 448.56 -4 .49 -760.93 1247.15 -{l.61 
-34 .93 784.13 -<l .04 895.90 446.61 2.01 
1409.75 1225.46 1.15 3149 .35 3283.58 0.96 
-837.58 579.10 -1.45 -1594.38 831 .43 -1.92 
189.44 610.70 0.31 2671 .20 1557.71 1.71 
-677.01 695.60 -{l .97 -2245.13 2716.60 -{l.83 
-811 .72 389.27 -2.09 1210.96 723.43 1.67 
-1513 .76 952.89 -1.59 571 .36 2286.24 0.25 
420.60 1210.66 0.35 1041 .92 2090.46 0.50 
1745.72 446.64 3.91 2795.42 2071 .35 1.35 
514 .58 465.31 1.11 -1511.78 1528.76 -<l.99 
-3687.77 372.65 -9.90 -4049.78 1122.62 -3.61 
-2968 .37 1047.86 -2.83 -3452.84 615.97 -5.6 1 
-3816 .55 328.66 ·11 .61 -5127.49 1372.02 -3.74 
-4319 .01 610.27 -7.08 -4318.73 1533.94 -2.82 
-4 197 .07 596.13 -7.04 -6624.98 1459.95 -<4 .5<1 
-3045.22 956.19 -3.18 -5711 .15 3225.07 -1.77 
-801 .55 245.91 -3.26 
-25.43 215.38 -{l .12 
-1243.75 304 .63 -4 .08 
-1353.82 264.34 -5.12 
-1013.56 365.24 -2.78 531.80 1488.60 0.36 
-1088.43 197.19 -5.52 
-1517.57 209.37 -7.25 
-922 .42 158.66 -5.81 
-553.85 168.93 -3.28 
-1190.59 367.37 -3.24 
-458.22 318.60 -1.44 
-286.34 207.99 -1.38 
496.08 166.95 2.97 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 2107.29 2292.79 0.92 
-524 .01 350.77 -1.49 
-371.07 210.32 -1.76 
-1022.57 408.48 -2.50 -171 .35 1392.96 -{l.12 
-1009.79 250.45 -4.03 
-2067.22 34 1.82 -8.05 
557.96 296.81 1.88 11498.50 4986.34 2.31 
-490.99 285.73 -1.72 
-505.60 278.19 -1.82 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 985.36 1335.89 0.74 
-1451 .42 263.88 -5.50 -176.52 987.89 -{l.18 
-478.13 278.22 -1.72 
-3175.53 331.57 -9.58 448.87 755.36 0.59 
(dropped) 0.00 0.00 1824.04 11 50.45 1.59 
-996.93 254 .51 -3.92 
-144.27 244 .74 -{l.59 
381.40 152.33 2.50 
1772.20 235.95 7.5 1 
-88 .45 177.10 -<l .39 
10783.79 1117.94 965 8120.69 5669.32 1.43 
1655 215 
0.441 0.576 
0.454 0.441 
0.700 0.691 
2 2 
0.150 0.204 
6.05 3.21 
Notes: Dependent variable is annual earned income net of deductIOnS (C). Robust standard errors reponed In parenth . .... Standard.rT()(I are 
adjusted for spatial oorrelation in the residuals by clustering on local authority of worItplace. Red t-. taVF·slat indicate. coefflcl.nll. IlgnHlcantly 
different from zero at <1%. blue at 5% level (two tailed t-test). Instruments are dummy variables lor large urban ar ••• (population> 125.000) and urbon 
areas except for Peripheral model where instruments are dummy variables 'or remote small town and very remote smalilown, El tlmetod using STATA,9 
econometric software. Constant relates to a female employee with a qualincalion other than a degree wortdng full-lime 8S a managor or s nlor aMlcl l in 
manufacturing. Has a permanent job, works in a workplace with 25 or more other people In Glasgow City (except the Peripheral modol whore tho 
constant relates to a workplace In Dumfries and Galloway). 
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Table F: Earnings Function IV Women (Contd) 
Women 
Managers, prof •• slonals and Other occupations 
technicalocclJpations 
Co .. lflclent Std Error T-stat Co- Std Error T-stat 
efficient 
Generalised cost of commute -0.73 3.96 -0.18 -12.50 9. 14 -1 .37 
Potential experience (yrs) 647.21 101 .23 6.39 93.71 61 .89 1.51 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/ 1000 ) -10907.98 2037.75 -5.35 -1715.56 1243.22 -1 .38 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -4452.77 672.79 -6.62 -1949.76 466.83 -4.18 
variable ) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 2864 .56 546.86 5.24 3179.49 781.61 4.07 
Temporary job 613.51 1005.62 0.61 -1274.23 54 1.49 -2.35 
Pennanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 690.38 441.57 1.56 90.48 296.37 0.31 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -3764 .63 743.00 -5.07 -519.21 1969.93 -0.26 
Fishing -2858.57 3038.41 -0.94 113.52 2896.81 0.04 
Mining and quarrying 2130.09 640.19 3.33 5920.18 1016.08 5.83 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 1851 .1 3 2177.12 0.85 1528.06 1757.43 0.87 
Construction 1480.30 2300.70 0.64 -1493.49 928.08 -1.61 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -2317.65 665.91 -3.48 -3091 .15 615.95 -5.02 
Hotels and restaurants -1673.90 1258.37 -1 .33 -2868.83 823.51 -3.48 
Transport, storage and communication -116.42 2525.1 0 -0.05 -1 108.47 738.Q1 -1 .50 
Financial intermediation 1785.90 1436.53 1.24 539.30 1148.19 0.47 
Real estate, renting and business activities -1952.55 918.55 -2.13 -584.16 483.74 -1.21 
Public administration and defence; -46.88 984.62 -0.05 103.76 730.78 0.14 
compulsory social security 
Education -1192.23 880.08 -1.35 -3053.78 1066.62 -2.86 
Health and social work 
-807.48 777.82 -1.04 -1578.48 746.13 -2.12 
Other community, social and personal -17 11 .48 1176.23 -1 .46 -1992.70 657.20 -3.03 
service activities 
Private househokb and extra-territorial 1069.75 2517.00 0.43 -1 134 .22 1498.58 -0.76 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations 1694.40 433.33 3.91 
Associate professional and technical 104.27 604.53 0.17 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -190.04 952.32 -0.20 
Skilled trades occupations 
-462.40 1168.36 -0.40 
Personal service occupations -193.84 908.74 -0.21 
Sales and customer service occupations -1377.04 1049.06 -1.31 
Process, plant and machine operatives 
-11 37.13 958 .10 -1.19 
Elementary occupations 
Council area could not be derived -648.56 497.31 -1.30 -2235.91 801 .06 -2.79 
Aberdeen Cily -235.88 382.72 -0.62 -217.14 198.76 -1 .09 
Aberdeenshire 
-1475.77 412.34 -3.58 -2684.18 1055.08 -2.54 
Angus -2954.42 252.78 -11.69 -1501.38 775.72 -1 .94 
Argyll & BUle -647.36 697.92 -0.93 -2197.59 532.17 -4 .13 
Clackmannanshire -2596.69 253.25 -10.25 60.03 528.52 0.11 
Dumfries and Galloway -3043.28 189.15 -16.09 -1839.04 646.00 -2.85 
Dundee City -965.27 268.73 -3.59 -1691.74 208 .86 -8.10 
East Ayrshire -490.85 231.69 -2.12 -1589.09 698.13 -2.28 
East Ounbartonshlre -3621.99 791.96 -4 .57 -1030.14 993 .85 -1 .04 
East Lothian -1086.78 477.32 -2.28 3095.07 639.79 4.84 
East Renfrewshire 2946.80 41 8.01 7.05 -1363.04 383.09 -3.56 
Edinburgh, City of 315.51 180.31 1.75 642.35 203.29 3.16 
Eilean Siar 635.92 965.11 0.66 -526.04 683.55 -0.77 
Falklr1< -993.61 590.21 -1 .68 -1772.49 958.22 -1.85 
Fife -1401 .96 210.07 -6.67 -757.82 830.07 -0.91 
GlasgowCl1y 
Highland -2424 .38 504 .21 -4.81 -1804.93 871.53 -2.07 
Inverclyde -2101.72 392.00 -5.36 -1 165.42 598.58 -1.95 
Midlothian -2077.91 345.80 -6.01 -3703.03 1251 .02 -2.96 
Moray 1721.51 442.93 3.89 -1613.99 730.02 -2.21 
North Ayrshire -1491 .53 404.81 -3.68 -951 .09 591 .99 -1.61 
North Lanar1<shlre -936.51 323.85 -2.89 -211 9.27 11 49.58 -1 .84 
Orl<ney Islands -1 265.17 531.73 -2.38 -1022.41 671 .18 -1 .52 
Perth & Kinross -231 1.60 244.28 -9.46 -1641.03 554 .81 -2.96 
Renfrewshire -1 600.76 504 .23 -3.17 -896.39 653.04 -1 .07 
Scoltlsh Borders -5521 .14 501.25 -11 .01 -3014.57 958.57 -3.14 
Shetland Islands -1102.04 442.84 -2.49 -969.52 745.88 -1 .30 
Soulh Ayrshire -1368.39 497.1 8 -2.75 -1718.87 540.65 -3.18 
South Lanar1<shlre -1048.07 273.89 -3.83 -408.08 657.21 -0.62 
SlI~lng 727.77 248.1 3 2.93 -1504.80 796.68 -1.89 
West Dunbartonshlre 1354 .86 378.67 3.58 1394.23 428.93 3.25 
West Lothian -781 .40 234.54 -3.33 -917.47 737.14 -1.24 
Constant 7896.75 1425.29 5.54 14253.87 3082.89 4.62 
Sample size 906 991 
R-squared 0.270 0.282 
Wu-Hausman te .. (p-V81ue) 0.337 0.400 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.606 0.440 
Number of Instruments 2 2 
1 •• a'_g. reg,.. .. km 
R-squared 0.177 0.104 
F-stalislic on Instruments (F2,n) 5.38 8 .43 
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Table G: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Men and Women 
Men . nd women 
All Central Periph.r.1 
Co- SId Error T -stal Co- Std Error T -stal Co- SId Error T ... t..t 
olllclenl olllclonl olllclonl 
large urban areas -121.00 37.00 -3.27 -114 .47 34.61 -3.31 
Other urban areas -52.93 13.53 -3.91 -49.52 13.33 -3.71 
Small town accessible areas 
Small town remote areas 
-16.51 25.87 -0.64 
Small lown very remote areas 
-62 .30 13.83 -4 .50 
Rural Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rural very remote areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 1.73 1.25 1.39 0.87 1.37 0.63 3.06 4.58 0.67 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) -39.09 24 .62 -1.59 -25.82 28.54 -0.90 -46.93 88.93 -0.53 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -26.55 6.48 -4.10 -22.37 7.30 -3.07 -29.81 20.37 -1.46 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 55.78 9.40 5.93 53.75 11 .00 4.89 42.20 27 .05 1.56 
Female (dummy variable) -12.31 11 .77 -1.05 -15.59 13.25 -1.18 -0.22 27 .25 -0.01 
Temporary job 24.82 15.38 1.61 22.13 15.78 1.40 64 .91 53.46 1.2 1 
Permanent job 
W orks in a small workplace < 2Speople 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 3.95 5.95 0.66 0.04 6.49 0.01 28 .64 9.45 303 
Agriculture , hunting and forestry 17.32 31 .23 0.55 0.72 35.54 0.02 154.43 146.06 1.06 
Fishing 44.64 51 .25 0.87 317.87 140.18 2.27 42.35 36.74 1.15 
Mining and quarrying 13.42 25.96 0.52 -3.34 26.06 -0.13 193.99 29.80 6.51 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and waler supply -13.65 19.86 -0.69 -22 .52 20.68 -1 .09 39.86 97.84 0.41 
Construction 3.34 11 .72 0.29 -1 .65 13.89 -0.12 13.87 30.95 0.45 
Wholesale and retail lrade: repair trades -6.63 10.19 -0.65 -13.86 12.22 -1.13 37 .58 21.54 1.74 
Hotels and restaurants -29.30 14.95 -1.96 -23.13 18.25 -1.27 -21 .82 33 .32 -0.66 
Transport, storage and communication 6.92 9.70 0.71 
-0.1' 9.74 -0.01 35.16 19.45 1.81 
Finandal intermediation 8.06 18.24 0.44 3.20 18.57 0.17 45.73 82.97 0.55 
Real estate, renting and business activities -2.37 10.58 -0.22 -4 .28 12.61 -0.34 0.4. 19.53 0.02 
Public administration and defence: 0.96 9.22 0.10 -4 .63 8.45 -0.55 24.10 30.60 0.79 
compulsory social security 
Education -42.79 11 .31 -3.78 -40.87 12.39 -3.30 -43.01 60.54 -0.71 
Health and social work -18.56 13.32 -1.39 -24.08 14.85 -1.62 21.03 41 .21 0.51 
Other community, social and personal -19.28 8.73 -2.21 -28.20 10.15 -2.78 33.98 22.41 1.52 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial -29.54 24.76 -1.19 -27.31 26.93 -1 .01 12.70 25.87 0.49 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations 3.22 11 .47 0.28 -5.92 11 .14 -0.53 57.61 35.34 1.63 
Associate professional and technical 10.57 12.81 0.83 3.96 14 .20 0.28 -1.27 18.90 -O.Q7 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -31.54 14.02 -2.25 -39.08 15.77 -2.48 9.42 40.88 0.23 
Ski lled trades occupations -22 .29 9.89 -2.25 -30.77 10.25 -3.00 20.84 19.76 1.05 
Personal service occupations -39.01 12.59 -3.10 -44 .42 12.35 -3.60 -6.64 32.04 -0.21 
Sales and customer service occupations -54 .75 11 .27 -4 .86 -66.13 12.33 -5.37 -15. 17 37.92 -0.40 
Process, plant and machine operatives -47 .05 12.56 -3.75 -52.64 14.87 -3.54 -9.09 26.08 -0.35 
Elementary occupations -35.32 21 .52 -1.64 -45.28 22.43 -2.02 23.41 40.16 0.58 
Female Managers and senior officials 
Female Professional occupations -20.61 14.22 -1.45 -19.17 12.61 -1.52 7.70 62.16 0.12 
Female Associate professional and technical -29.41 22.30 -1 .32 -25.07 24.78 -1.01 0.04 46.83 0.00 
occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial -7 .22 20.67 -0.35 -6.14 23.83 -0.34 17.46 28.81 0.61 
occupations 
Female Skilled trades occupations -46.86 22 .09 -2.12 -66.30 22.60 -2.93 9.04 29.65 0.30 
Female Personal service occupations 8.03 13.80 0.58 11.01 14.96 0.74 -8. 17 34.94 -0.23 
Female Sales and customer service -15.42 17.90 -0.66 -6.98 20.98 -0.43 -15.42 67 .23 -0.23 
occupations 
Female Process, plant and machine 20 .10 22.45 0.90 19.64 25.07 0.79 38.42 56.96 0.64 
operatives 
Female Elementary occupations -19.57 35.79 -0.55 -14.68 37.57 -0.39 -43.37 65.77 -0.66 
Council area could not be derived 
-65.87 12.47 -6.89 -84.45 10.91 -7.74 
Aberdeen City 
-46.88 3.23 -14.51 -56.46 2.91 -19.38 
Aberdeenshire 
-132.83 19.81 
-6.70 -130.35 16.50 -7.90 
Angus -124.46 23.60 -5.27 -120.02 22.44 -5.35 
Argyll & Bule 
-163.27 25.29 -6.46 -70.43 20.04 -3.51 -52.59 21 .66 -2.43 
Clackmannanshire -160.32 23.71 
-6.76 -155.06 22.08 -7.02 
Dumfries and Galloway -147.78 26.66 -5.54 -145.81 25.26 -577 
Dundee Cily -48.85 2.11 
-23.17 -47 .47 2.16 -21 .97 
East Ayrshire 
-105.29 25.65 
-4 .10 -100.27 24.46 -4 .10 
East Dunbartonshire -23.15 10.26 -2.26 -20.86 9.90 -2.11 
East lothian -52 .83 13.93 -3.79 -3.18 6.39 -0.38 
East Renfrewshire 
-26.77 3.48 -7.68 -24.31 3.68 -lI .64 
Edinburgh. Cily of -13.38 2.82 
-4 .75 -14.97 2.16 -6.93 
Eilean Siar -230.74 26.44 
-6.73 -92.39 25.53 -362 
Falklr1< -124 .65 25.42 
-4.91 -120.28 24 .82 -4 .85 
Fffo -126.41 24.48 
-5.16 -122.56 23.48 -5.22 
Glasgow Cily 
Highland -166.38 26.04 
-6.39 -162.91 23.59 -6.91 -41 .18 23.35 -1.76 
Inverclyde -69.28 21.81 
-4 .09 -65.19 21 .57 -3.95 
Midlothian -121 .21 17.81 
-6.81 -121.66 16.69 -7.29 
Moray -127.84 25.12 
-5.09 -134 .83 23.61 -5.66 153.30 30.30 500 
North Ayrshire -103.76 25.75 
-4.03 -101 .65 25.00 -4.07 
North l anarkshlre -88.35 10.67 
-6.28 -85.66 10.49 -6.16 
Orkney Islands -195.28 27.29 
-7.16 -48.67 26.88 -1.81 
Perth & Kinross -97.14 22.81 -4.26 -88.28 21 .31 
-4.1' -17.10 20.45 -0.84 
Renfrewshire -27.80 2.28 -12.21 -28.71 2.21 -13.00 
Scottish Borders -125.97 25.56 -4 .93 -123.43 23.83 -5.16 15.37 24 .62 0.62 
Shelland Isla nds -177.60 26.30 -6.75 -35.30 27 .48 -1.29 
South Ayrshiro -121.91 25.42 -4 .80 -115.03 24.62 -4 .87 
South l anar1<.hlre -10D.86 16.63 -6.07 -96.87 16.10 
-6.02 
Sllrling -109.28 24 .80 -4.41 -104.14 23.64 -4 .37 
West Ounbartonshlre -47 .05 8.48 -5.55 -44.69 8.40 
-5.35 
West l olhian -78.67 22.22 -3.54 -60.01 21.43 -3.73 
Constant 365.08 29.07 1256 383.60 25.41 15.11 148.05 70.74 2.09 
Sample size 4417 3805 528 
R-squared 0.129 0.123 0.165 
F·stalistic on Instrument. (F2,n) 10.42 10.78 113' 
Notes: Dependent variabte Is commuting cost. Robust standard errors reported In parentheses. Standard errors ara adjusted for apatlal correlation In 
the residuals by clustering on k>cal authority of workplace. Red t-staUF·stat Indales coefftclent Is sJgnltlcanlly diNerent from zero at <1 %, blue II 5% 
level (1wO tailed l-Iesl). Esllmated using STATA9 economelric sof1ware. Con.lant relales 10 a male employee (excopl for female modol) wllh a 
qualification other than a degree working full-time as 8 manager or senior official," manufacturing. Has a permanent job, works In a workplace with 25 
or more olhor people In Glasgow Cily (exceplthe Peripheral modol where lhe constanl relal0. 10 a wor1<place In Dumfries and Ganoway). 
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Table G: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Men and Women 
(Contd) 
Men and women 
Managers, professionals and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co- Std Error r .. tat Co- Std Error T -stat 
effic ient efficient 
Large urban areas -142.34 44 .76 -3.18 -105.04 34.60 -3.04 
Other urban areas 
-65.82 23.01 -2.86 -40. II 12.57 -3.19 
Small town accessible areas 
Small town remote areas 
Small town very remote areas 
Rural Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rural very remote areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 4.43 2.32 1.91 -0.16 1.48 -0. 11 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) -108.65 45.10 -2.41 6.70 31.67 0.21 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -15.64 20.92 -0.75 -28.38 6 .95 -4 .08 
varlable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 54 .37 9.63 5.65 62.39 21 .18 2.95 
Female (dummy variable) 
-9.70 11 .23 -0.86 8 .16 21 .47 0.38 
Temporary job 41.25 26.71 1.54 17.83 21 .87 0.82 
Permanent job 
Works in a small wOrkplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 3.08 14.06 0.22 6.21 6 .68 0.93 
Agriculture. hunting and forestry 
-78.52 60.07 -1 .31 34 .60 34 .38 1.01 
Fishing 9.73 122 .58 0.08 49.88 43.17 1.16 
Mining and quarrying 
-3.39 19.84 -0.17 69.29 56.66 1.22 
Manufacturing 
Electridty, gas and water supply 
-68.45 30.84 -2.22 13.24 30.06 0.44 
Construction 
-29.89 34 .38 -0.87 11 .98 13.75 0.87 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -21.10 25.19 -0.84 -5.22 10.15 -0.51 
Hotels and restaurants 
-56.94 30.29 -1 .88 -25.14 16.83 -1.49 
Transport, storage and communication 37.70 27.09 1.39 -3.26 11 .74 -0.28 
Financial Intermediation 
-12.22 18.86 -0.65 31 .00 25.75 1.20 
Real estate, renting and business activities -13.30 15.37 -0.87 4.27 16.34 0.26 
Public administration and defence; -1.76 19.14 -0.09 -0.85 14.30 -0.06 
compulsory social security 
Education 
-46.02 14.98 -3.07 -34 .68 17.95 -1 .93 
Health and social work 
-11.83 21.08 -0.56 -31.49 13.81 -2.28 
Other community, social and personal -22 .96 16.73 -1.37 -22.11 15.85 -1.40 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial 
-34.78 40.86 -0.85 -43.67 42.68 -1 .02 
Managers and sentor officials 
Professional occupations 7.63 12.22 0.62 
Associate professional and technical 7.31 14.91 0.49 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 11 .09 15.04 0.74 
Skilled trades occupations 21 .64 12.55 1.72 
Personal service occupations 4.48 17.44 0.26 
Sales and customer service occupations 
-6.75 11 .63 -0.58 
Process. plant and machine operatives 
Elementary occupations 6.19 
Female Managers and senior officials 
23.81 0.26 
Female Professional occupations 
-28.21 14.24 -1 .98 
Female Associate professional and technical -38.30 21 .75 -1.76 
occupations 
Female Administrative and secretarial 
-25.31 26.68 -0.95 
occupations 
Female Skilled trades occupations 
-66.39 27.71 -2.40 
Female Personal service occupations 
-7.00 22.58 -0.31 
Female Sales and customer service 
-34.02 26.03 -1 .31 
occupations 
Female Process, plant and machine 
operatives 
Female Elementary occupations 
-29.9 1 36.85 -0 .81 
Council area could not be derived -106.25 7.41 -14.33 -73.51 t5.Q7 -4 .88 
Aberdeen City 
-76.42 5.98 -12.77 -19.50 4.37 -4.46 
Aberdeenshire 
-120.00 18.00 -6.67 -136.95 22.17 -6.18 
Angus 
-100.00 25.03 -3.99 -133.84 24.84 -5.39 
Argyll & Bute 
-215.71 31 .26 -6.90 
-132.40 25.24 -5.25 
Claci<mannanshlre 
-159.30 26.88 -5.93 -158.08 24.27 -6.51 
Dumfries and Galloway 
-147.36 27.56 -5.35 -143.81 26.38 -5.45 
Dundee City 
-74.35 4.57 -16.29 -30.27 3.78 -8.02 
East Ayrshire 
-11 5.73 27.03 -4.28 -97.35 25.50 -3.82 
East Dunbarton shire 10.02 16.28 0.62 -49.27 8.37 -5.89 
East Lothian 35.57 13.57 2.62 -11 9.67 16.90 -7 .08 
East Renfrewshire -17.88 11.00 -1.63 -29.37 3.72 -7.89 
Edinburgh, City of 
-24 .80 3.25 -7.63 0.83 7.21 0.12 
Ellean Slar 
-189.71 26.29 -7.22 
Falklr1< 
-153.91 25.46 -6.04 -105.54 26.12 -4.04 
Fif. -119.63 24.38 -4.91 -131 .29 25.87 -5.08 
Glasgow City 
Highland -198.74 27.70 -7.17 -143.82 25.51 -5.64 
Inverclyde 
-65.60 19.17 -3.42 -110.16 22.54 -4.89 
Midlothian -1 03.24 17.16 -6.02 -126.19 20.10 -6.28 
Moray 
-144.20 28.28 -5.10 -11 4.41 25.13 -4.55 
North Ayrshire 
-67.66 26.96 -2.51 -122.33 27.32 -4.48 
North Lanaf1(shlre 
-78.07 5.23 -14.94 -93.15 13.77 -6.76 
Ortmey Islands 
-159.60 26.03 -6.13 
Perth & Kinross 
-91.19 24.11 -3.78 -101.28 23.1 3 -4.38 
Renfrewshlre 
-62.23 2.86 -21.75 
-8.13 3.54 -2.29 
Scottish Borders 
-160.03 30.39 -5.27 -99.84 25.19 -3.96 
Shetland Islands 
-155.98 25.42 -6.14 
South Ayrsh ire -166.25 25.20 -6.60 -94.57 26.10 -3.62 
South l anaf1(shire -108.59 14.73 -7.37 -94.56 18.68 -5.06 
Stirling -93.56 26.65 -3.51 -118 .63 26.66 ~.45 
West Ounbartonshlre -46.25 11.11 -4.16 ~6 .39 8.15 -5.69 
West Lothian -37.55 19.74 -1.90 -103.09 23.43 ~.40 
eonstant 373.28 46.91 7.96 316.05 33.11 9.55 
Sample size 1865 2552 
R-squared 0.146 0.104 
F-ltat1sUc on Instruments (F2.n) 6.27 8.43 
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Table H: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Men 
~n 
All Central PerlDher.1 
Co- SId Error T ... tal Co- Std Error T ... tal Co- Std Error T -st •• 
offle lonl offlelonl efflelenl 
Large urban areas -133.14 41 .62 
-3.20 -127.78 38.99 -3.28 
Other urban areas -66.95 17.70 
-3.78 -65.90 18.09 
-3.64 
Small town accessible areas 
Small town remote areas 
-69.81 46.98 -1.49 
Small town very remote areas 
-78.15 16.50 -4 .H 
Rural Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rura l very remote areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 1.82 2.14 0.85 0.39 2.32 0.17 6.03 6.27 0.96 
Potential experience squared (yrs211000) -24 .68 40.17 -0 .61 -0.39 45.76 -0.01 -92.74 11 6.82 -0.79 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -26.70 9.64 -2.77 -21.90 11 .24 -1.95 -41.28 21.01 -1.97 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Oegree or higher (dummy variable) 56.49 14 .57 3.88 50.32 16.15 3.12 50.71 30.11 1.68 
Temporary job 49.38 23.71 2.08 40.41 25.22 1.60 95.08 66.44 1.43 
Permanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 2Speople 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 9.14 6.23 1.47 2.56 6.42 0.40 44 .18 7.54 588 
Agriculture. hunting and forestry 21.37 35.89 0.60 -2.67 41 .01 -0.07 261.56 171 .55 1.52 
Fishing 48.63 44 .94 1.08 284.08 188.31 1.51 62.74 36.05 1.741 
Mining and quarrying 33.05 30.36 1.09 12.60 34.29 0.37 180.90 37 .44 0 83 
Manufacturing 
Eleclricily. gas and waler supply -10.20 26.36 -0.39 -27.66 24 .75 -1.12 63.23 116.14 0.54 
Construction 16.60 13.22 1.26 11.35 15.63 0.73 29.72 32.02 0.93 
Wholesale and retail trade: repair trades 12.28 12.92 0.95 3.49 14.18 0.25 61.29 30.09 2.04 
Hotels and restaurants -7.12 21 .85 -0.33 12.95 24 .33 0.53 -50.98 40.83 -1.25 
Transport, storage and communication 10.84 13.17 0.82 6.66 14 .01 0.48 33.23 20.39 1.63 
Financial intermediation 33.70 22.20 1.52 23.28 22.70 1.03 267.07 48.49 S SI 
Real estate, renting and business activities 11.78 11 .14 1.06 13.76 14.39 0.96 -8.79 26.65 -0.33 
Public administration and defence; 1.27 12.88 0.10 -4.89 11 .11 -0.44 16.59 52.28 0.32 
compulsory social security 
Education -14.67 15.96 -0.92 -15.16 17.17 -0.88 -5.57 81.48 -a.07 
Health and social work -12.66 16.62 -0.76 -16.14 17.53 -0.92 3.58 69.27 0.05 
Other community, social and personal -29.94 11 .73 -2.55 -38.38 13.31 -2.88 -0.14 18.66 -0.01 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territoria l -28.08 36.84 -0.76 -27 .85 39.95 -0.70 4.68 33.32 0.14 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -5.19 12.73 -0.41 -10.48 13.26 -0.79 40.84 37.23 1.10 
Associate professional and technical 12.74 13.21 0.96 7.37 14 .45 0.51 5.29 21.29 0.25 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -32.07 13.29 -2.41 -38.56 15.35 -2.51 -0.68 06.24 
-0.0 1 
Skilled Irades occupalions -18.49 9.47 -1.95 -27 .88 9.26 -3.01 15.34 17 .81 0.86 
Personal service occupations -33.74 12.76 -2.64 -40.38 12.23 -3.30 -1.60 33.85 -0.05 
Sales and customer service occupations -50.98 10.80 -4 .72 -62.73 11 .33 -5.54 -16.48 30.92 -0.53 
Process, plant and machine operatives -42.54 11.95 -3.56 -48.65 13.23 -3.68 -14.96 21.50 -0.70 
Elementary occupations -39.08 21 .62 -1.81 -50.56 22.44 -2.25 30.07 39.81 0.76 
Council area could not be derived -73.43 13.58 -5.41 -65.87 12.04 -5.47 
Aberdeen Cily -30.37 5.06 -6.01 -44.46 4.18 -10.83 
Aberdeenshire -107.23 21.20 -5.06 -107.51 16.88 -6.37 
Angus -115.61 26.05 -4 .44 -114 .21 24.99 -4.57 
Argyll & Bule -144.76 28.38 -5.10 -55.80 25.62 -2.18 83.87 19.53 0 29 
Clackmannanshire -188.Q1 27.63 -6.81 -182.42 26.43 -6.90 
Dumfries and Galloway -181 .19 28.41 -6.38 -170.17 27.51 -6.18 
Dundee Cily -43.46 3.89 -11.17 -42.57 4.09 -10.42 
Easl Ayrshire -67.87 27.60 -3.18 -85.51 26.71 -3.20 
East Dunbarton shire 87.50 10.49 8.34 87.51 9.92 882 
East l othian -111 .55 18.64 -5.98 -57.35 13.09 -4.38 
East Renfrewshire -27.44 4.58 -5.99 -24 .40 5.01 -4.87 
Edinburgh. Cily of -1.28 3.95 -0.32 -6.44 3.36 -1.92 
Ellaan Siar -235.75 29.34 
-8.04 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 0.72 34.27 0.02 
Falkir1< 
-66.38 29.39 -2.94 -B2 .15 29.18 -282 
FWo 
-122.19 27.59 -4.43 -118.84 26.51 -4.48 
Glasgow City 
Highland -160.02 28.97 
-5.52 -151 .68 27.32 -5 .55 72.33 27.58 2 2 
Inverclyde -65.70 26.17 
-3.28 -82.30 26.07 -3.16 
Midlolhian -101 .39 18.48 
-5.49 -105.39 16.91 -6.23 
Moray -111 .23 29.04 -3.83 -117.03 28.21 -4.15 198.29 32.57 eov 
North Ayrshire -82.66 28.60 -2.89 -81 .23 28.15 -289 
North Lanar1<shlre -59.23 11.59 
-5.11 -57.94 11 .53 -503 
Or1<ney Islands -203.51 30.54 
-6.66 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 32.33 3S.00 0 80 
Perth & Kinross -63.70 24.44 
-2.81 -50.47 22.96 -2.20 4].2 1 2S.67 1,64 
Renfrewshire 19.21 4.19 4.59 16.55 3.29 503 
Scollish Borders -100.78 29.02 -3.47 -94.23 27.30 -3 45 139.57 17.58 7 05 
Shetland Islands -181 .63 29.47 
-6.16 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 54 .55 37.80 1.40 
South Ayrshire -114.53 28.67 
-3.99 -107.45 28.49 -3.77 
South Lanarkshire -92.35 18.39 
-5.02 -88.36 17 .67 -S.OO 
Stirling -107.1 8 28.97 -3.70 -106.44 27.98 -3.80 
West Dunbarton shire -30.25 8.12 -3.72 -29.27 9.09 -322 
West Lothian -60.41 24 .22 -2.49 -63.84 23.51 -2.72 
Constant 336.62 38.69 8.70 365.70 38.50 10 O~ 12.70 93 66 0.14 
Sample size 2520 21 50 3 13 
R-squared 0.145 0.133 0.228 
F-stalistic on instruments (F2,n) 10.70 11 31 11 13 
Notes: Dependent variable Is commuting cost. RObust standard errors reponed in parentheses. Standard errora are I dJuIlOd fOf I pall I corrolOIk)n In 
Ihe residuals by cluslering on local aulhorily of wor1<place. Red l-slaUF-slal lndlcale. coollicleniis algnlficanlly dllforonllrom lora 81 <I %. bluo 115% 
level (two tailed Hesl). Eslimaled using STATA9 oconomelric soflware. Conslanl relales lo a male e mployo. wllh a quallficallon Olh r Ihln. 
degree wor1<ing full-lime as a manager or senior ollidal in manufacluring. Ha. a permanenl job. wer1<' In a worI<place wllh 25 or more Olho. poopIo 111 
Glasgow Cily (excepllhe Peripheral model where Iho canstanl relale. 10 a wor1<place In Dumfrlo. and Galloway). 
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Table H: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Men (Contd) 
Men 
Managers, professionals and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co- Std Error T-stat Co- Std Error T--stat 
efficient efficient 
large urban areas -153.23 55.60 -2.76 -123.90 40.94 -3.03 
Other urban areas -82.99 36.08 -2.30 -51 .94 17.53 -2.96 
Small town accessible areas 
Small town remote areas 
Small town very remote areas 
Rural Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rural very remole areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 3.42 4.46 0.77 0.91 2.63 0.35 
Potential experience squared (yrs211000) -67.63 64.93 -0.80 -0.53 52.02 -0.01 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -13.60 33.09 -0.41 -27.35 9.81 -2.79 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 55.19 15.76 3.50 62.22 28.75 2.16 
Temporary job 77.24 47.63 1.62 36.32 33.55 1.08 
Pennanent job 
Works in a small workplace < 2Speople 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people 3.51 16.35 0.21 12.82 10.68 1.20 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry -104 .66 81 .89 -1 .28 47.29 40.57 1.17 
Fishing 
-27.52 101 .91 -0.27 90.86 36.89 2.46 
Mining and quarrying 18.39 25.72 0.72 72.05 68.91 1.05 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply -96.11 44 .77 -2.15 35.15 36.86 0.95 
Construction -6.85 40.32 -0.17 23.58 15.78 1.49 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades 2.87 36.76 0.08 14.34 13.03 1.10 
Hotels and restaurants -16.81 64 .28 -0.26 -4 .12 29.75 -0.14 
Transport. storage and communication 40.11 33.71 1.19 3.96 17.45 0.23 
Financial intermediation 13.49 30.49 0.44 81 .76 43.76 1.87 
Real estate, renting and business activities 3.86 16.49 0.23 12.89 19.40 0.66 
Public administration and defence; -10.93 23.02 -0.47 8 .39 16.26 0.52 
compulsory social security 
Education -22.36 17.10 -1 .31 22.04 42.17 0.52 
Health and social wont -8.95 20.30 -0.44 -25.98 25.52 -1 .02 
Other community. social and personal -33.50 27.96 -1.20 -26.26 19.15 -1 .37 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial -13.90 73.30 -0.19 -67.93 23.51 -2.89 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations -{).02 15.23 0.00 
Associate professional and technical 10.58 16.89 0.63 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 
Skilled trades occupations 17.44 14.55 1.20 
Personal service occupations 0.39 18.73 0.02 
Sales and customer service occupations -12.09 14.64 -0.83 
Process. plant and machine operatives 
-5.64 15.19 -0.37 
Elementary occupations 
-3.75 26.84 -0.14 
Council area could not be derived -114 .88 10.87 -10.57 -50.47 17.02 -2.97 
Aberdeen City -60.40 12.68 -4 .76 -11.60 4.52 -2.57 
Aberdeenshire -72.59 20.58 -3.53 -122.07 26.49 -4.61 
Angus 
-82.07 29.05 -2.83 -135.13 30.06 -4 .49 
Argyll & Bute -174.11 41.63 -4 .18 -133.05 30.37 -4 .38 
Clackmannanshire 
-198.25 35.34 -5.61 -182.44 27.74 -6.58 
Dumfries and Galloway -217.38 33.50 -6 .49 -167.38 30.1 I -5.56 
Dundee City -78.25 5.79 -13.51 -26.84 5.12 -5.24 
East Ayrshire 
-123.40 32.65 -3.78 -76.27 28.02 -2.72 
East Dunbartonshire 63.69 26.65 2.39 118.70 12.67 9.37 
East Lothian -32.68 20.66 -1.58 -130.97 19.81 -6.61 
East Renfrewshire -34.27 13.03 -2.63 -25.04 5.89 -4 .25 
Edinburgh, City of -13.01 6.69 -1.94 5.66 8.28 0.68 
Eilean Siar -294 .30 37.1 5 -7.92 -212.92 29.96 -7.11 
Falklrk 
-106.99 32.01 -3.34 -80.60 30.50 -2.64 
Fn. -1 25.80 28.23 -4.46 -124.27 31 .05 -4.00 
Glasgow City 
Highland 
-202.86 34 .1 2 -5.95 -136.59 29.59 -4.62 
Inverclyde 
-34.31 29.52 -1.16 -112.26 28.82 -3.90 
Midlothian -94.78 18.89 -5.02 -102.46 21.03 -4.87 
Moray 
-132.08 39.03 -3.38 -103.60 29.52 -3.51 
North Ayrshire 
-14 .06 31.56 -0.45 -133.50 32.52 -4.1 I 
North Lanarkshlre -80.79 6 .10 -13.24 -50.84 15.62 -3.25 
Orkney Islands -241.55 42.00 -5.75 -186.91 30.15 -6.20 
Perth & Kinross 
-54 .40 29.58 -1.84 -80.76 24 .71 -3.27 
Renfrewshire -9.32 8.05 -1.16 31 .74 6.07 5.23 
Scottish Borders -171 .67 39.72 -4.32 -65.18 30.18 -2.16 
Shetland tslands -225.45 39.61 -5.69 -1 60.01 30.70 -5.21 
South Ayrshire -170.29 29.55 -5.76 -88.98 31 .54 -2.82 
South Lanarkshire 
-108.66 19.30 -5.63 -87.62 20.36 -4.30 
Stirling -94.42 35.12 -2.69 -112.83 33.24 -3.39 
West Dunbartonshlre -35.06 26.44 -1.33 -27.51 7.51 -3.66 
West Lothian 10.70 21 .42 0.50 -93.61 27.85 -3.36 
Constant 361 .72 75.97 4.76 287.28 49.05 5.86 
Sample size 959 1561 
R-squared 0.154 0.119 
F·statistk: on Instruments (F2.n) 4.43 8.37 
315 
Table I: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Women 
Women 
All Central Peripheral 
Co- Std Error T -stat Co- Std Error T -stat Co ... ffk:lent Std Error T-stat 
efficient efficient 
Large urban areas -104.46 32.29 -3.24 -98.09 31.00 -3.16 
Other urban areas -35.06 12.57 -2.79 -29.96 12.48 -2.40 
Small town accessible areas 
Small town remole areas 46.96 40.00 1.17 
Small town very remole areas 
-45.96 21.92 -2.10 
Rural Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rural very remote areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 3.12 1.63 1.91 2.85 1.68 1.69 1.43 6 .51 0.22 
Potential experience squared (yrs2/1000) -89.17 32.40 -2.75 -87.35 33.10 -2.64 -28.33 113.16 -0.25 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -27.48 11 .36 -2.42 -27.82 14.27 -1.95 0.97 34.07 0.03 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 50.26 9 .73 5.16 SO.35 11 .77 4.28 52.96 27.90 1.90 
Temporary job 0.85 18.98 0.04 4.57 18.84 0.24 12.79 46.21 0.28 
Permanent ,iob 
Works in a small workplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people -5.82 8.58 .(J.68 -7.23 9.20 .(J.79 10.67 26.09 0.41 
Agriculture. hunting and forestry -23.46 53.72 .(J.44 0.21 61.30 0.00 -103.89 98.54 -1 .05 
Fishing 73.41 83.51 0.88 378.70 36.88 10.27 -41 .26 101 .80 -0.41 
Mining and quarrying -48.84 12.98 -3.76 -42.02 14 .63 -2.87 (dropped) 0 .00 0.00 
Manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply -9.03 40.05 -0.23 -0.58 41 .91 .(J.Ol -151.36 52.67 -287 
Construction -96.17 33.63 -2.86 -99.95 38.10 -2.62 -11 8 .52 47.43 -2.SO 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair trades -43.30 18.14 -2.39 -49.61 20.82 -2.38 4.64 67.97 0.07 
Hotels and restaurants -62.30 22.20 -2.81 -61 .03 25.52 -2.39 -30.03 65.77 .(J.46 
Transport, storage and communication -19.05 25.72 -0.74 -36.37 24 .10 -1 .51 89.72 90.40 0.99 
Financial intermediation -30.40 23.47 -1.30 -30.49 25.62 -1.19 -58.95 9 1.99 -0.64 
Real estate, renting and business activities -34.71 17.36 -2.00 -39.03 18.64 -2.09 -11 .08 32.74 -0.34 
Public administration and defence; -13.28 15.41 .(J.86 -17.95 18.6 1 .(J.96 8.78 58.15 0.15 
compulsory social security 
Education -84.06 18.61 -4 .52 -80.33 20.61 -3.90 -88.72 69.45 - 1.28 
Heallh and social work -44.37 20.60 -2.15 -49.48 22.44 -2.21 6.75 56.89 0.12 
Other community, social and personal -27.66 20.38 -1.36 -37 .43 20.32 -1 .84 49.83 62.SO 0.80 
service activities 
Private households and extra-tenitorial -27.07 37 .05 .(J.73 -22.56 41 .47 .(J.54 81 .46 43.56 1.87 
Managers and senior officials 
Professional occupations 2.34 13.88 0.17 -8.81 12.76 .(J.69 86.10 69.35 1.24 
Associate professional and technical -18.03 14.43 -1.25 -22.59 16.65 -1.36 12.66 43.11 0.29 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations -36.67 13.53 -2.71 -44.64 14 .84 -3.01 45.35 27.18 1.67 
Skilled trades occupations -80.87 23.57 -3.43 -107.40 21.83 -4 .92 43.77 21 .95 1.99 
Personal service occupations -26.13 10.42 -2.51 -28.30 10.86 -2.60 -3.9 1 47.04 -0.08 
Sales and customer service occupations -80.59 14.43 -5.59 -85.30 15.30 -5.58 -57.89 64 .44 -0.90 
Process, plant and machine operatives -18.10 22.58 .(J.80 -21.47 26.22 .(J.82 9.70 83.74 0.12 
Elementary occupations -SO.Ol 21 .35 -2.3-4 -52.64 23.81 -2.21 -63.90 77.82 .(J.82 
Council area could not be derived -103.63 12.03 -8.62 -108.65 11 .79 -9.21 
Aberdeen Cily -62.93 3.29 -19.13 -67.58 3.47 -19.47 
Aberdeenshire -163.62 19.05 -8.59 -158.70 19.19 -8.27 
Angus -1 33.56 22.30 -5.99 -127 .55 21 .91 -5.82 
Argyll & Bule -183.25 23.24 -7.89 -92.20 25.30 -3.64 -102.08 45.90 -2.22 
Clackmannanshire -115.46 20.33 -5.68 -110.12 19.32 -5.70 
Dumfries and Galloway -120.39 24.12 -4.99 -121 .09 22.80 -5.31 
Dundee Cily -46.89 3.62 -12.94 -44.SO 3.22 -13.80 
East Ayrshire -123.75 23.26 -5.32 -11 2.35 22.25 -5.05 
East Dunbartonshire -129.18 12.24 -10.56 -125.18 12.38 -10.11 
East Lothian 66.77 10.91 6.12 92.04 9 .30 9.89 
East Renfrewshlre -28.43 5.38 -5.28 -25.47 5.18 -4 .92 
Edinburgh . Cily of -26.75 3.87 -6.91 -24 .34 3.97 -8.13 
Ellean Siar 
-220.34 24 .SO -9.00 (dropped) 0 .00 0.00 -118.06 33.6 1 -351 
Falkir1< 
-175.28 21 .84 
-8.03 -169.66 21.47 -7.90 
F~e 
-129.85 21 .6 1 -6.01 -125.09 21.44 -564 
Glasgow Cily 
Highland 
-174.18 23.31 -7.47 -179.83 21.03 -8.55 -85.34 '1 .03 -2.08 
Inverclyde -101 .41 18.70 -5.42 -97.26 18.92 -5.14 
Midlothian 
-157.63 18.03 -8.74 -151 .5 1 17.64 -8.59 
Moray 
-148.54 22.SO -6.60 -155.92 22.10 -7.05 299.63 41.93 7 15 
North Ayrshire 
-129.18 22.61 -5.71 -123.68 22.33 -5.54 
North Lanartc.shire -125.85 10.17 -12.38 -121.46 10.26 -1 1.83 
Orkney Islands 
-190.43 25.33 -7.52 (dropped) 0.00 0.00 -66.70 44.37 -1.50 
Perth & Kinross 
-135.3-4 21 .86 
-6.19 -137.71 21.29 -6 47 3.81 46.75 008 
Renfrewshire 
-88.31 2.94 -30.07 -85.65 3.04 -26.17 
ScoHish Borders -159.36 22.94 
-6.95 -156.37 22.15 -7.06 -29.8 1 48.68 -0.04 
Shetland Islands 
-170.15 23.68 -7.18 (dropped) 0 .00 0.00 -57.07 33.28 - 1.72 
Soulh Ayrshire 
-130.23 22.61 
-5 .76 -125.58 22.61 -5 .55 
South l anartc.shire -117.06 14.78 
-7.92 -11 2.D7 14.85 -755 
Stirling -113.15 22.19 -5.10 -103.13 21.8 1 -4.73 
West Dunbartonshlre -66.34 10.23 
-6.48 -61.75 10.54 -586 
West Lothian -104 .09 20.88 -4 .98 -99.35 20.65 -4 8 1 
Constant 386.55 36.16 1069 392.84 34.49 11 39 204.59 11031 1 85 
Sample size 1897 1655 215 
R-squared 0.147 O.l SO 0.204 
F-statistlc on instruments (F2.n) 6.61 6.05 3_21 
Notes: Dependent variable Is commuting cost. Robust slandard errors reported In parenthesos. Standard errors are adjultod for , patlal corrolellon In Iho 
residuals by duslering on local aulhorily of wor1<place. Red l-slaVF-slallndlcales coefflclenl l, significantly dlfferenllrorn zero 81 (1 %. blue 81 5% Iovol 
(two lailed I-Iesl). Eslimaled using STATA9 economelrlc sof1ware. Conslanl re lalel lo a fema le employee wilh a qualification olhor IhAn I door .. 
wor1<ing full-lime as a manager or senk>r official In manufacturing. Has a permanenl job. _I In a wor1<place wilh 25 or more othor people In GluOOW 
Cily (excepl the Peripheral model where Ihe constanl relale s 10 a wor1<place In Dumfries a nd Galloway). 
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Table I: 1st Regression Results for IV Earnings Function Women (Contd) 
Women 
Managers, professionals and Other occupations 
technical occupations 
Co- Std Error T-stat Co- Std Erro r T -stat 
efficient emdent 
Large urban areas -126.36 40.63 -3.16 -77 .75 27.56 -2.62 
Other urban areas -51 .50 22.31 -2.31 -16.49 12.85 -1.44 
Small town accessIble areas 
Small town remote areas 
Small town very remote areas 
Rura l Accessible areas 
Rural remote areas 
Rural very remote areas 
Potential experience (yrs) 6.68 2.82 2.37 -1.12 2.36 -0.48 
Potentiat experience squared (yrs2/1000) -176.82 54.60 -3.24 0.92 48.24 0.Q2 
School certificate or no qualification (dummy -24 .03 28.78 -0.84 -3 1.33 12.36 -2.54 
variable) 
Other qualification 
Degree or higher (dummy variable) 54.57 11 .19 4.88 50.8 1 26.18 1.94 
Temporary job 22.29 25.14 0.89 -10.44 21.40 -0.49 
Permanent job 
Works in a small ¥IOrkplace < 25people 
Work in a large workplace => 25 people -4 .40 16.46 -0.27 -4.15 8.62 -0.48 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 14.98 30.73 0.49 -50.27 71 .61 -0.70 
Fishing 183.20 169.52 1.08 -36.20 67.47 -0.54 
Mining and quarrying -83.29 22.69 -3.67 82.47 13.00 6 .34 
Manufacturing 
Electricity. gas and water supply . 64 .05 81 .82 0.78 -72.56 38.08 -1.91 
Construction -142.86 46.60 -3.07 -58.99 50.6 1 -1.11 
Wholesale and retail trade: repair trades -49.22 31.16 -1.58 -48.43 22.25 -2.18 
Hotels and restaurants -95.63 37.18 -2.57 -60.62 23.61 -2.57 
Transport, storage and communication 45.63 55.30 0.83 -51 .41 25.58 -2.01 
Financial intermediation 
-44.63 30.14 -1.48 -19.28 32.32 -0 .60 
Real estate, renting and business activities -47.62 26.76 -1 .78 -22.83 21.62 -1.06 
Public administration and defence: 5.19 28.64 0.18 -26.34 24 .20 -1.09 
compulsory social security 
Education -81 .38 29.06 -2.80 -89.42 19.71 -4 .54 
Health and social work 
-25.45 33.26 -0.77 -59.05 19.63 -3.01 
Other community, social and personal -11.96 39.95 -0.45 -49.18 20.72 -2.37 
service activities 
Private households and extra-territorial -53.41 42.36 -1.26 -39.80 66.30 -0.60 
Managers and senior oHiclals 
Professional occupations 
-1.66 14.02 -0.12 
Associate professional and technical -32.87 11.58 -1 .87 
occupations 
Administrative and secretarial occupations 
-11 .28 25.34 -0 .68 
Skilled trades occupations 
-61 .26 29.39 -2.08 
Personal service occupations 
-4 .86 24.77 -0.20 
Sales and customer service occupations 
-54.21 25.86 -2.10 
Process, plant and machine operatives 
Elementary occupations 
-29.33 27.31 -1.07 
Council area could not be derived -94.32 14.82 -6.36 -123.16 14 .70 -8.38 
Aberdeen City 
-83.59 5.05 -16.57 -28.32 6.58 -4 .30 
Aberdeenshire 
-155.53 21.86 -7.11 -166.29 18.42 -9.03 
Angus 
-115.88 25.34 -4.57 -132.13 19.65 -6.72 
Argylt & Bute 
-257.04 30.80 -8.35 -117.77 21.70 -5.43 
Clackmannanshire 
-94 .24 21 .09 -4 .47 -1 14.39 21.49 -5.32 
Dumfries and Galloway 
-88.78 24 .88 -3.57 -129.31 21.1 1 -6.12 
Dundee City -58.64 7.54 -7.78 -18.63 7.52 -2.48 
East Ayrshire -98.05 26.81 -3.66 -132.85 22.23 -5.98 
East Ounbartonshire -91 .07 14.22 -6.40 -144 .84 12.69 -11.41 
East Lothian 75.45 14.84 5.08 2.72 20.74 0.13 
East Renfrewshlre 13.8 1 19.36 0.71 -43.94 9.41 -4 .67 
Edinburgh, City of 
-34.29 4.99 -6.87 -11.03 6.22 -1.77 
Ellean Slar -304.65 27.06 -11 .26 -147.69 22.20 -6.65 
Falkir1< -200.58 25.48 -7.87 -154 .45 21.09 -7.32 
F~e -111.35 24.30 -4 .58 
-144.48 21 .08 -6.86 
Glasgow City 
Highland 
-189.73 26.82 -7.07 -155.30 20.86 -7.44 
Inverclyde -98.13 17.67 -5.55 -108.76 18.98 -5.73 
Midlothian -113.52 21 .85 -5 .20 
-186.95 21 .24 -8.80 
Moray 
-154.93 25.78 -6.01 -140.41 23.37 -6.01 
North Ayrshire -137.06 23.37 -5.86 -121 .65 20.74 -5.87 
North Lanarkshire -65.69 7.82 -8.40 
-158.25 11.25 -14.06 
Or1<ney Islands -247.37 34.43 -7.19 
-129.29 21.74 -5.95 
Perth & Kinross -145.36 24.33 -5.98 -121 .53 22.18 -5.48 
Renfrewshire -112.90 5.65 -20.00 -72.55 6.07 -11 .94 
Scottish Border. -151.46 27.92 -5.43 -162.22 22.60 -7.18 
Shetland Islands -1 88.25 28.99 -6.49 -151.14 22.31 -6.78 
South Ayrshire -1 48.21 25.66 -5.78 -111.46 21 .36 -5.22 
South Lanar1<shlre -108.68 13.95 -7 .79 -112.96 16.30 -6.93 
Stirling -78.47 27.15 -2.89 -144.67 21 .11 -6.83 
West Dunbartonshlre -54.06 10.67 -5.06 -75.18 14 .91 -5.04 
West lothian -77.90 25.32 -3.08 -129.30 20.89 -6.19 
Constant 370.77 57.27 6 .47 396.61 45.35 8.75 
Sample size 906 991 
R-squared 0.177 0.104 
F-stalisUc on Instruments (F2 .n) 5.38 8.43 
